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November 9, 2016
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March 18, 1998
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October 30, 1957
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Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-0144,6R000100050006-6 9:7 AND /A FOR RECORD SUB CT: Conversation with Adriano Olivetti, 24 October 1951 This conversation was held at the request of Mr. Olivetti, to whom I had spoken about a year ago. I had the impression that he was interested in conveying: His views on the current Italian b. His views the international eituation, especially develop- re nts in the Satellite areas; c. A discreet and very indirect indication of hope that his Comenitit movement might receive sorn. e form of moral and perhaps other support from US sources. must ake it clear that this tatter was in no way explicitly indicated. As y cnersatlon last year. I was struck by Mr. Olivetti's combination, unique among Italian businessmen, of hard-headed practicality and intense idealism. Olivetti's judgments on the current political scene Italy were rather pessimistic. He sees much to criticise in all the political parties. With respect to the DC, he fears a growing trend toward corpora- tviem. As the party is growing stronger organisationally, it Is indulging in the all too human practice of discrimination against other parties through political patronage. Mr. Olivetti cited several instances of pressure in he various ministries, especially Interior, to create virtual DC preserves. e also cited pressures via the prefectorate upon municipalities where Christian Democrats were not in control. Aa a result of this expanding flC infiltration of government offices, there is a growing tendency in the niversities and lower career levels of administration to feel that adherence to the DC is a requirement for advancement. Mr. Olivetti felt that in the ng run the prospect of a one-party monopoly without the possibility of an effective opposition was a serious danger for Italy. He was not sure how enfant himself would develop as a political figure, but felt sure that he -1- c Approved For Release 1191MlfrerAm-1715780-01446R00100050006-EF Approved For Release 1994114614116,Ciaar80-01446R000100050006-6 warded himself as a. second de Gasperi, having before sibillity of 20 years dominance in Italian politics. On the other . Olivetti felt it unlikely that the DC could in the next elec eve the m*oranaa, which would permit it to dispense with a al coalition. He did feel, however, that it would not be access y DC to revive the quadri-partite but that an alliance with either the PSDI or the PSI would be sufficient. He seemed to feel that either of these alliances was more probable than an opening to the right. ith respect to the PSI)!, Mr. Mivetti was distinctly critical. party is dominated by its parliamentary group and by electoral concern of the tatter rather than by broad *tion. In this political, as opposed to moral or other, that the PSDI is in some measure "corrupt. fle was by the narrow margin of Sarsgat's victory in the party congress, sud doubted whether there was any danger that either of the left-wIrg peup. would secede. As he put it, if Eagszi were to come to COrSitiniti and ask for admission, he was sure that the movement would be very hesitant about accepting him. Olivetti said OW Comunith bad been a. IX for some time to establish a close workin& arr been put oil until after the party congress. Saragat would be disposed to conclude any a probably fears that such access of strength as (Mr. Olivetti spoke in terms of 3 to 4 seats) mi toral chances of Individual PSI* candidates. He feels show a slight gain in the coming elections and in any case smaller partiee, will secure additional seats as a result of the re of the electoral law which had hitherto worked in favor of the larger parties. Mr. Olivetti feels that the PSI remains divided on the central Issue of maintaining the U, with the PCI, approximate 40% being is favor of U. Noun, be is convinced, (and he feels that many others are) sincerelybreak with the Communists. On the Nonni is reluctant to force a split y at this stage when so large a percentage still 400 unprepnred to cut the Communist link completely. Nonni is also presum limited in freedom of action by financial considerations. Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050006-6 Approved For Relaseile80-01446R000100050006-6 r. Olivetti that be 1* not ant,i-Arnerican and not. opposed tic Alliance so long as adequate assurance is given of its e. Mr. Olivetti feels that it would be desirable for the US to make some approach to Nealli through non-official labor channels and to Javite him to make an unofficial visit to this country. 1-10 said nothing about any political agreement or negotiations between Comunitt and the PSI. The Communist party will probably suffer some loss - Mr. Olivetti suggested about 500, 000 votes. This might not take place in the event that some viable Issue is discovered by the Communists between now and the elections, but in any case, he feels that there is prospect that it will gain. It has lost considerable ground in the north and even in the south the rising level of prosperity has accrued to the benefit of Lauross party or the DC. Mr. Olivetti seemed rather discouraged in. He felt that the attitudes and policies of the indts m nt were militating against a sound development of the democ one and that a considerable number of potential defectors from the L were still. as he pat it, in a sort of "no-man's land". He felt, if nix. that the policies of the industrialists had become more benighted during the past year. Specifically. he claimed that an honest and confiden- tial canvass of Turin workers would indicate that at least 70% believe that many of CISL leaders are in the pay of Valletta. Whether this is true or not (and apparently Mr. Olivetti believes that there is some truth in it) the fact that this view is widely held has a demoralising effect on the labor Watteau lifted f r market by case of Fr both by fear of obstructionism. tion of this problem. e incubus of unemployment could be e Western European labor noted, however. that in the gely by the COT, motivated c employment and by Communist seemed optimistic about the resolu We did not discuss the broad aspects of I perity or of the future of the awed plan. He did in the Implementation of the Tremelloni tax laws (the attributed to Vanoni) was disappointing and that Italian continued to be deplorable. ;Lamle pros- however, that e for which h cal morality Approved For ReleaseireP80-01446R000100050006-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01448R000100050006-6 Our 4I*CUSBIO of the ernatlonalscene was rather brief. 1-1,P ceflod attention bleb he had delivered at irugee in August 1936 (a copy of which he gave me) in which he had discussed the problem about to be foreshadowed by the Polish and Hungarian up- risings. vus. the nature of a poet-Communist society (I shall comment on this separately after stadying his paper). With respect to the C.:Gym:014 movement, to be qietty entbusiaettc and optimistic. He felt that c made in the past year but added that ome doubt. He and its directors were seriously should become a sort of Italian Fel:item society or a political quasi-party. He spoke rather candidly about the financial problems of his movement, indicating that his entire salary from his firm was devoted to the movement. This put him under considerable train, since he had no other personal means available to put into omunitit and since the pressure to advance the business was of course very strong. H had indicated to me last year that his brother( -In-lave se political views are quite different, held him in considerable res *int because of his dominant financial position in the firm. heerfully. however, that he seemed able to c a progr movement was weighing whethe 25X1A9a Chief, SB Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050006-6 25X6B Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050006-6 TRANSMITTAL. SLIP DATE 30 04...t. 57 TO: Deputy Director/Intelligence ROOM NO. 354 BUILDING Admin REMARKS 2 5)ctinqt copy of this to (WE Division, has made no comment Accordingly, I put it in Although the Director enough on his mind, 25 while to send this to suggestion that he brie on the substance of page Or r L4 L.4..k. ASi.t..t.? t_vtA. . ler..4.4P6r1 t t ,LAAAM/Q1 memo in DDP) who on it. final form. doubtless has . t 'be worth tuii draft the irec:tor 4. /34310 . DBD I FROM: Chief, SRS/DDI ROOM NO. 304 BUILDING 2210 E St EXTENSION 2455 FORM NO, 211.1 REPLACES FORM 36.8 1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47) Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050006-6