YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS AT COOPERATIVE FORUM MEETING, 21 MAY 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 22, 1958
• Content Type: MFR

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22 May 1958
SUBJECT: Yugoslav Ambassador's Comments at Cooperative Forum Meeting,
21 May 1958
1. This memorandum reports the hightlights of last night's
meeting and after-session of the Cooperative Forum on the subject
"How Can We Minimize the Danger of Accidental War. " The panel of
speakers at this meeting was composed of: Brigadier General Thomas
D'Arcy, U.S. Air Force; Mr. Philip Deane, correspondent for the
London Observer; Dr. Hugh Darby, physicist, and Dr. Leo Mates,
Ambassador of Yugoslavia. The members of the panel spoke in that
order and Dr. Darby acted as Chairman.
2. As is customary at the Forum, the panel speakers made pre-
sentations of about ten minutes each, and the audience was then called
upon for questions. Because of the particular interest of the remarks of
Ambassador Mat,-es and because he was the most articulate and informa-
tive speaker, the remarks of the other members of panel are not reported
here. In general it may be said that they handled the subject adequately
if not illuminatingly and were in general agreement that the prevention of
an accidental war was not merely a matter of devising safety devices or
techniques but of creating a political climate which would make accidents
less likely. This view led directly into most of Mattes' remarks which
were largely in answer to questions of a broadly political or ideological
character.
3. The gist of some of the more significant of Mat:es' comments
is as follows:
a. Of course the Soviets do not want an accidental war any more
than we do, but they would probably be no more willing to sit down
and discuss tangible measures for preventing such an outbreak than
they were to discuss the recent U. S. proposal for counter-inspection
in the Arctic. The U. S. gained considerable political prestige by
reason of the 10-1 vote in the U. N. Security Council rejecting the
Soviet complaint against the U. S. Thus it might be to the psycholo_-
ical advantage of the U. S. to re-invite the Soviet Union-to a more
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limited discussion concerned solely with the prevention of un-
premeditated war. If they changed their attitude and accepted,
so much the better. If not, the U. S. would again be showing
the world that she is serious about negotiating for peace and
disarmament. The USSR has apparently been able to convince
many neutral people that we really do not want to negotiate a
peace settlement with them.
b. Despite Sputnik and ICBM successes, the Russians are
still very much afraid of the U. S. and the Western alliances.
The "scared men in the Kremlin" of a few years back are un-
doubtedly much more confident of their strength now, but are
still far from convinced that they have so marked a superiority
over the West that they can afford to relax in the thought that
they will never be attacked.
c. Anyone who has dealt with the Russians over any long
period of time must realize that there can be no compromise on
their part on any issues involving fundamental ideology or the
present power position of the Soviet Union. To approach negotia-
tions with them, with any hope of such compromise, is naive and
self-defeating. This does not mean, however, that on secondary
or lesser issues some agreement can not be reached. Austria is
an example. So was the Korean armistice even though the USSR
was nominally not involved. (In this case the USSR really wanted
to disengage from Kim-il-Sung just as the United States presumably
wanted to disengage from Synghman Rhee).
d. The process of negotiating with the Russians required
endless patience and endurance. It is part of the Soviet technique
to wear down the other side until it makes more concessions than
it wanted to. But if one can "stick it out" long enough, eventually
the Soviet negotiations will come around to agreements on the non-
basic questions.
e. Are the Russians "sincere"? Americans and Westerners
usually ask this question. The answer should be quite apparent.
They are undoubtedly sincere, unswervingly so, in the devotaon
to the achievemtnt of their objectives. They feel therefore that
whatever they do to gain their objectives is just as sincere as it
can be. If Westerners feel that the Russians are being "insincere",
it is because they do not understand the nature of the Soviet regime's
ideology, purpose and modus operandi.
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f. The negotiation of any agreement or contract in
international as well as private affairs must necessarily be
based on an assumption of good faith, or at least good inten-
tions, on the part of both contractors. If this were not so,
then there would be no point in trying at all to negotiate. On
the other hand if there is a condition of unchangeable, everlast-
ing good faith there would logically be no need for an agreement.
Thus all parties to an agreement implicitly assume that there
may be contingencies which will cause non-fulfillment. When
dealing with the Russians this is particularly true. Thus we
must, not assume that nothing can be done but on the other hand
we mutt not be so optimistic as to expect everything.
g. The intellectual ferment .within the Soviet Union is
significant. Even though it is repressed or studiously neutralized
by the regime the fact that, compared to the days of Stalin, it
exists at all, is important. This is particularly true of the longer-
range implications of the dissent and questioning among students,
who occupy so important a place in Soviet society and who are the
:leaders of the future. But we must not exaggerate the effects.
There is no extensive "revolt of youth" within the USSR. As for
the dissent of adults, the "intelligentsia, " it is not comparable
to that of Djilas in Yugoslavia. Djilas has questioned the funda-
mental premises of Marxism. The Soviet writers have criticized
only certain aspects - usually the economic or the bureaucratic
rather than the political - of Soviet society. None has challenged
the ideological bases of the regime, nor truly questioned the
supremacy of the Party.
h. Only the Soviet Union and the United States acting together
can prevent lesser states from acquiring nuclear weapons which
they might use irresponsibly and thus start an "accidental war. "
4. The total impression of Ambassador Mattes, obtained by this
listener, was that he is a man of profound conviction, personal integrity,
high intelligence and flexibility of view, cultured and articulate (and com-
pletely fluent in English). He does not deny being an ideological Commu-
nist, devoted to the Yugoslav way of achieving "socialism, " but unlike
the Soviet leaders, he acknowledges the evolutionary character of capital-
ism (as well as of socialism if allowed to develop freely and not as it is
in the Soviet Union). He appears to be completely convinced that capitalist
and socialist states can truly co-exist and work together for the betterment
of mankind.
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