CONVERSATION WITH ADRIANO OLIVETTI, 24 OCTOBER 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 30, 1957
• Content Type: MFR

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9:7
AND /A FOR RECORD
SUB CT: Conversation with Adriano Olivetti, 24 October 1951
This conversation was held at the request of Mr. Olivetti, to
whom I had spoken about a year ago. I had the impression that he was
interested in conveying:
His views on the current Italian
b. His views
the international eituation, especially develop-
re nts in the Satellite areas;
c. A discreet and very indirect indication of hope that his
Comenitit movement might receive sorn. e form of moral and
perhaps other support from US sources.
must ake it clear that this tatter was in no way explicitly indicated. As
y cnersatlon last year. I was struck by Mr. Olivetti's combination,
unique among Italian businessmen, of hard-headed practicality and intense
idealism.
Olivetti's judgments on the current political scene Italy
were rather pessimistic. He sees much to criticise in all the political
parties. With respect to the DC, he fears a growing trend toward corpora-
tviem. As the party is growing stronger organisationally, it Is indulging
in the all too human practice of discrimination against other parties through
political patronage. Mr. Olivetti cited several instances of pressure in
he various ministries, especially Interior, to create virtual DC preserves.
e also cited pressures via the prefectorate upon municipalities where
Christian Democrats were not in control. Aa a result of this expanding
flC infiltration of government offices, there is a growing tendency in the
niversities and lower career levels of administration to feel that adherence
to the DC is a requirement for advancement. Mr. Olivetti felt that in the
ng run the prospect of a one-party monopoly without the possibility of an
effective opposition was a serious danger for Italy. He was not sure how
enfant himself would develop as a political figure, but felt sure that he
-1-
c
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warded himself as a. second de Gasperi, having before
sibillity of 20 years dominance in Italian politics. On the other
. Olivetti felt it unlikely that the DC could in the next elec
eve the m*oranaa, which would permit it to dispense with a
al coalition. He did feel, however, that it would not be access y
DC to revive the quadri-partite but that an alliance with either the
PSDI or the PSI would be sufficient. He seemed to feel that either of
these alliances was more probable than an opening to the right.
ith respect to the PSI)!, Mr. Mivetti was distinctly critical.
party is dominated by its parliamentary group and by
electoral concern of the tatter rather than by broad
*tion. In this political, as opposed to moral or other,
that the PSDI is in some measure "corrupt. fle was
by the narrow margin of Sarsgat's victory in the party
congress, sud doubted whether there was any danger that either of the
left-wIrg peup. would secede. As he put it, if Eagszi were to come to
COrSitiniti and ask for admission, he was sure that the movement would
be very hesitant about accepting him.
Olivetti said OW Comunith bad been a.
IX for some time to establish a close workin& arr
been put oil until after the party congress.
Saragat would be disposed to conclude any a
probably fears that such access of strength as
(Mr. Olivetti spoke in terms of 3 to 4 seats) mi
toral chances of Individual PSI* candidates. He feels
show a slight gain in the coming elections and in any case
smaller partiee, will secure additional seats as a result of the re
of the electoral law which had hitherto worked in favor of the larger
parties.
Mr. Olivetti feels that the PSI remains divided on the central
Issue of maintaining the U, with the PCI, approximate 40% being is
favor of U. Noun, be is convinced, (and he feels that many others are)
sincerelybreak with the Communists. On the
Nonni is reluctant to force a split
y at this stage when so large a percentage still 400
unprepnred to cut the Communist link completely. Nonni is also presum
limited in freedom of action by financial considerations.
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r. Olivetti that be 1* not ant,i-Arnerican and not. opposed
tic Alliance so long as adequate assurance is given of its
e. Mr. Olivetti feels that it would be desirable for the
US to make some approach to Nealli through non-official labor channels
and to Javite him to make an unofficial visit to this country. 1-10 said
nothing about any political agreement or negotiations between Comunitt
and the PSI.
The Communist party will probably suffer some loss -
Mr. Olivetti suggested about 500, 000 votes. This might not take place
in the event that some viable Issue is discovered by the Communists
between now and the elections, but in any case, he feels that there is
prospect that it will gain. It has lost considerable ground in the north
and even in the south the rising level of prosperity has accrued to the
benefit of Lauross party or the DC.
Mr. Olivetti seemed rather discouraged
in. He felt that the attitudes and policies of the indts
m nt were militating against a sound development of the democ
one and that a considerable number of potential defectors from the
L were still. as he pat it, in a sort of "no-man's land". He felt, if
nix. that the policies of the industrialists had become more benighted
during the past year. Specifically. he claimed that an honest and confiden-
tial canvass of Turin workers would indicate that at least 70% believe that
many of CISL leaders are in the pay of Valletta. Whether this is true or
not (and apparently Mr. Olivetti believes that there is some truth in it)
the fact that this view is widely held has a demoralising effect on the labor
Watteau
lifted f r
market by
case of Fr
both by fear of
obstructionism.
tion of this problem.
e incubus of unemployment could be
e Western European labor
noted, however. that in the
gely by the COT, motivated
c employment and by Communist
seemed optimistic about the resolu
We did not discuss the broad aspects of I
perity or of the future of the awed plan. He did in
the Implementation of the Tremelloni tax laws (the
attributed to Vanoni) was disappointing and that Italian
continued to be deplorable.
;Lamle pros-
however, that
e for which h
cal morality
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Our 4I*CUSBIO of the ernatlonalscene was rather brief.
1-1,P
ceflod attention bleb he had delivered at irugee in
August 1936 (a copy of which he gave me) in which he had discussed
the problem about to be foreshadowed by the Polish and Hungarian up-
risings. vus. the nature of a poet-Communist society (I shall comment
on this separately after stadying his paper).
With respect to the C.:Gym:014 movement,
to be qietty entbusiaettc and optimistic. He felt that c
made in the past year but added that
ome doubt. He and its directors were seriously
should become a sort of Italian Fel:item society or
a political quasi-party. He spoke rather candidly about the financial
problems of his movement, indicating that his entire salary from his
firm was devoted to the movement. This put him under considerable
train, since he had no other personal means available to put into
omunitit and since the pressure to advance the business was of course
very strong. H had indicated to me last year that his brother( -In-lave
se political views are quite different, held him in considerable res
*int because of his dominant financial position in the firm.
heerfully. however, that he seemed able to c a
progr
movement was
weighing whethe
25X1A9a
Chief, SB
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25X6B
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TRANSMITTAL. SLIP
DATE
30 04...t. 57
TO:
Deputy Director/Intelligence
ROOM NO.
354
BUILDING
Admin
REMARKS
2 5)ctinqt copy of this
to (WE Division,
has made no comment
Accordingly, I put it in
Although the Director
enough on his mind, 25
while to send this to
suggestion that he brie
on the substance of page
Or r L4 L.4..k.
ASi.t..t.? t_vtA. . ler..4.4P6r1
t t ,LAAAM/Q1
memo in
DDP) who
on it.
final form.
doubtless has
. t 'be worth
tuii draft
the irec:tor
4.
/34310
. DBD
I
FROM:
Chief, SRS/DDI
ROOM NO.
304
BUILDING
2210 E St
EXTENSION
2455
FORM NO, 211.1 REPLACES FORM 36.8
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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