MR. DULLES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080006-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 5, 1998
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 11, 1960
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80-01446R000100080006-3.pdf108.68 KB
Body: 
MEMORANDtMpF,)ked fqr F Rgse 2000/08/30 : CIA-F~ 25X1A9a Bob Amory concurs in FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101 I AUG 54 IVI WHICH MAY BE USED. EO/DCI 11 April 1960 E (DATE) Approved For Release 200 of it. 1 c : 25X1A9a The boss does not think much of this proposal and sked what you and= thought CONFIDENTIAL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (47) FFICIAL ROUTING SLIP Chief of Operations, DD/P Remarks : k ? D Qkogwulc FORM 1 A R 55 23 ! Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used. DP80-01446R000100080006-3 (40) U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1955--0-342531 Approved For ReI na- ' -3 - 80-01446R000100 6 April 1960 I 00 _.~iegistxy ~JV 33 25X1A9a MEMORANDUM FOR: MEN= 221 - Admin Building SUBJECT: Harrison Salisbury's Article in Saturday Evening Post, 19 March 1960. With respect to the Salisbury article, I would suggest the following steps might be worth considering. 1. Discuss at the OCB level whether there is agreement with a. Salisbury's favorable interpretation of developments in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev; b. His thesis that Khrushchev is seriously apprehensive over the ominous development of China; c. His contention that Khrushchev in the long run will seek an alliance with the West against China.; d. His implied recommendation that US policy should move in that direction now. 2. In the light of the findings on the above, the OCB might determine whether a. The Salisbury thesis is one which is favorable to long range US interests and should be followed up tactically and operationally now;. b. Any or all of his theses are detrimental to US interests and should be countered; c. His views are without real significance or impact, and should be ignored. !T rNO. i L;: Approved For Release 2000/08/30-7-1 - 0 f H4q QQQ8AQ,0~ 30 Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : Cl -RDP80-01446R000100080006-3 3. If his views are considered wrong and dangerous, appropriate action might be recommended by the OCB to various Departments. 4. With respect to CIA, our suggestion would be to labor with New York Times editorial personnel through whatever channels are available, to persuade them, preferably, to dissociate themselves openly from Salisbury's views, or at least not to come out in support of them. I would suggest that such an exercise would be timely not in terms of Salisbury alone. There is a strong current of similar thought in Europe, centering around the so-called Starlinger Thesis. Even deGaulle is believed to be influenced by it. A review of our own long range interest would place us in a better position to react to European pressures in this direction which are likely to grow stronger in the future. 25X1A9a Chief, SRS/DDI Approved For Release 2000/08/30 CIA-Rt)P80-01446R000100080006-3