MR. DULLES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080006-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 5, 1998
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 11, 1960
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080006-3.pdf | 108.68 KB |
Body:
MEMORANDtMpF,)ked fqr F Rgse 2000/08/30 : CIA-F~
25X1A9a
Bob Amory concurs in
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 IVI WHICH MAY BE USED.
EO/DCI
11 April 1960
E
(DATE)
Approved For Release 200
of it.
1
c : 25X1A9a
The boss does not think much of this
proposal and sked what you and= thought
CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(47) FFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
Chief of Operations, DD/P
Remarks :
k
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D
Qkogwulc
FORM 1 A R 55 23 ! Replaces Form 30-4
which may be used.
DP80-01446R000100080006-3
(40)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955--0-342531
Approved For ReI na- ' -3 - 80-01446R000100
6 April 1960
I 00 _.~iegistxy
~JV 33
25X1A9a
MEMORANDUM FOR: MEN= 221 - Admin Building
SUBJECT: Harrison Salisbury's Article in Saturday Evening Post,
19 March 1960.
With respect to the Salisbury article, I would suggest the
following steps might be worth considering.
1. Discuss at the OCB level whether there is agreement with
a. Salisbury's favorable interpretation of developments
in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev;
b. His thesis that Khrushchev is seriously apprehensive
over the ominous development of China;
c. His contention that Khrushchev in the long run will
seek an alliance with the West against China.;
d. His implied recommendation that US policy should
move in that direction now.
2. In the light of the findings on the above, the OCB might
determine whether
a. The Salisbury thesis is one which is favorable to
long range US interests and should be followed up tactically and
operationally now;.
b. Any or all of his theses are detrimental to US interests
and should be countered;
c. His views are without real significance or impact,
and should be ignored.
!T rNO.
i L;:
Approved For Release 2000/08/30-7-1 - 0 f H4q QQQ8AQ,0~ 30
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : Cl -RDP80-01446R000100080006-3
3. If his views are considered wrong and dangerous,
appropriate action might be recommended by the OCB to various
Departments.
4. With respect to CIA, our suggestion would be to labor
with New York Times editorial personnel through whatever channels
are available, to persuade them, preferably, to dissociate themselves
openly from Salisbury's views, or at least not to come out in support
of them.
I would suggest that such an exercise would be timely not in
terms of Salisbury alone. There is a strong current of similar thought
in Europe, centering around the so-called Starlinger Thesis. Even
deGaulle is believed to be influenced by it. A review of our own long
range interest would place us in a better position to react to European
pressures in this direction which are likely to grow stronger in the
future. 25X1A9a
Chief, SRS/DDI
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 CIA-Rt)P80-01446R000100080006-3