SOVIET SENSITIVITIES

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01065A000600090006-7
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RIFPUB
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C
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 7, 2000
Sequence Number: 
6
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Publication Date: 
February 9, 1953
Content Type: 
IR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01065A000600090006-7.pdf1.56 MB
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A Approved For Release 20W09/01 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00060009 6-7 DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONFIDENTIAL .,. ! rrmrmsr r1TTnT*.. .n...>. Off ice''of Intellig.,ence,Res.ear0 SOVIET SEMI TIVITIES., The'. Psycholog cal':.Strategy ;Board has requested a, preliminary report illustra*ing-the Soviet Oc;vernmentts.:sen~sitivit es as..revealed.,by the scone and f or iai' it's react ons t ious U - o var S moves ,and.:-statements. Ix response o ghat request; this repgrt -;sets' forth a se sie$ of examples, e9cluding, ,ever, .:.theBtion of major US ?n ve`s connected with defense arrange- m ts c en , sin e there is no need.to illustrate-Soviet., sensitivity to any, action that serves to strengthen; the military position of:the' US soviet laader:s : re rd' as :'an actual . - - < '; oz* potential `t: neat .to. their paver position. finlike nos~t governments, however, th Soviet leaders have both .. .. a near psychopathic iyper' 3insitiv ty.toward tyre ts,..real.hnd imagined, and an unusual.,~i.efinittl6n of " at aoris itutes power. This h ersensitivit~ -p .. asp 3' p#nga f rem a - rii of arruro'es'i: the suspicions :insvttebl r bred by,a_ny aftospheres of conspiracy, the anxieties impligit jn;, `any :reg'lme t atM ru es bp ntxeroibn 't-pther- than by :'bnsent,, the tensions or... totalitsridni'sm, :tb wdigtr lot inherent in their gui'din'g premise of immutable, hostilitI between.,Qe miunis a =and }non Qc mmwnistee ... Their concept of power is ales; -vmique, Por them power is not confined simply to control of the "political apparatus; it. is.. implicit inT all human activity, Accustomed as revo.lut:i?n ri+ss` to' exploiting: even minor organizations and f unctions to enhan~c;e: their 'po1itIoal influence, they are understandably ovary, tame the r.:become rulers ofr'4ny.-independent group or activity. .Since in their view power. is pcit:ep ial1y everywhere, they insist above .all on gonoentrating in"their own hands a com letee monopoly of.' power total in quantity, absolute in quali y, t ?a11 facets of Soviet life, from composing.poetry to b ee~iing.. cattle Strus the'recor.,e come under their ` control, To: tolerate freO dom.of choicer ti ividuals wowdzbe,. in their outlook,' a;.a Commxunist a a. d virtual glossing over Tito ts~..oxistebci. Most Communist,- Pro ,pagan &. OA Tito is directed, to, Yugoslavia. ?Pr av taelffor .exatrtpl`s, .,devoted less than 0.5 percea of its f ' oreign "owe spac 1955 t Ys e no ? .ugoola v a', vvirr 111rJ4 rJ.AJr SEUURIT'X? IN$'OIIO~T Approvecl.For Release 2000109/01 CIA=RDP80-01065AO006.00090006=7 Approved For R@ se 200010 t f 80-01065AO 00090006-7 SEC II '42MATION Sino.So,vi?t..Relti, ns US Aot.ioasT Seorete;i- r?Ache'aon Oh January 12, 19513 cnargea ay cne Nationa rasa Club that the I SR' was detaching Manchuria and others areas from China and had completed this process in, Outer Mongolia, S.gviet Reactions After, acre than a week's silence,the, Soviet press on January 2 carried a TASS, di sliatoh from Peiping -attacking the,. Acheson statement. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshins ^ on January 22 went- to the ...length of issuing a formal statement which denounced Achesonrs "absurd" and "ax~nstroui" rexi rks,,, For .several weeks 'Sovpropaganda continued to attack ..the !.cheson stift . temerit along these.. lines .and said that the US the alliance b Teen the USSR and communist 'ot wa.s trying in In-to split China, O ter Mongolia also" issued a' for al denial which wa.s given con-' eider le publicity., by Moscow and Peiping. Co hi s Soviet reaction betra ys a sensitivity to any suggest c t the USSR is encroaching on Ch neseCoribnuniat sovereignty,. [] fiction: The dS press durinl .the Ge~nera ;Assembly .,session in negotiating behind the scenes ,on the Korean issue. the VS : Ggdarnment, on October..25 had Soviet Reaction: Al thou already denied ese report s, TASS on November 3'6190 "issued a deiial. Coiimeut: he TASt deriiel appears ; to be a further =effort to make Ilea .to p ng that Moscow mas not negotiating behind 'its backs on an issue,v tal tr the Chinesc ContnunIgts, C'ongorselyst whenyjhinsky on wneam'h ar F . A rineunc ed Peininp!* s abmolet e " su'e Sort for . hi`s'.. re.l ec' inn on thy. Ind ~n resolution on Kq ea, it ? appeared to rtdioate Con'munist ".anxiety , to ke dear STrio-Soviet solidarity-. Soviet Espionage with.comtrdtting espionage on' behalf of the SSR? t has also` requested the -.USSR :et times to , wi thdrsw' Soviet. officials n hie country :;?; (Gubitchev, NO?rlkov) who have been impIi3 tad` in espio age. Soviet React p s ..Moscow devoted .considerable effort to denouncing as US-ins Pi4T4 sr" the findinge in the anadian spy t ials og 1946. Sinc..e that time., . however,,. Moscow has a.ppare t'I3r, fel i silfienae, to be a better policy. _ Soviet; m~d a in: general , cgmnplet.el ignore .these, develp ends. 4lthou '~ S.ovtet. pro garde ePO t~d t e, Gubito'hev .case,; it neverr rovealed ,.. the ,ea iipaaa:ge aspect s, The-Soviet `tTniari has. ignored the' on erg oases and while the satellites have discussed it "is' evidence of . a.. pa'r`eecution of "progressives" and Jews, they have omitted any mention of the espionage charges, except for one Bulgarian broadcast. G0NFIDENTIAL CURYfYINFORMATION Approved For Release 2000 09/01: ClA=RDP80-01065A000600090006-7 Approved For Release 2000/09/01 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000600090006-7 CONFIDENTIAL lwi SFICU,RITY INFORMATION Co? nt t Sime the USSR is the. self-styled champion of peace and cobpera it refuses to, admit, even. by denials, that it is engaged in espionage activity.,, US Aotion: The US press and: other media ha't'e publicized the un- precede, e num er of refugees fleeing from East .Germany, particularly in Soviet Bloc Reaotioxi ', Soviet sensitivity both h td,'the exodus, of., refugees -an .to US publicity has beep,demonstrated by the increased con?,- t rpl= measures taken t o' b look movements . into West .B.erlip. and ,by the_ gymnastics of the East . German propaganda, line in, attempting tci. explain the situation. the. propagandists have tried the themes . the three tiffs .as many refugees flee to -East Germany than: to the` hest, that :refugees from ' East Germany are few, in number, that they are largely "criminals " saboteurs," "big landowners,"' and.. "sc,um," that a ,dire, .fate a rai'ts`any East German iefugeenaxd'.that:,many :'are now disillusioned`.,and"'-wish to.. return that the East German regime is !rgenertis" and welcomes anrefugee that wishes to return.- Finally ' East, German Premier Grotewohl._felt it necessary sought to reassure the East German population .that "No decent person here who does his work-an'-d' czbya, the law. ,., has any reason to seek the despair Comment:' The Caitimutf'st authorities appear.ta be caught,, here between two sensi ties,,,; On one handy they are obviously'6Oncerixed .over the loss'. the other hand, they are appareptly reluctapt for the present, to' establish since any advance preparation' fqr,.such., a measure woult undoubtedly prep pitate ' a sharp increase in the `fi.ow cif. refugees, before a,co;ess to Peet... Perlin >wae. ;.? completely sealed off a#id w,quld pace upon the,USSR tho' resptons..bilty "for'. , splitting Berlino US A ctioon% The Gong'res-s: Th' Oct0&,r 'l9'51_pas'sed tKe. Mutual Sacurity acre kmm), ino ucing aprovision' for approptiations "not to exceed ti 100,COO,OO0 ..,. for ax y,selected persons who ar,,O resi,dix g" in or' escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland., Czech oslovakia Hungary,.."Rumania.; Bulgaria Albania, Lithtaania, Latvia and.Estonia, or.the Cotah sat,-d urinate .areas Hof'' Germany and Austria, and any` other countries :;.absorbed by the;Soviet Union either to form such persons into ~eleme:ntts of the military' forces support;, ing the North Atlantic Treaty Or:ganiz.at'ion.or or,;,6t er ;purpose ,when'it; is similarly determined by the ?resident that such-,assistance Will con tribute to the defense of the North Atlantic ;`area and to-the'ecurrity of the United States." President Ei s:eihower, in';hi s , sppeeoh.to the American Legion on August 25, 1962, urged s.upport': f or :,ti e?.ultzmst?e "liberation" of Approved For Release 2000/09IRR X-l AOoo ooO90006-7 Approved For Rdse 2000/0"bo80--01065A000600090006-7 SWURITY I1qFbRMATTO1d 12 Soviet Bloc Actions Beginning With a note' to the U5 on Novembers 21, 1951, the made e A the basis for a full-scale propaganda` and diplomatic offensive against,the US, including debate on the Act before the UN General Assembly. Protests were made to the US or the UN by all of the Eastern European satellite## with the main difference' in `them being the "evidence" cited to bolster charges of subversion.. This..oampaigu rais preceded and accompaniedby a flurry of "spy" trials in Eastern Europe and by appeals to the population to maintain "vigilance." The campaign sub- sided in early 1952 but revived in the autumn, partly in response to the statements made during the US presidential campaign on ."liberation" of Eastern Europe. Pravda on Augusts29, comeuting on the Eisenhower speech of August 25 painTec aphighly alarmist picture of US' policy in the event he were elected. The areas he planned to "conquer"' were spelled out and his alleged policy was described as one that would dictate a "military decision" to.the Soviet people. At the 19th'Soviet Party Congress, a Latvian party spokesman scoffed at the, possibility that Eisenhower would succeed in his alleged designs. Eastern European comments on the Presidentt.s election were particularly vitriolic in' their attacks on his "liberation" policy. The campaign for "greater vigilance" has reached a peak in recent weeks. ?Comment Soviet and satellite efforts to increase vigilance within the orb an ,through an intensive propaganda campaign, to frighten allies of the US with the prospect of their being led into a war through US irresponsibility clearly indicate Moscow's sensitivity. ? The various US statements on the subject of future freedom of the Soviet satellite countries were quickly spread among the orbit populations. Scattered intelligence reports agreed that one of the results of these statements and of Eisenhowerts subsequent election was a quickening of popular hope of ultimate liberation. There can be no doubt that the Kremlin is concerned over the possibility of a concerted US campaign, of subversion against the satellite regimes,, regardless of the confidence` it may have in its own security organs and controls. More important, however, is the Kremlin's concern over popular expectations of such infiltration, If large .portions of the satellite populations believe that the US is engaged in a systematic program of subverting the Communist dictatorships they are apt to. become less tractable -- not necessarily in any spectacular way, but in small "passive" ways whose ownuNtive effect would be at least to impede the efficiency of the regime. To deflate any hope of US success the' Communist regimes have ridiculed the Eisenhower and Dulles statements and also staged several "discoveries" and "liquidations" of allegedUS,spy rings, in which the testimony emphasized the ineptness and stupidity of the alleged spies, and the ease with which they were caught,. At the same .time the Communist regimes have been intensifying their vigilance drive. Polish-Germany Boundary Issue ~ rim I M tion' The ITS information service has occasionally reminded Tye e c the Poles Na' , quite aside from all questions of the ultimate rightness CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 200Ag/v`f IC1A F8Q- 1865A000600090006-7 Approved For Release 20QI09/01 : C f 1 65A000600090Q G-7 SECURITY INFORMATION 13 or wrongness of Poland t8 claim to, thAi O&or+-Ne'is'se 'territories, Poland has no solid hold on these territories so long as the USSR remains their sole guarantor. US spokesmen point out that the Soviet, avsrnmezaxt can and may transfer some of these territories back to the Germans if it ever serves a Soviet political purpose to ..do st: S viet Bloc Reaction: -A ' main 'element of Polish Communist propaganda is the p +. nonce a th Oder-NeJ.ase frontier and the a.1leged fixity of Comment: The'Polish