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March 23, 2000
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March 27, 1953
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Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0106000600110012-7 Security Information SE R.ET COPY No. 25 27 March 1953 25X1A 25X1A MEMORANDUM To: From: Subject: Malenkov Test Case 1. The major points in this report were transmitted orally to you, during January and February. The most important finding was that there was not enough primary data on Malenkov to warrant a dataiied psychological analysis of his life. But as a result of my search for data I have come across suggestions related to this type of approach, as well as some ideas in respect to Malenlcov himself, which might interest members of PSU and perhaps others in the government who are work- ing on similar problems. To such persons this report may be of some value. 2. I have not incorporated observations and information available since the death of Stalin. In a ,luncheon conversation with of the Soviet Internal Branch of OTR, I learned that a number o, studies on Malenkov have been produced by that Branch since the death of Stalin. No doubt other government agencies have also been busy on the same topic. My own opinions concerning Ma.lenkov's personality wore reflected in a memo entitled "Malenkov," dated 3 March 53, and certain suggestions concerning the desirability of destroying a build-up of his hero image were jotted down in another memo entitled "Theme re Malenkov," dated 10 March 53. PSB :R 3/27/53 Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/15 S yp RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Relere 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01065000600110012-7 Security Information SECRET, 25X1A To: COPY NO. ,,,,,V5,- 26 March 53 Subject: Malenkov Test Case REFERENCES : (a) PSB D-24., dated 1 ' Nov. 52, entitled Program. of ^yr_9 2glgal gre arat.on for S"a.? in? s Passi q P r from E2Lle". 25X1 A b) d t d M fr ( a e emo om 4 Dee. 52, entitled k,vcMologica 401ys s of Pol itburo Li ders : Te , G , g. In PSB D-24 it is stated that the ''Ways of enhancing top-level conflicts in a useful. manner before Stalin's passing should be continuously studied, developed if promising, and employed when considered feasible and desirable by the members of PSB. This task should envisage not only conflicts as such but also those con- tributary factors which might eventually shape events in directions favorable to U. S. interests. Particular emphasis should be put upon exploring the possibility of developing psychological operations aimed at influencing the minds of top-level Soviet leaders in such a manner as to enhance decisively present or potential conflicts among them." This paragraph has created interest in the possibility of making detailed psychological analysis of important Soviet leaders, especially members of the Presidiums The classic psycho-political analysis :in World War II was made by Prof. William Langer and Prof. Henry Murray of Harvard in which they predicted that in the face of defeat Hitler would most likely commit suicide. This prediction proved useful to the intelligence community, since they were able to set in motion forces that at least partially destroy-d the Nazi image which Hitler wanted to leave behind him. Is it possible to produce comparable psycho-political analyses of Soviet leaders? Langer and Murray had available to them tremendous resources of psychological data, many primary sources: persons who had lived, Approved For Release 200085Hy4`~`01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Releftt 2000RWiyCRIPtq0 0106?00600110012-7 worked, played, and even engaged in sexual intimacies, with Hitler. Without primary source materials psychological studies are of dubious validity. Do we have enough primary source materials on members of the Presidium to make it worth while to undertake such a study? As the result of discussions of this problem with representa- tives from the supporting agencies of :TSB it was recommended that, on the basis of a test case, we decide if at present it is feasible and practical to carry out a detailed psychological analysis. Since Malenkov, during the last few years, has been frequently mentioned as the most likely successor to Stalin, it was decided to make him the test case, and the Deputy Director of PSB authorized a search by the undersigned of information and intelligence on Malenkov available in State, Defense, and CIA.* Searchirz,_for Rata.: Three general methods were used in searching for information on Malenkov: (a) Talking with persons who were knowledgeable about the Presidium or Malenkov for facts, opinions, and clues; (b) Screening or reading currently available non-classified literature on Malenkov; and (c) Consulting files on Malenkov available in government agencies, Government _iles_ on__Ma.lenkov : The government files which were consulted on Malenkov were as follows : Depar&snen"- ,~ c~t'~ theAzmy : (a) The Eurasian Branch of G-2 has two relevant files, both of which were consulted on 12 January. One file deals with the Politburo and the other with Malenkov. Norman Eli.asson, who made the files available to me, said they had been maintained by Mr.. Y. J. Skalnik for the use of General Weckerling when he was Deputy G-2. Mr. Skalni.k was at the time away on active duty. Eliasson suggested that there might be valuable information on Malenkov and * Morgan memo 4 Dec. 52 - 2 - Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/1t,sE -RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Rele 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0106!000600110012-7 Security Information SECRET others who had negotiated with the Russians and worked on missions in the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1946. The Navy and Air Force files on Malenkov were not consulted, since I was advised that nothing of any consequence would be found there on a purely political personality such as Malenkov. The G.-2 files had valuable materials and clues not duplicated in other sources. (b) At the time I consulted these files I talked with Mr. T. A. Georgevitch of the Eurasian Branch of G-2, who is responsi- ble for translating needed portions of the new Soviet Encyclo- pedia. He said that in the new Soviet Encyclopedia Malenkov would appear in about Volume 22, but only 11 volumes have so far been received in the United States; the 12th is on its way. Georgevitch also suggested that a complete search of data on Malenkov should include looking through articles and official biographic information on him which would have automatically appeared in central or provincial newspapers at the various times he was a candidate in Soviet elections. He felt that the Library of Congress would be the best overall source for Russian newspapers prior to or during Wor],d War IT, but that CIA would be the best source for postwar provincial newspapers in Russia. 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 29k*AA (a) CCD~ CS Is _UCZ. chi 23 January. in charge of Intelligence Support for covert operations, and ad a con- f erence with Mr. and two other CCI staff members on Malenkov, We reviewed the Ma enkov file which had assembled from everything available in CCD, CC10 and appeared to be quite knowledgeable about ovie o uro mac nations. The bulky folder on Malenkov contained quite a bit of both covert and overt information duplicated in the State files on Malenkov, but there were some new items on Malenkov, including a few _O reports previously unknown to me, Anyone who wishes to 25X1A make a complete study of Malenkov should consult folder; he has agreed to keep it intact and up-to-date in an cipat on of further studies. especially, but also the other CCI representa- tives, pointed out that the great majority of sources on Malenkov were secondary or tertiary and that the few primary sources which 25X1A were available could not be confirmed. As agroup, they thought quite highly of what had done in his -biographic 25X1A profiles of the Politburo. said that CIA information on the Politburo, including covert sources, had been provided to while he was searching for data. Approved For Release 2000MMS 1 0 01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Releo 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01065100600110012-7 Security Information made the following suggestions for research re (1) That a "content" analysis be made of the speeches of 25X1A Malenkov to determine trends of thought and points of emphasis. commented that Malenkov, like so many other important Soviet leaders, employs military phraseology, e.g., "arm the workers," "let us develop weapons for industry." (If a study of this kind 25X1A were to be undertaken might be extremely useful). (2) To make a study of the cliques in which Malerkov has played a role from his earliest days until the present to find out which meribers of the cliques have disappeared and who are still closely tied to Malenkov. What characteristics were possessed by those who disappeared? By those who survived? What elements of power do the members of the Malenkov clique at present control? And what persons or forces in the Soviet Union threaten their con- trol? 25X1A 25X1A (3) To make a similar study of the cliques around Malenkov ,patsy de Rassia, especially in the Satellite areas, to see if there are any relationships which can help to explain his past. or present influence or predict future developments involving him. In this connection, said that they are at present carrying out a study of the relationships between Politburo* and Satellite leaders in an attempt to determine what predictions can be made. pointed out that Zhdanov had at one time deliberately intervened in order to put Slansky in power in Czechoslovakia, and that now both are gone. Are there other persons tied in with Zhdanov and Slansky who might expect to be liquidated? (b) SR LI Division of DDP. had charge of the Malenkov file for this division. The file, which I consulted on 23 January 53, consisted of 6 cards, 5 X.S inches. In two instances the cards had information I had not previously known about. 25X1A (c) Rog_strY& I DP. On 28 January 53, and of his office turned over to me for inspection some 110 references which had been pulled out of Registry and Archive files of CIA. I estimated that about 25 or 30 of these references In this report the term "Politburo" is used synonymously with the present Presidium, which includes pre,-19th Congress Politburo members. 25X1A -4- Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/1;55 --RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Relea 20098%5' 9&-0106 x000600110012-7 SECRET contained information not otherwise duplicated in other Malenkov files and which should be consulted for a thorough study of him. 25X1A In addition to the 110 references which I screened there were, according to estimate, 27 references which they had not 25X1 A yet been able to obtain. At an rate all references are carefully annotated in a folder in office under the responsibility 25X1 A of As I reviewed this material I realized that even though 25X1A had been given access to CIA information on Malenkov, there was Wmuc nformation about Malenkov which, even though seen by- 25X1 A had not been reflected in the biographic profile study on him by 25X1 A Dep ~ tenant of Sfiate : BI/LI/OIR. On 14 January I talked with Mr. R; G. Mays, Chief of the Best European Branch of BI; he has charge of the Malenkov file in the Biographic Information Division of the Department of State. Comparatively speaking, Mays r folder on Malenkov is the most complete one available in those government agencies which I consulted, In addition to the folder itself there were 162 cards, 5 X 7, which contain information on Malenkov. If a quick survey of Malenkov information has to be done and limited to one source, then this would be the place to go, hLi _jt dippl be en nisi e that there is nc single f ilg_a as i1a a _! ZAI e in the go Te rn2Nnt~that has all the imp or. * a,nt_ inf orroa do _o i~_ gym. It is interesting in this connection that no one has compiled a reasonably complete bibliography of information on Malenkov. Nays thinks that a Malenkov bibliography very much needs to be done. Mays had a num- ber of suggestions: (a) He said that Joe Dees of VOA in New York has often stated that there are many untapped VOA sources on the Politburo 25X1A in New York. This suggestion by Mays is along the same g7neral line as one made by of CIA. Before he left for Europe25X1A in his quest for information on Soviet leaders told me that in preparing for his mission he discovered that there were many good sources of information in New York; particularly among recent refugees, on Soviet leaders. said that he hoped that 25X1A when he completed his European mission, in about a year, he would be able to find time to pick up some of the leads he uncovered in New York. He felt that they have so far not been sufficiently ex- ploited because the Eerensky group has monopolized the attention of those seeking information. (b) Mays thinks that an analysis of Malenkov's speeches and reports is a most important project which should be undertaken.* It is not at all unlikely that his earlier speeches reflect more of a personal and less an official production than the later speeches, which might then lead to interpretations of his personality and mental traits by means of "projective" and other remarks. Approved For Release 200 rNilo-f.MP80-01065AO00600110012-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Security In#.9r;pation SEJCRtT Depar_rtment of State: At the suggestion of 25X1A PSB liaison officer on this problem, on 8 January I converred with Mr, Chief of the Soviet Internal Branch of OIR, who had collected data on Malenkov. In addition'to looking through the 221 1 A Malenkov material and talking wit I di,ecus sed Malenkov matters wit as well as with Mr. 25X1A 25X1A Perhaps the most important item obtained from this Branch was a bibliographic listing of Ma.lenkov's known speeches and articles supplied by A List of lerkoyte Speeeeches and Articles 1. "Vovlecheniye Rabochikh V Partiyu" (Enrollment of workers into the Party), Belch?v-, No. 21-22, November, 1926, p. 41. 2. "Povyhheniye Proi svoiditelnosti Truda I Zadachi Nizovoi Partiinoi Rabo uy" (1mpxovem-iut of the productivity of labor and the tasks of lower Party units), Rols,tLit No, 6, March, 1929, p. 67. 3. "V Borbe Za Tempy" (In the Fight for Efficiency), Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 2, February, 1930, pp. 35.40. 4. "Report of the Mandate Commission to the XVIII All-Union Party Congress" - Br.1piiev-lk, No. 70 April, 1939, p. 91; Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 6, March, 1939, p. 61. 5. "Stalin 0 Bolshevistskikh Kadrakh" (Stalin About Bolshevik Cadres) Bots'.evi.L:, No. 1, January, 1950, pp. 70-76; Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 1, Jar_uary, 1940. 6, "Report to the XVIII All-Union Party Conference" (About p-roblezna of Party organiiati.ons in industry and transportation) -- Bolshevik, No, 3-4, February, 1941, pp, 11-35; Ko,Zuna.sti,ehesi In ternatt.s iona1, No. 3, 194L, 7. "Speech delivered in Moscow during the 1946 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet" -- Pravda February 8, 1946, p. 2; P~rtiinc~ e Stc~i';telscva, No. 3, February, 1946, pr 63. "Report to the Cominform Meeting in. Poland, September 1947" (About internal situation in the USSR) - Prvda, December 9, 194.7, pp,, 2-3. Malenkov signed the USSR Communist Party's condolences to Tokuda, General Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party. 'racTda, July 21, 1948, p. 1; So let News (English text), July 22, 1948. Security Information SECRET - 6 Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-.01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Relc ,se 2000/05/15 :CIA-RDP80-010 000600110012-7 Security orma on ` EbRiT 10. "Stalin -- The Leader of Progressive Mankind" (Published in honor of Stalin's 70th birthday). Pravda,, December 21, 1949, p.2; Bolshevik, No. 24, December, 1949, pp. 8-14; Soviet News, (Enlish text), December 23, 1939, p. 6. 11. Speech delivered at the Moscow celebration of the 32nd Anni- versary of the October Revolution. Pravda, November 7, 1949, pp. 2-4; Lolshevik No. 21, November, 1949, pp. 117; Soviet News (Lnglish text), November 7, 1949. 12. Speech delivered in Moscow during the 1950 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet3 Fr.dl.> March 10, 1950, pp. 2-3; o~ _vt News (English text), March 21 and 22, 1950. 13. "Report of the Central Committee to the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party." P atria,, October 6. 1952. itblisat_L01 Consulted: Bolshevik, 1924-52 Part'no~?ea St oitestvo, 1929-46 Pp.r_ ti pV2 Zhi.&,n, 1947-48 vast uovetov, 1921-38 Kpmnual sichesi Tnter~n, ional., 1919-51 Prayda Soviet News They are 13 in number, the last of which is the talk he gave before the 19th Party Congress. pointed out that25X1A references 1, 2, 3, and 5 in this list are not wel known. This list 25X1 A may prove useful if the suggestion made by is carried cut. It is of interest that these Malenkov speeches and articles spread from 1926 unto the present day. The earlier speeches, if they can be determined to be more or less personal products, would be especially valuable in a personality study of him. 25X1A - said that in his opinion and in the opinion of experts on Russia, Maleiicov is in first or second place as a suc- cessor. Molotov would be the only other contender. Security Information SECRET Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Rele 20%}/i'1,: ,F&P-0106000600110012-7 SECRET The Soviet Internal Branch has quite a thick folder on Malenkov. There are a few clippings in Russian and other foreign languages. Most of the data in the Soviet Internal Branch is from overt sources, among which is a dittoed copy of information on Malenkov given to Mr. Gilmore of the Associated Press on 24 October 46 by the Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau. The omissions in this outline may prove of significance. Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/155 qdRDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Rele 20Q0e05111t5y: RDP~80-0106 000600110012-7 SECRET Remarks and Conclusions As a result of my search of the.Malenkov literature I have come to certain conclusions which I should like to jot down. These suggestions are in addition to those which have already been made by persons with whom 'I have talked and whose ideas have been noted in the text of this report? They will not be repeated here. Anyone interested in studying the life and influence of Malenkov should review such suggestions to determine which or them might be carried out, (1) There is nowhere available in the government a complete file of Malenkov material, State and CIA have the bulkiest collec- tion. There is much overlap but also significant omissions. All this material needs to be brought together. (2) It is important to emphasize that the existing available knowledge on file on Malenkov does not warrant a d.eta~led psycho- logical analysis of the maxi. We know precious little about him. The Soviets have been complete and effective in depriving us (and their own people) from personal information about him. What were his parents like? His brothers and sisters? Or was he an only child? What did his compard.ons have to say about him? His record at school? There are hundreds of items of information essential to a proper personality study and we have so very few ans this case. The VOA article on Malenkov* (which, with theM 25X1A profile, are the two best jobs yet done on him in this country shows how much bare speculating it is necessary to engage in to derive conclusions on which we might act. Actually, we do not have any comments from anyone who has engaged in conversation with him beyond a hello or any exchange of ordinary greetings, or who has even worked directly for or with him.,** In the absence of basic primary source data there is no practical reason to encourage a team of highly specialized beha-iioral scientists to analyze Malenkovas personality. More primary source material needs to be collected. gF,orai 11alel-,;cZr by Lazar M. Pistrak, dt td. 2 Oct. 52, The Research Unit and Library of the International Broadcasting Service, Dept. of State, Report #1257, Pp. 46. i* Two books have recently appaared which shed some light on his personality but the r. eferenoes to him in these books are sparse : c1e Jcp p'a S?al .r, by Budu S 4aanidze, publi2hc:d by G. P. ZY-Yij Putnamis Sons, New Yo-^k; 1952, Pp. 235; and T_:to by Viadimar Dedijer published by Simon & Schuster, 1953, Pp. 436. -9- Security Information SECRET ' Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 ApproVed'For Reley 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0106 000600110012-7 Security nforma ion SECRET (3) Even though we don't have much primary data on Malenkov, we do have at least 400 different references dealing directly or indirectly with him in government files as of January 1953. For example, in a report dated 17 October '47 from Admiral Hillenkoetter to J. Edgar Hoover, entitled "Com-aunist international," it was stated that as early as 1945 it was known that Zhdanov and Malenkov were feuding. This important bit of information is not yet integrated into the fabric of fact and deduction about Malenkov. Two things could therefore be done : (a) Collect and evaluate all information about Malenkov (names, dates, factual and logical inconsistencies, observations, places, rumcrs) and (b) Then prepare a information to guide data search teams such as the 25X ? (4) There needs to be developed a moss unified plan for the collection, organizauioa, and exploitation of data on important per- sonalities. Considerable thought and planning will have to be devoted to'this subjeot if we hope to utilize to psywar advantage information about important personages. At present we do not have a system of classifying biographical information, and intelligence officers and attaches are given very little indoctrination on this topic. I should like to see three major developments take place as soon as possible in this connection: (a) Organize all our data on Soviet leaders so that we will have for each important person, a comprehensive, detailed, well-documented biographic staely. Each biographic, study should devote particular attention to the friends, enemies, and acquaint- ancesof the subject. (b) A. research project should lap pit is e for t ho de- ye pmept of a system fox_organizi,:? ? ecor .xr,, 1a o nh~.c~ in-- fnrn,at or,. Such an outline or. sycten would prove useful to intelli- gence officers who need guidance in the collection of information, report writers and analysts who have to organize and make frequent use of biographic data, and psychologists and political scientists who are sometimes called upon, to interpret the data for purpooes of prediction. At the presont time, even ,.hough all knowledge on a politically important personage were physically located in one office in a government agency, it would require an inordinate amount of time for an intelligent reader to make any sense out of the miscellaneous welter of de:ta h,_:A hazarded1y, even though chronologically arranged, in a folder. Research psychologists (working with political and social scientists) should develop a comprehensive questionnaire- schema which would make it possible for a non psychologist to - 10 Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/15 ~E*'RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Releao 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-0106*iQt000600110012-7 Security Information SECRET systematically get and easily use information on persons who are politically significant to us. The schema should be so arranged that one could seek a particular type of personality information on a certain page or by means of a particular coding - for example, cross checking information about Malenkovts friends with informa- tion about Molotov's enemies. (5) I believe that it would be useful at this time, in con- junction with psywar planning, to have a psychologist and a political scientist, both linguistically competent in Russian and with considerable knowladge of Russia and Communism, read and analyze Malenkovls speschas and publications in an attempt to de- termine their psychological and political content. Previous reference has been made in the text of this report to this project. It is well to bear in mind that, even though some of Mrlenkov's speechei and publl.cati,ons may be ghost written,, or merely parrot the party line, they are the only tangible indices we have of his atti- tudes and his thinking. (6 ) In analyzing the life of anyone, much light can be shed by a careful examination of the lives of persons closely associated with him, Since so little is known about Malenkov., it would be advisable to trace out the lives of persons who he either worked in-4imately with him or who have, in some way, clao'aed with Malenkov. In the case of Kaganovich, some of the questions that ws might ask are: How much influence did Kaganovlch really play i.n indoctrinat- ing Malenkov in the '2O's and in promoting him within the party? What role did Malenkov play in putting KaganovichIs sister in Stalin's bed, and was he instrumental in divorcing them later? Is he, Malenkov, as appears to be quite likely, the author of the anti- Semitic theme which Russia is now playing, and how does that fact, if it is established, relate to his teacher and mentor - Kaganovich, a Jew, and Zhd.anov, who is supposed to have had manly friends in the Satellites? Does Kaganovich, the early mentor of Malenkov, know too much about Malenkov so that sooner or later. Kaganovich must be liquidated? To what extent was Kaganovich rather than Molotov responsible for planting Ma.lenkov on Stalin as a personal secretary? How did Kaganovich and Malenkov get along when they worked together on the five-man World War. II production and defense team? And what were the relations betwoen Kaganovich and Zh(ianov? Was Zhukov, with whom, according to Budu Svanid.ze, Ma.lenkov fought on a volley ball court) in any way tied up with Zhdauov? Other than the fact that Zhdanov was competing with Malenkov for power, what personality traits did Zhdanov possess which annoyed or agitated Malenkov? (7) My investigation of the available data on Malenkov has con- vinced me that there is a need in the government for a Division of Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/1 5I(-RDP80-01065A000600110012-7 Approved For Rel6ask 200W 4 j ( ,R -0106 000600110012-7 SECRET - Personality Analysis to serve intelligence and psychological opera- tions. This division should be staffed by clinical psychologists, who have been trained and experienced in making individual biographic studies, but who have also had intelligence experience, political sophistication, and intimate personal knowledge of at least one foreign area and mastery of at least one foreign language. There has been talk about the need for this sort of thing since the end of World War II, and some progress has been made in this direction through increased attention to personality data. But a more systematic attack on this problem now seems warranted and practicable. /s/ 12- Security Information Approved For Release 2000/05/15 sZTPPRDP80-01065A000600110012-7