CRITIQUE OF THE QUANTICO PAPERS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100160003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 17, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

4 NO. 64 ON
FROM : Charles H. Taquey
SUBJECT: Critique of the Quantico Papers.
1. Strategy.
It is recognized that this set of papers does not pretend to
reflect an organized strategic plan for the Summit Meeting, but limits
Z itself to the listing of tactical moves designed "for exacting from the
(A enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent strength". Besides,
C) many items listed in the summary and the bulk of the supporting briefs
p relate to long-range steps well beyond the purview of the Conference. The
CD views of the Quantico experts should, therefore, be discussed point by
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ce- Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
., Dr. H. S. Craig DATE: June 17, 1955
make. Because it envisages "no concessions" at the start, it ends up
with accepting in certain cases a "neutralization" of Germany which is
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y uses a or
the preparation of Summit (see paragraph 3, page 3 of this memorandum.)
However, since there appears to be a general philosophy, or an absence of
philosophy, underlying the conclusion of the group, it is important to
clarify this undercurrent of thought and motivations in order to throw
some light on the validity of the proposals. Clearly, the group has re-
coiled from the idea that the U.S. should make any concession to the Soviet
Union. In other words, it has adopted the attitude that anything short of
unconditional surrender on the part of the Soviets amounts to appeasement
on our own. An uncompromising attitude featuring the monosyllable "no" and
expos 4s of Soviet turpitude can be justified, but in the present circum-
stances it presents two grave dangers. Even if the Conference had not raised
expectations - and it has - this attitude would be in contradiction with
the fact that the U.S. and its allies have called the Conference together.
The result of inflexibility would be a loss of strength. On the other hand,
it is incompatible with the dignity of the office of the President to make
proposals which we know the enemy will reject, and such proposals can only
create dissensions among allies and weaken our position. Most important,
if we fail to propose a carefully considered list of acceptable concessions,
we may be trapped into making some which will not be of our own choosing.
The "mock" negotiations outline in the paper on Germany - useful as the
latter is - gives a good illustration of the point which I am trying to
must be carefully considered. This requires first and foremost a study
of the type of concessions we desire from thj0 pprAnt, and an even more
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certainly not acceptable. All the art of diplomacy consists in securing
from the opponent concessions greater - in fact and not in appearance -
than those which we make. The effect of reciprocal concessions on the
respective accumulation of power of the two parties in the course of time
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careful one of the concessions which we are ready to make. Instead of
avoiding any mention of concessions, we should keep them at the center of
the preparatory work. This of course does not mean that we should show
our hand at the beginning of the negotiations. At that point, we should
obviously introduce maximum demands. The difficulty in the present case
is that negotiations will be divided in two stages, the first one being
limited to the identification of topics by the Chiefs of Government. If
the President accepts to place on the agenda a certain item, this may
indicate that we are ready to make concessions on that item. This pitfall
may be avoided by letting one of our allies introduce the item or waiting
until the Soviets mention it. The existence of the pitfall is one more
reason in favor of an identification of the areas of negotiation in terms
of potential concessions, an identification on which agreement should be
reached with our allies prior to the Conference. For this purpose, con-
cessions should be examined from the following points of view: Are they
capable of determining substantial reciprocity? Are they compatible with
the national interest? And are they acceptable to public opinion? A
few such areas have been indicated in this collection of documents, but
quite incidentally. I will refer to them in paragraph 3, page 3 .
2. Position of strength.
Another assumption which seems to have confused the thinking of
the group is that we are in an overall position of strength. If we are
really in a position of strength, what is important is to maintain this
position at any price, to perfect the internal conditions of this strength
and to lull the opponent into a false sense of security by showing a spirit
of conciliation. A position of strength is incompatible with a frantic
search for a "solution", with the grave risk of firming up the will of the
opponent by trying to exact advantages which lt~is determined not to give.
To quote the London Economist: "It is one of the enduring ironies of
politics that whenever a firm and resolute attitude produces undreamt of
concessions, the reasons why these concessions were made are always apt to
be overlooked,. while the hunger for more leads men to exchange firmness
for imprudence". We should take this warning very seriously, and if the
members of the group did not do so, it may be because, subconsciously,
they are much less certain of our "position of strength" than they appear
to be. In fact the bulk of the paper points out a decreasing edge of U.S.
military power over Soviet military power since 1945, and a net Soviet
superiority by 1960, especially in the field of technology. The balance
of U.S. elements of strength and weakness on page 6 of the "Report" does
not appear to be overwhelmingly in our favor. Surprisingly enough, our
key advantage in the negotiations, namely: "a desire in the free world
that the U.S. should not withdraw its forces from Europe" is barely
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mentioned. Little more than a qualified judgment about the balance
emerging from a comparison of our present advantages and disadvantages in
the cold war can emerge from a more careful analysis. The truth is
probably that these various elements: manpower, technology, alliances,
psychological motivations are shifting, difficult to grasp, and, above all,
without common measure. If this is true, there cannot be any overall
position of strength or weakness, only specific instances of superiority
or inferiority, and therefore any reasoning based on the assumption of
an overall position of strength is vitiated ab initio.
3. Proposals recommended for consideration.
Regardless of the basic approach, the group has hit upon the
three main areas where there exist some freedom for maneuvers trade;
exchanges of persona and information; Germany.
a) Trades The proposal is listed on page 2 of the summary:
"The U.S. should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning
exchange of ... goods ... covering: a. An agreement for the expansion
of East-West trade". Unfortunately, there is no development of this key
recommendation in the supporting papers. A great deal of thought must be
put in the drafting of a U.S. position on trade. It is unfortunate that
the CFEP studies on East-West trade were not completed before the present
meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries. Allied planning on this very
important matter will be deprived of the necessary background information.
However, without exhausting the subject a few liminal points can be made:
(1) At the proper stage of the negotiations we need not offer more as a
concession than accepting the principle of relaxing restrictions on East-
West trade; (2) We can make this relaxation conditional upon progress in
disarmament plans or plans for the reunification of Germany; (3) Trade
among allies must be liberalized before East-West trade is, and the U.S.
must give tangible proofs that it wants to liberalize its own restrictions
on free world trade. This means the prompt passage of a tariff simplifica-
tion act; a firm attitude of the Executive on the Escape Clause, and an
1 With regard to the means of improving our position further, there is
an excellent proposal in the supporting briefs for pooling NATO technical
knowledge in order to boost our rate of progress. Although this is a long-
range step, it might have a bearing on the Conference if before that Con-
ference we were to start consultations in that direction with the Continental
powers, especially the French. The French are particularly sensitive to
what they consider a U.S. slight of their inventiveness and scientific
ability, and some recognition given to them in this field would strengthen
their support at the Conference. More generally, I think that we will
have to examine seriously without delay all possible methods of strengthen-
ing the Western Alliance in the fields of science, culture and trade. Time
is too short now to give detailed attention to these things in the prepara-
tion of the Conference. I alluded to them in a previous paper.
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immediate start of tariff negotiation under the new Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act. This must be accompanied by a deliberate effort to use
all possible financial and monetary devifa to quicken the pace of the
circulation of goods in the free world. (4) The U.S. view of East-
West trade is that the scarcity of goods available for exchange in the
Soviet orbit is a greater deterrent to trade than Western restrictions.
This position is sound and cannot be abandoned. However it tends to
minimize the value of the concessions which we could make and therefore
it should be held in reserve at this time. (5) In any discussion about
trade with Soviet orbit representatives, we must remember that, due to
the trade monopoly in Communist lands, trade between East and West can
not be conducted on an equal basis unless Western trade submits itself
to some form of organization. Such an organization does not need to be
and should not be as rigid as the COCOM - it can be most informal and
still binding. In order to preclude future Soviet protests against the
establishment of such an organization, we must include in any trade
agreement with the East a provision that trade will be conducted on an
equal basis, or on conditions of equality, or some like formula which
permits us to organize w s-a-vis the Soviet trade monopoly. (6) Con-
sumers goods must be included in trade agreements. An increase in trade
of non-strategic items between East and West should obtain prior to nego-
tiations covering those items now considered strategic. (7) Revision
of the international lists should be considered, but only when relations
have already improved. Incidentally, we must accustom ourselves to the
idea that such a revision will be necessary at some point, and we must
ascertain whether, in view of Soviet technological advance and in view
of the lead time on scientific developments, trade in items which were
in the past considered sensitive may now be harmless or even of indirect
benefit to us.
b) Exchange of persons and information.
Listed page 2 of the summary: "The U.S. should be prepared
to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information ...
covering: ... b) An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons
to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes; c) A convention
providing for free and unhampered international communications for the
exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-
Jamming agreement". There are negotiating possibilities in these fields,
and we should not recoil from them for security reasons. Increased
exchanges produce in fact better opportunities for police control of sub-
versive activities than the present restrictions. In order to'take full
advantage of police control we should of course simultaneously improve
1 I will not go into the politico-economic rationale for maximizing free
world trade before going into a substantive relaxation of East-West control.-
Briefly said, East-West trade presents dangers which can be countered only
by an expansion of trade among the nations of the free world.
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international police cooperation in the free world. The most severe
treatment of domestic Communists is not incompatible with improved rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. The cases of Nazi Germany and India show
that a crackdown on the domestic brand is in fact a pre-condition of an
improvement of relations with the Kremlin and never a subject for com-
plaint on the pert of the latter. It should be well understood before we
reach agreement, but it need not be spelled out in the agreement, that
any activity within the territorial border of a State is fully subject
to the police power of that State. The Soviet Union has traditionally
adhered to this position. In order to prevent the subversive effort
of the diffusion of Soviet literature, the proper authorities can ask
our nationals to subscribe a statement that such literature is needed
for research purposes. This makes available the name of the bona fide
recipients, and renders automatically suspect anyone who chooses not to
disclose his interest. As far as exchange of persons is concerned, the
starting gun of "relaxation" should be an invitation to top Soviet
leaders to visit the United States. This can be represented as a great
concession on our part, and at the same time we can expect interesting
results from formal and informal contacts of which these leaders have
been deprived for a long time. Technicians should afterwards be invited
in increasingly large numbers. We would benefit from reciprocity, and
also from the influence our own people will exert on those technicians
during their stay in this country. International communication is there-
fore the optimum field for negotiations. We will derive benefit from the
concessions of the opponent, as well as from our own. In a contest
between a Communist ideology, rudderless since the death of Stalin, and
our free criticism,we are bound to win. Moreover, we can use these nego-
tiations in the comumxnication field to regulate parallel negotiations in
the field of disarmament, for instance, on the sound theory that no progress
is possible in reaching political or even technical agreement until some
basic semantic differences between the Soviet Union and ourselves have
been reconciled. Such things as "coexistence" or "reduction of tensions"
have different meanings in Soviet and Western parlance, and no progress
can be made toward a goal defined by a common understanding of these
terms until this common understanding has been achieved. Such a consensus
cannot be reached by negotiations, which will always be vitiated by the
mental reservations of Soviet representatives, but only by a free exchange
of ideas. Even if we consider with skepticism the possibility of narrow-
ing the gap between Soviet and Western approaches, the slim hope which
remains of doing it rests on free flow of information. A clear U.S. posi-
tion in favor of the latter would not only enhance our prestige in the
world, show our self-confidence, but might also in the long term help
progress on other fronts.
c) Germany: Appendix C II, "U.S. Guidelines for a German
Settlement", indicates a gradual approach to the question of Germanyts
reunification. Not only a gradual approach has considerable merit, but
it is probably the only practical approach. We must put time on our side.
A serious criticism is addressed to the hypothesis on page 9, according to
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which a strongly rearmed and neutral Germany might be acceptable to us
"provided the Soviet Union evacuates the territory of the European
satellites and commits itself not to interfere in the political affairs
of the reconstituted satellite governments." Obviously such a neutraliza-
tion of Germany would take us back to the 1910's and to the 1930ts. The
resulting imbalance in Europe would produce a new world war as surely as
the two preceding World Wars were the result of a similar imbalance.
Moreover, a Soviet commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs of
the new Eastern governments would be meaningless. Such commitments are
easily disposed of by the Communist argument that subversive activities ~~J't
inspired by them in the territory of iade ' 6tates are jrtivlable a err'-"A,*'
to the police of these States, that they are not the concern nor the
responsibility of the Soviet State. In spite of what the authors of the
document say, the Soviets may well advance a proposal for Germany's
neutralization con rearmament, but such a proposal would be against U.S.
interests. I think that as far as Germany is concerned, we should insist
that there is no way back from a European community, including the whole
of Germany, that this community of economic interests and culture exists
potentially, that East Germany is a logical part of it, that it cannot
be dismantled, that the only aspects of it which are subject to negotia-
tion are the security aspects. If this leads us to consider a "European
security pact" between the Western European defense organization and the
Eastern defense organization, and although such a pact might constitute
one of the Soviet proposals, I do not think that we should reject the
entire concept without having seriously considered it in the preparation
of the Conference. Non-aggression or security pacts among groups of
powers of approximately equal strength might be a useful expedient at
this time. It is surprising that no discussion on this subject is reflected
in the Quantico papers.
4. Critigues and a ions lati to of r polpts of the summary.
a) Berlin highway tolls. "The U.S. should insist that the
Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the Conference". There
is apparently no harm in mentioning informally the highway toll robbery to
the Soviets, but it would be a mistake to make this a pre-condition of
the Conference. If we seem to attach so much importance to the toll
blockade, the Soviets will either refuse to act and "Justify" their refusal
on the basis of GM's autonomy, in which case we have lost our move since
we can ill afford to follow up on our threat not to go to Geneva. Moreover
we will have given the Soviets a clue for reaffirming the principle of
GDR's autonomy, a principle which we do not recognize. On the other hand,
if the Soviets direct a lifting of the blockade, our attitude will permit
them to represent this as a great concession for which payment will be
expected. Such a move will place us in a weaker, not in a stronger posi-
tion. On the other hand, the Soviet directive would be evidence of the
GDR Government's subservience to the Soviet Union, a fact which could be
exploited at the Conference. In order to maximize our advantage and
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minimize our potential loss, we must therefore raise the toll question
most informally at San Francisco and without seeming to attach too much
importance to it.
b) Austrian Treaty: "Suggestions should be made to the USSR,
to the U.K. and France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifica-
tion of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the Conference". This
approach plays into Soviet hands since the latter would make propaganda
hay out of such an exchange. U.S., U.K. and France should expedite the
ratification of the Austrian Treaty and the implementation of measures
undertaken under the Treaty. If the Soviets lag behind this win give us
a talking point at the Conference.
c) Control of armaments: The discussions and the recommenda-
tions overlook the main point, namely, that the Summit Conference is not-
called upon to "solve" the problem of "control of armaments", but to
"make arrangements for subsequent negotiations". This raises two questions.
In the first place, the Soviet omnibus proposal involves a broadening of
the concept of disarmament and lifts it from the technical to the political
plane by introducing elements such as "dismantling of foreign military
bases", "ban on war propaganda", "settlement of Far Eastern problems by
the nations concerned". The first question is, therefore, whether or not
the UN Commission or the Subcommittee are empowered to discuss these
questions. Since they are probably not competent, a great deal of dis-
cussion at Summit will be devoted to the aspects of a new machinery. Many
points will be involved, such as Germany's participation, which should be
carefully considered before, the Conference. The second point is whether
or not the U.S. should make a new disarmament proposal at Summit. In view
of Adenauer's insistence, this point deserves serious attention. If such
a proposal is desirable, it could hardly be purely technical in nature
and limited to such questions as "inspection", '"overflight of aircraft:",
and "meeting of a scientific conference on fallout", as proposed in the
paper. A purely technical plan will certainly not "captivate the mind of
men". Two courses therefore are possible. We might propose to circum-
scribe the discussion on disarmament, and, as we did at Berlin in 1954,
propose to start with the less controversial items, going progressively
into the more controversial ones. If we follow this course, we should,
however, pick up some new non-technical subject, such as discussion of
"war propaganda", in order to dress up the proposal. Another course is
to bring a whole new proposal along the lines of the President's speeches
of April 13 and December 8, 1953, taking into account the need for a
"moral and economic substitute for armaments".
d) Far East: "a) Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-
Peiping alliance; b Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the
Conference". The first proposal is based on a closely reasoned paper by
Professor Linebarger, but unfortunately vitiated by wishful thinking.
There are no evidences of exploitable strain between Moscow and Peiping.
It is highly doubtful that we should renew the Yalta experience t4 negotiate1
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Chinese matters with Russia. There are, however, some interesting remarks
in Professor Linebarger's paper, and the line which he indicates is not
fundamentally inconsistent with the approach which I w,ll recommend in
the next paragraph. As far as Japan is concerned, I agree that we should
give Japan a sense of participation, but we must remember that the internal
situation of Japan and the status of their present negotiations with the
Soviet Union do not permit us to take them completely in our confidence.
We should certainly keep them informed of the progress of Summit, and
possibly consult them, but not without taking precautions.
5. Recommended approach.
It is not sufficient to state that we should test the Soviets
during the Conference. It is necessary to indicate along which line, on
the basis of which principle we will test them. I propose to revert here
to an old standby of American policy, namely, the question of respect of
treaties. Facts Bunt servenda. The type of "coexistence" which can obtain
as a result of the forthcoming negotiations is admittedly limited in space
and time. The Soviet Union will not cease to believe in the ultimate
triumph of Communism, will not abandon war as an instrument of revolutionary
policy, but may accept for a period of time certain limitations on aggressive
actions which will simply formalize the limitations which they have already
accepted to apply de facto to their conduct. Substantial changes in the
world situation are ruled out, but the world expects to be reassured. We
are working under conditions of peace psychosis, and this is what obliges
us to make concessions. Our success will be measured by our ability to
obtain a maximum of advantages for a minimum of concessions on our part.
I have indicated that the best method for avoiding excessive concessions
was to determine very carefully in advance the areas where we can afford to
be flexible. But an intent to be flexible on certain points should not be
revealed too soon. On which basis can we present maximum demands for nego-
tiation purposes without showing an inflexibility which would alienate the
opinion of the world? I think that this basis is the pasta aunt servenda
adage. Since this is the first meeting of heads of governments since the
post war period, there are good reasons for basing our demands on wartime
and post war agreements which the Soviets have conspicuously violated.
Surely no "coexistence" can take place even for a limited time, if treaties
are not observed and what chance is there that agreements reached in 1955
will be observed if the post-1945 violations are glossed over? It is by
reference to the 1945 agreements and treaties that we can keep the Soviets
on the defensive when such matters as the status of the satellite countries,
or the Far Eastern tensions are mentioned. We should, for instanc., find
an opportunity for asking the Soviets which they intend to do about their
Yalta commitment for free elections in Poland, and what they intend to do
about the August 14, 1945 Chinese-Soviet Treaty. We should not hesitate
to mention or threaten to mention such things as the Katyn massacre and
the violation of the treaty with the Republic of China in Manchuria. With-
out asking for unconditional surrender, we can maneuver the Soviets into
a position where, with only a little face saving, they will make such
"concessions" which they have most probably already resolved to make.
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