LUNCH WITH (Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070015-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 18, 1957
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release-,D99/09/0 h00010GQZ0015-4
18 January 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
25X1A9a
SUBJECT: Lunch with
V over largely the ground covered in earlier conversa-
tions. views toward Socialist merger do not appear
to have undergone any fundamental change but seem to take greater
account of the subtlety and complexity of the process which is at work.
He still regards Nenni as untrustworthy and feels that Saragat and the
Democratic Socialists are justified in holding again~s~.iathe lon
period of his Communist collaboration. However,
appears to have come to the conclusion that the merger may succeed
in any case and that some degree of adjustment to it should be pre-
pared. I attempted to convey the following points:
a. The International Socialist leaders of Western Europe
are probably more directly and vitally interested in the success
of the merger than we realize. Although they will undoubtedly
insist that a unified Socialist Party be truly Democratic before
admitting it to the Socialist International, they will probably
be less concerned than the US Embassy in the fine points of
its foreign policy position or the nature of its anti-Communist
professions. Ultimately what is at stake is the balance of power
in a unified Europe between the two great political groupings of
Social Democracy and Christian Democracy, or more broadly
speaking, between Socialism and conservative Capitalism. With
the balance between these two factors more or less even in
France, Germany and the UK, not to mention the lesser coun-
tries, the role of Italian Socialism may be of critical moment.
b. Fanfani, Saragat and Segni have all been reported as
believing that out of the current Socialist negotiations will
emerge not one unified party but three separate parties.
Presumably Fanfani and the others regard this as greatly
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in their political interest. * I suggested to that this
would be essentially a short term view and one in which we
could hardly concur. The fragmentation of the Socialist Left
could only lead to immobilism on the part of the center
coalition with resultant strengthening of Communism.
c. The PCI has undoubtedly been seriously shaken by
recent events. We both agreed that if elections were held
now it might show a loss of as much as 20% in votes. Never-
theless, I suggested that this was perhaps a short term situa-
tion and that we should not underestimate the effectiveness of
Togliatti in retrieving the situation. He has already taken
significant steps to restore the strength of the Party leader-
ship. In the event that the situation within the Bloc should
stabilize, and the policy of coexistence and relaxation of
tensions be resumed, there is every r Wio believe that the
appeal, of the PCI would remain high. agreed to this
point and also suggested that in any case, the great majority
of Italians who vote for the PCI are not vitally concerned with
Communism as such, least of all in its foreign aspects.
d. This raised the question d the future of dissident
elements within Italian Communism. I suggested that history
indicates that there have been no successful dissident move-
ments found in and around the defection of a single individual
or even in a group. For this reassoonARReeale is undoubtedly
right in feeling that he must cas i with the movement
toward Socialist unification rather than attempting to found
a Titoist type party of his own. on! agreed, but pointed
out that it was somewhat ironic.-a for Reale as a Communist
to claim that he could moderate the role of the Filo-Communist
of the2?RTAad protect Nenni from pressures of Togliatti.
I told that the points I madelast summer still seem
valid, viz. establishing contact with Nenni, if only for re ssurance
and adoption of a detached, if not a sympathetic attitude toward the
reunification movement. Nevertheless I have myself come to view
the entire situation with greater detachment and like many others,
a' merely waiting to see what will happen rather than predicting or
urging a particularl policy line. For that rt ason my work is now
chiefly concentrated on analyzing the strengtand weakness of the
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070015-4
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Communist parties in France and Italy. In this connection, I expressed
the hope that he would pass on to me any information, of bibliographic
or research nature, which he might pick up in Italy. He agreed to do
so and suggested that at a later date after his return it might be possible
to assemble a small group of 6 or 8 interested specialists from various
parts of the Government to discuss the problem.
Chief, SRS/DDI
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100070015-4