PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZATION TO PROVIDE DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE COLD WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100140012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 21, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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RMSEDm 21 I3y 1951
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
C } NCEPT OF THr 'tCRIIIZATIOII TO PROVIDE
DY'IIAIIIC PSICHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
III TIM C'. LD WAR
THE. PTBM:
1. To analyze the scope and mission of the Psychological. Strategy
Board and the tasks of the Director and the Staff; and to derive there?
from the qualifications and approximate aomposLtbn of the staff
FACTS BFARIIIG OII TIM: P.ROBIM
26 The purpose of the l cutive Directive of 4 April 19518 is
the
"to authorize and provide for/more efiective planning,
coordination and conduct, within the framework of
appo roved national policies, of psychological opera-
tions*)
3, The Psychological Strategy Board is responsible for the
"formulation and prcamulgaticn,t as giiomce' to the
departments and' agencies responsible for psychos
logical operations,; of overu.aU national psydho-
logical objectives, : olicies and prctrams, and for
the coordirAt3on and evalnxtioc of t1,e national
psychological effort"
is.. There is provided a btractor, designated by the Pre iciest, re.
soon b1 under the Board for directing its. activities. He is assisted
by a sta,ft, the organization, qualifications end size of trhich within
limits set by the Board, are established by him.
DISCU`'ON?
56' The Directive creates no rev operating agency, It results from a
gonem1 sense of need for haraasssim the disparetQ resources of existL,g
departments and agencies responsiblo for exocutina various psychological
operations and intensifying the national effort. it includes under the
tern "psychological operations" a aide spectrum o overt and covert
activities o from propagation of truthful foreigt information to sub.
versive operations of both a moral and a physical character.
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f, In face of tlx3 peculiar challenge of Bolshevist Russia, the Primary
objective of intensifying these unconventional national of forts is; to uin
the cold uar and prevent declared global irar. Failing this, the second-
ary objective is to create concltionc favorable to our orthodox forces
.Mn the event of tsar- If all our resources available for psychological
operations tare bro.'.ght to bear consistent] r, progreccdvely and cumula-
tdvely, the chances of kee- ding the peace or speedily winning the war
tmttld be immeasuzably increased. If that is true,, the establishment of
an organization for exploiting these resources should be considerr d a.
major national project. It should not be undertaken with half measures.
7. Psychological opera ti onq an In no mazmer a sub stit to for sound
political-diplcmatLc actions, sts+ong armed forces or alert intelligence.
Psychological operations reflect the strength of all these but will al-
-ttayss be subsidiary or cupplomentary to orthodox governmental operations,
Th z fore, the functions of the Psychological Strategy Board are not in
conpetttion or conflict with no=al operations of the dsparb oats and
agencies. Instead, the Board coordinates and steers the resources of
their pssycholo; ical units Into profitable channels toward national goals.
3, Soviet Russia and too satellites employ every inotramentality of
govern nt, orthodox and unorthodox, in lighting the cold war. Foreign
offices back up their propaganda; ground, sea and air forces shift and
naneuver in support of the psychological war. It is di ficult to ay
ithether orthodox forces supplement psychological operations or the con-
trary - which is dog and which is tail. All Soviet resources are de-
ployed actively or potentially in support of war that is x ,u beittig waged.
As long as they have the Initiative,, our conventionl planning for a
future declared uar.iss constantly throtm off balance and tends to be con-
fused or unnalisstic.
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9. Cowrontional concepts and plans based upon a L-Day thick no man
can predict lead us into the dilenna of two dangerous oxt -sa es,
Either our state of preparedness will be inadequate on the critical
day or over-mobilization loapg?dravn.out will be economically destruc-
tive. Particularly is this true because war plans are based upon
the a ssumpt on that the cold war cannot be decisive, Planning could
be more realistic if it were a sstimed that the cold war could be tan
and, if ton, could be decisive. This as arption would occasion a
modification of conventional war plans bat not in such per or do-
Mee as to alter significantly the slate of our prepazodmess at any
particular future date. The assumption would' ho ever, greatly enhme
the importance to be attached to current cold war operations,, enlarge
the concept of such operations and ensure the availability of both
active and potential national facilities (orthodox as mall as unortho-
dox) in its conduct.
ID, This conceptual background of tie Psychological StrateWr Boards
the importance of the eta-Iwo involved, ar d the scope and variety of
operations to be coordinated ? these all r,ro indicators of the requi-
site qualifications of the director and his staff.
114) Although the Board does not perform psychological operations,, its
re,ponsibility to give impotus to an intensified psychological effort
Implies considerable power of decision in the initiation and control of
major projects. Likewise# uhile the psychological operating units within
the departments and agencies caim,t be directed by the Board to carry out
its programs, the individual membire of the Board es,?off.i.cio are' of such
prestige as to create the preswapbion that the ex+ icuting agencies will
conciderguidance- approved by the members as being in effect mandatory.
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OrMCLUSIONS
12, Keeping in mind this implied authority, the Board, 1rector and
Staff should exercise functions canparable to both oonnand and staff
even though their explicit authority 13mito the natuxe of "comriand
to guidance. Otherwise expres ed, the Director and Staff are respon.
sible for the management of the psychological aspects of the national
cold var effort, Since no single individual could have the competence
or t3mo to mawige the global cpaign, it seems evident that under the
supervision of the Ldrector,, this management moat be in part delegated
to staff assistants. A uorkablo arrangor ent could be to employ for
this purpose regional and functional t cialists, each of whom would
bo responsible for assisting in the fozmilation of and directly
charged trith steering his part of a coordinated global program,
13, lore precision can note be given to the role of the Board,
to the cKalifications of the Ldrector and to the composition and
functions of 'the Staff,
THE BOARD
24, In the specific field of psychological operations the Board
functions begin' ubere the functions of the National Security Council
leave off. The Council promulgates broad national policies and prin-
ciples but its reports are too general to constitute blue-prints for
implementation. The Board on the other hand adopts specific and pract3o
cable obbectivee and initiates action to attain them, Tho Board ap?
proves lines of action and programs which assign workable and 'coordi-
nated tasks to the operating agendas,
Z$, The members of the Board trill be able to give only limited
pars.nal time to the details of ant of national psychological
operations, Hvucvera their decisions, bon ta'aneelated into dynamo
action programs by the hector and Its Staff and promulgated to the
Departments and Agencies, c n give national purposes.. consistency and
continuity hitherto 3mpossibl,e in this field.
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t3ithin, trio' Tern Of the Board, the motor shoed be
icuad a high degree of izfi-- .at$ to act promptly and ? s 1b1y in those
fast -m ovi situations inherent in psychological warfare ? He should
be supported against bureaucratic inertia or obstruction in bringing
to bear, at favorable opportuniti.os, all natioml psychological re-
sources in order to maintain the of'f'ensive in the cold tzar,
THE DIRE GTM
17, Director should be a nationally aot figure and have a
broad hackgro ad in inter att. ,nab. affairs, %,eferably he should have
o orl.enco in rare than one aspect of the broad speck of ctivitiec
eorpriaed in pays ological operations as defined in the Prosidentae
Eira;cti.ve, Ho should be riore a man of action than an intellectual
anoiyst, He should be capable of quick and bold decisions; uithin his
autho ity~ but methodical In directing longer a planning by his staff.
By ; ud. tcint and t act he should be able to inspire ?heamwork in cparating
depasrtaw: is and agencies,
l3a Ms task is of such national importance as to deserve unhesitating
saappors from Board and the President himself.
As proscribed by the President a s i23.y?ective, he ohalit
ao Be responsible for having prepared the programs,
policies,, reports., and recm.iendations for the
Board's considera?tio%
h. Sit t ith the Board and be responsible to. it for
organizing its business and for e: pediting the
reaching of decisi ,9
Co Promulgate the decisions of the Board,
do Ascertain the manner in tech agreed upon objoc
rtes, policies, and programs of the Board are
bei ng implemented and co ..rdi hated .song the
depar'ents and agencies concerned
e? Report thereon and on Us evaluation of the
rational psychological operations to the Board
together u.ith his reconraaendations3
P. Perform such other duties necessary to carry out
his rcapon.sibili.tios as the Board may direct.
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19. The SUM s' ou1.d have re n bility mder -the Director for
the performance of the fofloaSng specific fu ctions tihich cannot,
delegated to operating agenciest
a? Uithin the franeuork of approved national policies ,,and
as authorized by the Ord, the for::ulation and promulgation in.
practical. operating terns (not abstractions) of coordinated tror1d
7,ri.cd&e and regloxmi
(1) psycholo.ca1 p Uc eso
(2) psycholocical objectives,
(3) pea choiogLcal pro s.
ba Curing irpetw to the detei2M p] ring and a cution
by the operating agencies,
cp Con us evaluation of tie,: res_.lts of operaons4
with a view to making propt Ad st ment z in the pa?ogramo when neces.
say
d. The preparation of required reports,,
a4 Its oun secret xiatads strative duties0
20. The foregoing list inadequately reflects activities required
to give vitality to the conduct of the cold war? It d?ess hot ere
suggest the indispensability of dynwdc per?sona1ities to give flesh
and blood to the organizations. If the Orector and 4r ,.them-
selves up to ponder and planning., tv shall have sueceeded ofily in
establishing master Ivory Tvr. tbie they munt plan systematical
to the extent necessary to forma ato mund strategic objectives and
practical programs, the Tirector and Ws principal assistants should
sense themselves as being full 1 e "at. the front" in the cold tsar as
literally as coDnancbrs in or dox tea
220 As princip aids the Dirt cto should have certain re to
and functional chiefs (each with a fete assistants) tho should be out
standing expert in their raspective [,e6graphio poli.tjcal and functioasal
areas, These print pa , subordinates japresent in a sense the "c dsrss"
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FRET
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of the regional Operations. Dore accurately, as a group they night
app 3 ,T be ca Lied the
rational Coordination and MuglMentation Division
Thy specific regiana1 Staff Sections euggestod area
(a Soviet Russia and European satellites,
Chin, South East Asia and "bath ice,
ca itiddie and Near Feat and 11ocleri North Africa,
(d) British Comioralth and Free Europe,
(e) Latin America.
22. a. In intimate persona3. liaison with the co rosprspdfng
regional, heads of the operating agencies, the Chiefs of the fbregoing
staff sections exercise their. steeringgcoordina function,
t rlthin the teams of the a }proved policies objectives and pro-
grams foo ted by the Strategy Group and the Plans and Prograane
Division. Also, in collaboration frith the latter staff, th37 assist
in all steps in the forpn stun of policies, objectives, and pro-
grams applicable to. their respectivo regions. Thar follasr the
development of the opc rations, evacuate the results and keep the
Director currently informed of n dii'.cations uhiah may be required
in the programs*
b. The regional chiefs should be prod to famish the
authorized interpretation to. operating agencies of approved policies,
objectives and proms*
c. Tyre should also be provisions for functional speciali-
zation as appropriate.
23. The other major responsibility of tho staff is that of plazrni og
on the n3ti nal lavrol, that Lao the formulation of policio , objectives
and programs as guidance to the operating agencies. These major divi-
sions of the staff might be called the StrategE Grou p and the PlM8
and Pros Division. These staff division, should be responsible
for the formulation and communication to the operating departments and
agendas of all types of formal guidance required to iui .ate t
projects and pur.)oses of the BoardO
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strategy C~raup
216 This gr.,up sits at the call of the Director and is chaired
by himo Its permanent membership should consist of the Director,
tho Board Designee and a small, group 'of professionally skilled
VU-time consultants? in addition, Regional and Functional I
plea nters from the Oporationai Coordination and IMlementation
Division, as wall as consultants from operating departments and
agencies should sit with this group, uhen the subject of discussion
requires,
25. In addition to routine business of the Staff, the Strategy
Group considers policies, objectives and projects originated
by the Board as tell as those self-origi.nateda ;hen approved by
the Board, they am passed to the Plans and Prow Division for
formulation into coorciito.ted guidances, plans or programs for
prmmulgattton to the opcratiog agencies,
26. It is from the Strategy Group perhaps that the most dmagi..
native and consecutive tb nktng should emerge. It is hero that
the global psychologisel aspects of the cold tar are considered as
a whole, , The long-.range objectives having been fo1 u ated, inter.
radiate objectives are adopted and strategic moves to attain than arc
continuously otudiod. The initiative in the cold mar is seized at
each f-vorable opportunity, The broad terms of the action required
are decided. The Plans and Programs Division then works out coordi-
nated guidance or programs required by the operating agencies to
initiate pleading or immediate actions depending upon the nature
and urgency of the operation,,
Plans and Programs flLvision
27. This is the pla ring unit of the staff which performs the
mechanics of program planning, Its functions are to incorporate into
coordin-tod guidancos, plans or programs the strategic decisions and
courses of action approved by the Board and to prcuulgate them to the
operating agencies. In their final form these guidances, plans and
programs, While of broad national ace d in a global framework
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FEZ
should constitute basic bl uop nts for action on the part of
one or more of the rating. agencies. They, should not be perms
mitted to deb eneato into abstractions or generalities, but
should be forsrulated only in texts of practicable tangible ob-?
jectives.
28. A key nnclous of the Plans and Progvams Division should be
recruited from the only area of goverment where systomatl.o and
coordinated planning is really understood and practiced,, namely,
the ar sd. services. Thane key plannera tad e it b1i b a pat
and instra.ct spociaali.sts,, dmtan from ?sycholo@;ical operating
agenctec s in the essential maebanics of programing. Plans and
programs should be kept realistic by intimate o:oilaborati on on
an ad hoc or task basis of regional and funct,Lonal. specialists '
froi the operating departmonts and agencios and from the Operational
Coordit :.ti on and Im lemantation Division,
SUIIIAR.Y OF D IICEPT
29. Planning and oporational co acc .nati vn should be based
on the assamptLon that the cold uar can be cacti. Asa secondary
responsibi.ty only,, should the Board permit the enemies of the
Staff to be diverted to planning. wart programs as -distinct from
current operations. A small nucleus of planners mi gt appropriately
bo set apart for programing national. plAMs foa.v psychological warfare
in timrtte,, but major consideration :3bould be gtvan to tho cursont
opor.tions of the global conflict.
30. Reubering the D?Day for the cold war, . ocm c?ed several years
ago, the plans and programs frith uhieh the: Board aril be pr3marily
concerned are for a. campaign be t ne fought, or. The Board and its
Staff should cancer itself to funefiton as the eo# wnd and staff
of an army in combat rather than .as a delmrtment of',ck etze preparing
for a zr, to come.
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