PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMUNIST POWER IN FRANCE. (PSB D-14/C).

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01065A000500070012-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 8, 2002
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 1, 1952
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01065A000500070012-3.pdf509.91 KB
Body: 
aecuri y j.nz ormai .on TOP j, f ?`C F'SB D-30 Approve& For Reler,~, PI.Ai I` II`:G A~~Ts i `1' ? r O OF l107MIZO E THROUGH 30 JUNE 1952 AUGUST 1, 1952 L. 1. PLANS COMPLT'TED AI:~D BEING EXECUTED EYES ONLY A. Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Erance. (PSB D-14/0- This plan and the corresponding one for Italy (Paragraph 1B) were developed by the same PSB planning panel and actions under both plans are being coordinated by the same group. Both plans resulted from extensive inquiry during the summer and fall of 1951, as a result of which the Board concluded that the French and Italian communist apparati, the two most power- ful in Western Europe, constituted a serious threat to American foreign policy and to Nf,LTO plans for defense of Western Europe. In consequence, the Board prescribed specific courses of action for reduction of communist power in both France and Italy. Upon approval of both plans on February 21, 1952, a Washington inter- departmental coordinating committee was established under the chairmanship of a member of the PSB staff, and comparable panels were established in Paris and Rome. These groups are in communicr-.tion with each other with respect to implementation of the plans. Analysis of the communist position in both France and Italy resulted in the conclusion that in both countries the primary source of communist power was in their organized control over trade unions. Therefore, the main emphasis in both plans is devoted to reduction of communist power over trade unions and the encouragement of the free trade union movement. The most important actions that can be taken in both countries are for to give positive support cori iunir t to the democratic unions in their struggle against domination of organized labor, to stop subsidizing and to stop dealing with the communist unions and to work towards a more equitable share of the n~'t3.analrrcome for labor. With regard to the French plan, progress toward achieving the major objectives appears hopeful under the prevent Pinay Government. Unlike its prede- cessors, the Pinay Government is strong, stable, and on its own initiative has OSD AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE. r1r C11~ OSD and DOD review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2002/08/3g9A?11R 38y,~ 4fi 000500070012-3 TOP SECRET . Page 1 of 9 Pages Security Information Al`TIJI: E TOP SECRET PSB D-30 Approved *For Rele 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0005Qf 0700G4 st 1, 1952 been moving vigorously against the communists within the last two months. The goveniient has given us assurances that it will continue this campaign and that it intends to take specific action to reduce communist power in the trade union field. While making known to the government our continuing interest in this problem, we have withheld more affirmative participation and are watching the French initiative with hope ctrl its promise for the future. B. Psychological Operation9 Plans for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy. (PSB D-15/b). As stated in connection with the similar plan for reduction of communist power in France reported'in the previous paragraph, this plan was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952. Development of the plan, which was in con- junction with the development of the French plan, is reported on in the previous paragraph. With regard to progress concerning the achievement of the objectives of the Italian plan, since September 1951 we have made high level representations expressing our concern over the continued strength of communist power in Italy and the DeGasperi Government has repeatedly assured us that it intends to take vigorous measures to reduce the strength and influence of the communist movement. Up to the May 1.952 elections, the government had done very little along these lines and, particularly, had not moved against the main sources of communist power in the trade union field. The local elections throughout Italy in 1951 and 1952 indicated no diminution and perhaps a slight increase of electoral support for the communist-left socialist bloc. Since the 1948 national elections when this bloc polled 31,45, it has for the first time made substantial inroads into the agricultural South. In contrast to this the electoral support for the four democratic center parties was substantially reduced compared to 1948 due to a sharp fall off in support for the Christian-Democrat Party, while the extreme right received a sharp in- crease in support. Since the May elections we have received renewed and more positive assurances that the government means to move against the communists and there Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA RDor8m0-01065A000500070012-3 ~j 2 2 9 TOP ,SECRET Par;o 2 o?' 9 ,cs Security Information AIV ME E TOP SECRET PSBD-30 Approved For Rel a 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00 00Q0? Z6 1, 1952 have been indications of formal action. The government will put its main reliance on new legislation. The situation now appears more promising and hopeful than it has been for a long time, but we are awaiting positive results. Since the communists appear to be avoiding the provocation of the Italian Government, we are hopeful that the latter will take positive action on its own initiative. C. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees Phase.. "A" (FSB D-18a). This plan, approved by PSB December 20, 1951, includes programs to care for and resettle current escapees, and envisages maximum possible utilization of escapees in CIA programs and under Public Law 51 (Lodge Amendment), which permits recruitment of escapees into the U.S. Armed Forces. For discussion of Phase "B" see paragraph 3A. On April 7, pursuant to approval by the President, ~'p4.3 million dollars were made available by the Director of Mutual Security to the Department of State, which had been given responsibility for the program, The time since funds were made available has been used to build the organization and staff for the continuing administration of the program; and to identify and c're for the most urgent immediate needs of escapees, Organization. Small staffs are being established and activities have begun in each of the countries which border the iron curtain. A regional office in HICOG and a policy and coordination unit in the Departin nt of State have been established. Resettlement and upplemental Care. A general contract was signed on June 16, 1952, with the Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME, an international body organized in November, 1951) for the overseas transport of up to 1.4,000 escapees during one year at an estimated rate of $100 per capita. The number thus far moved under t1B program is negligible, but it is anticipated that a scheduled flow may be attained in August. Projects have been authorized to care for urgent iimiediate needs of -capee^ resident in Greece, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Italy, such as Approved For Release 2002/MZtir3J*-18Otl A000500070012-3 d 2 `-- 9 4 TOP SECT-1; T Page 3 of 9 Pages TOP SECRET PSB D-30 Au us t _i 1952 Approved For Rele 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000070012- food, clothing, shoes, repair and decontamination of barracks, medical treat- meet, arnd the like. In every country of operation the immediate needs of the escapees are being met. Pr2E,, nda Utilization. No general propaganda utilization of the plans and activities of the escapee program is now contemplated by State Departmmnt. Newsworthy projects^nd assistance to key individuals will be used in media reachii:sg iron curtain areas when appropriate. When the program has greater accomplishments to po.i rlt to, the State Deiaartn.ent plans more general treat- ment. Similar policies govern domestic information activity., Funds. Of the initial authorization of 4,300,000 an estimated ,1,500,000 1,460,500 is being was obligated during the fiscal year 1952. An additional ; % requested to cover an increase in the estimated number of escapees already requiring assi; tance. Acccm-plishment of Other Purposes. As requested under this phase of the plan the Department of Defense has somewhat liberalized the conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the authorization of the Lodge Amendment. Of 5194 applicc.tions, 3916 have been rejected, 295 have been accepted (262 on active duty) and 982 are being processed. The program has not proceeded far enough to make a significant number of referrals to CIA for use in its programs. D. Public Statements with Respect to Certain Weapons. (PSB D-17d) In February 1952, following a series of conflicting statements by public officials as to atomic and related developments, the PE-B approved and forwarded to the Executive Secre;,ary, NSC, recommendations for a guidance to appropriate agencies on public statements with respect to certain weapons. On 9 May 1952 a memorandum on this subject was issued by the President setting forth the criteria recommended by the PSB and directing compliance therewith. At present ?l,e PSB staff is reviewing the action which has been taken by the agencies and th affect of the application of the criteria. Approved For Release 2002/08/21: CIA-RDP80-01 Q65A000500070012-3 8 2219 L. Security Information TOP SECRET Page 4 of 9 Pages oecuri.-cy inrormazion Mutt . J/ TOP SECRET PSB D-30 Approved For Relea&' 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A0005fil 0700fP-gu.st 1t 1952 2. PLANS COMPLETED BUT NOT YET BEING EXECUTED - STAND-BY PLANS A. Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c). Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on October 25, 1951. This plan is designed to establish special psychological objectives to be implemented toward our allies as well as our adversaries, with respect to the Korean. conflict. Some of the desired courses of action are at present in effect, but the majority of the recommended actions are directly related to the progress made in connection with the cease-fire. The operational planning is substantially complete. An alert network has'been established among the affected agencies so that the appropriate action can be put into effect without delay as developments lake this necessary. B. Emergency Plan for Breakoff of Korean Armistice Negotiations (PSB J--19d). Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board on September 18, 1951 This plan endeavors to establish for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations courses of action for application in preparation for, and in the event of, a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. The operational planning is substantially complete. The receipt of certain assurances from the Far Eastern Command with respect to logistical support is necessary in order that the affected agencies an establish the appropriate contingent plan without delay, should developments make this necessary. C. Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities (PSB D-8b), This project was approved by the Board on February 21, 1952 and sub- to the National Security Council as NSC 127. Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000500070012-3b' 5 4 Security Information Page 5 of 9 Pages r eVnnrm TOP SECRET PSB D.30 Approved For Rele 2002/08/21 : lA-RDP80-01065A00dW_f 07001'~23 '"'1' 1, 1952 This plan was designed in order that the proper agencies would be able to conduct psychological operations in pursuance of prescribed national objectives during general hostilities. This plan shall be executed upon Presidential proclamation ii the event of war or at such time as the President may direct. D. National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General War (PSB D-11/b). Approved by the Board on November 15, 1951. This plan sets forth the objectives which will govern the national overt propaganda effort in a general war forced upon the United States by the USSR or any of its satellites. The objectives and tasks which should be followed by the United States with respect to the world as a whole, the USSR and its satellites, our allies and friends, and neutral nations are set forth. This guidance has been distributed to the various departments and agencies for their use. The Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC) has established z x--Day Committee which is concerned with the inter-departmental coordination n_" pclicies and operations in the event of war. This guidance is being used Li the implementation of their planning. 3. PLANNS AUTHORIZED AID IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPI,NTT A. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees - Phase "B"" (PSB D-18a/1) This project is concerned with the stimulation of defection and exam- ination of the psychological and subsidiary military advantages which would resit from the proper utilization of these escapees. Phase A, concerned with the care, resettlement, and possible utilization of current escapees, is '-ported on in Paragraph 1 of this paper,, B. Inventory of Instrumentalities for Countering Soviet Orbit Blackmail Tactics (PSB D-19/1). Board has had prepared an "Inventory of Cold War Weapons" consisting of a list of certain agencies and instrumentalities (some of which are of a Approved For Release 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP80-01065A000500070012-3 b 22 3 L.4 Security Information Page 6 of 9 Pages Security Information ."UItt'Ui b TOP SECRET PSB D..3O Approved For Rele 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A006 0 ly 1952 25X6 novel character). The Board has further directed study toward the feasibility of harassment and retaliation against the Soviets by use of appropriate instrumentalities. D. Psychological Strategy Planning for the Middle East (PSB D-22). This plan is to devise by means of coordinated psychological operations a national psychological plank taking into account both long-range and short- range considerations, in order to overcome or prevent instability within this area wtich wo,Uld threaten Western interests. It seeks to prevent the exten- sion of Soviet influence and at the same time to strengthen Western influence and to establish within the community of nations a new relationship with the states of the area that recognizes their desire to achieve status and respects their sovereign equality. E. Psychological Strategy Planning for Southeast Asia (PSB D-23) This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated psychological operations in preventing the free countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing in these countries the will and ability to resist Communism from within And without, and to contribute to the strengthen- n,v of the free world. Security Information TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000500070012-3 4 2 2 9 4 Page 7 of 9 Pages Security Information Vl L PSB D D??30 TOP ,SECRET Approved For Rele 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80-01 O65AOOO 6"31' 1952 F. Psychological Operations Plan for the Exploitation of Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24)- This plan is designed to study the actions the United States should take to develop the maximum psychological results at the time of Stalin's death. G. Preliminary Analysis of the Communist B.W. Propaganda Campaign (PSB D-25). This study concerns itself with the psychological problems which the current "Hate America" communist propaganda campaign have presented. H. Statement of U.S. Aims in the Cold War ("Princeton Statement" - FSB D-26) This paper was designed to devise the maximum psychological effect which could be achieved by a statement of high U.S. or foreign officials relative to the liberation of peoples now under Soviet Communist control. 25X6 J. Psychological Strategy for Economic Security Vis-a-vis the Soviet Orbit (PSB D-28) This plan is designed to prepare national psychological strategy and sn ific courses of action with respect to the psychological. aspects of U.S. e().:.-,i.. security progrrms concerned with the Soviet orbit by increasing the Approved For Release 2002/i l z W- ,qI O 5AOOO5OOO7OO12-3 TOP SECRET 1 2 2 9 4 Page of 9 Pages Approved For Rehea 2002/08/21 : C1A-RDP80-01065A0000r0012-3' TOP ~ECRET PSB D..30 ust 1 1952 degree of acceptance in the Free World of U.S. economic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet orbit. It also seeks to weaken Soviet control over the orbit countries by capitalizing on and obstructing Soviet economic exploitation of captive Europe and China through psychological operations. d228L Approved For Release 2002/0Ti1?J - R g7 '91 4000500070012-3 TOP SECRET