UNOFFICIAL COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS OF OPC MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100140010-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: PAPER

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UNOFFICIAL COIN?IJIENTS AND SUGGESTIONS OF OPC MEI0hi-tS OF AD HOC CMIIIITTEE
Our difficulty with the attachments to the memorandum proposed for i''r.
Dulles' signature stems from the treatment of the issue described in the
attachments as follows:
"Under one view the Psychological Strategy Board and its
Staff would emphasize the function of coordination among exist-
ing agencies. Under another view the Psychological Strategy
Board and its Staff would itself systematically plan and direct
the psychological strategy of the 'cold' war."
In disagreeing over this issue the majority of the ad hoc group felt that
it might be deferred until after the appointment of the Director. Although
we would be perfectly content to have the question deferred until the Direc-
tor is appointed, we do not believe that this is the action which the major-
ity has taken. As we read the attachments, they require the Staff to be
coordinators rather than planners, and we are fearful that the adoption of
these terms of reference in their present form might well jeopardize the
Director's ability to conceive of his functions as being otherwies.
The President's directive indicates that he intended that the Psycholo-
gical Strategy Board be more than a coordinating mechanism. In our view,
the Board is expected to define the objectives which this country should
seek in. the "cold" war situation, to develop the plans for attaining them,
and to coordinate the carrying out of the plans by the responsible operat-
ing agencies. Thus, the purpose of his directive is "to authorize and pro-
vide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct, within the
framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations." The
Board is responsible "for the formulation and promulgation of overall psycho-
logical objectives, policies, and programs and for the coordination and
evaluation of the national psychological effort," which is defined as in-
cluding "all activities (other than overt types of economic warfare) en-
visioned under NSC 59/1 and 10/2."
The President's directive thus notes in effect that the weaknesses
in our "cold" war effort are our lack of well-defined national objectives
(below the NSC level) and our lack of an overall strategic plan for the
achievement of these objectives. We feel, therefore, that the Board and its
Staff should concentrate its efforts from the outset in the satisfaction of
these requirements and that its organization papers should reflect this
priority.
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Our recommendations as to the language in the attachments are based
on this concept of the Board's purpose and on the assumption that the Board's
Staff must play a principal part in assisting the Board to accomplish that
purpose.
TAB B
a. We suggest the addition of the following subparagraphs a, b, and c:
"a. On the basis of the existing intelligence, to conduct an intensive
arc continuing investigation of the vulnerabilities of the present
Soviet regime to attack;
"b. Propose to the Board the objectives which can be attained by the
United States in the "cold" war situation through the use of overt-
covert weapons;
"c. Propose the general lines of action to be followed by the United
States in the use of such weapons for the attainment of these objec-
tives; recommend the allocation of operational responsibilities where
these are not now established or in such cases where the transfer of
responsibility will lie in the national interest."
b. Substitute the following for subparagraph g:
"To investigate the possibilities of developing new and of improving
present-overt-covert weapons and techniq,.zes, and to arrange for the
conduct by responsible departments and agencies of such research and
development as is found necessar7l."
c. Add new subparagraph:
"To consult with those Departments and Agencies responsible for the con-
duct of overt types of economic warfare to the end that US objectives,
plans, and policies in this field be consistent with the objectives,
plans, and policies adopted by PSB."
d. The first task of the Staff should be that of reviewing the current
situation and then of formulating strategic objectives and plans. If
we do not start with this we will continue indefinitely on an ad hoc
approach. This priority should be reflected in the chart of "Proposed
Organization - Phase II" by indicating the immediate creation of a
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VW MW
Plans Group and its activation prior to that of the operational
coordination and programming and. evaluation group shown on the
chart. The Staff Director should have the authority to staff this
group with individuals who are now employed by the Federal Government,
as well as consultants, and the member depart_aents and agencies should
place a very high priority on assisting the director immediately to
obtain the very best talent available.
e. Note (1) authorizes the appointment of deputies to the Board member-
ship. Although this is desirable and although, as stated in the
note, the departmental responsibilities of such deputies should by
all means he as broad as the scope of the Board's responsibilities,
it is essential that the Board's business not be turned over to the
deputies. In order to avoid this, we suggest deleting the second sen-
tence of the note and substituting the following;
"For the purposes of a quorum, at least two of the Boards members
must be present. In the absence of the Chairman, the Director will
act as chairman."
It is obvious from our previous comments that in our view the
first task of the Board and its Staff is to set our "cold" war objec-
tives and develop an initial strategy towards them which will encompass
an integrated use of all available "cold" war weapons. Consequently,
we suggest placing these two problems at the top of the Board's agenda.
Since it is likely that the best solutions to other items presently on
the agenda will be found only after the objectives and general overall
strategy towards them have been adopted, we also suggest deferring
these other items f or.the time being, during which they can be handled
as at present.
Although we feel that the treatment of "psychological strategy in
the 'cold' war" which appears in the annex is again too heavily weighted
on the propaganda side, we think that the concept of a. working group,
composed as suggested, which would meet outside of Washington during
the summer, is excellent. We suggest that this group be organized
early in the summer and be asked to assist the Director and his Staff
in preparing for the Board the statement of objectives and the broad
strategy towards them, which we have referred to several times elsewhere.
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