FISCAL YEAR 1961 ALLOTMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE DD/P AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01370R000600020006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 7, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 Approved Fo e I e a s e 4i'. jp ? bb4+RDP80-013700600020006-8
Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Comptroller
FROM : Deputy Chief, Budget Division
SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 1961 Allotment Structure
for the DD/P Area
REF Memo for Comptroller from Financial
Advisory Committee, Same Subject
is desired, there is no_objection on my party
DATE: ry JUL '96O
1. I do not have any objections to the recommendations contained
in paragraph 5 of the referenced memorandum. The recommendations do not
propose permanent changes and, moreover, are subject to action on your
part and approval of the DCI on the partial waiver of Regulationr 25X1
~
2. There are inferences in the memorandum, however, that I would
like to comment on. The first inference is that "each operating unit"
is the Deputy Director level whereas in my opinion "each operating unit"
is the office, staff, or division administered by an "operating official"
as defined in the regulations. This means that I think allotments should
go to the operating official level as a part of the other authorities and
responsibilities placed at the same level. The second inference is that
the amounts of approved Operational Programs or Operating Budgets can be
used as operating target levels and still serve as fund controls. I think
that there are two parts to financial administration: one is fund controls
through the apportionment and allotment process; and the second is opera-
tional and management controls through the cost plans system. These two
controls are separable and should not be commingled, or effective fund
control administration will be lost.
3. Another inference is that under the proposal the DD/P can
facilitate his "savings" exercise and adjust balances to avoid "red"
balances. If the DD/P exercises good financial controls, he will still
have the same problems of attempting to "squeeze" an office and if suc-
cessful will still cause "red" balances. What it amounts to is a proposal
to adjust "red" balances after the close of the year and to anticipate
unobligated balances to cover any over-obligations. This is not sound
practice and should not be condoned if that is the intent of the proposal
from DD/P.
4. To some extent, the DD/P proposal is a transfer of some of the
functions and responsibilities of budget execution to the DD/P. It could
eventually mean the establishment of a Clandestine Services budget branch,
presumably under your technical guidance, but responsible to DD/P and
physically located in DD/P.
5. However, as mentioned in the first paragraph, if a test operation
Approved For Release 20