RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01240A000100140002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 28, 1961
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001 /09 - P80-0l 240A000100140002-5
W S
28 July 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Eugene L. Pahl
SUBJECT: Responsibilities for Production of the
National Intelligence Surveys
REFERENCE: Draft Report on Review of Selected Activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency, January
1 9 , 6 1 , by the Comptroller General of the
United States
1. At our meeting in Mr. Robert F. Keller's office on
8 June 1961, we agreed that the Agency would submit a memor-
andum covering points raised by you in the rtfereneed report.
The specific items concerned reimbursement by this Agency for
work done by the Department of State on the National Intelligence
Surveys (NIS) and Biographic Intelligence (BI).
2. To place the problem in perspective, the concept of
the over-all governmental intelligence structure should be kept
in mind. It has unique aspects in that the intelligence components
outside of the Central Intelligence Agency are integral parts of
their respective departments and agencies and yet in the field of
intelligence they must function on a coordinated batis to form a
close-knit team.
3. The basic responsibility to advise. and recommend to
the National Security Council on the coordination of intelligence
i3 placed in the Agency by section 102(d) of the National Security
ict of 1947, and subsection (3) of that section specifically places
on the Agency the responsibility to correlate and evaluate intel-
tigence relating to the national security and provide for the
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Govern-
ment "using?iere appropriate existing agencies ax*d facilities.
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NIS and BI are by definition intelligence relating to the national
security. Their preparation and dissemination are,` therefore,
basically the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. The NIS, because of their encyclopedic nature, require
multitudinous contributions, many of which are covered to one
degree or another in normal departmental intelligence output or
in other papers, reports, or studies done by various portions of
the Government, some not directly related to the intelligence
community. It would obviously be inefficient for the Central Intel-
ligence Agency to set up a staff which could duplicate the output
that is already required from these other outside staffs. In some
cases, these outside contributions need only some final editing to
be satisfactory for NIS purposes. In others, there must be sub-
stantial analysis and evaluation before they are suitable, and the
question arises of where such work can be most efficiently per-
formed and who shall bear the financial burden. In certain cases'
where a department or agency has basic competence in the field
of a particular contribution but must no to additional expense to
make the contribution responsive to NIS needs, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency may be responsible for compensating for such
additional expense. In others, the NIS contribution is compatible-.)
with departmental requirements and priorities so no question of
reimbursement arises. In all cases, however, it is the basic
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency to see that the
contributions are forthcoming and in satisfactory form, and the
Agency has the further duty to see that the completed NIS studies
are kept current and are given appropriate dissemination.
5. Obviously, some portions of the NIS studies will be
more troublesome than others and involve larger permanent
staffs and, therefore, greater continuing costs. Also, changing
requirements and capabilities make it necessary that the system
be flexible so that requirements can be met in the most efficient
manner.
6. The need for a flexible team concept in this area was
recognized by the National Security Council in its Intelligence
Directive No. 3, entitled "Coordination of Intelligence Production. "
In recognition of the Agency's statutory responsibility for correla-
tion and evaluation of intelligence relating to national security,
paragraph 1. d. puts the responsibility on the Central Intelligence
Agency for coordinating production and maintenance and accomplish-
ing the review, publication, and dissemination of the' NIS. In
further recognition of the statutory directive to use existing
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agencies and facilities where appropriate, the Directive provides
in subparagraphs d. and e. of paragraph 1. that other departments
and agencies of the Government may be called on for contributions.
7. In order to give guidance to the intelligence community,
paragraph 7. does allocate responsibilities in certain spheres to
certain agencies, and in subparagraph 7. a. particularly states that
the Department of State shall produce political and sociological intel-
ligence on all countries and economic intelligence on countries out-
side the Sino-Soviet Bloc. However, these assignments are subject
to refinements through a continuous program of coordination and
evaluation by the Director of Central Intelligence (paragraph 7. ),
and it, therefore, appears that the National Security Council clearly
recognized that the basic responsibility for the NIS rests in a team
composed of the intelligence community with the Central Intelligence
Agency as the focal point.
8. The practical demonstration of this theory is given in
the present assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency of the
allocation formerly given to the Department of State in paragraph
7. a. based on economy and an over-all saving in personnel in the
Executive Branch. We do not believe, therefore, thnt the provisions
of paragraph 7. of NSCID No. 3 are inconsistent with the basic
statutory responsibility of the Agency in the production of national
intelligence or that they preclude reimbursement bythe Central
Intelligence Agency of the whole or a portion of the coats incurred
in the preparation by other agencies of contributions to the NIS.
This position is further supported by the actions of the Appropria-
tions Committees involved, which are known to you.
EYRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
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