COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ON MR. DULLES' SPEECH - 19 SEPTEMBER - SAN FRANCISCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100020005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 16, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
.aceurage
inevitable
of intuition
Lnion the general tone and tenor of the speech is overly
*tic. It is true that reservations and warnings are stated
speech, but the thrust of the speech is still such as to
11sf that International communism is in the process of
ation. This is, of course, a matter of judgment - indeed
In our opinion little purpose is served by encouraging the
naturally sanguine and perhaps complacent tendenciei of the American public.
We feel that the emphasis of public utterances should always be on the
extreme gravity of the Communist threat. If it turns out that we have been
Cassaddras beyond necessity, so much the better.
*dile Comma
estions
Para. 3. Some transition may be recut ed from Para. 2. Suggestion:
"Our socIety is confronted with a world situation in which the two great
forces of stability and change are in an almost unique state of tension.
Our American way of lLfe which was launched on a wave of revolution,
and shaken by a great civil conflict, has achieved what we feel to be a high
degree of stability. And yet it is confronted internally with factors of change
No Ci iANC:f.E IN CLASS.
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sad developme
ome we cannot always foresee, and
with menacing revolutionary chriltenges of worldconquering thrum;
this transition were adopted, the first two lines of Para. 4 would have to be
modified: "In a scene characterised by the interplay of change and efforts
to maintain stability, it is difficult. . . " etc.
Page 4 - first and second paragraphs Should not a sharper
distinction be drawn between the loyalty problem in the USSR and those in
China and the East European satellites? We feel that one should not discount
the satisfaction and pride which the Russian and perhaps the bulk of the Soviet
peoples derive from the Impressive growth In power, wealth add influence of
the Soviet Union. This is also true of Communist China.
Page 4 - last paragraph. It is a basic Communist principle that
change is an essential aspect of progress. This is expressed in the so-called
"dialectical view of history: thesis-antIthesis-synthesis. The task for
the Cornmunist Party and its leaders is to bring about change in a way to strengthen
the system, rather than weaken its vital principles. Hence the current
=phials on the d"creative interpretation" of Malhdam-Lardnism, expressed
in the simultaneous attack on "dogmatism" and'revisionism". Of the two,
the latter Ls currently regarded as the greater danger and is the more
rely reproved. We are not convinced that the Communists regard the
at-Leninist theories as of 'little aid" today; but they are showing
.flexibility in applying them. We must follow their distinctions
goals and methods, strategy and tactics, in evaluating their situation.
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Paragraph 6. There is considerable confusion in Western
about the "revolutionary" nature of Communism. In the Soviet
view, the USSR established the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by
revolutionary means. On that base it has "built socialismnot merely
laid its foundations, as Molotov alleged. It is now proceeding to the
achievement of "Communism". No other country has fully completed the
construction of socialism" phase, hence they must all. in some measure,
the Russian model. This applies to China. The loss of revolu
onary
fervor and drive is not necessarily uniform thoughout the Communist world.
It may actually be a source of strength within the USSR, "base" of world
Communism, while providing an "exportable" commodity which is not only
attracticre in the areas of 'liberation" throughout the former "colonial" and
the underdeveloped areas but is a useful tool of Soviet policy/.
Paragraph 7. It is true that there are no new"prophets" in the
USSRI but as indicated above, they may not be necessary at this stage
of Soviet development. They are still required in China, and Mao fulfills
that role.
Paragraph S. Middle. Suggest delete "reckless" and substitute
usystrimatic" cruelties of secret police.
Paragraph 10. Question first sentence. Boris.attempted to use
his control of the secret police. which had become a state within a state,
as the primary means of seising power. It was not his only means, as is
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shown by his role in respect of the "nationalities" policy and (probably)
faun Germany. But he lacked the essential mean., control of a powerful
pasty followinv hencehe failed.
Paragraph 11. There is no antithesis between "dictatorship of the
riat" and "collective leade ship". The primary distinction is between
gild and a "0/2**1111111 zu1et, both exertised in the name of the
&V a.
*graph. It is probably true ges" have
In gene al strengthened en Communist party even though may be
Ming at the time. We would suggest that the "separation of pow ers
principle as developed in the US is not applicable to Russian political experience.
Paragraph 12. Malenkov was obliged to confess primarily to
risme and to ce tain economic shortcomings. However1 the New
Cows principles were largely maintained by the successor ?egime. The
controversy over the priority of "b.svy industry" was largely a manifestation
of the ilantlly power struggle. AU Soviet leaders, whatever their factional
position. have consistently maintained that this priority was absolute, but
that increasing investment in consumer goods was neceasary and possible.
Page 9, Una S. Perhaps better to say with the "acquiescence" rather
than th "support" of the military. The role of the military, except in
matters of defense, still appears to us to be subordinate to that of the party.
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Paramph 13. There are strong indications that Khrushchev is con-
sc1cus
ty following the pattern of Stalin 'e seizure of power. How far he
that course entabts to be seen. It is doubtful that he will
*tternpt to push beyond the stage Stalin reached in the early 30s. before
the blood purges. - Suggest eh, last line to darkness of Outer Mongolia".
Paragraph 14. It might be worthwhile to amplify the "handpicked"
aspect. pointing out that between a third and a half of the Central Committee
was pa iasally appointed by Ithrushchev or the Secretariat which he fully
controlled. As result of the coup by which he seized power, it may be
possible in the future for the Presidium to ignore the Central Committee,
a* in the past. (Suggest Presidium be substituted for Politburo, throughout).
goasral, this section of the diecussion appears to give too little
weight to the decisive role of the CPSU apparatus. Khrushchev has adopted
the ici at restorer of the party, and it would seem prudent to &giwne that
wiU have considerable success in it.
Par. 11, top line. The Soviet leaders probsbly still regard Lenin -
- as useful guides in the field of power poll.
Poucy?
aad r
ce and foreign
It might be worth11e to point out that there has been an
Um in Soviet economic circles of the role of price, costs
a planned esoncrmy. Probably at this stage no one can foresee
what changes will take place in the centralized planning function, but
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of Page 12) it might be noted: (a) that the economic ministries
the Union Republics are represented at the Moscow level; (b) GospIan
greatly strengthened. (Some 27 specialized ministries have been
First paragraph. It may be questioned whe
would entercise decisive voice in "decentralisation". Of course, U the
onization result n a weakening of defense production, they might
have something to say. But it might be noted that the 7 or 8 ministries
LJ
most involved in defense production were not involved-in the decezstralization.
Page 13, last paragraph. As an indication of the magnitude of the
/a
lands" program, it might be pointed out that 200 million acres have
dready been opened, with a promise of conaiderably more. This increment
r than the entire wheat growing axea of Canada tor the United States.
115?11031147 though of course of inferior quality. The climatological significance
of the ponble might be pointed up by the fact that 3 out of 5 years should
terrmally have crop failures. The sequence of an extellent and a fair year
has already cheated the law of averages over the past 40 years. Nevertheless.
it is too early to predict that the gamble will fail in its objective, which is
to provide the necessary increment, at whatever cost to bring the Soviet
food supply more nearly up to the expectations and desires of the people.
Pap 13 - last line. Suggest "problem1 rather than 'fia5co which
appears too strong.
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is novr
Page 14-15. It will be izUx..ttni to see what progr..s the So4.ta
improving farm labor efficienyy. Now that the. r industrial
r situation has e.ntered the intensive Ass* (sharpened by the loss
persons in World War II, creating a birthrate decline which
ginning to be felt in the labor supply) they will undoubtedly be
o intensify the mechanisation and rationalligstion of aixLci4tr..
here is .normotia. provided the incentive problems of the
be solved. There are signs that Khruahchev recog-
the necessary steps (cf. the abolition of forced
easants' private plots).
You might add the claim of the Soviet breeds s that
dative; from
440
they WL1t be able to produce a Larger number of twin Iambs I
age 17. We feel that the Soviet policy toward the satellites is
fairly clear now matensuce a firm control. with greater elasticity
and avoidance of coercion; opposition to "national ConunsLnismu? ambivalent
Ultima with Tito, watchful attitude toward Gomulka, etc. We believe that
the USSR has not abandoned the long-range goal of integrating the economies,
least, and eventually the polities of the satellites with the USSR. Hungary
of cowl**. remains a standing difficulty. and at the momant. it is particularly
We 'believe, however, that the Soviet leaders have confidence that
time II reduce the gravity of this setback. particularly in the area of their
diplomatic thrust. the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
4?1.1.
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Page le line 4. Query 'facts of life ' - has other c annotatiolas
lane 8 suggest chang 'panicky" to alarmed".
Paragraph 10 Suggest less colloquial phrases such as "answer
obliquely, and turn aside with vituperation and diversive issues
The at interest of the Dudintsev novel lay in the picture it painted
of creative individual genius frustrated by "careerism". Perhaps the chi**
reason Khrushchev has "lambasted" it is the fact that Dudintsev assigns
role to the party whatsoever in the resolution of the dramatic conflict.
Khrushchev did admit that the book had some merits, and incicod.
Soviet press is full of attacks on bureaucratic sbdtification. always emphasising
that these are distortions of the system, not basic faults in it.
Page 19- last paragraph. Suggest omit "dream world" and substitute
'have Little or no knowledge . " Suggest "allegedly hostile attitudes of
certain American circles - (esually identified as Wall Street, Admiral
Radford and the Dulles brothers!). They emphasise the potential friendliness
of the "American people'.
Paragraphs 19-20. While we agree that the tang rang. prospects
of the Soviet educational system may be favorable to us, we would suggest that
political indoctrination will undoubtedly be /screamed with perhaps
growing effectiveness; (b) there is as yet no evidence that Soviet students
and intellectuals are extensively criticising the fundamezntals of the Communist
system; and (c) disciplinary measures and career incentives, coupled with
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iono economic opportunity and foreign policy successes
may go far to rninimise studeat restiveness.
Paragraph 20, last s stew . The problrm of the
eects intensive Itudy. We feel that the antithesis between party
aM industrial managers has been exaggerated. To a
coisidi,rab1e extent they represent complemantary and interlocking careers
sad Were a.
Paragraph 21. The diwuslon of Soviet motives in disarmament
to be somewhat incomplete. There are wudoubtedly economic
considerations, and propaganda advantages. Basically, they may not be
avers* to the camtinuation of the arms race, at least for a while longer. It
La a subtle. dangerous game, but not 3secessar4ly one which divides the
party !from the military leaders.
Paragraph 23. The Communists of course
is reeponsive to the true needs and aspiration* of the people. The area of
ambiguity is well indicated in Sahara "guided democracyconcept , which
may have been foisted on him by the Communists.
Paragraph 24. Some repetition in at **Intones.
Paragraph ZS. Last paragraph. We suggest that the ideOlogical
force o Communism in established Communist regimes may still be
I from being the basis of a militant revolutionary moerne,
adually becomes an accepted set of principles, notaher ilc_ctjto
ay nor special enthusiasm.
-9-
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IP,
the i e)'stern
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ion at the appeal of COMilittreiern i the nnderdeve1opd
1124114111 Irdght be expanded slightly to include more reference to the
convergence of iociaflsrn and nationalism.
Pages as.26. We are inclined to question the applicability o the
7 of the Trench Revolution to the Bolshevik, except in the mos
d generalised terms. A "Bonapartist" evolutio2x seems doubtful
in the atomic age
P * Z7. The
the four cisgi approa,ch, including the national bourgeoisie.
the great speedup of socialisation in 1955, the differant balance of agri-
allel needs further development,
cellars and industrya
ornpared with the USSR. etc. (We would be glad
to attempt a psra.graph along these lines).
Suggest the theme of "entrapment" be neeedioned in coromection with
rent attack on "rightist deviationists" - (cf. Secretary Dulles
yr* s conference).
Page 27 - last paragraph. We question the *ming demise".
Page 30- middle. We heliev
Soviet people are questioning
thods more than the basic tenets of the Communist erste
16 Septembez 1957
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