PROGRESS REPORT ON THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000500090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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ONLY DATE October 30, 1952
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*DOD (OSD), DOS & NSC
REVIEWS COMPLETED*
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
PROG'tES3 f .EPORT ON THE N TION .L PSYCHOLOGICAL E~.7i)O.RT
FOR THE PIItIOD JULY 1, 1952, TKIOUGH SEPT1 IBE i. 30, 1952
Submitted to the President and the National Security Council
by the Psychological Strategy Board
WARN INS
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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SECURITY INFQR``IATION
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3 November 1952
Mr. James Lay, Jr,
Executive Secretary
The National Security Council
Washington 25, D, C,.
Dear hr. Lays
I have the honor to transmit herewith to the
President and the National Security Council a Progress
Report on the National. Psychological Effort for the
period July 1, 1952 through September 30, 1952?
This is bitted in accordance with your
"Memorandum to the Director, of the Psychological Strategy
Board*- Status of United States Programs for National
Security," dated hay 29, 1952.
This Report was approved at the Sixteenth Meeting
of the Psychological $trategy Board held October 30, 1952.
Sincerely yours,
Alan G. Kirk
Director
Enclosures;
PSB D-34, Copies 6 and 7
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PSB D,34
Qrtpber, 30, 1952
PROGRESS REPORT ON T'iE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT
FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952) THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 19 2
Submitted to the President and the National Security Cgur c .l
by the Psychological Strategy Board
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I, Evaluative Summary of Significant Psychological Activities.,. 2
II4 The Work of PSB,....,*..+.,,........*......q~...9..,...V
III, Summaries of Reports:
Department of State ...................................... 15
Department of Defense.* ....*....,.,...*..*'.,..., q, l9
*Central Intelligence Agency .......... ............~....... 24
Field Representatives of rtitual Security Agency........... 38
Text of Report of Department of State ........................ANNEX A
Text of Report of Department of Defense ......................ANNEX B
The Summary of the Report of the Central Intelligence Agency is
specially classified.
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SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD UNDER REVIEW
l The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psycho-
logical activities during the reporting period on the part of the de-
partments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.
Capabilities b Area
2R Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved
in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capa-
biltties for making an immediately effective psychological contribution
to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence, These
gaps include the USSR. itself,, Communist China and most of the European
satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in
building capabilities for future development:
,3i Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being
employed in the psychological field against the USSR? The Russian
ltjamrriings continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the
whole field of communications, Insofar as Communist China is concerned,
the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due
to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses;
Anti-American Attitudes
1, In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific
grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in
anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propa-
ganda and pressure, During the reporting period a substantial increase
was made
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October 30, 1952
was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect
and non-attributable propaganda. However,'the above trend makes clear
the importance of still further increasing our efforts to develop in-
direct and non-attributable information activities.
I''estern Europe
5, The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues
to cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes
favorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusiasm
continues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically militaryA
i,e., NATO and EDC. However, U. S. psychological action has contributed
to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries,
notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration atti-
tudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional
and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth
of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread
of neutralist sentiments.
Middle East
6 The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U. S.
capabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country;
though some limited results of non-attributable activities are reported:
The danger of further deterioration in Iran,emphasizes the importance of
rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries,
where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt,
the political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the
present
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present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements
that make the future uncertain, In the area as a whole, little
progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter
toward the achievement of national policy, objectives. A notable
contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, how-
ever, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800
Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda,
Par East
7, In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was in-
creased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological
impact of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid
programs,. Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been
expanded, especially in the non-attributable field, but little in-
crease in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the
area to identify the United States with European colonial powers,
and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolu-
tionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological
obstacle.
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Korea
8, Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of
hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure
on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of
voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, This principle has gained
widespread acceptance in the non-communist world.
"Hate America!' Pro aganda
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"Hate America" Pro agenda
9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been con-
cerned with combatting the Soviet-Communist "Hate America" propa-
ganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on
this subject-was provided for both overt and non-attributable propa.
Banda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil
purpose;of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate
the release by the Department of Defense and its components of in-
formation on biological and chemical warfare; The effectiveness of
these activities cannot be gauged in isolation front other United
States operations#
iIilita Assets for the "Cold War""
10, A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense
and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in
Western Europe and the INiiddle East, illustrate the type of contribu-
tion these services can make to the national psychological effort.
However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for
the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of ap-
proved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty
is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific
authority and missions upon which military psychological activities in
peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation
is under study.
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II. THE WORK OF PSB
ne Ac vtes
h A paper dealing with the problem of a strategic concept with
special reference'to cold war operations under NSC 10/5 was completed
and submitted to the Board,. Pending development of capabilities and
situations which may make it possible to envisage a final solution of
the cold war, it proposed continued effort in the direction of building
capabilities and effecting cumulative retraction of Soviet power,
12, A revised text of a statement was approved by the Board with
the understanding that it might be "worked into an early speech" in
order to provide current psychological operations in Eastern Europe with
needed support without implying ar.r more ambitious programs there.
13. The Board decided that intea-agency and inter-departmental
coordination for social science research in support of psychological
operations should be further developed and agreed to continued PSB
association with this study.
Ejannlne
14, During the period under review, the first comprehensive area
plan to be undertaken by PSB was completed and submitted to the Board for
approval. This paper, entitled "A National Psychological Strategy with
Respect to Germany". lays down basic guidance for U. S. psychological
operations aimed at furthering the integration of the German Federal
Republic into the Western European Community, and other national objectives.
15; A similar basic plan for another critical cold war area
Japan ;~ was completed in draft form during the 6 rter and circulated
to the departments and agencies concerned for final comments ]eftre
submission to the Board in the coming Quarter.
16,. Apart from
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16. Apart from their immediate importance in providing guidance
for national psychological operations in two vital areas, these two
plans proved valuable in developing and clarifying the novel concept
of national psychological strategy planning. On the basis. of the lessons
derived from them, the Director's staff began a study aimed at improving
the P$B planning process as a whole.
17. During the Quarter, the Board's coordination function with
respect to field implementation of the approved plans for France and
Italy was furthered in two ways. The U. S. Ambassadors to these countries
took advantage of a meeting in London to discuss fully mutual problems
in connection with the plan, thereby assuring an interchange of their
experiences on the subject; and a comprehensive re-study of the two plans
was initiated both in the field and in Washington, with a view to deter-
mining the main lines of approved action to be stressed in the near future.
18, In anticipation of Board approval of the German plan, the
Office of the High Commissioner for Germany organized a coordinating
panel for implementation of the plan in the field.
19. Some progress was made during the Quarter in meeting the Board's
responsibility for "evaluation of the national psychological effort".
At the Board's direction, the Director's staff, in collaboration with
the departments and agencies concerned, has undertaken an evaluation of
the national psychological effort directed at Italy. The staff has also
undertaken, as part of a larger government wide economic policy study,
an evaluation of the psychological impact of U. S. foreign economic
policies in the
These projects should contribute
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additionally
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additionally to the establishment of valid criteria and workable
approeahes for future evaluation activity,
20. Following is a detailed report on PSB planning activities for
the Quarter
(a) Psychological Operations Plan for the
Reduction Of Communist Power in France
(PSB, P-11.E/o ), and
(b) Psychological 1perations Plan for the
Reduction of Communist Power in Italy
(PSB D-15/b)
(1) During the Quarter under reviews the Washington inter-
departmental committee and its counterparts in Paris and Rome con-
tinued to'coordinate U, u, activities under these plans,
(2) According to Btnbassies Paris and Rome, the French and
Italian governments have in recent months shown a disposition to
take vigorous action to reduce communist power In their respective
countriesq. Therefore, our Ambassadors are agreed that the United
States should continue to remain in the background, while making
known to both governments our concern that vigorous anti-communist
action be pursued, They are also agreed that principal liaison
should remain at the prime ministerial level,
(3) Theaxarter saw what may prove to be a basic shift in com-
munist tactics, reflected in both France and Italy, i.e., away
from a policy of militancy and non-cooperation with non-communist
groups and toward a policy of "respectability" and cooperation with
nor-communists. If such a shift persists, the willingness and
ability of the French and Italian governments to take vigorous anti
oommmxntst action might be impaired, In turns the U, 4? would find
it more difficult to tn.fluenoe these governments and their people
in. taking
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In taking a strong anti,-communist position..
(c) Psychological Operations Plan for.
Soviet Orbit. FAcapees--Phase r"A"
(PSB D-18/a)
(1) Qr nnii.s,ationn under this plan, which is administered by the
Department of State, was completed during the period under review.
Figures for eligible escapees have been revised slightly, and now
total 20,995 in the countries of reception,. plus estimated arrivals
of 429 per month.. o acts authorized or underway include language
and vocational training courses, a visa opportunity search, and
registration and documentation of escapees, in addition to care
for their urgent immediate needs.
(2) Resott1 me t is now in progress.. Voluntary. agencies have.
requested transportation for*860 escapees under the program. Actual
partures number 295, while 508 are awaiting departure for overseas.
.Propaganda utilization has been made of individual oases of re-
settled escapees, both by the Voice of America and domestic news
media. The Department of State has under development a propaganda
plan for exploiting the escapee program as such.
(3) &nds obligated to the program through fiscal year 1953
now total This includes an initial authorization of
in dollars and in counterpart funds..
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(4) Accomplishment of other purposes of the program has been
slight. The Department of Defense reports: inplementation of the
Lodge Amendment as follows: applications for recruitment, 60081
rejections, 4847{ acceptances,,395; scheduled for processing, 108;
under review by CIO, 655. The Department of the Army does not con-
template any further liberalization of the conditions under which
escapees may be recruited....
(d) Staff Study
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(~d) Staff Study--Preliminary Analysis
of the Communist BW Propaganda
Campaign with Recommendations
(PSB D-25/b)
This study, which is connected with the current "Hate America"
.communist propaganda campaign, was al-,;roved by the Board on
August 71Responsibility for undertaking and coordinating opera-
tional planning to deal with the problems raised in the study was
assigned to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.
At PCC diregtI:n, a Working Croup on Hate America Propaganda has
been assigned to the problem,
22~ aUg Um aate? To Yet Pei -- ta. Plan
'~ Exec ed~,- ,.
(a) Psychological Operations Plan Incident
tq Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations
(PSB D-7/c), and
(b) Emergency Plan for Break-off. of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSD J-19-d)
The first of these plans is designed to establish special
psychological objectives with respect to our allies as well as to
our adversaries, to be implemented in the event of.successful cease-
fire negotiations, The second plan endeavors to establish for
government departments and agencies engaged in psychological. opera-
ttous courses of action in preparation for, and in the event ofp a
breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations. Overt operational
planning under both plane is substantially complete, Covert
operational planning is currently being revised,
(c) Plan for Conducting Psychological
Operations During General Hostilities
(PSB D-8/b ), and
(d) National Overt Propaganda Policy
(',dance for General Wad' (PSB D41/b )
Both the plan and the guidance have been distributed to the
various
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various departments and agencies for their use? and have been
integrated by the military services with their war planning.
Planning on inter-departmental problems relating to psychological
policies and operations in the event of war is currently being
accomplished by an Xnay Committee under the Psychological Opera-
tions Coordinating Committee.
23, Plan Anthor ed [ ,d In Process Of D eve went
- (a) Psychological Operations Plan for
'
Soviet Orbit Escapees--Phase "$""
(PSB D-l$a/1)
This phase of the plan is concerned with the psychological and
subsidiary military advantages which would result from the stimu-
lation of defection together with the proper utilization of such
escapees, Progress in drafting the final plan will be largely
dependent on a decision as to what use will, be made of the funds
avail ble under Section 101 (a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act.
Phase '!A', concerned, with the care, resettlement and possible utili-
zatiQn of current escapees, is reported on a bone (see paragraph 21-c).
(b) A National Psychological Strategy
with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)
This plan will prescribe certain desirable psychological courses
of action in respect to: (1) supporting the achievement of German
unity; (2) the role of a unified Germany in the unification of
Europe; (3) actions designed to-reduce Soviet capabilities in
astern Geri any,
(c) Psychological Strategy Planning for
the P1Udle East (PSB D-;4)
(1) This plan will provide a national psychological strategy,
designed to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and at the same
time to strengthen Western influence in the ? ddle East, and to insure
that h&;
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that the resources of the area are available to the United States
and its allies for use in strengthening the free world. It will
seek to accomplish these objectives by psychological measures aimed
at overco 4ug instability within these countries, strengthening the
will and ability of these countries to resist aggression, and estab
l.ishing a new relationship with these states which will recognize
their desire to achieve status and respect for their sovereign
equality.
(2) Annexes covering the basic factors and considerations are
now being developed in crder to aid in crystallization of the psy-
cholotical strategy concept and selection of the psychological
objectives and tasks,
(d) Psychological Strategy Planning for
Southeast Asia (PSB D-23)
This plan is designed to assist by means of coordinated
psychological operations in preventing the free countries of South-
east Asia from passing into the Communist orbit and in developing
in these countries the will, and ability to resist Communism from
within and without, Difficulties in policy interpretation are being
resolved and Board approval is expected during the next 4iarterr.
(e) Program of Psychological Preparation?
for Stalin's Passing from Power (PSB D-24)
The participating agencies are now in the process of clearing
a Revised Draft,
(f) Psychological Strategy Plan for the
Pro-U.S. Orientation of Japan (PSB ID-27)
Following the adoption by the National Security Council of
NSO 125/2 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with
Respect to
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f?~ptober 3~, 1952
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NSC
RQSpect to Japang, the Panel ao'eed to a draft of a plan which is
designed effectively to assist,
in carrying out the objectives of NSO 125/2 negessary to
ma4mize, Japanis contribution to the attainment of U, S. vbject.ves
in Asia.1
(g) Psyaholagica,l Strategy for economic
Security Vis-a-Via the Soviet Orbit
(PSB D-28),
The plan is des fined to provide a natinal psychological
strategy and specific courses of action with respect to the ps cho-
logical aspects of U. S, economic security pro ;rams concerned with
the Soviet orb ,t by increasing the de ree of acceptance in the Free
World of U. St eeongmic security objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet
orbit, Suggested courses of action to be developed wj3,. be governed
by the Economic tefense Advisory Connmitteets decis4on as to what
should be U, S, poltoy in informational statements to foreign
governments with respect to trade in goods which are not covered
by the Battle Act and other Security Lists*
(h) Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare
Against the USSR (PSE D?-33)
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NSC
The Board has accepted a recor=endation that a panel be
created to examine the field, of ideoloical warfare specifically
directed against Soviet doctrine, and to make recommendations as to
hoer the United States can gain superiority in this feld1
(i) Western Europe
In consultation with mem:1)~r agenciea particularly the
determine the most fruitful approach to a psychological strategy
epartment of i$ate, a preliminary study is being undertaken to
plan for Western Europe.
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On inotruottons from the Board, an inquiry was carried out by
the Director 1s staff which oo ,ciuded that a program for utilization
-o' young escapees would be of definite psychological
value, iowever, i,t was impossible without answers to specific
questions to weigh the psychological desirability against the cost
of overcoming physical obstacles to sash a program in
the suggestion of the Director the Department of Otate has under-
taken a aivvey in to determine the advantages and disad-
vantages w4ch would result if. such a.program were inaugurated.
24, Planning frocedure
An analysis was made of the dlfficu tie9 which have been
en0ow4ered in dove .ola4ug i?SB plans. Recomtrendati one were developed
for an Improved format for nationall, psychological strategy plans
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III, Su :i?~',t~.IrS Of D,.~1_hT.1 : ~TAL A :J) F:Ci, 'CY E I PO TS IP04 r'N"' ? :400
U TD. i. 4171 01'
Sumrn of the heport of the Department of .",tate on the.
ore -n n " arena lop ._ ro rain-~
Daring the period under review the tasks of trio Foreign
Inform t .on and ;,ducatigna . i,xchpn(;e Programs of the Department
of state continued to be those set forth in ciSC 114/2, namely,
to multiply and intensify psy-cholo6ical deterreats to aggression
by Soviet Communism; to intensify and accelerate t;te growth of
confidence in and among the peoples and governments of the free
world; to cor+bat extremism and neutralism; to maintain among
the peoples hold caative by uovict Communism the hope of ultimate
liberation; and to maintain particularly among the peoples and
governments of Latin Aiiierica continued recognition of mutual
interdependence,
The hepprt lists the principal actions taken y the
Department of state in endeavoring to carry out these tasks.
They includes
Projecting to the peoples and govcrnulents of
nations dominated by E:oviet Communism the growing
strength and unity of the free world, This involved
exploiting in the programs of the International Infor,a-
tion Administration such policies, activities and events
as 110? joint '(ATO maneuvers on the
Luropean continent, the A!ZUS Conference, the development
of tactical atomic weapons, and exposure of the deceitful
nature Qf the proposals of the uSSt concerning the unifi-
cation of Gprmany.
Projecting
~a The full text of the Department of State report is appended as
ANN1XA*
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?, Projecting t, le peaceful intentions of the U, a,
through explpitation of our disarma+iient efforts, of our
patient atte.,,pts to reach an armistice in 4orea, and of
the justice of the U. Conunand' s refusal forcibly to
retriate prisoners of wart Particular emphasis was put
on exposing the irraunifeat absurdity and evil purpose of the
E ovit t hate campaign, including the bacteri ol,at;ical war-
fare charges;,
3* In its continuing attempts to aCgravate internal
weaknesses of Soviet Com,nun:Larn,' the Information Program
endeavored to exploit such tte;as as the atrenj;theniag of
the tyranny ot the remlin over the peoples of tze W, h.
implied in plans for the Comrriuni.st Party Con, ress; the
purees of Coin n*nist Party leaders in the satellites and
in 11raxnce and Italy, and the implications of the refusal
of large numbers of Chinese captured in itorea to return
to China.
.4q Convincing peoples and governments of the free
ti.orld of Vie need and the possibility of building up
adequate militazy strength as a deterrent to war, This
involved exploitation of 110?, i !iAq IQAi JE1 Z~ i t~c~C .~" and other
maneuvers l.n F'.}ro~ae; it included also encouragement of
moves toward ;1 uropcan integration, including the exploita,-
tion,, largely through indigenous meang, of t..ie establish-
meat of the European Coal, and steel Authority, of develop.
vents within the Council of 1 urope# and of progress toward
the .{,aropean :)efense Ccomiunity,
iiairltenance of confidenpe in the oeaccful
intentions and reliable leadership of the U,. included
cur L4FQZZ'll_TIJN
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$LCISET
F'-'B P-34
October 30? 1952
special efforts to give a balanced understanding of develop-
ments,, especially those affecting foreign policy,
growing out of the Presidential election, ;ipeeia;
efforts were made in the Information Program to explain
the motives of the U. S. when differing with the United
Kingdom in the Iranian crisis And with France on the
north African problem, The program also placed special
emphasis on projecting a greater understanding of the
cultural maturity of the united 4,tates. Fxs,.iplea of
this were the i urppean tour of "r-lorgy and viees"a the
participation of American artists in the Venice U'iLSCO
Conferee ce, and presentations of typical artistic
creations at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in i'aris.
6, Combatting neutralism through exposing its
dangers as a means of safeguarding individual liberty
and freedom and as a sutversive device of &Qviet
Co n nism.
7, Combatting instability and extreme nationalist
tendencies,, particularly in the Near and i?Addle East.
The iteport notes that exploitation of the USA? airlift
of pilgrims from Beirut to 1,iecca was left largely to
indigenous cihannels, but was the subject of a pictorial
pamphlet produced by the U. S. Information :services in
Beirut, of a filmm, and of a series of statements by
members of the crews of the planes involved,
8 i iaintaining hope of ultimate liberation among
the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, Largely
through the Voice of America and by RIAr, in F erltn,
efforts were made to explain statements in the Presiden,
tial caopajgn concerning U, S, policy towards the 8
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October 30,f 1952
atellites; to interpret the si riificance for the satel,-
3ites of the Nineteenth Conuaunist Party Congress; to
expose the "Hate 444,ierica" campaign; to portray the Sino-
Soviet meeting in rioscow in a light calculated to raise
doubts In the minds of Chinese as to the motives of the
I4ping regime in dealing with the UF,Sh:
9. Fostering American solidarity through exploitation
if such actions as the visit of tie 5F.;:c:tr of State to ;brazil,
the conversion of Puerto I ico to Common4 e lth status, and
through efforts to expose the threat to Latim A erican countries
inherent in 5ovi. t Commtlni sm.
1Q; Operational act'vi.ties listed in the neport include
approval of a project for the establishment of an irk
i;e jonal Service Center in Beirut; inauguration of a new
series of Inf orrnation Policy Guidances known as "Inforr.,ta-
tion Guidance i3ulletins," initiation of radio programs in
nine ].angua;es by the ship-borne transmitter "The Courier,"
stationed at Khoges; production and distribution of a film
sho4,ng participation of the individual American voter in
the process of phpos ng presidential candidates, and
scheduling of another film showing the voterta participation
the elcotion of the President.
SECUk'ITY INFO iii .TI ON
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S CURITX INIF u~xloll
TOP SP.Chk;T
FSi3 D-34
October 30, 1952
ruin na of the., de rt of the De rtment of Defense*
During the reporting oari,od the Department of Defense and
the willta.ry services have continued to make noteworthy contribu.-
tioris, incident to Cieir oarimary 441itary mi?ssion# to the national
paycholo.-ical effort, ,iorlever, one of the considerable difficulties
noted 4thin the De oartrrient of Defense in env a ;ing in cold liar
activities (except in a supporting role) continues to be the fact
that the ,)epartJrent+e role in such activities is principally implied,
There exists no srecific delineation of aut!iority and responsibility
upon ?wh; ch meth tax'y psychological operations in peace-ti,.i.-rie may be
based, ~ome such specification for the Deoartiaent of Defense old
contribute to firiore effective participation of the military services
in the national psychological effort, This observation applies both
to opez`atiors designed to attain an independent res.; choi.ogical effect,,
and to onerrt ,ons in which, al- iou ;h their nriirary purpose is military,
political or econoiriic, psycho~ogicai factors .,just be considered?
During the .c ri od under review military a: id naval maneuvers
and statements of high military officials have served :osvcholo.ical
ends, priiiarily in ' extern ::.trope, Although the potential psycholo.
r icril impact of maneuvers at home and abroad is not yet w~iplly inte-
grr-ted into operational plans, continuing attention is being; devoted
to this irist ter,
The i)e:oartnient of 1 fence has joined in cozibattin ; anti,
i-tmerican eeatiments, ?particularly in i?:urorne, by various means within
its area of responsibility, The :te:oaxtment of Defense feels, however,,
that we are still. on the defe nsi.ve in regard to the "Hate America"
campaign generally,
In the
of The }'vll te=at of the aenartineet o ? -)efense report is append a
t1 V..; ;k 9:,
dtU1bJfI
:~~~ t tiI1 1'JFc4tr, a`IUPi
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TOP S Ch :T
BS.:i DT3L
October 30p 1952
In the aJ dd a ;ast, the Beirut.Jidda airlift and several
of c r opcra.tidns involving the Department of Defense have contributed
materially to the creation of a psychological climate rupre favorable
to the iYest, In :area} notable actions include the North 14orea target
warning operations and continuous and effective leaflet drops.
t4escarch anal, forward planning in tie psyc 4olot ical field con-
t nue, directed for the most part to the contingency of general war.
efforts are ccntinulne to define the specific prole of the .Jeoartment
erase as an aptive participant in the cold war,
2perations by Areas
In the hur an areas contributions to reduction of
ncatral sm and anti-\..cxicanism include iarticipation in U.4,.'rench
military maneuvers east of the itd.ine and -? ritish-?reach ground
and air maneuvers in Germany; alert drills. of the U,S, garrison in
i rlin; the large-scale 'iA.T0 naval maneuvers in the :`'orth Sea and
the =3altic; fleet vz.sita to Yugoslavia and elsewhere; and state.
gents by general 4dgway and other senior U.S. commande re re-
Mphasizing the need for, and practicality ofd an unrer:ri tting col-
lective effqrt to build a position of strength against aggression.
In thy: field of troop-civilian relations, a narked degree of closer
cooperation and collaboration between u,, , commanders and local g;ov-
errimer t p: ficial,s has been achieved and will be pressed forward. A
trend toward greater acceptance of U.S. military personnel can be
noted throughout estern %urgpe, The continued policy of offshore
procurement of supplies from t uropean sources contributes indirect7,y
to these ends by st .mulating the'I uropean econorrq and fostering
%nderstand..ng aragng ,north t tlantie defense forces.
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TOP ~ChLT
PhD P-3?
October 30, 1952
In the .piddle jLast two operations duurin?; the reporting
period, involving Defense Department actionp have contributed to the
psychological .effort, Thesc were the airlift of 3,854 pilgrims from
Beirut to Jidda, and the airlift of 4 tons of hybrid seed corn to
Lebanon, In addition, new evidence has emerged of the favorable
impact obtained from the good-will tour of Lebanese-born v jet
ace iajor Jabara (previously reported), These actions, undertaKen
specifically for their psychological effect,, have made a significant
contribution to the U.S,, cold war effort in the area.
In Latin America the Department of Defense continued to
assist iri the training,; and equipping of national r4litary forces,
tnus contributing to. t:le support of J.S. national policy and to the
etahilitr of existing governments,
4. In+a the conduct of a program to warn civilians residing
in 73 North Korean cilt es of tie impending bonihing by the United
i''ations Comr and expresses the intent to save non-combatant lives,
and at the came time is dgsgned to increase the pressure on the
c ata,unist negotiators at T'anmunjoiu. The continued refusal of the
Un ted iations Cox-;and to use force in repatriation. of prisoners of
war has gained wide s.?,pport in the free world. Leaflot, radio,, sad
l.qudspeakcr operations, directed at North Korean soldiers and civilians
and Chinese corrarioni,st soldiers., were continued at a high level,
Keports continue to indicate wide readership of the leaflets (of
which nearly 3 billion have beep dropped to date) despite harsh
-reprisals and scare propa,anda used by eornynu.ru st authorities against
the indlvid+aal involved, In the radio field,
S :CUhIT' 1ti1 U th TIQ
TOP $;Chi-T
a series Eras initiated
exploiting
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PSB D-34
Qctober 30, 1952
exploiting the statements of Chinese conurunist prisoners who oppose
forcible repatriation. on the debit side, publicity on agitation
in prisoner-of-war carips has provided the communists td.th additional
effective propaganda material$ despite attempts tp present a
contrary interpretation,
Other ,.e ,.
v ,t es
It Psychological ezplojtatien of military power;- Certain
atomic weapons tests have been exploited psychologically In conjunction
with the Department of State and the Atomic i ner;,y Cowriaspion. The
Department of Defense has promulgated a comprehensive policy on the
release of public information regarding atomic weapons, guided missiles,
and new weapons. Shows of military force have continued, primarily in
Europe (as noted above).
2, In addition to various activities indirectly countering
the cczicrrnuf,st '`Hate Awerica" campaign, the Department of Defense has
cooperated closely with the Department of State and other agencies
concerned to coord,nate the rei,gase of information on biological and
chemical warfare by the De,oartment and its components; and has joined
in the interdepartmental planning task concerned with countering the
B':" charges and other "Hate [Anerica" propaganda.
'o"ard illanntnC and h.esearch
The De artr,ient of Defense continues to conduct a broad
proram of research and development in strategic intelligence and
psychological warfare operations,
2, To further the wartipte national; psychological effort, the
joint Chiefs of staff approved a psychological warfare plan to
support
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TO? S:: Ckc T P ?i D-54
October 30, 1952
spot the rtJoint Emergency War Planprr using as guidance for this
purpose the u ati onal Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for General
I,-,a'" approved by the Psychological 1-:trategy Board+ The military
*vices and major subordinate connands'are currently developing or
modifying existing plans accordingly, Planning is progressing on a
"Traa1sfer Plan" to facilitate the vartirrte transfer of U. ` . foreign
info 'rnation equipment end nerscnne , to militsry control.
A psycholo1:i,cal plan to support the V .S1 forces in Japan
is bainh; developed.
t The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under study a oa.}er setting
forth the views of the supreme A lied Commander, i urope, on his
wartime psychological warfare responsibilities.
a5; Initial plans for the wartime conduct of psychological
open^Uons in Alaska, developed by the Commander in Chief, Alaskan
Forces, have been submitted to the joint C~4.efs of r,taff,
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SECT } ITY INFORMATION
TOP SWEET,
PSB D-3t
October 30, 1952
Swnr~a of Ry e its Field Staff esentatives of the
Mutual Securit Agen
Western Europe
The defense build-up and its attendant problems continued to
dominate the psychological climate in Western Europe during the period
under review, Although the period closed with a short-term upswing
in optimism, new and aggravated psychological factors were among the
major obstacles to the attain.m nt of U. S, policy objectives in the
area,
Following are the significant psychological factors noted;
1, Renewal of the Mutual Assostance Program by the U. S.
Congress served to reassure Europe as to the stability and con-
tin#ty of U. S, policy. However, the relationship of rich bene-
factor to needy beneficiary, inherent in the "foreign aidIf concept,
remained the most important single obstacle to favorable psycholog-
exploitation of U, S. programs in Europe. A new concept,
geared to the partnership approach,, would provide a much healthier
climate for psychological operations.
2, The defense build-up was accompanied by further swings in
the pendulum of popular attitudes. By mid-summer the noticeable
lift in European confidence and morale which had followed the
Lisbon Conference had sagged badly. Late in the quarter there
were signs that progress in the placing of offshore procurement
contracts, change in political leadership in Germany, and the
Pinay Government's success in holding the price line had contributed
to some alleviation of the earlier pessimism. However, the fear of
war,
This summary is based on reports of field representatives reviewed by
pill
8 9 / 1
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October 30, 1952
war, Soviet pressures and the economic burdens of defense con-
tinued to bode trouble for the rearmament effort,
31 Progress toward ratification and realization of the
European Defense Community, particularly in Frances ran afoul of
diminished public enthusiasm,
1. NATQ, while maintaining general support as a defensive
alliance, continued to lose its grasp on the popular imagination,
It is now viewed as a military alliance and nothing more. The
NATO Information Service has remained ineffective.
,t The impression is spreading in Europe that the economic
situation is not getting any better. As the quarter ended, em-
ployment was high and inflationary pressures had been checked in
some places, On the other hand, pressures on living standards
and general economic development, growing out of the defense pro-
gram, were causing visible restlessness, Some progress was achieved
by NSA programs for economic education, particularly in the field
of productivity and technical assistance, But U.. S, tariff and
trade restrictions remained a definite psychological drawback to
our general efforts abroad.
6. Neutralism, in its "third force" context, continued to
give ground in the face of Europets growing military strength,
the developingiisense of unity and possibly the Soviet peace
offensive, At the same time, opposition to the defense build-up
from the Bevanites and other European Socialists remained a very
serious problem, for which a better substantiated and documented
rebuttal needs to be made,
7 Anti-Americanism remained on the increase, Contributing
factors were the inevitable problems arising out of the growing number
SEMITY. INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
Of ,S.
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October 30, 1952
of U. S, troops abroad, the current U. S, election campaign,
Congressional cutbacks in aid, the growing impression abroad
that American officials tended to be more blunt and insistent
in their relations with European governments. Economic pressures
of the defense program, the generalized European unhappiness with
the state of the world, and the feeling in some quarters abroad
that America ie taking too strong .a line against Russia have also
been contributory causes of anti-Americanism,
In assessing the effectiveness of the MSA information program in
dealing with the foregoing psychological problems, the report points
to further progress during the quarter in the integration of NSA and
State information operations, and to increasing acceptance of the idea
within the U. S. government that our information operations dzould be
somewhat decentralized. At the same time, the report draws attention
to serious shortcomings in organization, procedure and direction,
I, MSA has relied almost entirely on the Mutual Security Act
for guidance as to "national objectives,"
2, There is increasing need for improved liaison and policy
and operations coordination between military and civilian informa-
tion elements' This is evident in such programs as offshore pro-
cerement and the delivery of military end-items to Europe6 , . ,
3. The NATO information services have not developed an effective
positive program, and remain weak.
fit, Recent exre rience has underlined the effectiveness of in-
direct propaganda techniques and suggests the need for further
development in this field,
In vi ew
SEQURITYY INFORMATION
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October 30, 1952
5, In view of the great size and psychological impact of the
.annual influx of American tourists in. Europe, more should be
done to study and influence this particular movement,
Southeast Asia (Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Formosa; Malaya)
Favorable psychological results accrued during the quarter from
LISA programs in the fields of agriculture and public health. The use
of DDT in anti-malaria campaigns and of aureomycin in treating
trachoma helped greatly to increase awareness of American aid,
Distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural programs made a
noticeable impact in the. area. Installation of community radio re-,
ceivers widened the audience available for information programs;
At the same time, it was reported, attempts to achieve the
maximum psychological impact from U, S. programs in the area were
impeded by conflicting policy interests. The U. S. position, in the
belief of peoples of this area, continued to suffer from too close an
identification with Western colonial interests and indigenous ruling
groups, in the face of a rising tide of revolutionary nationalism,
The report concluded ui th the following suggestions:
1. Local personnel should be trained to take over from
American personnel as quickly as possible in our various in-
formation, economic and social programs,
2, A special effort should be made to influence and support
intellectuals, professional ,people and upper insane groups, since
their influence is disproportionately large throughout the area,
Possibly a team of American specialists could be assigned to es-
tablish close liaison with these individualse
3. A strenuous effort should be made to recruit the highest
caliber of U.S, personnel for assignment to Southeast Asia.
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