CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AUDIT - JUNE 8, 1962, MEETING WITH CIA COMPTROLLER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01240A000100140058-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: June 11, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
CIVIL ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING DIVISION
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES
Subject: Central Intelligence Agency audit--
June 8, 1962, meeting with CIA Comptroller
A. T. Samuelson, Director, CAAD, and E. L. Pahl: met with
Mr. Bross, Comptroller, CIA, and Deputy Comptroller,
CIA, in Mr. Bross' office, Room 6E64, CIA Headquarters Building.
Mr. Samuelson summarized the history of the GAO audits of CIA
activities, and the status of the present audit. i?r. Bross was
informed that the limitations on the audit access wai such that we
could not make a worthwhile contribution, either to the Congress or
the agency, commensurate with the investment of our professional
resources, and we therefore were taking steps to discontinue the
audit.
Mr. Samuelson stated that he suggested this meeting with
Mr. Bross as the alternative to the meeting at which Mr. McCone
and the Comptroller General were to attend, to comply with the
request of Mr. Dulles, former )irector of Central Intelligence,
in his letter of May 17, 1961, to tie Comptroller Ge3ieral in which
the DCI stated that before final action is taken to discontinue the
GAO audit of CIA he would like to discuss witb the Unmptroller
General the possibility of continuing the audit on some scale.
In arranging for a meeting with Mr. McCone to &iscuss our audit,
its limitations, and our proposal to discontinue, Mr_. Campbel_ had
agreed to attend the meeting should Mr. McCone so desire. However,
this meeting had been called off because the LCI had advised the
Comptroller General that he had been fully briefed obi the problems
of the GAO. audit at CIA.
Services Committee staff, be advised of our pion.
Mr. Samuelson stated that we have reviewed substantially all of
the areas in which we are permitted access and that under the present
limitations on our audits he believes it is not possible for GAO to
make reviews on a continuing basis that wouldbe helpful to the Congress.
Accordingly, he is again recommending to the Comptroller General that
our reviews at CIA be terwinated and that Mr. Smart, of the House Armed
.June 11, 1962
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Lengthy discussions followed this summarization in response to
a number of inquiries from Mr. Bross on the reasons (i)why GAO could
not make an effective audit, (2) the services GAO might continue to
render to CIA in the event the audit was discontinued, (3) the extent
of access to CIA activities that would be necessary to making a compre-
hensive audit of CIA activities, and (4) the congressional group or
groups revie~wJrjg GAO activities. The comments of GAO officials on
these matters are summarized below.
(1) GAO cannot make an effective audit of CIA activities
because the administrative activi.ties~iupport of zonsensitive
operations to which we are permitted access are not separated
from those in support of sensitive operations to thich we are
not permitted access. These administrative activities, such
as financial, property and personnel management, Control CIA
activities and are the areas where GAO audits are usually
productive of significant evaluations. In addition, the
activities of the Intelligence Component are of such a nature
that they are not readily susceptible to audit. she great bulk
of the expenditures of this Component are for personnel services
rendered in selecting on the basis of personal judgment under
broad guidelines the specific information to be collected,
collated, and used in the production of intelligence.
(2) It was agreed that: at such time as the GAO audit of CIA
is discontinued, GAO would continue to service such requests
of CIA that are necessary to maintain the ecrecy of their
sensitive operations, Including (a) horforing requests
for the cessation of field audits of contracts coming under DCI
certifications, under section 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949, and
(b) providing necessary contact:, for CIA use in fecretly obtain-
ing opinions, conclusions, and information from (SAO officials
without disclosing the identity of CIA.
(3) To obtain the maximum ei_fertivene>s of a (;Ai; audit of CIA
activities it would be nec:sssary-for the GAO audit staff to have
complete access to CIA activities. However, it ,is believed
possible to perform reasonably comprehnsi;ve reviews of CIA
activities with complete access to adsiri?stratiJe activities
performed in support of both 'genrit.ivj anti ,.np's' n1Ai ive operations.
P ponse to offs i
interest
(4) The GAO audit was erformed in ris '
demonstrated by Mr. Kilday's special subbommitt, on, CIA, and
other congressional. groups had not reque;t.Y tc 1SrrW,
audits of CIA, It wa. also stated that GAO pe fiorms 'audited,
under statutory authority granted it, and in adtf, tion undertakes
audits or reviews requested by committees and mombers of Congress.
E. L. Pahl
Supervisory Accountant
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