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November 9, 2016
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March 18, 1998
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November 10, 1960
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Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 10 Nov 60 TO: Director of Central Intelligence ROO2NO ,1 2 BUILDING Admin REMARKS: These two papers attempt to survey some of the areas of contra- diction and consensus lying behind the visible manifestations of the Sino- Soviet "dispute. " One was written before any indications had been received that high level Party meet- ings were to take place in September. The other was written on the eve of Liu's arrival in Moscow. 25X1A9a FROM: C/SRS/DDI ROOM NO. 304 BUILDING 2210 E St EXTENSION 455 FORM I FEB H505 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 Approved For Release 1999/090 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 12 November 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence SUBJECT: Three Urgent Points for Action during the Transition Period. On behalf of the Senior Research Staff on International Com- munism, I am taking the liberty of expressing our gratification over the announcement that you will continue the leadership of CIA into the new administration. By sheer coincidence, SRS will begin what it hopes will be its Second Piat.etka (Five Year Plan) on Inaugural Day, 1961. We intend at that time to present a summary of our first five years' activity, listing a series of what I believe to be valuable insights into the Com- munist Movement, and of proposals in line with our original charter - as to means of countering it. In the meantime, the news of the last week suggests that on at least three major themes which we have developed over the past five years, some interim action might be desirable, pending the takeover of the new administration. 1. The Sino-Soviet Relation. We venture to suggest that any briefing of the President-Elect should stress the likelihood that the current meeting of the Communist Party leaders in Moscow will pro- duce a convincing demonstration of unity. This view is in contradic- tion to that which has been expressed by most other elements of the Agency. It constitutes a dissent, which we have registered during the past weeks, from reports of the Sino-Soviet Task Force on the course of the "contradictions" between. Moscow and Peking. We have indicated elsewhere the basis of this dissenting judgment; it is rooted in our conviction that most Western analysis errs in its failure - or deliberate refusal - to credit the dialectical approach of the Commu- nists with any weight in determining their courses of action and with any efficacy in preserving the dynamics and the unity of their move- ment. We have reached this judgment over the past five years through the pursuit of the approach originally prescribed for us by Mr. Bissell, i. e. the attempt by research and by speculation to reproduce the thought processes of International Communism and to evaluate its strategy and Approved For Release I 99 ,,,, : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 Approved For Release I 999/0 " ? ~RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 tactics in terms of those processes. It has been our experience that this approach throws significant light on events as they occur and is an indispensable tool for forecasting. It has, inter alia, led us to question the existence of a trend toward the inevitable deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relation. 2. The Southeast Asian Situation.. During our first five years, we have repeatedly called attention to the still under- appreciated threat of communism in Southeast Asia, and over- appreciated capacities of Free World resistance. We have stated our belief that no country in the arc from Pakistan to South Korea is stable standing alone, and that as a chain, all of the links are weak. We have urgently recommended the adoption of the only policy which can strengthen this tenuous arc, the forging of region- al unity. We are aware that the policy of this country has been favorable in. principle to regionalism, but this platonic idea has hardly been translated into systematic measures of actualization. The difficulties have been held to be insuperable. We would auggest that a demonstrative affirmation by the President-Elect that he asso- ciates himself with the regional program advocated by Nelson Rocke- feller and many others - and espoused during the campaign by the Vice President - would strengthen the hand of enlightened statesmen in the area and would galvanize our own policy and operations. There are a host of specific projects which could be examined immediately, including, for example, one which was recommended by SRS three years ago - the establishment of a Southeast Asian Technological Institute. (Of course, the regional principle should be applied else- where, but it would be best to begin where it is most urgently needed.) 3. Support of the Nenni Socialists. Despite the characteristic optimism of today's New York Times editorial, the results of the Italian elections offer no grounds for complacency. The extremes, Fascist and Communist, have gained significantly at the expense of the Center. While these gains may not immediately affect the stabil- ity of the Fanfani government, they could be translated into serious portents for the next general election, in the not unlikely event of further Soviet successes or of economic difficulties in the Western European community. Throughout our first five years we have urged a constructive exploratory approach to Pietro Nenni and the PSI. The fact that his party suffered what appears to be a small defection to both the PCI and the PSDI should not be viewed with. satisfaction. Approved For Release 199910910 CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 Approved For Release 1999/0 CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0 Rather it indicates the beginning of a trend of frustration over the delays of socialist reunification. It points in the direction of political polarization, which as we have repeatedly warned is the chief danger in Italy. There is no need to review the prolonged, and often agonized discussion of the Nenni problem which has been conducted within the Agency and the Department of State. Suffice it to say, that the opposition, to any approach to Nenni has consider- ably abated, and in its die-hard form may be confined to a single determineed individual in the Rome Embassy. Any further, effort on our part is, of course, not a matter which would call for public comment by the President-Elect. But in case he is unaware of the significance of socialist reunification, not only for Italian but for European political stability, it might be advisable to discuss it with him as prelude to further discreet negotiations with Nenni. We have lost some favorable opportunities, but it is not too late. 25X1A9a Chief, SRS/DDI Approved For Release 199 '8 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060001-0