INFORMAL MINUTES OF DIRECTOR AND CONSULTANTS INTERDEPTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION IN OFFICE OF DIRECTOR - DECEMBER 1,1950
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-01065A000500130029-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
29
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 1, 1950
Content Type:
MIN
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CIA-RDP80-01065A000500130029-8.pdf | 223.51 KB |
Body:
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INFORMAL MINUTES OF MEETING OF DIRECTOR AND CONSULTANTS
INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION
IN OFFICE OF DIRECTOR - DECEMBER It 1950
PRESENT: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director
Mr. Oechener, Acting Executive Secretary
Mr. Hulten
Mr. MacKnight
Mr. Phillips
Department of Defense - General Magruder.
Department of the Army - General McClure
Joint Chiefs of Staff - Lt. Col. Philbin
Economic Cooperation Administration - Mr. Berding
National Security Resources Board -> Mr..Sheppard
Central Intelligence Agency
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Prior to opening of general discussion, Q proposed a certain
treatment of the A-bomb theme by his Agency among the Chinese, based on a
statement which a. prominent scientist was prepared to give for the purpose.
Following discussion, Mr. Barrett summarized the main points as follows:
1. It would be useful to got dissemination of the
theme among the Chinese.
2. It was not desirable to have the theme used in
the U.S. or Europe.
3.. Voice of America could'pick up the theme from some
obscure source and play it to China.
4. It would be useful to have the theme played in
Hong Kong by Nationalist elements.
It was agreed thati Agency should procure the statement
from the scientist mentioned, and then work out procedures for the place-
ment and use of the material along the lines of the above summary.
The Director, in moving to general discussion, said that there were
no set items for the agenda, but that he had felt it desirable to call a
special meeting in view of the seriousness of the situation in Korea.
He presented an estimate of the general situation by the Intelligence
Section of the Department of State, stressing its gravity. He-felt that
the Board should:
1. Ensure planning in the propaganda field which
would help to deter expansionism by the Chinese
Communists or other forces.
2. Reexamine long-range planning, contemplated use
of facilities, etc. in the Government's information
program.
Mr. Barrett,askod whether others felt that the intelligence
estimate was in proper perspective; no dissent was expressed.
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Mr. Barrett stated, that his office had sent out a circular telegram
to public affairs officers in Western Europe and some parts of the world
for an appraisal of public opinion in their respective areas, and requested
Mr. Phillips to summarize the replies. Mr. Phillips stated that the fol-
lowing main points emerged from the replies:
1. There was deep apprehension of the danger of a
general war.
2. The U.S. should try all peaceful means to handle
the present situation.
3. There was criticism of General MacArthur for not
following UN directives.
It was feared that under the pressure of U.S.
public opinion, the U.S. was rushing into an
adventure.
5. There was repugnance to the use of the A-bomb.
Mr. Barrett observed that these replies indicated an obvious propa-
ganda job, in addition to deterring the Chinese or Soviet Communists in
their present course; this job was to "put spunk into a jittery Western
Europe." He felt this in spite of the fact that an intelligence estimate,
based on the opinion among Western European UN delegates, added up to a
belief that the Soviets were not yet ready to engage in an all-out war,
but only to embroil the U.S. with the Chinese in the Far .past.
General McClure asked whether the Board felt that publication of an
Army decision to revoke certain holiday leave would be useful. It was
agreed that it would be.
With respect to deterrents, Mr. Phillips said that he had a strong
feeling that the Soviet population-was really a better deterrent to
Soviet expansionism than the A-bomb and that we should perhaps take
another look at our defector policies and program.
. During discussion on this point,. General McClure felt that,a modest
program based on "selective defection" was desirable, rather than one
based on mass defection. He felt that it was important to concentrate
on individual defectors, who could be trained and sent back into Russia
as agents to assist perhaps in forming a foreign legion. General Magruder
agreed. that we did not want just a mass of dissatisfied defectors and
pointed out that the whole question of the defectors was now under serious
study by an ad hoc committee with interdepartmental representation; he
felt that the thing to do was to expedite this study. It was agreed'that
Mr. Barrett, on behalf of the Board, would undertake to urge this.
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Mr. Phillips, as a tangent of the question of defectors, said
'40hat he felt the need of a thorough reexamination of our output to
Russia to see whether we were following effective and realistic ob-
jectives at this time.
I&. Barrett reverted to the possibility of the use of deterrents
on Communist expansion at this time, as well as bolstering the morale
of our friends, and asked whether we had anything up our sleeves for
emergency use (balloons, leaflets, etc.) to use now on the Chinese
troops in Korea-or the Chinese mainland.
In the course of ensuing discussion, the following points
emergedt
1. General Magruder felt that we should seek a
policy decision to use the Chinese on Formosa
for propaganda purposes. He noted that
earlier efforts in this direction had been
canceled and felt that it would be in order
now if the Formosa Nationalists were kept out
of politics.
2. General McClure felt that we should put a
propaganda expert on our military mission in
Formosa and this was agreed. Mr. Berding
pointed out that ECA had a good man there.
3.
4.
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5. Mr. Berding suggested the possibility of a fort-
night's swing by General Eisenhower around Western
Europe, perhaps in a purely private capacity, which
he felt would have the effect of reassuring the
people of that area, since General Eisenhower was
so well and favorably known.
6. Mr. Barrett asked whether a Pentagon statement was
in preparation to refute the anti-MacArthur outcry
in Western Europe. General' McClure stated that
such a statement was in preparation-to show the
comparative phasing of General MacArthuree and the
Chinese offensives.
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Mr. Barrett asked the status of the planning under which State
Department personnel and facilities would be turned over in wartime to
theater commanders. Mr. Phillips said that he and LSr. Block were work-
Ing on this. General McClure reported that the Army plan for the
adaptation of such facilities and personnel in theaters had been
completed that day.
Mr. Hulten referred to problems that were arising in connection
with the wartime use of radio transmitters and other production centers
and felt the need to re-explore the possibility of using shipboard
transmitters,
Mr. Barrett, in closing the meeting, felt that the Board should
meet at least twice weekly hereafter.
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