TWO PROPOSALS FOR ACTION IN THE ITALIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 1, 1958
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA
Z;_
THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence
SENIOR RESEARCH STAFF ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
1 April 1958
:MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Two Proposals for Action in the Italian Election Campaign
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to urge the immediate
taking of two operational steps in connection with the pending Italian
elections (May 25th):
2. These measures are recommended on the basis of our appre-
clation of the prospects for the Italian, election which is somewhat more
pessimistic than what appears to be generally held within the Depart-
ment of State and the Agency. The most authoritative government
estimate at present available to us is contained in O/NE Staff Memo-
randum published recently which foreshadows a post-electoral situa-
tion generally similar to that which now obtains. From this forecast,
the O/NE memorandum draws a picture of the political prospects for
Italy during the next five years from which the US government can
derive but little satisfaction. In our opinion, even this note of concern
does not go far enough.
3. It would seem prudent to envisage the possibility that the
Communist Party may substantially improve its present strength. The
PCI has a number of cogent issues which it has begun to exploit with an
ominous crescendo; chief of these is the missile bases, which in the
light of the Soviet renunciation of nuclear testing could achieve Sputnik
momentum in Italian politics. The United States economic recession,
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if it is not clearly reversed in the next month, might also be
a weighty point. Finally, the classic issues of clericalism,
fascism, and monopolies have not lost their virtue. That the
relative prosperity of Italy during the past few years has not
blunted the edge of resentment and protest among Italian work-
ingmen appears to have been demonstrated by recent shop steward
elections, in which the CGIL has strikingly reversed its downward
trend.
4. It would also seem wise to be prepared for a relative set-
back for the Christian Democratic Party. Although the DC has
greatly strengthened its organization and has utilized its govern-
mental position to apply the instrumentalities of patronage and
propaganda, it has at the same time encountered increasing hos-
tility from all other parties. Whether this will be reflected in the
vote is difficult to predict, but it seems probable that there will be
a considerable tendency in the electorate to spill off to the left and
to the right as the unwieldy mechanism seeks to continue its broad
swath.
5. The prospects for the two Socialist parties can only be
,guessed. Saragat's recent efforts to dissociate himself from the
strict Atlanticism of his earlier policies and to embrace an element
of neutralism have shown how difficult it is for any party which calls
itself socialist to maintain a position greatly different from that of
the British Labour Party or the SPD in Germany. Whether this
drift away from full support of NATO will gain or lose votes for
his party is problematical. If anything, it is likely to strengthen
the Nenni Socialist position which on this issue, at least, has been
fairly consistent.
6. Thus it would appear that even by the more optimistic
predictions, there is little prospect for a situation radically better
than that which now prevails. The status quo has, indeed, been re-
garded by some as in itself satisfactory. We do not believe that
such a view would prove justified over the coming five years. There
will be mighty pulls on Italy, on the one hand from the rapidly form-
ing institutions of the Western European Community, on the other
hand from the growing power complex of the Communist Bloc, not
to mention the rapidly changing Arab world toward which Italy feels
increasingly drawn.
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7. In such a situation it is essential that dynamic and
effective democratic government be possible in Italy. This can
hardly be the case if a powerful Communist Party is able to
maintain its hold over the PSI. It is more than ever necessary
to break this hold, splitting the PSI in such a way as to insure
the maximum accession of strength to the forces of Democratic
Socialism. Only in this fashion can a healthy basis for a govern-
ment-loyal opposition or a "grand coalition" regime be estab-
lished. Without such a development, and in the face of crises
and setbacks which the Free World seems destined to undergo,
the prospect for Communist obstruction. in Italy becomes truly
alarming.
8. It is for this reason that we urge prompt action to bring
about a merger of the democratic elements of Italian Socialism.
We feel it certain that some such process will be resumed after
the elections, and that we will have to go along with it. It would
appear wiser to anticipate this development and establish now our
basis for subsequent negotiation with Pietro Nenni.
9. It is suggested that Olivetti's Communit'a movement be
supported at this time, not because it is likely to play an important
role in the next parliament, but because it represents an intellectual,
moral and ideological nucleus which would be of great value in the
coalescence of the disparate elements of Italian Socialism. Further-
more, in our judgment, Community and Olivetti represent a construc-
tive force transcending the boundaries of Italian politics and offering
a promise for the entire West European integration program. By
concentrating on the creative development of the local community,
Olivetti has pointed the way to a process of softening the tensions
of politics which might prove in time the most effective answer to the
divisive machinations of the Communists. In a sense, support of the
Communitk movement might be said to be truly in the spirit of the
original concept of the Marshall Plan: to help the peoples of Europe
to help themselves. We would not only be furthering a worthy
political and social cause, but would, at least implicitly, be encour-
aging a reform effort of enlightened private enterprise, seeking
harmony with Democratic and Christian Socialism - an effort all too
rare in contemporary Europe.
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10. We believe that there is still time before the elections
to carry out these two moves, and that, in doing so, we would be
fulfilling a basic mission of the Agency to nurture a healthy, and
democratic, political opposition.
Chief, SRS/DDI
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060015-5
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
1
IaAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
2
2210 E Street
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
25X1D1a
The Director read the attached with a
great deal of interest and commented,
, that he' was inclined to agree 5
however,
with the WE Division that
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
22 Apr 58
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(40)
No- 237 Re] --laces Form 30-4 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 0 342531
FORM
1 APR 55 55 which may be used.
X1X4
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060015-5
25X1A9a 25X1X6
Buekslt a
A o _
Attache is a summary of article
and a suggested draft for a reply from DCI.
Unless itseems inadvisable to reply to a communica-
tion of this sort, we would recommend that
some acknowledgment be sent. Possibly the Director
would be interested in seeing the summary.
A~ -Gg
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100060015-5