THREE URGENT POINTS FOR ACTION DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE 10 Nov 60
TO: Director of Central Intelligence
ROO2NO
,1
2
BUILDING Admin
REMARKS:
These two papers attempt to
survey some of the areas of contra-
diction and consensus lying behind
the visible manifestations of the Sino-
Soviet "dispute. " One was written
before any indications had been
received that high level Party meet-
ings were to take place in September.
The other was written on the eve of
Liu's arrival in Moscow.
25X1A9a
FROM: C/SRS/DDI
ROOM NO.
304
BUILDING
2210 E St
EXTENSION
455
FORM
I FEB H505 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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12 November 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence
SUBJECT: Three Urgent Points for Action during the
Transition Period.
On behalf of the Senior Research Staff on International Com-
munism, I am taking the liberty of expressing our gratification over
the announcement that you will continue the leadership of CIA into the
new administration.
By sheer coincidence, SRS will begin what it hopes will be its
Second Piat.etka (Five Year Plan) on Inaugural Day, 1961. We intend
at that time to present a summary of our first five years' activity,
listing a series of what I believe to be valuable insights into the Com-
munist Movement, and of proposals in line with our original charter -
as to means of countering it.
In the meantime, the news of the last week suggests that on at
least three major themes which we have developed over the past five
years, some interim action might be desirable, pending the takeover
of the new administration.
1. The Sino-Soviet Relation. We venture to suggest that any
briefing of the President-Elect should stress the likelihood that the
current meeting of the Communist Party leaders in Moscow will pro-
duce a convincing demonstration of unity. This view is in contradic-
tion to that which has been expressed by most other elements of the
Agency. It constitutes a dissent, which we have registered during
the past weeks, from reports of the Sino-Soviet Task Force on the
course of the "contradictions" between. Moscow and Peking. We have
indicated elsewhere the basis of this dissenting judgment; it is rooted
in our conviction that most Western analysis errs in its failure - or
deliberate refusal - to credit the dialectical approach of the Commu-
nists with any weight in determining their courses of action and with
any efficacy in preserving the dynamics and the unity of their move-
ment. We have reached this judgment over the past five years through
the pursuit of the approach originally prescribed for us by Mr. Bissell,
i. e. the attempt by research and by speculation to reproduce the thought
processes of International Communism and to evaluate its strategy and
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tactics in terms of those processes. It has been our experience
that this approach throws significant light on events as they occur
and is an indispensable tool for forecasting. It has, inter alia,
led us to question the existence of a trend toward the inevitable
deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relation.
2. The Southeast Asian Situation.. During our first five
years, we have repeatedly called attention to the still under-
appreciated threat of communism in Southeast Asia, and over-
appreciated capacities of Free World resistance. We have stated
our belief that no country in the arc from Pakistan to South Korea
is stable standing alone, and that as a chain, all of the links are
weak. We have urgently recommended the adoption of the only
policy which can strengthen this tenuous arc, the forging of region-
al unity. We are aware that the policy of this country has been
favorable in. principle to regionalism, but this platonic idea has
hardly been translated into systematic measures of actualization.
The difficulties have been held to be insuperable. We would auggest
that a demonstrative affirmation by the President-Elect that he asso-
ciates himself with the regional program advocated by Nelson Rocke-
feller and many others - and espoused during the campaign by the
Vice President - would strengthen the hand of enlightened statesmen
in the area and would galvanize our own policy and operations. There
are a host of specific projects which could be examined immediately,
including, for example, one which was recommended by SRS three
years ago - the establishment of a Southeast Asian Technological
Institute. (Of course, the regional principle should be applied else-
where, but it would be best to begin where it is most urgently needed.)
3. Support of the Nenni Socialists. Despite the characteristic
optimism of today's New York Times editorial, the results of the
Italian elections offer no grounds for complacency. The extremes,
Fascist and Communist, have gained significantly at the expense of
the Center. While these gains may not immediately affect the stabil-
ity of the Fanfani government, they could be translated into serious
portents for the next general election, in the not unlikely event of
further Soviet successes or of economic difficulties in the Western
European community. Throughout our first five years we have urged
a constructive exploratory approach to Pietro Nenni and the PSI. The
fact that his party suffered what appears to be a small defection to
both the PCI and the PSDI should not be viewed with. satisfaction.
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Rather it indicates the beginning of a trend of frustration over the
delays of socialist reunification. It points in the direction of
political polarization, which as we have repeatedly warned is the
chief danger in Italy. There is no need to review the prolonged,
and often agonized discussion of the Nenni problem which has been
conducted within the Agency and the Department of State. Suffice
it to say, that the opposition, to any approach to Nenni has consider-
ably abated, and in its die-hard form may be confined to a single
determineed individual in the Rome Embassy. Any further, effort
on our part is, of course, not a matter which would call for public
comment by the President-Elect. But in case he is unaware of the
significance of socialist reunification, not only for Italian but for
European political stability, it might be advisable to discuss it
with him as prelude to further discreet negotiations with Nenni.
We have lost some favorable opportunities, but it is not too late.
25X1A9a
Chief, SRS/DDI
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