DISCUSSION WITH (Sanitized), 9 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 14, 1957
• Content Type: MFR

Sanitized - Approved For R. ,se : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070010-9?,
PSh/A '~A.SIP h
14 October 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR RECO1A5a1
SUBJECT: Discussion with 9 October
25X1A5a1
1. primarily discussed aspects of Soviet policy.
He began by pointing out that in 1955 Khrushchev had developed his
policy for flanking the Free World by (a) neutralizing the non-
committed countries, and (b) neutralizing the West through the strata-
gem of "co-existence". In 1956 this policy was impleme`n.ted in the
pronouncements of the 20th CPSU Congress. However, because of
the events following this Congress, the period up to spring 1957 wit-
nessed the replacement of Khrushchev's original policy with one of
emergency so as to "put out the fires" that were burning.
2. In spring a?)SlA&@1e began a period of stabilization (this
was the very word used). The emergency was over. Its
duration had been cut short because of the inadequate policies of the
West. US policy appeared to be without perspective, and thus the USSR
had all the trumps in its hands; it could not lose. Therefore Khrush_
chew did not have to go back to his 1955 policy. He could go far beyond
it.
.3. There are two types of crises the Kremlin had to cope with.
One arose out of ideological difficulties. This crisis has not been
resolved and may not be resolved for a long time. It is, however, a
very important one and may ultimately decide the fate of Communism
throughout the world. The second crisis was, a policy crisis pe 1iAfia1
a5W5Mations between the USSR and other countries, and it is-
contention that this crisis has been - or is on the way to be -
resolved.
4. The establishment of Khrushchev in a very strong position,
following the ouster of Malenkovjerr Molotov et al. in June 1957, made
it easier for him to revert from his "fire brigade" policy to a long-range
stabilization policy. He was now really in power and there was no sign
that anybody could threaten him. From now on, changes in Soviet policy
were not necessarily connected with new personalities but became, the
result of Khrushchev's own dbcision. Supporting his strong personal
position. are the following factors;?oc=~,
NO f.!...c 5. I
( -
t 12-
1, 00.1
Sanitized - Approved For F&elease ` CIA-RDP80-014468000100670010 9
Vii; *3`juN.r_'R'ti e.,.. f
 Sanitized - Appraed For R A-RDP80-0$*46R000100070010-9
a. There has been some measure of unilateral disarmament
in every western country. This has been achieved without long confer-
ences and without any obligation on the part of the Soviets to disarm
likewise.
b. There has been a crisis in relations between the US and
its western allies after the Suez affair. As a result, West Germany is
now the best ally of the US - and that is not healthy. If a Labor govern-
ment should come to power in Britain and the US did not change its policy,
the gap between this country and its chief ally would widen further.
c. The Soviets have under-estimated their influence in under-
developed areas. They have found their position to be much stronger than
they believed. Hungary has not really shaken these "neutral" nations, and
in the Middle East the Soviet position is not weaker but stronger. It follows
that the USSR can make mistakes, can outdo the west in cold-war activities,
and yet hold a firm position and enjoy tremendous prestige in the under-
developed areas. The Soviets have recognized that they have a great free-
dom of movement since the West has no positive projects to help these
areas; a few gifts, loans or limited technical assistance are simply not
enough.
d. It is not surprising that the Soviets feel militarily very
strong and brag about it. From their point of view , the new technological
developments and the western disarmament ha changed the military
balance of power in their favor.
e. The Communist Worlds situation in the developed areas and
among the fellow-traveling organizations is probably not regarded as too
important a factor by Moscow. The Kremlin believes that Soviet successes
will. unify and stabilize the parties in the end. There may be a long crisis
but it will not deter the Soviets in any respect. In the under-developed
countries there is no party problem; the tool there is nationalism.
5. The question, then, is: Are Khrushchev's new policies tactical
or :Long-range strategic? The answer depends to a great degree on the West.
If the West effectively counters the new Soviet policies, Khrushchev will be
compelled to modify his more aggressive approach and perhaps retreat to
his 1955 line. 25X1A9a
+` 5
SRS/DDI
Sanitized - Approved For Relleap : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070010-9