NATIONAL VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 19, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
"NATIONAL" VERSUS
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:
A Comparative Analysis
CIA/SRS-3
N? 300
-01445 R
JOB ?0,
n?
NO, _-___I -------
FOLDER NO1 __ _____
TOTAL DOGS HEREIN _,~..
DOCUMENT
NO CHAN:. I- LI CLASS. E:
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEX1 F EViEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, "Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA'-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
"NATIONAL" VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:
A Comparative Analysis
CIA/SRS-3
This is a speculative study which
has been discussed with US Govern-
ment intelligence officers but has
not been formally coordinated. It
is based on information available to
SRS as of 30 November 1956.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
This paper is offered as a contribution toward the
critical evaluation of the prospects for World Communism.
It attempts to analyze the phenomenon known as National
Communism in contrast to International Communism. The
discussion is presented primarily in conceptual and specu-
lative terms, leaving for subsequent consideration such
pragmatic features as the power struggle within the Com-
munist leadership and the aspirations of the non-Soviet
peoples of the Communist Bloc.
Although the primary purpose of the paper is to
analyze National Communism, it also presents a tentative
evaluation and projection of that development in relation
to U. S. security interests. Finally, it examines a number
of hypotheses concerning the possible effects of National
Communism on the world movement.
In the past, the Communist leaders have rigidly
maintained the doctrine of the "inevitable downfall of capi-
talism". There is ample evidence that they still cherish
this belief, even though its falsehood has been proved in
the past, as it will be in the future. On our part there
appears to be a growing tendency to expect an "inevitable
downfall of Communism". This paper submits a number
of reflections which cast doubt on the validity of this
expectation.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
Introduction: Background
Terminology
The Essential Characteristics of
International Communism and National
Communism: A Comparative Analysis
Ideology
The Party
Economy
Intra-Communist Coordination
The Class Struggle
16
The Meaning of International and
National Communism for US Security
18
Some Hypothetical Future Developments
24
Conclusions
29
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
"NATIONAL" VERSUS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:
A Comparative Analysis
Introduction: Background
1. When Marx and Engels, in 1848, conjured up the
"'specter of Communism", they envisaged it as an international
phenomenon, even though they thought of .it primarily with respect
to industrial countries where a proletariat languished under the
exploitative whip of Capitalism. Moreover, contrary to Com-
munist claims, Marx and Engels were inexperienced in the tech-
niques of revolution. They did not outline a clear plan of action
for the implementation cf their theses.
2. It was Lenin who first conceived of methods to carry
out Marxist Communism. Lenin's concept of internationalism
was much broader than that of Marx-Engels. He saw Communism
as a.world force but he did not assume that it would, of necessity,
be directed by one hegemonic power. He displayed no contempt
for small countries but, rather, insisted on. "fraternal" relations
among CPs all over the world. It was only at the end of his life,
and of course under Stalin's auspices, that the organization of
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-0 TP445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
World. Communism, the Comintern, came to be dominated by
the CPSU and that Soviet supremacy emerged in the Communist
world.
3. Stalin's concept of International. Communism differed
considerably from that of Lenin. His belief that "Socialism can
be establi-shed in..one country" prevailed over the far more cosmom
politan concept of Trotsky, who insisted that a "permanent revolu-
tion" must continue until Communism had triumphed throughout the
world. Stalin, after having defeated Trotsky, set out to consolidate
the gains of Communism in the USSR, and to make it the "base" of
World Communism. On the basis of his success in the USSR, he
concluded that "Socialism" had to be built on the Soviet model, and
that the CPSU, controlling the USSR, must command the fealty of
all CPs throughout the world. Under his guidance the Comintern
became the instrument of Soviet Communist leadership until World
War II. By that time it had outlived its usefulness, and propaganda
considerations dictated its dissolution. The doctrine of Soviet
leadership of World Communism had been firmly established, and
the movement could now be adequately guided by the less militant
instrumentality of the Cominform, or directly by the CPSU.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA- U0030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
4. In Stalin's lifetime, Soviet control of International
Communism was breach d_ twice: first, by Tito's establishment
of an independent type of Communism following Yugoslavia's
ejection from the Cominform; and second, by Mao Tse-tung's
speedy conquest of the Chinese mainland which did not conform
to Soviet historical and ideological patterns. In both cases,
the Stalin regime found itself unable to prevent what amounted
to deviation from the -orthodox. line. Although they created dan-
gerous precedents, these breaches of solidarity had no significant
effects on the Stalin regime.
5. After Stalin's death, the rigid conception of what con-
stitutes deviationism was loosened, and the more flexible -Leninist
view -of relations among. "fraternal" Communist parties was found
better adaptable to prevailing conditions. This return to Leninism
was furthered by the recognition that the Stalinist type of adminis-
tration had compromised the progress of International Communism,
thereby harming USSR interests, and, in any case, would fail
*Chief among these is Mao's thesis of the peasantry as the spear-
head of the Chinese revolution as opposed to the Leninist concept
that only the industrial proletariat could aid should furnish revolu-
tionary leadership.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
without a Stalin. Neo-Leninism was hastened by the realiza-
tion that the nuclear stalemate made imperative the implementa-
tion of a new Communist strategy if the ultimate goal, Commun-
ist-world conquest, was to be achieved.
6. Concessions to the Satellites and to other components
of International Communism throughout the world were made for
two reasons. First, it had become essential to permit the blow-
ing off of nationalistic steam and to loosen economic stringencies
in an attempt to strengthen loyalties to the USSR and Communism.
Second, it was found necessary, in pursuit of the much advertised
relaxation of tensions, to present a more respectable front to non-
Communist areas, especially the Mr-o-Asian neutralists. Being
well aware that non-Communist governments look at Communist
organizations as conspiracies, the Kremlin strove to make them
appear as national political parties. In carrying this concept to
its logical conclusion, it tacitly admitted that "proletarian inter-
nationalism" was not sufficient to secure the loyalties of the
parties and sympathizers in the satellites and abroad nor the res-
pect of peoples in the free world. Thus it was led to allow for
considerations of national particularities in "building kocialism".
Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA-RD -0030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
Terminology
7. This new approach is loosely called "national Com-
munism", a term which has serious defects. Communism, if
it is to remain true to its long term objectives, must be "inter-
national". . So-called national Communism is less a form of
nationalism than a regional or local interpretation and applica-
tion of Marxist-Leninist theory, opportunistically adapted to
achieve certain strategic objectives. In contrast, international
Communism insists on a rather uniform interpretation of the
Marxist-Leninist gospel, which can emanate only from Moscow;
leadership of the Soviet Party and State is .held to be imperative
if Communism's final victory is to be won. The emergence of
national Communism has introduced new elements into Commun-
ist dialectics. Indeed, ever since Malenkov's introduction of the
"new course", the 20th.CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's "secret"
speech, there has been growing unrest, confusion and uncertainty
in the Communist world. The 30th June CPSU Resolution sought
to reduce the disturbance, but with only limited success.
8. National Communism is not a uniform phenomenon.
Its manifestations vary in every state where it has been wholly or
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : Cl - 001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
partially adopted. If the independent conduct of foreign rela-
tions is the keystone of sovereignty, only Yugoslavia can be
described as genuinely national Communist. Communist China
remains too deeply committed to Soviet foreign, economic and
military policies to be counted among the genuinely national
Communist states, Moreover, China believes that its own
experience can serve as a valid model for the development of
Communism in large areas of the world, and thus it will pro-
bably avoid overemphasis on the thesis of "multiple roads to
Socialism". Poland has adopted many features of national
Communism but it cannot have an independent foreign policy
and it remains closely bound to Bloc economy. The Soviet
concept of the satellites as a cordon sanitaire does not permit
independent implementation of individual foreign policies which
might run counter to Moscow?s interests. Therefore, the East-
ern European satellites patently cannot have full national. Com-
munist status. National Communism in the satellites is bound
to remain limited to mere trappings of sovereignty, although
they may be allowed to depart from the Soviet model in certain
aspects of internal political and economic organization and methods.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
9. In analyzing the Soviet position toward national Com-
munism, it must first be recalled that the 30 June Resolution
.calls for "ideological unanimity and fraternal solidarity of the
Marxist parties" and strongly implies that this requirement
takes precedence over "national peculiarities and the conditions
of each country". A PRAVDA editorial of 15 July states that
only "among the politically immature and over-credulous may
there be some who would fall for this claptrap of 'national
Communism'. " Again on 24 July, PRAVDA linked ideological
diversity with. the old errors of "reformism" and thundered:
"To believe that the peculiarities introduced by indivi-
dual peoples into their movement along the road to
socialism can assume forms of estrangement in. the
field of ideology is to draw a monstrous caricature of
reality . . . "
Three days before, on.2l July, Bulganin had exhorted the Poles
in Warsaw:
"We cannot disregard the attempts to weaken the inter-
national ties of the socialist camp under the banner of
so-called 'national peculiarities', attempts to sap the
might of the people's democratic state under the banner
of a dubious 'extension of democracy'. "
On.the other hand, it is significant that the Yugoslav Party paper
BORBA, just two days before Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade, con-
-7-
M, 1"1111 "M
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-014 0030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
demned by implication the intransigence of the 30 June
"Cooperation among socialist forces cannot be limited
to questions of practical politics or to the peace
struggle. It must be based on sincere belief in the
existence of various ways to socialism. . . Any
centralistic organization of socialist forces - even
if it were freed completely of hegemonic tendencies
which never has been the case can only harm
socialist development . . . "
10. This contrast between the Soviet and Yugoslav
concept of Communism has been highlighted by recent events
in Poland and Hungary. The 30 June Resolution outspokenly
stipulated that concessions to "independence" of states and
parties were contingent upon.abiding loyalty to the "socialist"
cause as the USSR understands it. Nevertheless, the pro-
nouncements of the 20th Congress which the Soviet leaders
have frequently reiterated, have created a cleavage between
"national" and international Communism. An attempt will be
made in this paper to analyze the differences between these
two types of Communism and to evaluate the findings in the
light of US security interests and possible future developments.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
Essential Characteristics of International Communism
and National Communism,
Ideology
A Comparative Analysis
11. Belief in the Marxist-Leninist ideology is a
fundamental requirement for every Communist. The univer-
sal adoption of this secular religion is the avowed goal of
Communism, and its acceptance by Communists throughout
the world gives it an international basis, despite national
diversities.
a. The Stalinist concept of International Com-
munism presupposed a central direction for all the
components of world Communism. The Soviet model
was to be followed and no deviation was permitted.
Among the Communist parties, the CPSU was the
unique fountainhead of wisdom and ideological inter-
pretation; the Communist bloc was a monolithic unit,
firmly welded along political, economic and military
lines. This extremely rigid doctrine has, indeed,
been loosened by Stalin's successors, but the Soviet
position of pre-eminence in.the Communist World
has not been relinquished.
-9-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 6QU" 01-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
b. National Communism is also based upon
Marxism-Leninism but it qualifies this adherence
by claiming its own right of doctrinal interpretation
in accordance with local conditions and national
self-interest. Moreover, while it still looks to
the USSR as primus inter pares of the Bloc, it no
longer feels bound to follow the Soviet model
exclusively in "building socialism".
The Party
12. The unique status of the Communist Party is
the cardinal doctrine of Leninism which international and
national Communism both acknowledge. The Party is the
"spearhead of the revolution" and the indispensable leader-
ship organization during the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Without it, the Communist state is unthinkable.
a. The Leninist concept of the Party requires
absolute domination over the organs of government.
Stalin, during the pre-war period of his rule, followed
this doctrine and as General Secretary of the Party,
-10-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
was doubly interested in enhancing its power for his
own. purposes. However, after World War II, the
concentration of State and Party leadership in Stalin's
person brought about some diminution of Party
influence; Stalin was the Party and he left it little
maneuverability. The Statutes of the 19th CPSU Con-
gress indicated this decrease of the Party's power
position and the deterioration of its, Leninist
character. _ Stalin's death abruptly ended this develop-
ment. -Once again, the Party became supreme. In
this respect, the "return to Leninism1" was genuine.
b. The status of the Party under national Com-
munism cannot be defined so clearly; it varies with
the type of leadership and the geographical location.
For example, in countries contiguous to the USSR or
Communist China, the Party's power tends to be
greater than in Yugoslavia. Generally, national Com-
munism's trend toward decentralization of administra-
tion - and economy would tend to make the Party a high
level guide whose primary task is to provide broad
-11-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA-RDP80-01445R000 '001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
counsel instead of detailed orders. As a result, the
executive power of government, especially in imple-
ment ng overall policies, would increase and lead to
more articulate divi&ions between Party and State.
Nevertheless, the body politic of a national Commune
ist state remains within the framework of the one-
party dictatorship, even though its Party apparatus
is more flexible and accommodating to the State's
requirements. Since Party and government are
interlocking and are often represented by identical
officials, no State-Party antagonism or clash of
interests need arise.
conomy
13. In the fields of economic planning and organiza-
tion, the differences between international and national Com-
munism come into clearest focus. It is here that the interests
of the Soviet state may collide with those of other Communist
states, regardless of ideological affinities.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
a. The USSR, leading international Communism,
has sought to build a monolithic bloc economy in which
detailed economic tasks and norms are assigned to each
member. A CEMAmtype* of organization probably is
considered essential for directing and coordinating the
overall Kremlin plan. Strengthening the Bloc economy
by "scientific" planning also strengthens the Soviet
economy and thereby assures the position of the USSR
as the "base" of World Communism. This concept of
a Communist economic master plan does not appear to
have been abandoned in the turbulent course of post-
20th Congress events. The doctrinal "liberalization"
proclaimed at the Congress applies only to the methods
employed by individual countries to fulfill their "norms
and not to the basic roles of their economies.
'.g CEMA, i.e. Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, is a
Moscow controlled organization, set up for the purpose of coor-
dinating and integrating satellite economy with that of the USSR,
iii accordance with Moscow?s economic master plan for the Orbit.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
b. National Communism regards its own economic
welfare as basic to the survival of Communism within its
own borders and, by extension, of Communism throughout
the world. It resents Soviet economic dictation with its
depressing effect on local living standards. It does not
accept the pace of industr. l:ization imposed by international
Communist doctrine, nor the principle of compulsory agri-
cultural collectivization. It does not seek to eliminate
government control of national economy nor to initiate non-
socialist methods. But it tends to leave the implementation
of the nation?s master plan to local enterprises, to decen-
tralize the national economy and to direct its efforts toward
better living conditions rather than the achievement of speci-
fic Soviet assignments. However, the economies of such
national Communist countries as already exist are compara-
tively weak and, with the exception of Yugoslavia, trading
possibilities with non-Communist countries are as yet quite
limited. Thus, satellite states, even if they were to estab-
lish national Communist regimes, would still be obliged to
depend on Soviet help which could be obtained only if they
remained within the Soviet economic empire. But even if
14-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-014
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
they became less dependent on.Soviet assistance, they
would hardly be permitted to break out of CEMA.
Intra-Communist Coordination
14. Leninism presupposes close cooperation between Com-
munist governments and parties throughout the world. It considers
the integral and total coordination of policies and tactics to be
imperative, embracing the political, economic, military, socio-
logical and cultural fields. Implicit in this approach is the subor-
dination of national interests to Communist objectives.
a. International Communism adheres to this line. The
Communist Bloc is to be strengthened by economic integration
(cf. above, 13. a.). Its military organization aims at coordin-
ating Communist forces throughout the Bloc with those of the
USSRin such fields as training, weapons parity and centrally
directed strategy. International Communism seeks to
identify "national" defense with defense of the Bloc in
general and the USSR in particular.
b. National Communism tends to accept a certain
degree of coordination but is wary of total integration. It
-15-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
aspires to deal with the USSR as nation to nation, in
the traditional sense, hoping to minimize CPSU intru-
sion. It is willing to accept a close affiliation of Bloc
economies, provided this will not adversely affect its
own economy and living standard. It will accept Soviet
military aid and counsel, since it needs weapons and
technical advice which it cannot obtain from the West.
But it opposes the infiltration of its armed forces by
Soviet officers and technicians. In general, it does not
believe that its own nationalism must of necessity be
suppressed in order to achieve Communist objectives;
it sees possibilities for combining national with Commun-
ist interests according to Togliatti's concept of "poly--
centrism". It might agree that there should be ideologi-
cal unity but would hold that this does not have to impair
national independence.
The Class Struggle
15. The doctrine of the class struggle which would end only
after the destruction of the bourgeoisie, capitalism and imperialism,
has been one of the cardinal points of Marxism-Leninism.
-I&-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA- 001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
a. For international Communism, this concept is
basic and untouchable. It is not subject to super-
structural changes. To relinquish the class struggle
would be like renouncing the creed of dialectics. The
November 1956 issue of the CPSU magazine PARTINAYA
ZHIZN' reiterated that "the construction of socialism
is impossible without a class struggle". This struggle
is not always possible by means of-open aggression or
violence; it must also be carried on through a vast pro-
gram of subversion, sabotage, infiltration, espionage
and propaganda. In the non-Communist world, Party
cadres, underground organizations and Communist fronts
are in charge of implementing Communist policies, with
the CPs acting as transmission belts for Soviet orders.
Within the Bloc, naked force will be unhesitatingly applied,
as the Hungarian example has shown, wherever the doctrine
shows signs of deviating toward "reformism".
b. National Communist regimes are first of all con-
cerned with the consolidation of their own independence,
standard of living and social problems.
It may therefore
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
be assumed that domestic energies will be spent on
internal reconstruction rather than on an activist class
struggle to which lip service will be paid in a perfunc-
tory manre r. The issue of the international class
struggle will remain, for a while at least, in abeyance,
but will not be formally abandoned so long as Marxism-
Leninism continues to be the guiding ideology. Given
a chance, national Communist regimes may seek to
influence and win the cooperation of labor movements
in non-Communist countries and to exploit nationalistic
aspirations of the "neutral" or uncommitted nations.
As national CPs acquire the appearance of respectable
political parties in many parts of the world, they may no
longer be looked upon as conspirators and may have
excellent prospects for building up united fronts with
Socialists.
The Meaning of International and National Communism for US
Security
16. In estimating the significance of different types of
Communism for US security, it is necessary to differentiate
-18-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RTYR80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
between short and long range effects. In the near future, a
monolithic Communist bloc under Moscow's leadership would
obviously be far more dangerous than a decentralized, or
"polycentric" group of national Communist states, primarily
concerned with their own welfare and unlikely to indulge in
Communist missionary work abroad. But in the long run,
Soviet absolutism in the Communist orbit, unless greatly
modified, might further undermine the loyalty and reliability
of the satellites and possibly lead to the deterioration of
Communist Parties in the Free World. On the other hand, a
polycentric league of Communist nations, based not only on a
common ideology but also on similarity of national interests,
voluntarily cooperating and working toward eventual Commun-
ist victory along independent lines, might prove to be
extremely dangerous for the US and its allies. Such a league
might appear most attractive to the neutralist nations, many
of which are already tending toward socialism.
17. It is true that the concept of National Communism,
despite basic Soviet objections (see para. 9.), has made some
headway. Events since Stalin's death have unquestionably
-19-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-014 158000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
shocked many of the faithful, and have created contradictions
within the Communist world. However, this should not
obscure the prospect that Communism, led by two large and
powerful countries, will eventually absorb the blows which it
has received since the 20th CPSU Congress. National Com-
munism will probably continue to be an element of disturbance
and contradiction, but it will nevertheless remain basically
loyal to Marxism-Leninism and will work toward eventual
destruction of evolutionary democracy.
18. The short range aspects of Communism's threat
to US and Western security;, if measured in terms of Interna-
tional and National Communism, may be outlined. as follows:
a. With the help of its organizational weapons,
International Communism will continue to stimulate un-
rest in the political, economic and cultural fields. Even
though the Soviet Communist leaders probably seek to
avoid general war, owing to the nuclear threat, to their
economic needs, and. to the realization that the Satellites
are not reliable, they will continue to use their military
establishment directly or indirectly as an instrument of
-20-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
pressure both inside and outside the Bloc. Such pres-
sure might be used liberally in conjunction with other
means of political warfare, since the Kremlin probably
discounts the likelihood of Western nuclear retaliation.
It probably considers that it can pursue activist policies
much farther without running into unacceptable risks.
b. National Communist states, on the other hand,
are less likely, for the time being, to initiate or follow
reckless policies. They must consolidate their gains,
strengthen their economies and firm up their "indepen-
dence". Moreover, they seek an end of Soviet occupation
and the ouster of Soviet nationals who have penetrated
their armed forces as advisers, technicians andofficers.
Nevertheless, it is possible, and even probable, that the
national Communist states will have to play the role of
respectable fronts for Soviet manipulations. It is con-
ceivable that such activities may not necessarily be
recognizable as such by national Communist regimes
or avoidable if Moscow orders them.
19. In the economic field, the interests of Soviet and
-2T?-
IMF-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
national Communisms are at variance. On the one hand, the
USSR will continue to strive for maximum influence on the
economic policies of the satellites and for the further integra-
tion of the Bloc. On the other hand, economic necessities in
national Communist countries will overshadow, for the time
being, ideological affinities and beliefs. If the USSR remained
adamant in limiting satellite economic contacts with the Free
World, economic deterioration could lead to more unrest,
rebellion and serious dislocation within the Soviet orbit. Such
policy, obviously, would not be in the best interest of the USSR.
By permitting the satellites some economic rapprochement with
non-orbit countries, the USSR might achieve certain benefits to
itself, despite the risks involved in exposing them to non-
Communist influence. In any event, the effectiveness of the
Bloc - whether monolithic or polycentric - will remain impaired
so long as serious economic deficiencies exist in the Satellites.
20. In the military field the Hungarian events have demon-
strated that Moscow can no longer be confident of the reliability
of the satellite armed forces. Recognition of this situation should
modify the Western estimate on the anti-Communist resistance
-22-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R0001G0030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
potential, at least for the near future. Continued Soviet
absolutism would probably perpetuate and deepen. the unrelia-
bility of Satellite forces. However, a polycentric organiza-
tion of nominally independent national Communist states, .
enjoying relatively decent living conditions and the symbols
of nationhood, might change the mood of these forces and
perhaps even permit the eventual development of greater
reliability.
21. If developments should favor progress toward inde-
pendence and local deviations from the Soviet model (such as
the end of agricultural collectivization), the gulf between the
USSR and national Communist countries might widen, thereby
strengthening national pride, and weakening established doc-
trines. Such developments could, in. the end, lead to a loosen-
ing of Communist solidarity, even though an appearance of bloc
unity vis-a-vis capitalism and imperialism might be maintained.
The need of national Communist countries for peace and economic
improvement would undermine the Leninist character of the
regimes and promote efforts toward a modus vivendi with the
non-Communist world. It is questionable, however, whether
-23-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
the Soviet Communists would permit such a situation to
develop. So long as Communism can uphold the fundamentals
of Marxism-Leninism, with its implacable hostility to the
"imperialistic" West, the Sino-Soviet Bloc in ideological,
economic and military respects probably will eventually re-
gain its cohesiveness.
Some Hypothetical Future Developments
22. There is ample evidence that the post-Stalin
methodological changes and the revision of certain unreward-
ing Stalinist policies not only have left untouched the basic
structure of the Soviet concept of state and society but have
considerably enhanced the strength of the CPSU, which still
remains the "spearhead of revolution". There is further
evidence that genuine Titoism, specifically the independent
conduct of foreign affairs, is confined to Yugoslavia and that
the 20th Congress doctrine of "various roads to socialism"
will be forcibly watered down in those satellite states which
are part of the Soviet cordon sanitaire . Thus national
Communism, so-called, may well serve as a strategic
auxiliary of the USSR and as a propaganda weapon for Soviet
purposes in Asia and Africa to boot. The lesson taught
Approved For Release 1999/0910i CIA-RDP 0.- 01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
the CPSU by Stalin's attitude toward the Yugoslav deviation has
been learned and applied. Can those changes, permitted in
satellite states as well as in the Communist Parties outside
the Communist orbit, leave residues which may, in the long
run, affect the character of Communism? And if so, in what
way and to what extent? While it is, of course, impossible to
foresee such developments with any degree of accuracy, the
following hypothetical thoughts are submitted for consideration.
A return.to Stalinism proper probably is believed inadvisable
by the Soviet leaders under present conditions. Leninism
provides the Kremlin with a policy sufficiently elastic and
aggressive to cope with a variety of developments which may
result from the end of the Stalinist imperium. Ruling out the
resumption of Stalinism, the following possibilities present
themselves-
a. Pursuant to Lenin's thesis of "fraternal
relations" among Communists, and in literal fulfill-
ment of the theses of the 20th Congress, monolithic
control of satellites and CPs abroad might be relin-
quished in favor of mere ideological affinity. True
national "independence" and development toward
-25-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
"socialism" according to prevailing local conditions
would be taken for granted. Such.a depolarization of
Communism, together with internal decentralization,
would increasingly remove national Communist states
and parties from Moscow's control and influence.
Indeed, it could result in a retreat from Leninism
toward a far more moderate type of socialism and an
inevitable rapprochement with the Free World. Moscow
is unlikely to permit such a development to happen within
the Bloc, since this would endanger Soviet physical secur-
ity and contribute to a deterioration of Communism
throughout the world. It might even use force to prevent it.
b. Lenin's idea of "democratic centralism" might be
adapted to international use in a polycentric system of
nominally "independent" Communist states. Such a system
would still adhere to the doctrine that "socialism" can be
built in various ways wit"ain a Communist league, albeit
under Soviet leadership. This association of states would
remain rather loose, for the time being. Its professed
principles would be that socialism is better than capitalism,
-26-
O i'43Y
Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA-RDP80-01445! 030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
that capitalism is inevitably doomed, and that a new
order must be established based on the socialization of
all means of production. These Marxian theses, pro-
pagated by an organization of nominally independent
states, might well exert a tremendous influence in those
areas where socialism is considered the only solution of
contemporary problems. Since many countries in Asia,
Africa and part of Europe are now in this category, a
"socialist" commonwealth, even though obviously Soviet
directed, might have a good chance to extent its influence
gradually throughout most of the world. Its success and
effectiveness would depend, of course, on the willingness
of the Eastern European satellites to play their part, on
the extent and character of Tito's cooperation and on the
participation of Communist China and its Far Eastern
satellites. It would further depend on the stability and
strength of the Moscow regime and its ability to carry
out "liberalization" measures on the one hand, while
successfully preventing secession of member states
from the Soviet orbit on the other hand. Without Com-
-27. -
LY.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-UI445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
munist China's cooperation, a Communist commonwealth
would be limited to Eastern Europe and would offer far
less attraction to non-orbit nations.
c. The Soviet leaders might decide that the creation
of a Communist commonwealth would not be a satisfactory
implementation of the new Leninism. They might, instead,
put severe limitations on national Communism, granting
only marginal independence to the satellites, while display-
ing a more liberal attitude toward Titoist countries not
contiguous to USSR territory and toward parties in the
free world. However, there would remain the problem of
organizational control It is not impossible that, if Moscow
believed the time for tighter control had come, a new type
of Comintern might be established. In this case, conces-
sions to Titoism would probably have to be made, in order
to avoid splitting the Communist nations into several blocs.
d. There is also a possibility that the Kremlin might
conceive of a polycantric transition period as a gigantic
tactical maneuver. After having served the purpose of get-
ting Communist nations closely together under Soviet auspices,
-28-
Y
Approved For Release 1999/09/08: CIA-FIDP80-014458- U 30001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
the "Socialist Commonwealth" would be led back,
more or less gradually, into a monolithically ruled
Communist bloc. It must be assumed that the Soviet
leaders remain convinced that they alone can lead
the way to the goal of a classless society and that,
until that is reached, on grounds of tradition and of
their power position, they must not let their control
slip away. Such a development could conceivably
result in a neo-Stalinism. However, it probably
would be considered feasible only after most or all
of the neutralist nations in Asia and Africa had joined
the "Socialist Commonwealth".
Conclusions
23. Recent events in Eastern Europe and, previously,
the apparent relaxation of Soviet aggressiveness, have given
rise to some hopes that Communism has degenerated and may
be at the beginning of its end. In our judgment, however, there
is no indication that Communism is dying, even though it may
be temporarily "indisposed". The Soviet leaders, armed with
-29-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
the faith of Marxism-Leninism, and a great power potential,
have the resources and the determination to prevent a
Goetterdaemmerung of Communism. Their present favorable
position vis-a-vis the former colonial and semi-colonial
countries provides an additional, strong element of potential
support. However, the appearance of Communism has changed
and is changing. Such changes have frequently occurred inthe
past. They have often seemed to indicate a retreat from basic
ideology but never actually were. They simply indicated that
in order to make better progress, different methods were being
employed or different strategic objectives established. In the
past, confusion and dissension resulting from such shifts have
always been overcome. There is no reason to assume that this
will not be the case again. Whether, as has been suggested, the
ferment created by recent events will result in an ultimate
erosion of Communism remains to be seen. It is suggested,
however, that current events do not provide reliable clues to
long-range Communist developments. Historical experience
has shown that the convulsions of relatively new movements
have often been instrumental in their strengthening and resur-
gence, albeit in different forms.
-30-
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
24. If individual national Communist states should
prove viable in the next few years, a conversion of the cen-
trally controlled Communist empire into a "commonwealth"
or league of cooperative and partially coordinated national
states would increase the total capabilities of the Communist
sector of the world during the next generation. The measures
presently being used at the initiative of the Soviet leaders are
contrived to assist the national sectors of the Soviet orbit to
solve their more pressing internal, administrative and economic
problems and thereby to develop a more stable, productive and
reliable society.
25. Granted the primary fact of national Communism,
namely, that each state will be run by its own Party and govern-
ment, we believe that the common ideological positions, the
personal associations of the leaders, the increasing power of
the USSR and the comparable social, agricultural and industri-
al problems facing each of the member: states provide a reason-
ably solid basis for continuing cooperation and for a common
attitude toward the non-socialist parts of the world. We there-
fore conclude that national Communism per se does not give us
any basis to hope for a decline of Communism in the foreseeable
App%W&For Release 1999/09/08,,; C)A RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4
Approved For Release 1999/09/Q$/C'FA-RDP80-01445R000100030001-4