COMMUNIST PARTY LINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 30, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

ADDRESS OFFICIA&Iif101ORICR4N5 TOr Release 29/09/12 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100150-9
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25. D. C. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
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SECURITY INFORMATION
October 30, 1952
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Subject: Communist Party Line
25X1A9a
Supplementing Mmemorandum on Stalin's
speech, the following poin s may be of some use:
1. Further evidence against the "popular front"
hypothesis comes from Stalin's article on economic problems.
The stress on inter-capitalist conflicts, including the
possibility of wars, is reminiscent not so much of 1936
as of the late twenties. It indicates a relatively hopeful
outlook for revolutionary movements.
2. Both Stalin and Malenkov imply that world war,
though still a grave "threat," is perhaps less probable
than formerly because_,of the increased relative strength
of the Soviet bloc and the further development of forces
making for disintegration of the capitalist system. This
implies less need for such devices as the "popular front."
It also indicates that if general war really is less probable
in Soviet eyes, the reasons are grim rather than encouraging
for stern hopes: Stalin may feel that he has passed the
peak of danger produced by our sudden spurt towards rearma-
ment born of the Korean emergency, and that from now on he
can probably retain military superiority and devote relative-
ly greater attention to profiting by the economic and poli-
tical backlash now beginning to result from our original
drive for a rapid build-up. Such profit-taking means efforts
at further revolutionary gains at our expense, not a "soften-
ing" of the general line.
Document No.
Review of this document by CIA has
deter dined that
CIA has no objection to declass
tains informat rn of CIA
interest that aunt remain
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3. Stalin's speech, while in the main reviving
further the language of orthodox class warfare, nevertheless
combines it with the post-war slogans of "peace," "national
independence," etc. which, of course, are calculated to have
wider appeal, This is matched by Stalin's statement in his
article to the effect that the peace movement does not aim
directly at socialism though it may develop into a revolu-
tionary struggle in some cases.
4, Malenkov's speech (about the middle of part 2)
is most precise about excluding a genuine "popular front"
because he attacks the British Labor Party, the French
Socialist Party, and the German SFD. But he does speak
hopefully of some "more sober and progressive politicans"
who are "not blinded by anti-Soviet hostility" and "are
beginning to come out against war," This leads him-to
predict that "peace-loving democratic forces" in countries
that are now pawns of ".American dictatorship" wwill find a
way of establishing an,independent "peaceful" policy, and
he promises that countries which enter on this "new path"
will meet with "full understanding on the part of all peace-
loving countries," This can be read as a lure held out to
Bevanites and similar dissidents who might come in time to
break with NATO and similar American alliances, but it offers
no evidence that Stalin will make any real steps to meet
them half-way.
5. The general trend toward an orthodox communist
line is confirmed by Togliatti's speech of October 17 (Pravda,
October 20) which refers expressly to the Moscow Party Congress.
Togliatti gives major prominence to "the working class" and
"the international communist movement," Here also, however,
Leninist orthodoxy is modified to the extent of combining
national and peace motives with those of socialism. No
mention is made of any alliance with bourgeois parties, but
"the progressive part of the middle stratum" is included
along with "toilers" in the concept of the ''people," of which
"the working class"-is "the leading, most organized part."
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6. In sum, the line looks like a moderate shift
toward more open expression and pursuit of Leninist
revolutionary aims. Instead of "popular front" there
is a continuation of "peace front" and national "fronts,"
which have masked those aims for certain psychological
purposes in recent years.
FSB:D/Y:GAMorgan:eh
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ADDRESS OFAppFIOfIJe AFQr Release 200/, I12 :
THE DIRECTOR OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
MFMdRANDUM
TO: Dr.
00100150002-9
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON
25X1A9a
FROM: John Elliott
SUBJECT: Comments on the Paper
Stalin's Speech
30 October 1952
Document No.
Review of this document by CIA has
doter ined that
date
has no ob2rtion to declass
p It contains intormaik'n of CIA
interest that most remain
classified at TS S C
Authority; HR 7C?2
^ )t .contains nothing of CIA interest
Data Reviewer -L0-'5q,--,50
"Possible Implications of
As a programmatic speech, it seems to me that Stalin's address
of October 15 before the nineteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist
party was much less revealing and indicative of future Soviet inten>
tions than his statement of policy on political and economic affairs
published in the magazine "Bolshevik" on the eve of the Congress.
Particularly significant, as I see it, are Stalin's remarks
about the disintegration of the pre-1939 united world markets, the
consequent deepening of the crisis of the world capitalist system,
and his thesis of the "inevitability" of future wars between the
capitalist countries.
Therefore while I agree with Ed Taylor's interpretation that
Stalin', plans no "hot war" for the immediate future and that the
Soviet Government is likely to continue to rely'heavily on the
pattern of indirect aggression by revolution, I am not able to follow
his line of reasoning, leading to the conclusion that the master of
the Kremlin is not contemplating a revival of popular front tactics
on the Continent and that no basic change in Communist tactics in
Western Europe is impending,
the
In the light of/Marshal's article, "Chip" Bohlen strikes me as
being absolutely right when he says that Stalin's supreme objective
at present is to smash the Grand Alliance (NATO) which has been
formed against him and to isolate the United States, its principal
architect, by separating this country from its Allies, particularly
Great Britain, France, Western Germany, and Italy.
The Soviet dictator apparently hopes to arrive at his goal over
these two paths;
1. On the international plane to strive to drive a wedge
between the United States and its Allies;
2. On the national level, foregoing the policy of violence
and direct action, to use the national Communist parties
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as catalytic agents to form "popular fronts" with a view
to fostering neutralism and promoting resentment against
increased expenditures for defense as well as to spread-
ing the belief amongst the peoples of Europe that the
United States is a war-mongering nation, seeking to incite
other countries to wage war against "peace-loving" Soviet
Russia.
1. The Kremlin is obviously gravely disquieted by the prospect of
West Germany's rearmament and adherence to the Atlantic Pact, the Schuman
Plan which promises to eliminate the struggle for markets among capital-
ist nations, and the developing tendencies towards European political
union. To forestall such a development.. Moscow aims to drive a wedge
into the rapidly-forming Western defence bloc, led by the United States.
Indicative of what appears to be the Soviet policy was the naming
last summer of Andrei A. Gromyko, chief Deputy Foreign Minister, to be
Ambassador to London. In this way Moscow showed the great importance it
attached to its relations with Britain at the present juncture.
Gromyko's appointment was preceded and followed by articles in the
Soviet press, pointing out the advantages that would accrue to Britain
from a general improvement in Soviet-British relations. Soviet commenta..
tors have been stressing repeatedly the divergence of interests between
Britain and the United States in the Far East and also with respect to
policies on the European Continent, particularly as concerns Germany.
What are described as "Anglo-American contradictions" have been receiving
increasing attention in Soviet official publications.
In recent months the Soviet press has been whipping up its "hate
campaign" against the United States while devoting relatively little
attention to the role of Britain in the formation of Western policy.
And if one day the Churchill Government were to be replaced by a Labor
cabinet dominated by Aneurin Bevan, Gromyko would be right on the spot
to exploit the possibilities inherent in this situation.
Ed Taylor's allusion to a resurrection of the Rapallo policy by
the Soviets is apt, especially when it is related to the policy lurking
behind the Moscow economic conference of last spring. There is every
likelihood that the Soviets propose to emphasize the mounting dollar
gap of the sterling area countries caused by the United states sponsored
restrictions on East-West trade. If unemployment rises, the greater
will the temptation for the British to accept Soviet trade offers, partic-
ularly if they are accompanied by United States tariff increases on
European imports. From the Kremlin's point of view, American commercial
policies offer great possibilities of staging a super-Rapallo that would
separate Britain from the United States and thereby wreck NATO as the
earlier Rapallo of the twenties torpedoed Lloyd George's dream of a
European economic union.
Likewise, dissension between the United States and France over the
impending German rearmament, the Saar, and North Africa can be expected
to be utilized by Soviet diplomacy to the utmost. In this connection it
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3.
is perhaps not without significance that while Stalin made no move to
invite George Kennan to the Kremlin during the time the American
Ambassador was in Moscow, the Soviet dictator hastened to receive the
French Ambassador shortly after his arrival there and is reported to
have made an effort to exploit current Franco-American differences,
doubtless with the hope of ultimately setting up a tacit Franco-Soviet
alliance against the United States.
Stalin's opening move to detach Italy from the West was made this
month when Pietro Nenni, left-wing Italian Socialist leader, fresh from
his reception by Stalin in Moscow, called on Premier Alcide de Gasperi
and presented him with a plan for the conclusion of a nonaggression pact
between Soviet Russia and Italy.
It is also perhaps worth noting, in passing, that only this week,
Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister, was host at a "secret"
dinner in New York City at which the guests were not only members of the
Soviet bloc, but also delegates representing the "neutral" countries of
Asia and the Middle East to the United Nations` General Assembly.
2. Simultaneously with this diplomatic campaign, the Soviets are
trying through the agency of the national Communist parties to detach
the Western European nations from the Atlantic Pace and to slow down
their re-armament.
It is true, as Ed Taylor points out, that at present a popular front
movement of the pattern that produced the Leon Blum cabinet in France in
1936 is unthinkable. Today British, French, and German socialists will
have no-truck with the Communists. Nevertheless, recent developments in
Europe appear to point to an abandonment of direct action method on the
part of the Communists such as led to the general strikes in France and
Italy in favor of cooperation between Communist and bourgeois elements,
Nowhere is this shift in tactics on the part of the Communists more
evident than in France. There Jacques Duclos, in announcing on September
3 last, the return of Maurice Thorez, the French Communist leader, to his
own country after an absence of two years in Moscow, launched an appeal
for a "United National Front" that would include all groups willing to
join the Communists in opposing the European Coal and Steel Community?
the Atlantic Defense Community, and West German rearmament. His call
was followed in a fortnight by the dramatic news that Andre Marty and
Charles Tillon, had been publicly disgraced and demoted. Exponents of
a policy of violence and revolutionary tactics, these almost legendary
French Communist heroes, have been discredited by the fiasco of the
anti-Ridgway demonstration. French Communism, disillusioned, was revert-
ing to the "soft" tactics, exemplified by Thorea, co-engineer of the
"Popular Front" of the thirties.
Similar tactics are being employed by the Communists in Italy where
the party's central committee, meeting to review the party's policy in
the light of the municipal elections of the spring, pointed out the need
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for a broad Communist-dominated electoral front made up of "leftist
independents", Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals. The party's
current propaganda themes emphasize not the nationalization of industry
or the supremacy of the proletariat, but anti-Fascism, defense of the
republican constitution and anti-clericalism. It is virtually certain
that the Communists, as in 1948, will enter the parliamentary elections
next spring on a common electoral ticket with the Nenni Socialists.
Like Duclos in France, Max Reimann, the Communist leader in Western
Germany, has raised the banner of the popular front. The recent action
of the Communist-dominated East German government in sending a parlia-
mentary delegation to Bonn to confer with their West German opposite
numbers on the subject of German unification points up the move on the
part of the Reds to cooperate with non-Communist Germans.. in preventing
the integration of West Germany into Western Europe. The German Communists
will work closely with Pastor Martin Niemoller and the German "neutralists"
in seeking to obtain their objectives,
And th ile the Kremlin is holding out the olive branch to the Allies
of the United States, the "hate campaign" against this country continues
unabated. Most signifc a~,~ibtl 3.s connection is the recent ousting by
the Soviet Goveernment/of George Kennan as American Ambassador to Moscow,
Kennan was a leading exponent of the theory that peaceful co-existence
with the Soviet Government and he went hopefully on his mission to Moscow,
believing that he could make a substantial contribution to improving the
relations between the two countries, But a six month's sojourn in the
Soviet capital was enough to thoroughly disillusion Kennan and long before
his enforced departure he was sounding the tocsin to his home government
about the menace inherent in Soviet propaganda against the United States,
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