COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL CONCERNING THE SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100040003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
CONCERNING THE SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMUNISM
constructive attempt to improve the organizatia
. The Report
General is weieomed by SRS as a
ch on
ctuai base of policy in countering the greatest threat to our
rt of a bold and imaginative design to broaden and deepen the
SRS from its inception has recognized that
national security. As such, it conceived itself as being an experimental
vessel. launched with hoes and misgivings in the riptides of govern-
anent. Like any serious trial project, it. has constantly sought to
appraise itself dispassionately and to consider the alternatives to its
continued existence. In the course of two and a half years of intense
self-criticism, it has come to Certain conclusions which differ signi-
ngs and recommendations of the Inspector General
urn, SRS believes that the original conception from which it was
ed was sound, but that certain thangea in its pos
Agency would be advisable. These are presented below in the form of
specific recommendations after a comment on the findings of the
We believe that the Inspector General's account of the origin
of SRS is correct, although it may
.irate sufficiently the complex
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nature of the survey conducted by
horizon of ideas surveyed at that time, lies, in our
ect resolution of the problems which the Inspector
the full scale of alternatives which were canvassed at that time.
This is a not unimportant omission, in that it passes over the
deliberation with which SRS was established and the we
the intelligence community which it was intended to have . Further-
opini
General's report has analyzed.
3. The report _might also have devoted mor,
for conduct
ation to
- attempted to provide a three-part mechanism
esearch on International C
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1954-55, nor
strengthening the roles of
and of 0
defining an
e field of Interna
and creating a news
went, SRS,
conduct
a type of research which neither of the other two was intended to do.
This conCTUOf, which was noted officially by the IAC (IAC-D-99,
August 1955) clearly implied cooperation and interaction of the three
Ytainng separateness Of function. In a sense,
rch was created which could not c
its three structural elea
and from tb
eras: that the
rat thus,
:nue to stand if one of
removed. The recommendation of
S function be removed from the Agency
Dt only negates the original conception,
CON ! T AL
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but raises the question how the two expanded Communist research
meats of D#}/P and OIR would deal with that ar
'l
which had been assigned to SRS.
ure to give due weight to 466 speculative function.
speculative
it seems to us that the principal criticism of
study of Communism was considered to be a
is made clear in both the o
in 3:AC-D-99. SRS has worked c
d
n that
to view the world situation of Communism so far as possible
through Kremlin eyes", and to develo
that insight, suggestions
for "countering communism. " To this task it has brought a specialized
form of imagination and discipline
y replaced If its staf
That the speculative func
we believe, could not be
sed.
SRS involves comment on US
policy was recognized in the language of IAC-D-99. The Inspector
General believes that this is not an appropriate function for Intel-
Nevertheless, de
to exercise, and in the strict sense this may be true.
rrch on International Communism
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morandum of
gently under the a
ne event d! _Lure, CIA doea play a
and execution of national policy, and so long as
ase, we believe that it should have ;
O FL ENT L
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which concern
speculation on such m;
of Central intelligence includes within his purview It,
channel of the Deputy Director for Intelligence who
has been at liberty to indicate any transgressions of the bounds
the Staff was intended to operate. If it. should be deemed
entire function is inappropriate, it could be eliminated and
d that this aspect of SRS production has been rigidly
ie broad range of intelligence speculation which
was also assigned to SRS and which has be
d of its production disseminated outside the Agency.
opinion that sa net ng valuable would be lost by
the conception of the Staff.
6. The actual production of SRS has, we believe, been more
a decision, but it cad be carried out without doing violence t
dietinc
only partially correct to say that
primarily
:ruitful than the Inspector General`s report seems to
ject of the bulk
rk has been
erated. " A substantial proportion has bee-
ve to direct requests for assistance, notably from the 10
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and has been received with appreciation.
sio contributed directly to outside Agencies, especially OCB
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and USIA (notably SRS-5, Moscow Festival, which was transmitted
to: SEATO in advance of Agency publication). We have C
commented on drafts of the Director and ONE, and have had numerous
ions with desk officers of the DD/P branches bear
their operational problems. In other words,
and probably should be the
hile "self -generation"
ource of SRS activity,
The Staff has become an integral part of the Agency
and the intelligence community, and through this position has ma
ubstantial contribution to other elements of the governse
gani ational braLdening of base,
SRS production to that of other Agency
ion of the relation
7 The report presents, we believe, a somewhat misleading
ended below, its
?
e can be greatly extended In the future
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sex nate d works have frequently presented views conflicting with
eats, especially ~ It is not correct to imply that our
el~
I- Xg other Agency publications. major SRS studi:s bear a,
caveat, stressing tto speculative approach and the informal nature of
the coordination to which it has been subjected. is not sufficient
fhisi
to differentiate SRS studiea. say from CIEs or-publications,
caveat could be made fuller and more explicit. We do not believe,
-ow stand, that our workd are misunderstood as represent-
lug
official Agency position.
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In spite of the fact that SRS judgments are independ
not subject to compulsory coordination, they have in fact been iarj
agreed to by competent elerne
In and outside the Agency.
The two exceptions noted in the IC report, rather than being evidence
of impermissible conflict, ar e in fact indicative of valid
of opinion on
C 0NSr vc?rhv?`
ortant subject, i.e. the role of political as
TA! tCe- A
measures in combatting Co
-f I t Lo-
Our paper on Legality vs. Illegality (SRS-4 -
was a balanced evaluation of the two approaches to this task, and was
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'recognized as such by many of its readers. The fact that was
opposed. to its publication was communicated to DD/I, who nevertheless
approved its issuance. It is true that SRS judgment with respect to the
Nenni Socialists was different to that of the Ci Staff, but it is not true,
as stated in the report, that our view was disseminated outside,. or
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even within the Agency. Rather, at the instigation of er
debate was conducted in which it became apparent that the judgment
not only of SRS but of the majority of intelligence analysts CONE, OC
and OIR) we opposed to that a,
:aid before the Director,
f DDP.
as far as we are aware,
has not indicated that the SRS contribution to this important debate
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was out of order. Apart from these two issues, there has been
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general harmony of views between SRS and we haw reviewed
each other's papers in draft, and SRS has made many suggestions to
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which have been received with expressions of appreciation.
9. The comparison between SRS and CI/ICD production may be
Co ,r.1 Ff`fa r4'C1 rip q
sosrscwhat misleading. The purely statistical c ' considering
the relative sizes of the two elements, in not unfavorable to SRS.
election, and
implies a degree o overlap between the two which In fact does not
exist. The IG report notes a difference of content and approach
products but does not specify, its nature.
eiceC ga ofound,
effecting the quite diverse functions
production is property wee,
support
pus; it is usually either narrative-descriptive or in the
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nature of detailed factual aco ptlation.. occasion. Indeed,
has ventured into the speculative field, some
objected to these paperaj{e. g. Titoism the 40th .Anniversary `,
which have been received with due appreciation. Nevertheless, a
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problem does exist in the incursion of - into a field which is p
of DDI in general, not merely of SRS. This problem has been noted
by the DI?I himself. The recommendati
kven below is designed,
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olve this matter by peoviding a legitimate charter
outlet for the considerable residue of speculative thought which
inevitably h accumulated in a large group of specialists doing
research in support of operations. It might be noted that this
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problem is not confined to- but arises, n other elements of
DDP. notably SR Division,
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10. Perhaps the most disappointing feature of the 10 report
apparent failure to evaluate the production of SRS in terms of
originality, depth and intellectual distinction? Such an evaluation is
indeed difficult to formulate, whether on the basis of a reading of the
a sampling of reactions by customers .F SRS has constantly
ted to obtain such rea' ions, and, while they have not been numerous,
at least in written form, they have been substantial and positive.
possible to judge indirectly from the incorporation of
Ae-
SRS themes and proposals into thought and action of groups and
From this we feel justified in concluding that we have
fated with the action programs and policy functions of
made a number of contributions on the most important subjects of
national security which have been consistent, clear and marked by
unusual foresight. It is not the purpose of this paper to illustrate this
claim, but SRS is prepared to list a number of major s
uld be sufficient to justify its existence.
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11. Turning to the recommendations of the Inspector General,
SRS contends that they do not follow as a neces
effect what is said is that more s
on international Comm
its desirable, but that it
within the government. It is not entirely clear to use whe
be done
conclusion is derived solely from intrinsic considerations, or is to part
influenced by concern for budgetary tidiness. It would hardly seem
the transfer of this type of work from an Agency office to an outside
organization supported by the Agency -would constitute an
make the Agency?s budget more defensible. If ec
e research
ctive,
it would seem possible to achieve this more rationally by tidying the
ructure of research within the Agency )W inter
on this subject -
elusion from
SRS wed have a nurser of proposals to
12. It may be deb*ted
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outside org
is capable of exercising greater influence on the
process than a strategically placed element of g
t Itself. It is
true that, on occasion, a non-governmental voice, a prominent columnist
e.II
or correspondent or
positive reacti
hed scholar,
a c
T s r-ae more
ed intelligence agency.
r experience suggests that the resea
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scholarly institutions are all too often neglected, except perhaps
by individual z1x analysts, and do not have the weight of properly
staffed offices papers .
13. Moreover, the advantages enjoyed by governmental research
appear to us to be decisive in the type of work with which SRS is charged.
There is no substitute for the full "take" of cables, dispatches and
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reports which even in a cleared group such as
and, pr
Lever fully
Still less is there a substitute for the
daily contacts 1
st deal with the problems
g Communism on the level of action r{
advantage of detachment and freedom from pressure, which
times imputed to non-governmental scholarship, is
less i at than freque
but perhaps
posed. In any case, SRS has found
from its own experience that it is possible to achieve detachment and
time for reflection within the government fr
pressures of production need not weigh too -eavil,y on a group who are
long-range purview
clearly recognized and protected. SRS has als
and flexibility I
ahoI iJ(I
e of a number of aeadeenr3:c groups in the field. This
valuable asset, wldch to fully reflected in our work, would be lost If
SRS were removed from Washington. -10-
1.O)
est academic circles,, enjoying a
of prestige and access which would scarcely be achievable if
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I
14. Another negative, though secondary factor weighing the
nspector General's recommendation,
rr position
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of the staff members who might be affected by a transfer to _
needed,
recomm en
and feel that the
acquired b
pt the career obligation to go where their services are t~
do not we leo:
.are' experience which most of them have
iligence can beat be utilized in Washington.
event SRS were abolished, they would hope that their records would
ible for them to get suitable positions elsewhere in the
Since, as indicated above, we do not regard the
nendation as the best solution to the problems posed, it beh,
constructive alternative. This has been a c
preoccupation of SRS. In a sense the concern with aster:
be said even to have antedated the creation of the staff, and the
the prospect presented by the I
They are all, dedicated to gover
orated by
16. In essence the recommendation is Sim
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~ in 1955.
of Chief.. CI set forth on P. of the Inspector Elsner;
This matter was discussed in 1956 between Chief, Cl Staff and Chie
SRS, and has been ripened subsequentiy' It was not presented earlier,
0 prejudice the Inspector General's findings, nor to raise
internal organizational stirrings prematurely.
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Cnu NF I L
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17. Our proposal
established as an offic:
Director of Central fate,
aced fields, notably pa
by i DP/CI for operational support matters which would de
research matter from the Office of International Communism. To the
kuld be added a number cd scattered research elements n
]Propaganda Analysis Branch, and aemal
from SR Division and M
also be desirable to transfer from C?.
but we
lcai aspects of th
be qualified to do research in the long-range economic,
the proposed
The
somewhat comparable to the pre*
Director reporting to
'MMar
it, mi
t> a few individuals
a specif
should be organized on both
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hie and
such chiefs wed be responsible for direc
components, and would also constitute a b
aces Group of OIR., which w,
work of SRS= While this office would be independent
would help
y and varied missions.
them in closest collaboration and
A
co FID
E
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Inasmuch as Mr Allen Dulles is by law Director of Central
Intelligence of the U. S. Gore
national Comm
under him.
lints
ice devoted to Inter
tudies would be infinitaly stronger if placed
only have the right to crass D andDDP
Agency, but would be in a stronger position to main-
liaison functions outside the Agency.
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CONFIDEN'"i.
ate distracting influences and irn
19. A p s variant on this conception would
inciusti,
ividual representatives of the other LAC services
ld not be desirable. however,
telligence level.
e success of this Office would be careful
PA i1 "
Lot* available. This should include a nut
rear rotation,
Every effort should be made to simplify the or
and to slimi
td be si
a difficult to rec
other offices with the
"s K
necessary independence,
if all the necessary elements
of the Agency mentioned
14 imp
above. the whole could be consel dsted with a substantial ssavlu
a bold suggestion, d
?arg;
bed jurisdictions.
igalficant support Of the most experienced of,
of the Agency in this field. Chief/ CI. We beliebe that it is also a
a
he scheme projected by Elm . and one
-CO ~
QJflDENui1Ai
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-orn the Director and his Deputies, would stye
the Agency in Its central mission.
Z Z. Finally. it should be noted that this propos
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ply
OI- LNT L
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rind not be strengthened in the field of Inter
best solution to the Internal problem of the Agency.
This may well be desirable, but in our op