NOTES ON SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 7, 1961
• Content Type: NOTES

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.~ P 210(P E Street.
Introduction
We conceive of vulnerabilities as elements of tsea& ,nesa in the
political, economic and social system of the Soviet s erte i thich can
be intensified by specific actions on our part. Such actions may, how-
ever, produce counter-actions or reactions which eliminate the weak-
ness or even show that it did not exist in the first place.
We have previously pointed out that there are two aspects of vul-
nerabilities: short and long range. Short range vulnerabilities are those
which normal evolution or specific directed action* may be expected to
remove or at toast sufficiently alleviate (e. g. housing shortage). Itshould
be a matter of considered judgment whether or not to exploit such vulnera-
bilities; we could Imagine cases where needling would accelerate the remov-
at of such vulnerabilities and. where the application of the principle of ?ete
Ling them, stew in their own juice" would be more effective.
Long range vulnerabilities are less susceptible to remedial treat-
ment and therefore are preferable for exploitation. The problem is to
determine whether, what the Went would call a vulnerability, is indeed
one in Communist terms. This leads us to the observation that we must
be extremely careful not to misjudge the adversary by interpreting his
lack of virtues, qualities, or habits - using our own terms of reference
as vulnerabilities.
near
Having this clearly in sand, we might add a third category of vul-
a: those which could develop as a result of the inherent char-
acteristics of the
visible or incipient.
ciallst" system - which may or may not now be
is in this field that the knowledge of Communist
ideology, organization, strategy and tactics is indispensable.
"rally, when surveying, Communist vulnerabilities for purposes of
exploitation, careful distinction should be made among the characteristics
the USSR, the satellite states, and the ' non-aligned" countries.
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T VU
INTERNA I.,
. the sum total of Communist writings and interpr
Id
f
ay
qW %w
o
is both the t4retiglous"' underpinning of the Communist movement and a
manipulatory force used to achieve political, military and socio-economic
cohesion of the "world socialist system. `t As such, it is vulnerable wher-
ever its mixture of theory and practice do not coincide. It is also vulner-
i e deviation
le to in to pac eu
left (dogmatism). Such vulnerabilities cannot, however, be exploited by
can only be refuted in ostensibly Marxtan terms. In other words, the
object of exploitation of ideological discrepancies should be confusion
rather than conversion. The terms and Idioms of the Free World have
a different moaning in the Communis* realm; in counter-acting ideology,
the different meaning of language must be taken into account.
-izatio
The communist bloc at present is not statutorily organized. In-
stead, it has developed, after the liquidation of the Comi;.ntern` aad om-
inforra, under the concept of the "socialist camp, " the "world socialist
system. " and, in a more elevated form, the "'socialist commonwealth.
This "organization without an organization" is presumably held together
by ideological principles, by common interests and common hatreds. The
Bloc is a loose association of states of which the USSR is p mu s inter
, but no longer holds an absolute hegemony. This creates a double
vulnerability, the duration of which may, however, be limited, if steps
taken to forge a new Communist world organization and to re-create
centralized leadership are reasonably successful. It is difficult, how-
ever, to exploit this interim situation without driving the Communist
members of the "commonwealth" closer together. Left to themselves,
they may indeed drift farther apart. U. however, there should be in-
dications, of a now, tighter organization and the reinstatement of con-
trellised leadership by the USSR, we can then renew our attack against
arbitrariness and dictation..
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3. The accession
event of l[ hrusbchev'a demise, a period
might follow. The designation by Khrushchev himself of a successor
would be a questionable procedure and might not necessarily be
pieem.rated. Although it would be a mistake to assume that K ru-
shchev's demise will inevitably be followed by confusion and Power
struggles, at least a brief period of such may ensue. We must a
sumne, however, that the system is well grounded; the attetossion
struggle - provided there ie one - will probably be limited to a re
ti.vely short period of time. This means that the succession period
will constitute a short-raaxge vulnerability if Soviet policy contirmees
along lChrushchevite lines, as it well may. Should there be now trends
and tendencies, particularly toward the more "lefti,ast., " tsdogratic'"
side, the struggle may become more protracted, in which cases our
chances of exploiting this vulnerability would be good for a longer
period of time.
4. The t'a
In the tong run, the position of the Party may prove vulnerablev
but this depends on unpredictable factors. Since the Party
the rna c finery of the state and all propaganda media, it can shift re-
sponsibilities, to organs of the state or to individuals. On the of
hand, the Party is the efste and its actions must be closely scruti
ized by us for Possible toitation. Actual vulnerabilities may exist
on regional and local levsls. Moscow headquarters has not hesitated
expose aahvrtcorninga of local officials. e. g. in Baia en. Such
exposas may give use ammunition, but their use, as in the case of poi-
soh gas, depends an prevailing winds of the political and economic
we~*ther. Generally, it is better to attack individuals rather than the
:Party as an organization.
3. The Military
auction of forces doe-reed in 19S9 is still Likely to rank'
especially among the officers. Those released from the Army un-
doubtedly regret the Lou of their status and privileges; the Army it-
BeJf may decry the lose of >saanpvwer in spite of the sound teclical
and economic reasons for the cut. On the whole, there are few
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anerabilities, suitable for present exploitation. It must
er be forgotten that the Army in the instrument of the Party and
t is most unlikely to play a political role so long as the present
system exists.
6. Intellectuals and Yc t!
We still believe that the discontent of Soviet intellectuals and
Guth has been overestimated in the wake of the events of I9S6-37.
Since then, the achievements of the USSR, mainly in the technological
field (space exploration), have done much to neutralise dissent. More-
over, the improvement of living conditions and the general climate of
the KFarusshchev regime have almost certainty contributed to pacifica-
tion of rebellious minds. Dissent, if any, is one on method rather than
on the system itself which has more and more become identified with the
nation.
7. Soviet Nationalities
to nationality factors have constituted vulnerabilities in the
past, they are hardly acute now,, except in the former Baltic states.
The Soviet government has successfully overcome many of the former
,sages among the autonomous republics and national minorities, and
be some grumbtings on the part of the Ukrainian. Geor
gf:ann and other "nationalists, " we believe that these areas are now
er to the Great Russians than ever before. This also pertains to the
Central Asian republics. Whether the Great Russians can be accused
own country which roughly comprises the ter
r&esss under Czarist rule, is open to question. The charge may be
tried in psychological warfare against the Communist system and to
counteract, throughout the world, the accuastlonsa against Western
"'colonialism. " But the two systems are not the seaame and propaganda
on this theme would have to be careful in differentiating between them.
Relationship between the Reeglaraee and the People
cannot apply Western yardsticks to measure the posit v
negative elements of this relationship. The Soviet peoples have never
lived 'trader a syssstem Of deem.ocratte: freedom as we understand it; it is
probable that in the minds of Many the Khrushchev regime has offered them
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more liberties than they have had for a long time. Certainly, in
comparison with the Stalin era, things have improved considerably.
they hand, the Isadore still probably lack full confidence in
people and generally continue to prevent them from obtaining
suc,.h factual information, and objective interpretation as would be
available to 'Western peoples. This remains, then, a point Of weate
neso to be exploited. provided it it done with psychological insight
an finesse. It must be kept in mind that a totalitarian regime con-
trols all instruments of power and communications and uses them
effectively to impose its views and wishes. This, for us, appears
to be a great vulnerability, but for the average Soviet citizen it is
unquestionably an accepted fact of life.
BLOC RELATIONS
ooviot Relations
Relations have not been smooth between the parties of the two
countries and this in itself constitutes a vulnerasability.
however, to predict, on a long range basis. whether th
etroversy
wilt vitally affect Communist solidarity. We must. refn
not in relations among bloc countries and ta,twean
rid. We also must review Sin*-Soviet relations
sment of December 1960 so as to determine
whether the agreements contained in this Statement are being kept
by both parties. There .is strong evidence that they are. We
that it would be sot(-defeating to exploit the Sinai-Soviet squabbles
for short range purposes, overlooking the long range development,.
overt exploitation might boomerang and bring the two partners
closer together; ingenious covert or limited actions could be of some
use. For example, we could and should exploit the split in some CPs.
such as the Indian and Indonesian parties (and aperently the French).
We could play up Albania against the other satellites and vice versa.
We could play up Chinese economic failures "d and the lack of sufficient
Soviet help. We could set peking's foreign policy against Moscow's
set Maoism against ruehcheviim, wall cave , of course. I
Neeverthelese- we must remain aware that the basic Slnoti-Bout
relationship is not Only one between two states car parties, but that
,erects the entire Communist movement. This is as well known
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short range nature, the long range of which can only be determined
at a later date.
regarding the inns-Soviet arguments an a limited vulnerability of
rseir differences of opinion. For these reasons wss< would aaiv
to the Communist leaders as it in to us, and we must therefore
assume that, as Communists, they will make every effort to adjust
Z. The East Europe aasn Satellites
of the upheavals in Poland and Hungary, by both peaceful and
duce the weaknesses inherent in a satellite By1te m. It has almost
certainly made some progress in this direction. The liquidation
The Kremlin under Khrushchev has made a groat effur
and the stabilization efforts between the end of 1956 to
rnuni st summit - & ,diplomatic feat without
t aschieved through innumerable individual meetings - have
e satellite area generally strengthened. Albania's super-
of its rebellion. We cannot rule out that Pekin
to Soviet strategy, will throw Albania to the Soviet
may find it impossible to support Albania indefinite-
radi.caalissm is the exception, but we must be careful not to over-
economic disstitution and Soviet empirical political intrigues.
ty frorn so fir away and the Hoxha regime may fall as a result of
The satellite states have been given to understand that they
are "independent. s" Although the more extreme forms of direct
Soviet domination are no longer visible, yet the satellite area, re-
mains, from the f(remli;nss point of view, a vital pert of its terri-
torial security sphere. The crackdowns In Last Germany in 1953
Y in 1936 have made this clear; In Poland only the
c maneuvering of Gomulka prevented similar occurrences*
in devious ways, it is only realistic to recognises that popular Qppo
Apart from Poland, the satellite governments cannot cwt on gen-
uixsee popular support, and some party leaders are held in contempt.
Nevertheless, although nationalism stint exists and expresses itself
has been decreasing, even in Hungary, probably clue to the rissin,
living standards. For these reasons, the vulnerability of the satellite
r is at best a lirrs sited one. We should be aware of th
are not neces8raarly pro-Western. Probably the overwhelming part
over, that the satellites for all =. the popular op;
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peoples are in sympathy with some type of native Marxism.
Certain it is that the Kremlin cannot fully rely on the loyalty of the
peoples, and it is perhaps for this reason that it is so sensitive to
=eastern attempts to test this loyalty.
3. The Question of Soviet Lead.rship in the 8
The fact that the USSR no longer has hegemony over the entire
bloc cannot be overlooked. Although it still is in a position of leader-
ship, as primuue inter pares, due to its power and experience, it is no
longer absolute and Khrushchev has repeatedly and emphatically
stressed this fact. The question, therefore, arises whether an al-
legedly monolithic, totalitarian configuration of states can remain
without a dictator and not become "leaderless. " This dilemma does
not necessarily lend itself to exploitation. In fact, a "socialist com-
monwealth, "' indicating a loose association of like-minded states,
would appear to be less stringent and more genuinely democratic than
"
hitherto
the system of Moecow-contered "democratic centralism,
governing the bloc. If we exposed the bloc as non-monolithic andlack-
ing leadership, this would play into the hands of Red China. If we imply
thatt Moscow still exergisses absolute control we would not be telling the
truth. Conaequently, it may be advisable to *wait further developments
in Sino-Soviet relations, within the context of-the "socialist system, "
before embarking on a major campaign of exploitation.
ATIONALr REl ATlON$
1. Yugoslavia
nee that Yugoslavia interrupts the chain of satellite
countries constituting a cordon saa itsaire both territorially and ideo-
logically, it is a vulnerability to the USSR. But we must keep in mind
'
that Titoism is essentially a variant of orthodoxy rather than a repue
. Tito remains a Communist, even though he has reinterpreted
s for Yugc stav'purposes. He is much closer to the
: aaat than to the West. In trying to exploit the vutlnersaability, which he
des, we must be ca reful not to drive the opponeeat a nearer together.
_
but we probably can anticipate a r odcurn of fluctuation in the relationship
between Moscow and Belgrade, leaving open to us the opportunity of
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n with limited objectives. The role of China
albaanL in this dialectic must be carefully weighed.
iir
ear to be aggressive and endangering the peace
ea of the bloc states, except perhaps Reed China,
pear to be too "soft" in Poking where hru-
1t highly popular at present;
onsidered highly dangerous by non-aligned
an under the Marxist-Leninist spelt.
retained their free faculties of political
coexistence" in particularly vulnerable outside the Bloc be-
e etic sea of "peace" and a "continuing ideological struggle"
are not appreciated. In fact, a case can be made that the Communist
bloc does not want genuine peace but only temporary accommodation to
preserve its progress toward "transition to Communism. " The Berlin
ence s'1 the Soviet arms deliveries to Laos contradict it and the
engendered by Moscow, does not fit into the "peacefulness" of
promise on the nuclear test ban makes a mockery of it.
he United Nations Secretariat and the a a attempt to
pose a veto system through the triple-headed manste
Oily vulnerable to non-Communist attacks. The contradictions be-
tween words and deeds are clearly exploitable. So is the nuclear and
missile rattling in the background of political and economic a croachmaent,
regardless of the fact that arusa.hchsv almost certainly does not want war,
either general or local.
egeainst Communist distu
ded. Fundaam
nde*d. a
policy in an iatern,ationaal Communiia
Ilse" scale Western peace campaign
would be well timed and well
be forgotten. that Soviet foreign
etgn policy, whose ultimate
,orld state.
objective is the creation of a Commu, d
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iS9VILT ECONOMY
The Soviet economy is obviously powerful and dynamic. Its
growth rate - a matter of ""numbers gamesmanship" among experts
and laymen - is probably at least double ours, and, President Ken-
nedy to the contrary notwithstanding, its prospects for catching up
with our industrial production, absolute if not per capita, by 1970,
are good. The chances that we can slow down its impetus by any
action, we might undertake are considerably less than that we can
speed up our own.
The Communists, of course, claim that, being aeientific in
rationale, and based on planing, the Soviet economy is invulner-
able. We have learned enough to shy away from earlier crude state-
ments that a socialist economy cannot flourish because its planning
principle destroys the basic incentive which characterize* the private
that a greater measure of planning may be necessary if our own, to
""
some extent
mied" type of economy, is to flourish.
In spite of our relative powerlessness to do anythin
but t
r
g
y ,,%..
Is
outcompete, " we can hope that some of the problems confronting the
Soviet economy may in time prove difficult or intractable, and even
emerge as serious vulnerabilities. These may be considered under
Lhe following headings:
1. Institutional Factors
a. The planning mechanism itself has a built-in "-"cotatradic-
" between the central and local factors. This has been tinkered
over since 1957 with the organization of the sovma rkhoz structure,
great, is shown by the recent creation of some 16 economic regions
,
not exactly overlapping the Republic ,waits. The problem of balancing
ov
ll
l
era
. p
azaniug with flexibility in detail and execution will grow in di
ficutty as the economy progresses. But at the same time, new and
powerful tools are coning to hand, especially linear programming.
The Party is fully aware of the internal conflicts which arise bet-
--it and the functional, administrative and technological hierarchies, and
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is constantly seeking new adjustment. It is hard to serge what we can
do to hamper its efforts and induce confusion, but we should study
this matter closely and objectively, if for nothing else to see what
lessons we can learn.
b. The problem of pricing is thorny for the planned
"socialist" economies. Among its rraany highly technical aspects,
one asy single out the practice of under-pricing new products in
effect discounting the economies which are to be achieved in later
mass production, and creating a handicap to enterprising plant man-
agers. The emphasis has been shifted from overfulfiltment of gross
plan to cost reduction as the basis of the managerial bonus. In gen-
eral, the whole problem of price and the "market economy" has been
Avety professional soul searching, in which a surpris-
ing freedom. of discussion, has been allowed, if not encouraged.
Whether this will and in scrapping certain basic ideological concepts
atria to be seen, and we should be prepared for some measure of
convergence in both the capitalist and the Communist developments-
This is of special interest to us, in view of the rise of "administered
e?
c. The problem of research and development has troubled
the Party and Government leaders. Like ourselves, the Soviet plan-
ners have not fully solved such matters as basic and applied research.
the role of central academic work and the individual enterprises.
There appears to be a considerable gap between military and civilian.
R and D, to the disadvantage of the latter. Since the Party recognizes
that technology is the key to the massive development of the material
bases which underlies the "transition to Communism, " it is devoting
every effort to reconciling the contradiction, of organization which
constantly arise. New, coordinating co z tttees and eor?srz fissions are
being created in the Government and academic structure, and new and
more energetic persons are being brought to the top. We will have to
compete strenuously to maintain such technological lead as we may
still have.
heavy industry and producers goods have had a clear
over light industry and consumer goods. Khrushchevhas
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indicated that these are to be equalised. It is not clear exactly what
is to be done about this, and one may even doubt whether it wilt
actually take place. At any rate it opens a host of problems, includ-
ing psychological and political. if, in fact, the consumer is to be
"giver a break" on the scale implied by recent pronouncements, this
._ _ cater __. tai.... to a^_mx,-n tt1nrn1' which
can hardly be fully planned in advance. it is likely to create serious
strains and frictions with the Chinese Communists, still in the "hav'e
not" etage. It may also intensify what some observers regard as an
_ --- 2-&.. ~e7w~ra~rklg it
"`tel`oll OR QJL acv...,_ . --
would be premature, and possibly wishful, to conclude that the USSR
cannot accomplish a massive lift in the level of consumer gratifica-
tion and still sustain its military program and its campaign of eco-
nomic development to backward countries.
3. Labor
en asserted that the USSR, facing a sh.or'
.e b
e
It has o
decline in the increase of the tabor "M e, resulting from the towered
i
s
which will slow its rapid industrial growth. Tin's vzow
erts
d b
.
y exp
tong1Mr hel
sufficient increase to enable goals of labor productivity and actual prow
ductis n to be met under the Seven Year ian. The tong range prospects,
197CI and beyond, are even better for the USSR. Whether it will stabil-
ize the work week at the American or European level - virtually attained
already - or start moving toward the drastic reductions proclaimed as a
feature of the "transition to Communism" remains to be seen. Much
depends on the success in overcoming the shockingly low level of labor
.xrh t with the riss_
+
t
a
,
productivity in agriculture 4eee below). At any re
improve, and the likelihood that manpower, as such,
vulnerability of the Soviet economy seems small.
4. ,hut
ce sboulld
prove a major
Under this broad rubric, ranging from mathematical theory, traro
l near programming to a series of 81 major experimental enterprises,
ee program
e
ti
m
,
USSR is making impressive strides. At the same
appears to be balanced, rather than cxaahy. it is trying to avoid the
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t:Jiistsea of haste which characterized the Sixth Five Year Plan.
The theory and techniques of automation are more and more the
subject of international exchange and cross fertilization. It is
possible that the USSR is developing secret programs which will
give us a Sputnik-like surprise. In any case, it seems unlikely
that ,we can deflect them, and can at beat hope to hold our own in
the competition.
5. Consumer
this is an imponderable in the future pross-
above
t
,
ers
a vo
pects of the Soviet economy. Steps have been introduced, which if
r.
... t z A.2-- ....nw.. as.rrrxn rt. "king'
s in thta country - suxperrrriarlaet$, frozen fruit juices,
h
i
e
s
amass
"' heattcs - sugar coated yeti it, appliances and gadgets have been
prorni Bed and in part already delivered. Quality and appearance
rather than sheer bulk are becoming important criteria, and even
stepped-up television advertising is being used. On the other hand,
all this can be turned off, or at least down, if the Party finds it nsces
reenital0 will be the rue. It remains to be seen whether these fine
sursnnptuary principles can be maintained in the face of the "revolution
of rising expectations. ?` Here is indeed a vulnerability. If we cold
only make them more like ourselves, in the image of Madison Avenue I
6. Agriculture
rnaini the Achilles heel, but will it always be vulnerable
r
e
& ?
'1 net can only speculate. The dispr'opor'tion between US and Soviet
labor productivity in agriculture is the sharpest b in hrusshchev's
throat, and like the Berlin bone, it must at all costs be removed.
Factors of soil and climate, and the deep-rooted peasant possessive-
nee a - the private post - are a solid sand stubborn realities. But there
ty thss &,l,ocation of investment capital to farm machinery and fertilizer
on a realistic scale. This will undoubtedly come, the question is whether
sooner or later. This determination may ultimately be made on a purely
personal basis by srusshehev himself, or it may emerge from the in-
1# fr
ld socialist ayst+sm
h
e wor
rable pressures of the billion nistuthss of t
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which have to be fed. It is a question whether activities of
of MMr. Garst's constitute 3n effective exploitation of a vutne:
or the opposite. Communist China will pose an even greater ques-
tion, as it becornes clearer whether its present agricultural crisis
or is a transient phenomenon which more temperate
fuilt~in
,
~,~
management and a break in the weather can resolve. We need to
study this with close attention.
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