Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 18, 1998
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 25, 1956
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01446R000100050012-9.pdf115.44 KB
Approved For RQ~ase I 9 7C *& CIA-RDP80-0U46R000100050012-9 25 October 1956 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director /Intelligence 1. The attached memorandum is essentially my own, but the other members of SRS are in substantial agreement with it. 2. I hope that it will be possible for the Director to read it. I consider that this is a very critical moment for US policy in rela- tion to the Socialist merger movement in Italy. I don't know whether you have read the OCB program paper on the subject or are aware of the rather considerable hassle that lies behind it. I myself am not fully cognizant of the story, since I was out of the country at the time it reached its final shape. 3. It seems to me that we, the US Government, are launched in what amounts to an effort to frustrate the Socialist merger by insisting that it be accomplished on an inflexible anti-Communist basis. The Italians themselves probably look at the matter in a con- siderably more flexible and sophisticated light. For this reason I believe there will be a strong tendency, especially on the part of those who have an interest in the success of the merger, to keep us out of the picture. If this is the case, our policy is likely to end up leaving us in a rather isolated position with a possible long range loss of ability to influence Italian political life constructively. 4. Whatever the pros and cons of the policy matter, it seems clear to me that our intelligence coverage is unsatisfactory. I have followed the DD/P coverage as closely as possible and am forced to conclude that it is at best incomplete and at worst tendentious. For the last month DD/P has been issuing a series of reports based largely on information obtained prior to the important events of late August. This is no doubt worth doing in order to complete the record, but it certainly raises the question why this spate of material was not pub- lished when it would have been timely and useful. a,.J .~ ~ ?..I 0; '.- ~ { S C E Y E S ONLY AL""?DAT E: ' - A p p r o v e d For Release 1999/09/08 CIA-RDP80-0144 5 Q IRWIN Approved For R46ase 19 CIA-RDP80-04A46R000100050012-9 EYES ONLY 5. More serious than this delay, is the fact that a considerable amount of reporting is slanted and of doubtful objectivity. I think it would be worth your while to read the three attached examples which seek to convey the impression that Moscow and the Com2A*9YQgkre the moving force behind Nenni's concern with merger. was a particularly he ~i mple. Note especially the sourc gI 2W1 1t on Page 2. and the comment thereon in - -really should not be allowed to go unchallenged. It should be 25X1X4gI obvious to anyone that the remarks of a 25X1X4g 25X1X7gI can not be interpreted as s 25X1X7^ 25M%. I should point out that observations of 25X1 X6 ^ with strong anti-merger bias have been given high-lig to circulation to influential policy making levels as though they were the equivalent of intelligence reports. Without knowing the source of such reports, I am of course unable to corn it ob'ectivit , but I 5X1X6^ hat perhaps equally well informed &&J 25X1X6gI are not given the same i ng 7. I wish to assure you that these strictures on DD/P report are not exclusively my own. I believe you will find the same opinion among the better qualified analysts in the Agency and OIR. 25X1A5a1 2 7CV1 5 a 1 Cr r O 25X1A5a1 If his views had been more generally heeded at that time I believe we would have been much better off in the face of the actual developments. If it meets with your approval, I should like to take the necessary steps to bring him here. Approved For Release 1999/0 DP8