COMMENTS ON BACKGROUND REPORT #1.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01446R000100170006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 26, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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`A i%d For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-- QR 1446R000100170006-3
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DATE :
TO Dr. H. ='. Craig
t R
o.
Doc~vmen
Review of tic document by CIA has
determined that
FROM 1-d chard 'Hirsch ~ CI f hzs no objection to declass
f CIA
p It csntains information o
interest that must remain
SUBJECT : classified at TS S C
Comments on Background. Report #1. Authority: RR 70.2
May 26, 1955
p It contains nothing of CIA interest
ftte _-_ _ N*C Reviewer 1 '` r4
y comments will be limited to Section 1, "War, Peace, an Atomic
Weapons", since I have been dealing with this phase almost exclusively for
the past year. I therefore offer the following:
1. The intelligence community and the Nuclear Energy Working Group
has taken the position that public apprehensions are not reflected in the
policies of Western European governments. The upcoming NIE 100-5-55,
"Effects of Increased Nuclear Capabilities on Policies of Selected Coun-
tries", will state that increasing public apprehension over the possible
use of nuclear weapons does not appear to have led to any significant
increase in neutralization or to increased reluctance of our allies to
stand with usfndefense preparations.
2. I would like to qualify the above judgment. I agree that there is
no firm evidence that increasing public apprehension has in any way affected
the policies of Western European governments. I suggest, however, that the
worsening climate is a matter of serious concern to the U.S. Governmu;nt and
that if the trend continues, Western European government policy may very
well be affected. Perhaps an analogy will illustrate the differences in
These results
viewpoint over the significance of these polling results.
are like a darkening cloud on the horizon which is constantly getting
blacker. The intelligence community and the Nuclear Energy Working Group
people look at the cloud, admit that it is getting darker and larger, and
conclude: "It still hasn't rained".
3. One means of avoiding rain has been for the U.S. to precommit its
allies to decisions and actions in advance of any decision for war or peace,
including the use of nuclear weapons. The tendency has been to set up
through NATO and other instrumentalities a sequence of automatic responses
which would shield the crucial decision to employ nuclear weapons from the
possibility of either a political or popular veto. This was the implica-
tion of last year's NIE 100-54, which pointed out that: "If the Western
alliance had come through a long period of cold war as an integrated and
effective coalition, and., above all, if the intermeshing of political,
economic, and military relationships had become highly developed., each
member government might discover at the moment of crisis that a large part
of the crucial decisions had in effect already been made. Under such cir-
cumstances any government might find it difficult though not necessarily
impossible, to abandon its commitments, recall its forces, and reverse the
whole trend of its foreign policy." And further, that "If the crisis should
develop with great swiftness, it might make public debate upon policy
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almost impossible. In such a case, decision-making would tend to be con-
centrated in fewer hands than normally, and a few dominant powers in the
alliance might make decisions which for all practical purposes would commit
their lesser allies".
4. Implications of the above for future U.S. political-military-
psychological strategy bearing upon the "Summit Conference", are that
the U.S. should:
a. Continue major efforts to cement its alliances in the
political, economic and military areas, recognizing the need to pre-
commit the decision making process with respect to employment of
nuclear weapons for the defense of the free world to reduce the chances
of a popular veto over their employment in the event of a swiftly-
developing crisis.
b. Continue to demonstrate by vigorous, forceful and intelligible
efforts towards a genuinely safeguarded disarmament, that the U.S.
recognizes the deep-seated aspirations of the peoples of the free world
with respect to the fundamental issues of war and peace.
OCB /OF:":RHirsch:GBA
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