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Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 18, 1998
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Publication Date: 
February 7, 1957
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1.pdf435.14 KB
Approved For Re!easel 999/s ? : C1A-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1 OR UM SUPLrECT Effects of Soviet B. press Parties in italy an r 7 ebruty 1957 I. There has beau, a rather wi4epread impression that e Corn muniat parties of France and Italy have been seriously affected by the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising. Undoubtedly this action created serious strains within these parties. Nevertheless it does not appear that they have been permanently damaged or that we ahould anti- cipate a major decline in their hold on their respective electorates. Z. The following considerations suggest that the future of these pa es should not be too optimistically projected from our .viewpoint. 1. it should forgotten that the Communist operational code dictates maximum effort to recover from adverse developments by vigorous relftleeption of tactical initiatives along proven and established lines. Both parties have already undertaken the counter-offensive. and there is every reason to believe that they will have some SUCCOSS in expioiting a variety of domestic issues. Z. The long raztge impact of the Hungarian events may be some discounted in view of the short memo e average voter and of the ict that external events, no matter how dramadc1 have relatively little influence Am the way the ordinary French or Italian working mai. casts his vote. 3. In any case, th efforts which the Savt Unlo tabilize the posit GD of World Communism will probably ieawire of external detente which, will at least partially reduce the fer- nt by the events a October and November This is not to say that the impact of these events to ephemeral; it constitutes & lesion in the bodya International Cormmmiam. 4. The I pact on iiiteUectuai has been serious1 and torn*have permanently fallen out a rank. Nevertheless, the majority will probably rationalize their oontinued inegiance either positively, like the French poet Vercors. who reaffirms his loyalty to the ideal of Uri in spite of ite past mistakes, or negatively. for alternative. N omraun- 1 P.it?A0Iff* Approved For Release 19 9 09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R0001000800110-1' FR. lc 54 50 Approved For Release 19 9/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1 5. The underlying roots of the Communist protest vote which are largely social and economic have not been affected by these exter- nal events and can be destroyed only by a much deeper and more pro- longed process within the two countries the process of reform and proves*. 6. it seems unlikely the common market which is ist press of all European count ment. li, however, the common f achievement or prove visibly di 'Lydon will be great. e campaign against uratomand onducted throughout Comnrmtn- ii succeed in halting their develop rket and Euratom should either fail ppointing, the advantages to Cam 7. Dissident Communism, whether Reals or the Hervti type, does not appear to have political viability. It seems likely that at movements will be subject to the virtually universal law that imnunist dissidence is doomed **best to protracted isolation and orst to early death. B.?epcific Developmenttin ltay I. Although Togliatti 's authority was challenged at the ii Congress, it may have emerged strengthened rather than weakens This Is difficult to determine at this stage, but it should be noted that the Central Committee and the directing bodies of the PCI have on the whole been Invigorated by the addition of new blood and the rerr101/11 or elimination of dissident elements. Z. The PCI has effectively seised upon certain domestic poli tical issues, notably the debate on the Agrarian Pact Law. it is not certain that. It will be able to carry such campaigns to a successful conclusion, but their disruptive impact on Italian political stability should not be minimized. 3. The setback to the PCI in the labor union field its so although not reflected in corresponding gains by the free trade unions. The COL, under Communist domination, may represent a major trump card in frustrating the mtrger of the PSI and PSI)I and may continue to be a stumbling block to the establishment of a viable non-Communist working class movement, . . 4. munist hold unshaken. rtsdn loose (estimated at operatives, which is a basic source of funds, is e Com- -4- Approved For Release 19.61. CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1 5. It has been d that PCI etrengtlt has Lilian drastically, and there have been a le number of group defections and a general ag in renewal of Party- membership. Nevertheleas, even non-Communist Italian newspapers speculate that by the end of its membership drive the Party will claim, if not actually achieve. app rnately the same membership as in 1956. Moreover, it may be sus- pected that the PCI might have a tactical reason for keeping its rneut ship figures relatively low at this stage. C !ranee 1. It is icne rally agreed that the CF od under the Thorez Leadership. its strength and oganiiatoni etability von been diminiehed by the Hungarian possible that a certain tendency toward atrophy, whith ha seen noted in recent years and which has been the rem& of the one of prolonged amd isolated opposition, may be in part overcome by the eock of the Hungarian events4 leading to increased militancy and discipline. Z. As noted above, the impact on the intellectuals has probably csuse and may in fact now be producing a reverse reaction r strengthening their dedication. EVea the spectacular revolt tre should not be regarded as irreversible. 3. It is generally noted that econozuc .etbacks resulting from the Sues crsia constitute a promising political issue for PCF expktita tion. U ather factors lead to * slowing down in the rate of economic prop e past few years, or even to a recession, the Communists will have abundant material for propaganda and political agitation. 4. Unlike the situation in 1tay, Comrnwiiam in France is not confronted with a major crisis arising out of te prospcttve emergence of a large non-Communist socialist party. In Italy the successfid merger of the two Socialist partiee would undoubtedly cost the PCI considerable znexnb.rhip and voting strength. There is no corresponding possibility visible in F ance at this time. 5. rhe recent by-electionParis, while It ked triumph for the Rightist candidate, did not indicate any clear ioaa of voting strength by the Comtmmists, and has even been specio inter- preted in their own press as a sort of success. Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1 Approved For Release 1999/ RDP80-01446R000100050010-1 6, The probabitity that dev Aigeria will prove adverse, if not digest politics may soon face a period of intense * and left extremism would be heightened and Communist agitation would be increased. pecially s that Trench oth right ct for disruptive 7. remedy de and Lather eta will vigarousl lag made by responsible a ticsl system. notably in the el* ecutive to the legislative branch. The Corn oppose these efforts. and may have consider- success in frustrating moves to create a more stable polity. Thi rn would encourage Right extremism and might lead to an attempted coup or at least to greater political tension and violence. 25X1A9a SRS/ DDI Approved For Release 199 diA-RDP80-01446R000100050010-1