EFFECTIVENESS OF THE US-UK-FRENCH DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL IN THE UNITED NATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000500010003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 25, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

SECURITY INFORMATION
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 25, 1952
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE US-UK-FRENCH DI Ij ANENT_PROPOSAL IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Preliminar Stud. Py repared bathe Staff for the Information of the Hoard
I. The Problem
To prepare a preliminary evaluation of the psychological effectiveness
of the US-UK-French disarmament proposal in the current session of the
United Nations General Assembly,
II, Conclusions
1. The permanence of the Disarmament Commission and its present
terms, of reference, viewed as a sound foundation for eventual. reduction
of armaments, depends on whether effective world opinion can be convinced
that steady progress toward actual disarmament 4,s possible within this
framework.
2. Although follow-up efforts may help to produce a change in the
Soviets' attitude, their reaction thus far gives no sign of increased
readiness to relax tensions or to settle the armaments question or any
other major issue. They appear to interpret the Tripartite proposal as
an act of psychological warfare, not as evidence of Western peaceful
intentions.
3. The disarmament proceedings were substantially effective in
reassuring European opinion that the U.S. sincerely seeks security
through reducing the arms burden; but a vocal minority, noting present
world tensions and some harsh statements by U.S. representatives, con-
cluded that the proposal. was insincere.
4. A substantial beginning has been made in depriving the Soviets
of their near-monopoly on "peace" propaganda. However.. Soviet psychologi-
cal tactics on the armaments question benefit by a simple approach, and
one of our biggest problems of psychological tactics is to explain
our complex proposals with dramatic effect. An important aspect of this
problem, the need to nullify the terror value of Soviet atomic propaganda,
has been partly but by no means fully solved by the joining of atomic and
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conventional weapons in a single package.
5. The appeal of the proposal was appreciable in areas less directly
involved in the cold war (such as the Near East, India, and Latin America)
but was limited by basic skepticism about the great power conflict; by a
tendency in many such countries to be preoccupied with their own immediate
affairs; and by U.S. unwillingness at this time to see the disarmament
question connected In the United Nations with the concept of transferring
economic resources from arms to peaceful economic development.
6. We have thus far successfully avoided the danger of giving the
impression that the issue of global war or peace depends on the immediate
course of the disarmament proceedings.
7. We should continue to present the disarmament proposal as a
steady, long-range effort to establish a basis for eventual disarmament
when settlement of other issues and consequent relaxation of world tensions
permits. This approach appears essential in order to give further proof
of our sincerity without committing ourselves psychologically to achieve
early agreement at the expense of a fully dependable.plan.
8. The defensive character of the Soviet refusal to accept genuine
Inspection and other safeguards can be exploited psychologically to gain
acceptance for this aspect of the Western plan and to show the consequent
necessity for a relaxation of the iron curtain. While actual penetration
of the iron curtain through inspection seems most unlikely in the present
atmosphere, it might be worth while with this end in view to explore the
possibility of agreement on limited inspection without any prior commit-
ment to disarm.
III. Discussion
This discussion is organized in terms of broad opportunities and
dangers inherent in the disarmament proposal, with comments in each case
as to the degree of success which appears to have been attained, or to be
attainable, in exploiting the opportunities and averting the dangers.
A. Opportunities
1. To establish firmly a groundwork of principles and
procedures for dependable world disarmament, on a
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anticipation of material progress toward disarmament
when and if the world atmosphere becomes favorable,
Comments This opportunity was exploited 'psychologically to a
significant extent by the creation of the Disarmament Commission with
terms of reference substantially the same as those proposed in the original
resolution. This step had the effect of fixing the United Nations as
the proper forum for future action on disarmament and providing a visible
entity (the Commission), to which the Soviets felt obliged to adhere
despite their opposition on the issues, and to which the world will look
for continuing efforts within the established terms of reference. The
note of sincere purpose in the Presidentts November 7 address, and the
clarity of Secretary Achesorits detailed presentation before the Political
Committee on November 19, were both effective in creating a general
attitude of readiness (except in the Soviet bloc) to find substantial
merit in the Tripartite proposal. However, in view of the-keen interest
and earnest hopes displayed in a great body of early press comment on
the proposal, it seems likely that the groundwork which has been laid
depends for its permanence on the degree to which great-power agreement
to build on that groundwork is viewed as a realistic possibility. Con-
tinued great-power disagreement over two years or more might well force
liquidation of the Commission or a shift to terms of reference less
consonant with U.S. strategic interests.
It would be unrealistic to evaluate the benefit derived from
the General Assemblyts action in isolation from two major factors in
world public opinion. The first is an apparently almost universal
expectation that no substantial progress will be made on disarmament
while East-West tensions remain at their present pitch. This expectation
was made explicit by the demonstration in the General Assembly debates that
great-power hostility is as firm on this specific issue as it is on other
world problems. The second factor is a widespread longing for a quick and
simple solution, a oconsequence of which is a lack of sympathy or under-
standing in many quarters (particularly India and other non-European countries
but also in Europe to a lesser degree) for the Western insistence on
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2. By giving the Soviets new evidence of U.S. peaceful
intentions, to promote a favorable atmosphere for
eventual settlement of major issues, and to moderate
any conviction they may hold that the U.S. has aggressive
:. designs.
Corrutient,: While the Tripartite proposal may be viewed as a useful
means of testing out the Soviet attitude on a possible relaxation of
tensions, the results indicate that Soviet distrust of U.S. intentions
was running too deep to be reduced in the short run by this or any other
means. All Soviet and satellite propaganda treatment of the Tripartite
resolution, both domestic and international, including speeches and
statements in the General Assembly, has been dominated by the theme that
the proposal was designed to mask U.S. aggressive intentions, to post-
pone forever the prohibition of the atomic bomb, etc. The minor theme
of reasonableness (as in the Soviet magazine "News," the Paris Crypto
Communist "Liberation," etc., and in the few concessions made by
Vishinsky) was no more prominent than would seem necessary to avoid
alienating Soviet sympathizers and wishful thinkers. Since the disarma-
ment proposal was first made, Soviet policy has shown no tendency toward
settlement of any outstanding issue, and Soviet propaganda on other
subjects has been, if anything, increasingly harsh with new prominence
given to the "American subversion" theme and to supposed U.S. aggressive
intentions in Southeast Asia.
However, nothing in the above facts would seem to negate the
possibility that a sustained follow-up of the Tripartite proposal may
make a significant psychological contribution to the eventual moderating
of the Soviet attitude.
3. To convince our NATO partners and other friends
that we are doing everything possible to attain
peace and security by the route of disarmament
and relaxation of tensions.
co : Preliminary study of reactions in the General Assembly
and foreign press opinion suggests that a qualified but nevertheless
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substantial success has been attained up to date. Formal support for the
Tripartite position in the General Assembly has ben impressive through-
out among delegations traditionally friendly to the United States, including
such a technically neutral country as Sweden. European press opinion
appears to have leaned strongly toward the view that the United States is
sincere in its proposal; although a significant, and vocal minority in
Europe appraised the move as purely propagandistic. (This division of
views was also evident in the press of such neutral countries as India,
but there the negative appraisal tended to predominate.) The negative
view stemmed in some cases from a conviction that the timing of the
proposal was inappropriate since serious progress on disarmament is
impossible now because of world tensions.
In other cases, among those inclined to hope that genuine
Western good will might even now close the broach, there was a suspicion
that the United States was too fundamentally distrustful of the Soviets
to made a sincere effort and was merely going through the motions in
an attempt to appease world opinion. This latter attitude was occasionally
reinforced by what these observers considered unnecessarily sharp
expressions of hostility to the USSR by American spokesmen, occasional
tendencies to reject Soviet views too quickly and categorically, and the
conspicuous coincidence of Secretary Acheson's departure for the Rome
NATO meeting. However, such adverse reactions were offset to a con-
siderable extent by the excessive violence of Vishinsky's opening
speech and other evidences of Soviet intransigence, which were widely
4. To convince nations less directly involved in the
cold war that we are doing all we can to achieve
a peaceful world in which the threat of global
war is removed and the economic development so
many of them seek can receive greater emphasis.
Comments The material at hand (confined to India with some
fragmentary material from Latin America and other areas) suggests the
tentative conclusion that some progress was made, by the mere fact of
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the Tripartite proposal, in moderating the balance of opinion, especially
in India, as to the U.S. desire to achieve a stable and secure world, The
general tone of Indian press opinion (which gave very prominent attention
to the proceedings) was one of skepticism and increasing pessimism as to
the possibility of progress; but in the wide range of views and analyses
coming from India a considerable body of opinion appeared to assign the
major blame for failure to the Soviets, and found real merit in the
Tripartite approach, Solid Latin American support for the Tripartite
resolution (Argentina excepted) suggests at least an equally favorable
view in that area. There are indications that Near Eastern countries
were too preoccupied with their own problems to be much concerned with
the disarmament issue. The numerous abstentions in this area, and
Egypt's support for the Soviet insistence on prior prohibition of
atomic bombs, suggest the degree to which positions on this specific
issue were determined by more basic foreign policy considerations:
The Indian attempt to connect disarmament with world economic
development syrmiptomized a widely held attitude among underdeveloped
countries. At least one Latin American paper took the view that economic
development is a more fruitful approach to world peace than disarmament,
Although the Indian resolution on this subject was ultimately withdrawn
(and was criticized in some Indian press circles as rash meddling likely
to involve India in the East-West conflict), the Tripartite opposition
to this scheme could well be interpreted in underdeveloped countries as
belying the often-voiced U.S. desire to see resources transferred from
armaments to peaceful construction. U.S. unwillingness at present to
make any commitment on this heading in the United Nations should' therefore,
be set down as a psychological liability in these areas of the world,
50' To deprive the Soviets of their near-monopoly on
"peace" propaganda as an instrument of confusion,
intimidation, etc.
Comments Reactions to General Assembly proceedings up to date
indicate that a useful beginning has been made in exploiting this oppor-
tunity. A significant amount of European press opinion, starting with
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the belief that U.S. intentions are genuinely peaceful, expressed relief
that the West had at last seized the psychological initiative for peace
and put the Soviets in the position of having to say "no." There is
no question that Vishinsky's "laughterf' speech was a major blunder,
although its propaganda value to the West was reduced by the subsequent
Soviet counterproposals and apparent concessions.
Two factors appear to have limited the degree of success in
this field. The first, referred to in item 3 above, was the occasional
tendency of U.S. spokesmen to condemn the Soviets and their proposals
in conspicuously harsh terms, which lent credence in some quarters to
the view that the U.S. was more concerned with making anti-Soviet propa-
ganda than it was with furthering the cause of disarmament. The second
.factor, more difficult to deal with, was the Soviet concentration on the
psychologically potent atomic bomb issue. It seems clear that the
Tripartite resolution was psychologically correct in joining together
the previously separate problems of atomic and conventional weapons; but
some evidences of confusion on the atomic prohibition issue raised by
the Soviets suggests that the Western powers have yet to overcome the
terror value of atomic propaganda. Although press comment frequently
showed appreciation of the counterbalancing threat of massed Soviet
ground forces, it would seem that much remains to be done in the
direction of convincing world opinion that "conventional" weapons
are just as lethal and just as threatening to peace as atomic bombs,
6. By continuing to emphasize the necessity for genuine
inspection and other safeguards, to prepare the way
for their acceptance and the consequent relaxation
of the iron curtain; and in the interim to focus
attention on the menacing effect of the iron curtain
on the prospects for peace.
Comment= In European press comment on the disarmament debate,
the view was expressed a number of times that the Soviet political system
makes it unthinkable that the Kremlin accept a genuine inspection system.
The moral usually drawn was not that the Soviets have something to hide--
this appeared to be taken for granted--but rather that the Tripartite
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proposal was unacceptable to the Soviets in one of its basic essentials and
L,rico would not soon lead to real progress on disarmament.
Whether the disarmament proposal contains the possibility of
disproving this pessimistic view and actually penetrating the iron curtain
through inspection remains to be seen. Vishinskyfs apparent concession
on "continuous" inspection of atomic facilities was viewed in some
European quarters as more than a propaganda stroke. It would seem worth
while to consider the merits of an effort to obtain agreement on some
rjrm of limited inspection in advance of any commitment to disarm. Even
if the present atmosphere of distrust precludes Soviet agreement on such
a step, further exploitation of this issue would at least foster more
widespread understanding of the fact that the Soviet-imposed iron curtain
is the main cause of this distrust.
H. Dangors
1. To give the impression that the proposals are insin-
cere and purely propagasidistic.
Carntnent: As Indicated in items 3 and 5 of the foregoing section,
it appears that success in avoiding this danger has been by no means
complete thus far, The "propaganda" interpretation of the Tripartite
proposal seems to derive either from a belief that the timing was
obviously inappropriate for reai progress or from occasional statements
or actions by U.S. spokesmen. It would appear, therefore, that the
only sure means of overcoming this danger is to continue the effort
long enough to show conclusively that it represents settled U.S. policy
rather than opportunism; and to maintain a consistent attitude of
moderation and patience which will build up credence for Western
sincerity and properly highlight any manifestations of violence or
negativism on the part of the Soviets.
2. To give the Soviets a renewed opportunity for a
psychologically potent propaganda counteroffensive
on the themes of "peace" and atomic weapons.
Comments This- would appear to be an unavoidable liability of
the Tripartite initiative. As far as atomic propaganda is concerned,
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.U:.e degree to which this danger has materialized is discussed in item 5
of the foregoing section. However, one further comment must be made,
The Tripartite approach has the psychological disadvantage of complexity.
One London paper noted editorially that "the Western proposals, by trying
to be realistic, became procedural and complicate4, and hence infinitely
less politically effective and dramatic than the Soviet amendment." It
would appear that the problem of presenting the necessarily complex
Western approach in terms that can compete psychologically with the
:recious Soviet approach constitutes one of the most difficult and
most important psychological problems connected with the disarmament
issue.
3. To give non-sponsors, especially countries not
directly involved in the cold war, a feeling of
being snubbed in a matter they consider to be of
vital interest to themselves,
Comments This.potential danger would appear to have been
largely obviated, at least temporarily, by the widely held appreciation
that progress on disarmament must proceed from direct talks among the
major military powers. Furthermore, Western promptness in accepting
the initiative of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria for creation of a four-power
subcommittee furnished substantial proof of our respect for the views
of third parties, and contrasts favorably with Soviet insistence on a
five-power peace pact and other tendencies on their part to insist on
exclusive great-power dealing.
Some tendency emerged, nevertheless, to view the General
Assembly proceedings ems having degenerated into a propaganda slugging
match between the U.S. and the USSR in which both parties ignored the
third partiest vital interest in stopping a cold war not of their making.
It would appear to be useful, therefore, to give continuing evidence of a
concern for third-party interests and points of view.
4. To give the impression of offering a firm, final
proposal whose rejection would hasten the onset of
global war.
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Comments This danger would appear to have been avoided with
virtually complete success up to date." Press comment, even when despair-
ing of progress on disarmament or concluding that further Western
rearmament is the only course, never referred to a Western ultimatum
and seldom or never concluded that the General Assembly proceedings
had hastened global war. However, it would seem important to hae this
danger continually in mind as negotiations proceed, particularly if a
rrmnlete breakdown appears in the offing.
5. To allow the Soviets, by means of charges of U.S.
hypocrisy and tempting counterproposals, to foster
Western disunity and to retard or even deatroy the
effort to rearm.
Comment e It can be assumed that this represents one of the
major Soviet objectives, if not their supreme objective, in the disarmament
debate. No clear indication is at hand that the Soviets have met with
material success in this effort. Indeed the conclusion was often drawn,
especially in conservative and right-wing quarters, that the test of
Soviet willingness had been made, that the negative result could have been
predicted in advance, and that now clearly the only safe course was to
spur rearmament. However, not all European opinion seems so impervious
to Soviet tactics. The moderate left, especially in France, tended toward
the view that while the remotest possibility of agreement remains every
effort must be made to achieve it. While no explicit appeal was made
to sacrifice rearmament to this end, the possibility remains that a
series of tempting Soviet offers on disarmament might intensify anti-
.earmament attitudes among large groups who are already emotionally
inclined in that direction.
To counter this danger it would appear essential that the
disarmament issue be presented consistently as a long-range proposition,
necessarily dependent for solution on progress toward settlement of other
major East-West issues. The current phase of negotiations would thus
appear in the light of an effort to lay a sound foundation in the hope
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that general political conditions in the foreseeable future will make
possible the raising of the actual structure. To permit the widespread
growth of any immediate expectations for substantive disarmament would
be tantamount to making a psychological commitment which could not be
fulfilled without jeopardizing our security.
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SE E tachment COPY N0.
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
708 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.
25X1A
25 January 1952
Subject: Study on the Effectiveness of the US-UK-French Disarmament
Proposal in the United Nations.
1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the PSB staff study on the
above subject for your information.
2. It is noted that this study does not attempt to gauge the effect
of the Western disarmament proposal on public opinion in the Soviet Union
and other Iron Curtain countries. Soviet propaganda treatment was as
over-whelmingly weighted in favor of the official Kremlin line as might
have been expected. However, it may be significant that occasional
editorialized excerpts from Western speechs and texts were included in
Pravda and in Moscowfs radio output. This fact suggests the possibility
THE penetration of the USSR on this subject by the Voice of America,
the United Nations radio, and other programs was sufficient to cause
concern to the Kremlin,
3. It is my opinion that this study may prove of considerable value
in assisting the United States to gain additional psychological effect
from a continuation of the disarmament theme. It is, therefore, recom-
mended that the PSB staff continue its evaluation of this program as it
develops and that further reports to the Board be made on a continuing
basis.
25X1A
Raymond B, Allen
Director
Enclosure: PSB D-20, Effectiveness of the US-UK-Pirench Disarmament
Proposal in the United Nations.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 25, 1952
EFFE ESS OF THE US-UK-FRENCH DISIMAMENT PROPOSAL IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Preliminaxr Study Prenared_by the Staff for the Information of the Board
1. The Problem
To prepare a preliminary evaluation of the psychological effectiveness
of the US-UK-French disarmament proposal in the current session of the
United Nations General Assembly.
II. Conclusions
1. The permanence of the Disarmament Commission and its present
terms of reference, viewed as a sound foundation for eventual. reduction
of armaments, depends on whether effective world opinion can be convinced
that steady progress toward actual disarmament is possible within this
framework.
2. Although follow-up efforts may help to produce a change in the
Soviets' attitude, their reaction thus far gives no sign of increased
readiness to relax tensions or to settle the armaments gaestion or any
other major issue. They appear to interpret the Tripartite proposal as
an act of psychological warfare, not as evidence of Western peaceful
intentions,
3. The disarmament proceedings were substantially effective in
reassuring European opinion that the U.S. sincerely seeks security
through reducing the arms burden; but a vocal minority, noting present
world tensions and some harsh statements by U.S. representatives, con-
cluded that the proposal was insincere.
4. A substantial beginning has been made in depriving the Soviets
.of their near-monopoly on "peace" propaganda. However, Soviet psychologi-
cal tactics on the armaments question benefit by a simple approach, and
one of our biggest problems of psychological tactics is to explain
our complex proposals with dramatic effect. An important aspect of this
problem, the need to nullify the terror value of Soviet atomic propaganda,
has been partly but by no means fully solved by the joining of atomic and
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conventional weapons in a single package.
5. The appeal of the proposal was appreciable in areas less directly
involved in the cold war (such as the Near East, India, and Latin America)
but was limited by basic skepticism about the great power conflict; by a
tendency in many such countries to be preoccupied with their own immediate
affairs; and by U.S. unwillingness at this time to see the disarmament
question connected in the United Nations with the concept of transferring
economic resources from arms to peaceful economic development.
6. We have thus far successfully avoided the danger of giving the
impression that the issue of global war or peace depends on the immediate
course of the disarmament proceedings.
7. We should continue to present the disarmament proposal as a
steady, long-range effort to establish a basis for eventual disarmament
when settlement of other issues and consequent relaxation of world tensions
permits. This approach appears essential in order to give further proof
of our sincerity without committing ourselves psychologically to achieve
early agreement at the expense of a fully dependable plan.
8. The defensive character of the Soviet refusal to accept genuine
inspection and other safeguards can be exploited psychologically to gain
acceptance for this aspect of the Western plan and to show the consequent
necessity for a relaxation of the iron curtain. While actual penetration
of the iron curtain through inspection seems most unlikely in the present
atmosphere, it might be worth while with this end in view to explore the
possibility of agreement on limited inspection without any prior commit-
ment to disarm.
III. Discuss on
This discussion is organized in terms of broad opportunities and
dangers inherent in the disarmament proposal, with comments in each case
as to the degree of success which appears to have been attained, or to be
attainable, in exploiting the opportunities and averting the dangers,
A. Opportunities
1. To establish firmly a groundwork of principles and
procedures for dependable world disarmament, on a
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as .s accep a e o . s'ta
anticipation of material progress toward disarmament
when and if the world atmosphere becomes favorable.
Comments This opportunity was exploited psychologically to a
significant extent by the creation of the Disarmament Commission with
terms of reference substantially the same as those proposed in the original
resolution. This step had the effect of fixing the United Nations as
the proper forum for future action on disarmament and providing a visible
entity (the Commission), to which the Soviets felt obliged to adhere
despite their opposition on the issues, and to which the world will look
for continuing efforts within the established terms of reference. The
note of sincere purpose in the President's November 7 address, and the
clarity. of Secretary Acheson's detailed presentation before the 'oliticaJ.
Committee on November 19, were both effective in creating a general
attitude of readiness (except in the Soviet bloc) to find substantial
merit in the Tripartite proposal. However, in view of the keen interest
and earnest hopes displayed in a great body of early press comment on
the proposal, it seems likely that the groundwork which has been laid
depends for its permanence on the degree to which great-power agreement
to build on that groundwork is viewed as a realistic possibility. Con-
tinued great-power disagreement over two years or more might well force
liquidation of the Commission or a shift to terms of reference less
consonant with U.S. strategic interests.
It would be unrealistic to evaluate the benefit derived from
the General Assembly's action in isolation from two major factors in
world public opinion. The first is an apparently almost universal
expectation that no substantial progress will be made on disarmament
while East WWest tensions remain at their present pitch. This expectation
was made explicit by the demonstration in the General Assembly debates that
great-power hostility is as firm on this specific issue as it is on other
world problems. The second factor is a widespread longing for a quick and
simple solution, a-consequence of which'is a lack of sympathy or under-
standing in many quarters (particularly India and other non-European countries
but also in Europe to a lesser degree) for the Western insistence on,
elabora
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2. By giving the Soviets new evidence of U.S. peaceful
intentions,, to promote a favorable atmosphere for
eventual settlement of major issues, and to moderate
any conviction they may hold that the U.S. has aggressive
d;epi~ns.
Coxyanent.: While the Tripartite proposal may be viewed as a useful
means of testing out the Soviet attitude on a possible relaxation of
tensions, the results indicate that Soviet distrust of U.S. intentions
was running too deep to be reduced in the short run by this or any other
means. All Soviet and satellite propaganda treatment of the Tripartite
resolution, both domestic and international, including speeches and
statements in the General Assembly, has been dominated by the theme that
the proposal was designed to mask U.S. aggressive intentions, to post-
pone forever the prohibition of the atomic bomb, etc. The minor theme
of reasonableness (as in the Soviet magazine "News," the Paris Crypto-
Communist "Liberation," etc., and in the few concessions made by
Vishinsky) was no more prominent than would seeis necessary to avoid
alienating Soviet sympathizers and wishful thinkers. Since the disarma-
ment proposal was first made, Soviet policy has shown no tendency toward
settlement of any outstanding issue, and Soviet propaganda on other
subjects has been, if anything, increasingly harsh with new prominence
given to the "American subversion" theme and to supposed U.S. aggressive
intentions in Southeast Asia,
However, nothing in the above facts would seem to negate the
possibility that a sustained follow-up of the Tripartite proposal may
make a significant psychological contribution to the eventual moderating
of the Soviet attitude.
3. To convince our NATO partners and other friends
that we are doing everything possible to attain
peace and security by the route of disarmament
and relaxation of tensions.
omment: Preliminary study of reactions in the General Assembly
and foreign press opinion suggests that a qualified but nevertheless
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substantial success has been attained up to date. Formal support for the
Tripartite position in the General Assembly has been impressive through-
out among delegations traditionally friendly to the United States, including
such a technically neutral country as Sweden. European press opinion
appears to have leaned strongly toward the view that the United States is
sincere in its proposal; although a significant and vocal minority in
Europe appraised the move as purely propagandistic. (This division of
views was also evident in the press of such neutral countries as India,
but there the negative appraisal tended to predominate.) The negative
view stemmed in some cases from a conviction that the timing of the
proposal was inappropriate since serious progress on disarmament is
impossible now because of world tensions.
In other cases, among those inclined to hope that genuine
Western good will might even now close the breach, there was a suspicion
that the United $tates was too fundamentally distrustful of the Soviets
to mate a sincere effort and was merely going through the motions in
an attempt to appease world opinion. This latter attitude was occasionally
reinforced by what these observers considered unnecessarily sharp
expressions of hostility to the USSR by American spokesmen, occasional
tendencies to reject Soviet views too quickly and cate,orically, and the
conspicuous coincidence of Secretary Acheson's departure for the Rome
NATO meeting. However, such adverse reactions were offset to a con-
siderable extent by the excessive violence of Vishinskyrs opening
speech and other evidences of Soviet intransigence, which were widely
condemned.
4. To convince nations less directly involved in the
cold war that we are doing all we can to achieve
a peaceful world in which the threat of global
war is removed and the economic development so
many of them seek can receive greater emphasis.
Comment; The material at hand (confined to India with some
fragmentary material from Latin America and other areas) suggests the
tentative conclusion that some progress was made, by the more fact of
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the Tripartite proposal, in moderating t?ebalance of opinion, especially
in India, as to the U.S. desire to achieve a stable and secure world, The
general tone of Indian press opinion (which gave very prominent attention
to the proceedings) was one of skepticism and increasing pessimism as to
the possibility of progress; but in the wide range of views and analyses
coming from India a considerable body of opinion appeared to-assign the
major blame for failure to the Soviets, and found real merit in the
Tripartite approach. Solid Latin American support for the Tripartite
resolution (Argentina excepted) suggests at least an equally favorable
view in that area. There are indications that Near Eastern countries
were too preoccupied with their own problems to be much concerned with
the disarmament issue. The numerous abstentions in this. area, and
Egypt's support for the Soviet insistence on prior prohibition of
atomic bombs, suggest the degree to which positions on this specific
issue were determined by more basic foreign policy considerations.
The Indian attempt to connect disarmament with world economic
development syraptomized a widely held attitude among underdeveloped
countries. At least one Latin American paper took the view that economic
development is a more fruitful approach to world peace than disarmament.
Although the Indian resolution on this subject was ultimately withdrawn
(and was criticized in some Indian press circles as rash meddling likely
to involve India in the East-West conflict), the Tripartite opposition
to this scheme could well be interpreted in underdeveloped countries as
belying the often-voiced U.S. desire to see resources transferred from
armaments to peaceful construction. U.S. unwillingness at present to
make any commitment on this heading in the United Nations should, therefore,
be set down as a psychological liability in these areas of the world.
5. To deprive the Soviets of their near-monopoly on
"peace" propaganda as an instrument of confusion,
intimidation, etc.
Comments Reactions to General Assembly proceedings up to date
indicate that a useful beginning has been made in exploiting this oppor-
tunity. A significant amount of European press opinion, starting with
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the belief that U.S. intentions are genuinely peaceful, expressed relief
that the West had at last seized the psychological initiative for peace
and put the Soviets in the position of having to say "no." There is
no question that Vishinsky's "laughter" speech was a major blunder,
although its propaganda value to the West was reduced by the subsequent
Soviet counterproposals and apparent concessions.
Two factors appear to have limited the degree of success in
this field. The first, referred to in item 3 above, was the occasional
tendency of U.S. spokesmen to condemn the Soviets and their proposals
in conspicuously harsh terms, which lent credence in some quarters to
the view that the U.S. was more concerned with making anti-Soviet propa-
ganda than it was with furthering the cause of disarmament. The s econd
factor, more difficult to deal with, was the Soviet concentration on the
psychologically potent atomic bomb issue. It seems clear that'the
Tripartite resolution was psychologically correct in joining together
the previously separate problems of atomic and conventional weapons; but
some evidences of confusion on the atomic prohibition issue raised by
the Soviets suggests that the Western powers have yet to overcome the
terror value of atomic propaganda. Although press coummcnt frequently
showed appreciation of the counterbalancing threat of massed Soviet
ground forces, it would seem that much remains to be done in the
direction of convincing world opinion that "conventional" weapons
are just as lethal and just as threatening to puce as atomic bombs.
6. By continuing to emphasize the necessity for genuine
inspection and other safeguards, to prepare the way
for their acceptance and the consequent relaxation
of the iron curtain; and in the interim to focus
attention on the menacing effect of the iron curtain
on the prospects for peace.
Comments In European press comment on the disarmament debate,
the view was expressed a number of times that the Soviet political system
makes it unthinkable that the Kremlin accept a genuine inspection system.
The moral usually drawn was not that the Soviets have something to hide-
this appeared to be taken for granted--but rather that the Tripartite
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proposal was unacceptable to the Soviets in one of its basic essentials and
i.-nco would not soon lead to real progress on disarmament.
Whether the disarmament proposal contains the possibility of
disproving this pessimistic view and actually penetrating the iron curtain
through inspection remains to be seen. Vishinskyfs apparent concession
on "continuous" inspection of atomic facilities was viewed in some
European quarters as more than a propaganda stroke. It would seem worth
while to consider the merits of an effort to obtain agreement on some
f rm of limited inspection in advance of any commitment to disarm, Even
if the present atmosphere of distrust precludes Soviet agreement on such
a step, further exploitation of this issue would at least foster more
wl.despread understanding of the fact that the Soviet-imposed iron curtain
is the main cause of this distrust.
B. Dangers
1. To give the impression that the proposals are insin-
cere and purely propaga.ndistie.
Comtaents As indicated in items 3 and 5 of the foregoing section,
it appears that success in avoiding this danger has been by no means
complete thus far. The "propaganda" interpretation of the Tripartite
proposal seems to derive either from a belief that the timing was
obviously inappropriate for real progress or from occasional statements
or actions by U.S. spokesmen. It would appear, therefore, that the
only sure means of overcoming this danger is to continue the effort
long enough to show conclusively that it represents settled U.S. policy
rather than opportunism; and to maintain a consistent attitude of
moderation and patience which will build up credence for Western
sincerity and properly highlight any manifestations of violence or
negativism on the part of the Soviets,
2. To give the Soviets a renewed opportunity for a
psychologically potent propaganda counteroffensive
on the themes of "peace" and atomic weapons.
Comment: This would appear to be an unavoidable liability of
the Tripartite initiative. As far as atomic propaganda is concerned,
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tiL.,e degree to which this danger has materialized is discussed in item 5
_).t the foregoing section, However, one further comment must be made.
The Tripartite approach has the psychological disadvantage of complexity.
One London paper noted editorially that "the Western proposals, by trying
to be realistic, became procedural and complicated, and hence infinitely
less politically effective and dramatic than the Soviet amendment." It
would appear that the problem of presenting the necessarily complex
Western approach in terms that can compete psychologically with the
Yppecious Soviet approach constitutes one of the most difficult and
most important psychological problems connected with the disarmament
issue.
To give non-sponsors, especially countries not
directly involved in the cold war, a feeling of
being snubbed in a matter they consider to be of
vital interest to themselves,
ommen : This potential danger would appear to have been
largely obviated, at least temporarily, by the widely held appreciation
that progress on disarmament must proceed from direct talks among the
major military powers, Furthermore, Western promptness in accepting
the initiative of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria for creation of a four-power
subcommittee furnished substantial proof of our respect for the views
of third parties, and contrasts favorably with Soviet insistence on a
five-power peace pact and other tendencies on their part to insist on
exclusive great-power dealing.
Some tendency emerged, nevertheless, to view the General
Assembly proceedings 4s having degenerated into a propaganda slugging
match between the U.S. and the USSR in which both parties ignored the
third parties' vital interest in stopping a cold war not of their making.
It would appear to be useful, therefore, to give continuing evidence of a
concern for third-party interests and points of view.
4. To give the impression of offering 4firm, final
proposal whose rejection would hasten the onset of
global war.
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Coome tt This danger would appear to have been avoided with
virtually complete success up to date. Press comment, even when despair-
ing of progress on disarmament or concluding that further Western
rearmament is the only course, never referred to a Western ultimatum
and seldom or never concluded that the General Assembly proceedings
had hastened global war. However, it would seem important to hae this
danger continually in mind as negotiations proceed, particularly if a
emmnlete breakdown appears in the offing.
To allow the Soviets, by means of charges of U.S.
hypocrisy and tempting counterproposals, to foster
Western disunity and to retard or even destroy the
effort to rearm.
Comments It can be assumed that this represents one of the
major Soviet objectives, if not their supreme objective, in the disarmament
debate. No clear indication is at hand that the Soviets have met with
material success in this effort. Indeed the conclusion was often drawn,
especially in conservative and right-wing quarters, that the test of
Soviet willingness had been made, that the negative result could have been
predicted in advance, and that now clearly the only safe course was to
spur rearmament. However, not all European opinion seems so impervious
to Soviet tactics. The moderate left, especially in France, tended toward
the view that while the remotest possibility of agreement remains every
effort must be made to achieve it. While no explicit appeal was made
to sacrifice rearmament to this end, the possibility remains that a
series of tempting Soviet offers on disarmament might intensify anti-
,7es.rmament attitudes among large groups who are already emotionally
inclined in that direction.
To counter this danger it would appear essential that the
disarmament issue be presented consistently as a long-range proposition,
necessarily dependent for solution on progress toward settlement of other
major East-West issues. The current phase of negotiations would thus
appear in the light of an effort to lay a sound foundation in the hope
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that general political conditions in the foreseeable future will make
possible the raising of the actual structure. To permit the widespread
growth of any immediate expectations for substantive disarmament would
be tantamount to making a p8ychological commitment which could not be
fulfilled without jeopardizing our security.
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