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December 31, 1972
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Approved For Release 200'~~/Q,~~~I~~~P80- 3 ~ ~; ~ C 1972 BOOK WORLD 1 ~ ~ rr l~ ~ ~ ~~ o ~~ ~ TFIL' co~~nuc~ ~1,VD ~~1/.sco.~-l~c;cr or FOIi1~ICIV f11~I':~IIRS By C.hctrles Yost RcI-Idoru Ilor~sc, 23~I Irt~, k 795 By CIIAr.~rrrS ~r. ~or~~~~RTS IT IS n'OT just the Indochina war critics and the revisionist historians ti~=ho are hacking atiyay at the past and ctu?rc:nt .conduct of American foreign policy. \ow It is th; establishment. first came the thunderous coke of Hamilton }?'ish Arm- strong in his fare tell to the establish- menYs journal, Forei;n Affairs, with his cry of "isolated America." 1\'ow comes Charles Yost, a ~}0?ycar veteran of diplo- matic service on three Continents, finally as 1'residcnt Nixon's first ambassador to the United Nations, until 1971. Ycst's ~altttne is a rri de coe~au-, an outliouring of emotions long repressed by one sa disciplined. Post is no revisionist; he mi>ht be called a modern establir?hmcntarian. Ile is anf;ry ~i~ith nntr_h of the past, with the "misconduct" of American foreign pot- Scy. Eut like many others he seeks to - discern not anly ~yhat went wrong-~yith the ~i-ar the ultimate wrong but what must be lane in order, as Armstrong . puts it, that "v.=e may recaver our seif- confidence and self-respect and regain for cur nation the standing, in the tiyorld's estimation it once possessed." Yost, in ` fact, tees further: IIe socks a prescrip- tian for the global conduct of intcrra- tianal relations. Camino frmn an erudite man. with tang experience tiyiihin the forcibn policy cstablishmcut, what he says is well. worth rcadin~;. Ills "ultinutte canelusion" is that the conduct of toreicrn affairs "cannot be- come rational until these affairs cease to be 'foreign.' >' In turn, he examines haw the American system bas ~yorl:ed. and Hitt v:nrketi, and the "radical ana Canprc~hcnsi?:e action" l;e hclic~-cs na- tions must take to avoid catastrapbe in the nttcl~?:u? ?~r;tt. On the lit:~a point Yost lures out to STATINTL bete ;toire4turns outvtoube Iienre liissin4 aced to continue and increase. their ef- ger and his "conceptual frameworks,: for forts to "pt'y loose front coy politicians ~Ietternichian i-.alance-of-rireat-power di- sad bureaucrats" all they can about plomacy. Ile yearns for the stren~ sec- f?dd'df you, Bill. President Sukarno and ~ the Indonesian government know ?~~~~+~~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ all about this, and they are partic- d t h l l tby William Worthy In April 1961, a few days after the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs in- vasion of Cuba, Allen Dulles, at that -time the director of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, met in off-the-record session with the American Society of Newspaper .Editors at their annual conven- tion: Given the Cuba intelligence, by 'then obviously faulty, that had en- tered info Washington's rosy ad- ivance calculations, he inevitably was pressed to tell: "Just what are the sources of the CIA's infor- mation about ether countries?" 'One source, Dulles replied, was ?U. S. foreign correspondents ~aho 'are "debriefed" by the CTA on their return borne. The usual ;practice is to hole up in a hotel room for several days of intense interrogation. ? 1kluch of the? debriefing, I've y rncense a aving a man u ar of color sent to spy in their gatherer, differed with brother country." Foster Dulles, the Calvinist diplo- Cold-war readiness to "cooper- mat about the wisdom of the self-! ate" with spy agencies, whether defeating travel bans. motivated by quick and easy Years later, I ]earned that the !money (I've often wondered if U. S. "vice-consul" in Budapest; under-the-counter CIA payments who twice came to my hotel to ;have to be reported on income tax demand (unsuccessfully) my returns'.) or spurred by a miscon- passport as I transited Ilungary ceived patriotism, had its pre- en route home from China in 1957 cedent in 44'orld War I and in the was, in fact, a CIA agent revolutionary-counterrevolu- operating under a Foreign Ser- ~ tionary aftermath. hi the summer vice cover. Dr.rring a subsequent of 1920 Walter Lippmann, his lecture tour, I met socially in wife, and Charles Illerz published Kansas City a man who had rn the :dew Republic an exhaus- served his Army tour of duty in tive survey of how the New York mufti, on detached service in Times had reported the first two I~ North Africa and elsewhere with Years of the Russian revolution. the National Security Agency- Out ~ They found that on 91 occasions- of curiosity 1 asked him what an average of twice a week- . would be the "premium" price for Times dispatches out of Riga, a newsman's d.ebr7efing on out-of- Latvia, buttressed by cditoi-ials, bounds China. lie thought fora had "informed" readers that the? moment and then replied: "Oh, revolution had either collapsed or about 510,000." Out of the CIA's was about to collapse, while at the petty cash dratieer. same time constituting. a "mortal t ? to freely and willingly by indi~~du- ~. 1Iy first awareness of the CIA's al newsmen untroubled by the ~ sPecial use of minority-group world's image of them as spies. In ;newsmen abroad came at the 'time of the 1955 Afro-Asian ~at least one case, as admitted to summit conference at Bandung, me by the. Latin-American spe- Indonesia. Through 44'ashington cialist on one of our mass-circula- sources (including Itlarquis ' loon weekly newsmagazines, the Childs of the St. Louis Post ~de.briefing took place very reluc- Dispatch), Cliff Alackay, then edi- tartly after his initial refusal to for of the Baltimore f'lfro- ' cooperate w?as vetoed by his supe- American, discovered-and. told riots. But depending on the par- me-that the government was titular foreign crises or obses- planning to send at least one sions at the moment, some of the black correspondent to "cover" eager sessions with the CIA the historic gathering. debriefers bring handsome re- 1'he "conduit" fur the expense muneration. Anyone recently re- money and "fee'' was the director -- turned from the erupted Philip- pines can probably name his price.. Despite its great power and its general unaccountability, the CIA dreads' exposes. Perhaps because of a "prickly rebel" family repu- tation stretching over three gen- erations, the CIA has never approached me about any of the 48 countries I have visited, including four (China, Hungary, Cuba, and North Vietnam) that ha~i been placed off-limits by the State Department. But the secret agency showed intense interest in my travels to those ."verboten'' lands. In fact in those dark days, ~ tiers for .a press supposedly free Eric Sevareid once told me that ~ of governmental ties, I relayed ', Allen Dulles,. the intelligence ;this information to the American ' of a "moderate" New York-based national organization, -supported by many big corporations, that has long worked against employ- ment discrimination. The CIA cash was pascal to i he organiza- tion's dire~:~ar by a ;vghly placed Eisenhower :drain;s~ratibn of- ficial overseeing Latin-Ainerica^ affairs w?ho later became gover- nor of a populous Dliddle Atlantic state, and v;hose ? brofhe: s and family foundation have long been heavy contributors to the job op- portunity organization. Because of the serious implica- Sleeping Car Porters. Ted's re- Civil Libcrtie?s L mon. I also told" ~ Theodore Brown, one of A. Philip Approved For? 1~9L~s~s2#'i~3Mdi4i'~ CY STATINTL menace to non-Communis Europe. Lippmann and his as-. sociatesattributed the misleading coverage to a number of factors. F;specially cited in the survey were the transcending win-the- war and anti-Bolshevik passions ~'in"their classrooms and women where they shop. On one such occasion a bomb v.?ent off at 9.08 p. m. Five minutes earlier, at 9.03 p. m., an ambitious I. S. wire-service correspondent filed an "urgent press" dispatch from the 4Ycstern Union tele- printer in his bureau orifice, re- porting the explosion thiat, awk- wardly for him, came fire miu- utes after the CIA's scheduled time. 44'hen that correspondent and most of his U. S. colleague were locked up for a week or two during the CIA-directed Bay o! Pigs invasion and were then ex polled, many C. S. editorial writ ors were predictably indignant. Except perhaps in ~4'ashingtor itself and in the United Natrona delegates' lounge, the CIA's department on journalism t: probably busier abroad than a. ;tt newsmen al tome. In 1961, duriut a televised interview,' 44'alter Lippmann referred casually tc the CIA's bribing of foreign newsmen (editors as wolf as lh working press), especially at the time of critical elections. All oae: the world governments ~aitd politi cal leaders, in po~t?er and u~ op position, can usually name thei journalistic compatriots who are known to he or strongly suspectec of being on the CIA's boimtifu payroll. I believe it ,vas Leos Trotsky who once obsen~ed iha of Times. personnel, as well as it anyone who enaaee:; in in "undue intimacy" ??irh Western I telligence work is ahways ~rn- intelligence agencies. ~ covered sooner or later. After,1959, when .Fidel Castro ! Even neutralist countric~~ came to power after having !learned to become distrustful o% ousted the corrupt pro-American, ~ tl. S. newsmen. lu early 1907, Batista regime, itliami became a Prince Norodom Sihanouk ex- modern-day Riga: a wild rumor polled a black reporter after just factorv from. where Castro's 24 hours. In an official statement "de !h" and imminent overthrow the Ministry of Information al- were repeatedly reported for sev- leged that he "is known to be not oral years. Both ut that city of ex- only a journalist but also an agent patriates and also in Havana, of the CIA." In a number of :1fro- "undue intimacy" with the CIA Asian countries, entry visas for U. caused most North American re- S. correspondents, particularly it porters covering the Cuban rove- on a first visit, can be approves lotion to echo and to parrot of- only by the prime minister or ficial U. S. optimism about the other high official. Bay of Yigs invasion. r1s recently as a generation aye In the sump>er of 1961, on my it would have been unthin!;ably fourth visit to that revolutionary for most U. S. editors, publishers island, a Ministry of Telecom- ~ newscasters, and reporters to ac munications official told me of a duiesce in intelligence de not untypical incident shortly briefings, not to mention lcs; before the invasion. Through met- "passive" operations. 441;at Er cenaries and through thoroughly ?3lurrow denounced as the cold discredited Batistianos, the CIA war concept of press and uiiiversi was masterminding extensive ty as instruments of foreign polio sabotage inside Cuba-a policy had not yet spread ever the land doomed to failure not only In the ,years before the Secorii because anti-Castro endeavors 44'orld 44'ar, if any governmen lacked a popular base, but also l agent had dared to solicit the c~ because kindergartens, depart- .operation Hof a .William Allei merit stores during shopping ?hours, and similar public places -R~P1~0'F~~0g49 bombe In no country oes one mobilize mass support by killing FEDERATIOPd OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTER, Approved For Release 2001f~/O~~~IA-RDP80~~001 THE INTELLIGENCE CO~.M.UNI TY: T(ME FQR R V( W?~ 'i'hc intcllirr.nce community, and itc budget, pose manq rrrrrrrres such additional services of common concern as,~ t M b i ' + e n u nes Cart the National Security Council determ problcnrs cif traditional concern to the Federation o[ Amcr- lean Scic?utists: govcnunental ~ reform, morality, proper' . cli'rctively accomplished centrally; use of hiEh tcchnolugy, and defense expenditures. In the "Perform such other functions and duties retattd fv ' Inst quarter century, intclfigenee agcncics .have prolifcr- inreilrgence aficeting the .national security as lhC No- atr.d. The United States has cstnhlishcd an aEency which tional Security Council may tram tftlle to limo direct,", gees hcyr~ncl intclligcncc collection and, periodically, inter- (italics a,ddCd) ~. .,; ,' .,?''~~;'~' (tees in the internal affairs of other nations. TcchnoMgY These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intcllil;encc suitrct (ci the invasion of national artd personal privacy collection but they arc also used, to justify clandestinr_ po- has hcrrti developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion being litical operations, however, overthrowing governments, spent for intclligcncc might well be termed the largest secret wars, assassination, and fixinP, elections arc ccr- u " part of the dcfcnsc b "unrcvicwed dget, tainly not done "for the benefit of lhr, existing intclligcncc '1'wcnty-five years after flit passage of the Nadonaf Se- ` agcncics" nor ate they duties . "related to inteili~ rote." eurity Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the Someday a court may rut? ihat,palitieal activities arc not problems posed by these developments. authnrizcd.~ Of least a~nccrn in tcrms.of its budgr.t but~of over-riding in any case, at the urging of Allen ?ulles, the National sif;nificance in its international political impact, is the Ui- Security Council issr.ted a Ceeret.dircctive (NSC 10/2 i ir, rcctorrtc of flans of CIA, wiUrin which clandestine polio- 1948, authorizing such sprci~,l operations of all kinds-- cal ~peratir~ns arc mounted. This is the issue discussed in provided~thcy weer, street and small enough to be pausic~ly Goo whether clandestine political operations ought tv beEven this. aut~tority has been exceeded since sevc~al im- of an investigation, a 'secret bureaucracy-which stortcd 1J_2 (fight, the )iay~of f'ils invasion, the Iranian Coup, the which grew in the C[A during a cold war-m.ay simply The National Security Aet~ Pave the CIA no "police continue to practice a questionable trade. subpoena, law cnforcemcnt powers, or internal sccurit}' Clandestine "dirty (ricks" have their .costs not .only' functions ..." but another secret Executive branch uocu- ahroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too rncnt evidcrttly did give the CiA authority to cnFa;;r in easily, .And is not interference, in the a(Tairs of othct domestic operations related to its job. it was urulcr ulis ' nations wrong? ~ - ~ authority that snch?organizations as foundations, cduca- Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, """`? "'~"""casrvns, auu pnva[c vonlntary ~rOUps ?crc one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D.: revolved with the CIA at the time of the National Studcni J Association revelations (1966). ' I;asswcli, wrote a comprehensive and prophrtie book, ThP "white" part of CIA is, in a sense a cover for the STATINT "~?7ational Security and Individual Freedom." f1e warnr_d "black" side. CIA supporters and ofliciajs invariably cart- of the "insidious menace" that a continuir.g'etisis might pltasize the intcllisence, rather than the ? mini f~ar,;::~n "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrase., t,;at would sec, he predicted: pressure for dcfcnsc expendi- gloss over it quietly, The public can easily nc:ccpt the ~ic- htres, expansion and ccntralizalion of Government, with- suability of krrowirrg as much as?possiblc. liut its instincts holdinfi of information, gencral~suspicion, an undermining oppose doing abroad what it wor.rld not tolerate at brine. o~ press and public opinion, ;a weakening, of political And it rightly fears that injustices commiucd abroad nay phrtics, a decline of the Congress, and of the' courts. ' ~ begin to he tolerated at l%ome: how many elections can ;tnet Chairman fit the 1~htc~ R~ht,o.t ;11it. Sl'~It+YCTY)N. As n Innf;lintc mcnrDcr of the ~ l;ornnritlcc on lrorcil;n Itclnlions, ns nn nd hoc mcnt- hcr of the Appropriations Conuniltcc and Urc r:mk? inl; mcnrlrcr of Arnx?d 5en?iceF, f respcctfull,y plead svi(h my colleagues lu allow nie fo receive in executive session cnonl;h irttcllif;c?nrc inforntnlion In in turn fr,nn nn intcliif;cnt, jrulgotcnt nn ntnttcr~lrl~?frich so vitally affect our sccurih?; and so 1 con vofil Iri coan- mittcc and on Itrc floor of the Scnatc on !Lc basis ~tf r ihr. facts. 77rcrc have been several cases vvhcre~,~ t Itave not been able to do that in the past. Tn my;' ! opinion, Ibis Inck of divscminnfcd inforntntion has t ensi the cmrntr ? a reat deal oT t d g } reasure an v num? In any case, as the distaste for C1A g~uws, Ci~~\ has a moral obligation to stay out of the lives of thntic who du brr of Antericun Lives. not wish to tic tarnished ~y association with it, In one ? ~ '-front Corrgressf~naf Record-Senate country, it is reported; CIA put funds into the hank dr- ' ? Ngverrnc~r 23, 1971, 5-19,5 posits of a political party without its knowlcdyc. 13ut what itcpuri nn f)rtcnRC ncpartmcot nmttrcros: _Gilltc~t E=~tz- if this wcrc discovered! Ahviyusy, CiA could Iig.hUy risk huAl+. tc~t material t. cc c an is csscn ra ~ ater~a +. c~,l- ?,,.,...n.,,.... ,~ ..,.:_. _....~__. ~,~. _ .. CIA CHANGFNG'PERSONALI7Y? terry trans-Atlantic tclcn^honc cpall." ~ body cxisfin restraints on DOD which ('1 w~ i c rn -. A .ln,v 1p1~FO~kI iT~;r'BEY'Di~~~0~1r~ar0~4niit4~l~4.~rl~sq;~ol~~r~~a~'~~~c~~~rr,~~ ,Pensive indcpcnccnt checking in 1Vashington with sources,'' for training Cambodian military.forccs, in short, Senator In anti out of Goventntcnt who were familiar with in~'..?Casc is emphasizing the fact th;~'f C1A is a statutorily dr?. 'tctlircncr matters has resulted'in the cvrmharation of:? signed agency, which Congress' empowered, and which many of (the article's) revelations." Cxperttt' had drnieAl. 'Congress can control. a h~++vcvcr. the nlausihiiitt' of the nsscrtion that the sonhisti+:, . ~:ongress -has not only givcn? the ExccuUvc Ilranch n' entecl c~clrs itf the Su~'ict Union had bccn hrok~en. ~ ;'blank check to dc+ intclligcncc but it has not even in>isted CONG(~CSSIONAI. OVERSIGOiT OF TFi~ '.,. ~ on seeing the results: The NaAional Security r\ct of 19~t7 ' iNTCLi.iGENCE COMMUNITY' requires CIA to "corrclatc and evaluate intclligcncc relit-~ 1n each }louse of Congress, the Armed Scrvieex and the Appropriations Committees have a subcommiuce that is supposed, in principle; to oversee ,C1A. In the ~tuu~c of Rchrescntati+?cs, cv.en' the ?n?amcs of thC:-Apj+rctpr.iatiuns stalrcommiUcc ntembcrr;? arc accrct,~.'l~t ,lhc.?Scnatc, ~.thc .flue ecniut' mcml+crs at the Appruprietlontt ,Gontmitlcc ,fctrm o WFOAT DRlVkS !N~'~Lt,,lGcNCC 11'e are going to bore to fake a harder look at lnicl- ligence rcquirenrents, because they drive the hrtclli- Rcncc ~Yr0Cr55. in so doing they create demands for resnurccs. T'hl'rc is a t~r~c}cncy for rcquircmcnts--' once stated-In acquire irnnrorlalily. One requirentctris question s+c ++ill ask ourselves is KhMhcr r+?c should maintain n ++?orkl-++idc data basr,~ collected in advance, as insurance against the con? tingcncy that ++e mat? need some of this data in n par- licnlar situation, Much of this information con lrc acquired on eery short notice- by reconnaissance means. As for the remainder, +rc arc gnfng la have In accept the risk of not ha+ing complete infornratirrn. on some }tarts of the -sorld, 15'c haven'! cnrru;;ir re? soarers to cover cvcn?thi~+g. and the high lrrioritc missions Iravc first cstll on t+~hat we do have. ~-- Mott. Rohcrt F. Fmclrlkc, ,Sncr?irrf As.risfrrn! tr? il+r' . ,Secrrrnrv o/ I)e/Crr.ee Jvr lntelliRcn~e, /Irrre~ 9, 1971 hrfnr~ ncJ~rr.cc Aplrrc~prlnrlnus 5ut5corrurrlffee, Non+c' Pf ~ /t errc.CClr/(Ir%re.r. - ' tog to the national security trrrrl prot;irle /or rlre rrp~,rrrlrriurP? ,' dissrrrriunriorr of .s u c Ir 1n1clliFerrtc -r'illrin the ,cm?~r~r- ~rrear ..." (italics added), As far as the legislative branch of "govcrnntcnt" is concerned, .this has oat bccn done. . On )uly 17, 1972, the Porcign Relations Connttittec re- ,portcd out an amendment (S. 2224), to the National 5c-' eurity Act explicitly rcyuiring the CIA to "inform fully and currently, by means of regular.nnd special reports" ,the Committees on Parcign Relations and Armed Scn'ices ,of both ltouses and to make special reports in resnon~c to .their requests. 'f'hc .Committee proposal, sponsor~ct by Settatorlohn 5hcrman Cooper, put special emphasis upon ,thc.,cxisling prcccdcrtt whereby the Joint Atomic EnerF~? tCornrni'tlcc gets special reports .from pOV .on atomic cgcr~y lntclliRcpce ,~nfgfrn~jirn, (~, ~?-.'' ~u? ?~' at,f,~ommittcc on intclligcncc Upcrations. The 'subcornmitcc of Arrncd Scrviccs on C1A, has not ~ , met for at least two' years-although Senator Symington,' a tncrnbcr of ,the subcommiucc, has sought to sccurc such a rneclint. In '1971, Senator Stennis and Senator ]sllcn- dcr-then the Chairmen of the full Armed Scrviccs aitd Appropriations Cumntiltres (as well as of their CIA sub- committccs) said they knew nothing about the CIA- financcd war in Laos-surely CIA's I+ieFcst uperation.!~ (Congressional Record, November 2,3, 1971, pg. S19521 f ~ 519530.) The +Conj;ressntcn ;arc undcrstandahly rclnctant even :o know about intclligcncc opcration~. Without publicity, tad public support, there is a limit to their in(lucncr over 'hc events about which they hear, And if thc,y rannut appeal to their constituency, the,knrnvlcdgc of secrets only , ntakcs them vulncrahlc to the tmcar that they leaked a acceet or mishandled their rrsponsihi(itics. ' Approximately 150 resolutions have bccn ~uf;crcd in the Congress to control the C1A andJor other intclligcncc . functions. The most common resolution has called for a Joint Committee on intclligcncc, and 'there is mucli 'to he said for it. Such a Fcnewal of Coni:ressional authority to ' review such matters might strengthen Congressional ~~c~- bight. Two more recent cffort$, both sponsored by Senator Stuart Symington, have tried ditierent tacks. Onc rcsolu- . ? lion called for a Select Contmiftce on the Coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad;' such a committee would hnvc authority over C1A and DUD foreign activities in particular. Another approach called for limiting the U,S. intclligcncc expenditures of all kinds to $4 billion. Senator Clifford Case (1tcp., N.J.) has sought to cantrul .the ClA by~q~fy~j~'lp~~t~tl~~~i~~1g~c+~-~'Oq/~3'r04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 8000100070001-6 ascncy of the U.S. Government." Thcsc resolutrrnu rnr- . ~'raal: Barry 5. Txuma.n Approved For Release 2001/03/0 CIA-F~DP8~T('~~IT~000 By: hiar~axe~ ?~.'rtuaa~ . Dad ~+?as even able to jake about serious thinUs. Olie o[ 12is prottdest accomplishutents as President tti~as the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Before it tvas established, intelli- gence teas gathered by a ]]alf dozen agencies, and very little oC it reached the President. One day he sent the fallowing 2nemarat2_ dung to Admiral. Leahy and Rear Admiral Sidney \V. Souers, the first CIA thief: ~Ta ~I}? Brethren and Fellow Doghouse Denizens: ? By virtue of tale autllot?ity vested. in me as 'i'op Dog I re- quire and charge that Frot2t~ Achl2iral ~~~illialn D. Leahy and Rear adn2ira] Sidney 11'. Souers, receive and accept the vest- . meats and appurtenances of their respective positions, nan2ely as pe2sonal snooper alul as director of centralized snooping. ' ... I charge that each of you not only seek to better our for- - eign relations through .more intensive snoopinc; but also keep nee il2tormed constantla~ of the movements and actions o[ the other, for tsithout such coordination there can. 1>c no order alld Il0 aura Of 121n1ttal tl'USt. This refusal to let the seriousness of his tsork make him solclnn was typical not anly of 17ad hue of the men around him. 1\Iatt Connell}- t~;ts ot~e of the great all-time teasers. I]e loved to hang ridiculous nicknames on people. and tsould salemnly introduce "Corpora ]'~~ ~-aughan and "hield itlarshall" Canfil to bcf.uddlcd visitors. ]gill I ]assert was known as the "Bishop" because he teas a solemn- ~ holat?ly Catholic. Ina ]etzer to liis mathcr itz Scptctnbcr, ]~~lG, Dad gi,vcs a good picture of t'::e way t12e bays relaxed by torn2c22ting each other: 5;~~e Hearst colunn2ist by the name of. Tucker had called I-Ia,^.v Vaughan a fat, lazy major general who ought to be a co~- port ziul they really made Vatlglial2 believe that Tucker teas rig':1. I really felt sorry for both Vaughan and Graham [~eho eras ki.'.decl for anstsering nut mail] be[ore the naggers ]ec up on thcW.. ~ ,.. D'ad p]~1t'~~ a cleligl2tful joke on Dr. Graham early in September, I9~1G. HC.. ~~ hots he described it to his mother: tl~de Doc Graham a brigadier general yesterday and nearly - em_.~-ra.~sed him to death. I told hint to come to the mornin, Approved For~Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 Approved For Release 2001/0~'~'~~~~I~~DP80-0160 TFBE WHITE 9iOl1SE PLAN I NTL TO PRIDiVE THE GOVE~r~IYVdE~dT Now the re-elected President is moving on domestic problems. Ahead: efforts to overhaul Gavernmient, bring the budget under control, cut down on bureaucracy and avoid tax hikes. With a ne~y mandate from the voters . -but a Congress still controlled by the political opposition-President Nixon in- tends to press for far-reaching reforms in Government agencies and programs ? during his second term. The President has said: "I honestly believe that Government in Washington is too big, and it is too expensive. We tau do the job better will fewer peoplo," On .the outcome of this effort may de- pend the burden of federal taxes, the impact of inflation on the cost of living, the value of the American dollar, and the availability of money and credit for business expansion. Action agenda. In the fortnight im- mediately following his re-election, Pres- ident Nixon took these actions: ? Signaled a firm determination to 'shake up the organization of the exec- utive branch of Government from the White House on down. ? Called for resignations of about 2,000 presidential appointees, including Cabinet officers and White House aides. Many will be retained. Some will be shifted to new jobs. Others will be dropped. ? Conferred with top advisers includ- ing ~~ice President Spiro T. Agnew at Key Biscayne, Fla:, or Camp David, Mci., on plans for Administration per- SOIlIlel, policies and programs iu the new term. I14r. Agnew has been the President's liaison man with Governors, mayors and local officials around the country. ? Recalled Iioy L. Ash, president of Litton Industries and former head of the President's Advisory Council on Ex- ecutive Organization, to assist in the struchrral planning. ? Consulted John B. Connally, former Texas Governor who led the Dcmocrats- for-Nixon drive in the recent campaign. Mr. Connally was a key member of the Ash Council, before serving as Treasury Secretary in the first Nixon term. ? Set December 15 as a target date for announcing persomtcl and policy de- cisions in overhaul of the Government. Associates say the President will be guided by recommendations of the Aslr Council, which conducted a two-year study of Government operations in 19G9-1970. The advisory group submitted about 1G separate reports. Many remain con- fidential memoranda for the President. Others were published at the time ~Ir. Nixon First called for wholesale Govern- ment reorganization in his 1971 state- of-the-union message. "Most Americans fed up." The President said thou that "most Ameri- cans today are simply fed up with gov- ernment at all levels." The Ash Council found that the Gov- ernment has grown up in a topsy-turvy fashion, adding people and programs without any consistent pattern, and with a great deal of overlapping and dupli- cation among agencies. As a result, Mr. Nixon told Congress in January, 1972, "Our Federal Govern- ment today is too often a sluggish and unresponsive institution, unable to de- liver adollar's worth of service for a dollar's worth of taxes." here are major reforms proposed by the Ash Council, as revised by the White Ilouse in the last two years: New super-Departments. A half doz- en Departments of Cabinet rank and a score of lesser agencies would be con- solidated into four new super-Depart- ments along modern, functional lines. A White Douse documentary on the subject said that "the executive branch should be organized around major pur- poses of Government." The new super-Departments would deal with domestic problems in these areas: human resources, - natural re- sources, community development and economic alPairs. Programs dealing with people-such as education, welfare, health, manpow- er training, social security and unem- ployment insurance-would come under a Human Iesources Department. Other programs-those dealing with urban renewal, rural development, city planning, hospital construction, mass- transit systems and urban highways- STATINTL ` ,..: -Crockett in "Washington Star-News" "JUST WORKING ON MY GOVERN- MENT?REORGANIZATION PLAN." would be assigned to a Departrnent of Conununity Development. A Natural Resources Department would guide land use, soil conservation, energy sources and minerals, ~vatcr re- sources and marine technology, public works, recreation alld civilian atomic energy. Under an Economic Affairs Depart- ment would come many existing func- tions of the Commerce, Labor and Transportation Departments, along with the Tariff Commission acrd Small Busi- ness Administration. The Agriculture Department would be retained as a separate entity, but would be limited to dealing with farm- commodity production and marketing programs. Its present operations arc much broader. These Federal Departments would be abolished: Interior; Commerce; Labor; Ilcalth, Education and ~?Velfare; Hous- ing and Urban Development, and Trans- portation. Originally, the Ash Council proposed to leave intact the existing Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice. Recently, President Nixon reportedly has been focusing on shaking up the State Department, leading to specula- Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 aantz~?~.;.G~ Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 ,.LATEST (Sept., 1972) 2,767,872 lion that Mr. Connally may become the next Secretary of State. Objective: give the foreign service a new mission of looking out for economic interests of tl]c United States arowld the world in an era of increasingly tough trade competition. At Key Biscayne on November 11, Deputy White house Press Secretary Gerald Warren said that "a great deal of staff work" has gone into plans for remodeling the foreign-policy apparahls, Officials point out that a number of Government units have varying roles iu foreign affairs, including the `Treasury, Justice, Commerce and Agriculture De- partrrients; Export-Import Bank; National Security Cocmcil, Central Intelligence Agency, and many others. President Nixon would like to achieve better eo-ordination, particularly as it affects U. S. interests in world trade, monetary and economic ail=airs. The. "fourth branch." The White House distributed in 1971-without rec- ommendatians-an Ash Council report on federal regulatory commissions. Terming them a "fourth branch of GOVet11[Tlen.t," .inVCStlg:lt01'S folllld t11CSC commissions "are not sufficiently ac- countable for their actions to either Congress or the President." The report suggested that they should be "more responsive to the public interest." There are :tt least eight of these quasi-judicial bodies, with broad au- thority to regulate private enterprise. The. Ash. Cow]cil proposed that six of them be abolished, wi.tl~ their functions redefined and assigned to new agen- cies. The six: Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal ~Sari- time Commission, Federal Trade Com- mission, Securities and Exchange Com- mission and Federal Power Commission. New agencies to be created: 'Trans- po:rtation Regulatory . Agency, Federal Power Agency, Securities and Exchange Agency, Federal Trade Practices Agency and a P'edcral Antitrust Board. 'The Asb Council also recommended that the Federal Commwlications Com- mission be reduced from seven to five COIn II] 1SSI Ollel'S. 1Vo public recommendation was made -at least, none was published-conceru- ing operations of the National Labor Re- lations Board. The White IIouse took the position that it was circulating the report for collsideration and comment by inter- ested parties, subject to later action. However, informed sources say that the emphasis on Government reforms now being considered by 'dir. I\'ixon does not appear to lie in the regulatory area. Changes by Congress. Some chvlges proposed by the Ash Council and other advisory bodies have been enacted by Congress. For example: A new Enviromuental Protection Agency was created to .deal with air, water and noise pollution across the board. Tlie Budget Bureau was recast as a modern Office of Management and Budget in the Executive Office of the President. Also approved wero a new Domestio Council and an International Economi~~ Policy Council at the White House. The Post 0II}ce Department was re- formed as a Government corporation known as the U. S. Postal service. A new corporation was set up to take over at Government expense the; money-losing passenger operations of certain railroads, under the trade name: of AA?iTRAK. But the major proposals of the Presi?? dent for? Goveruanent reforms were ig?? pored by the Democratic-controlled Con?? gress during the last two years. Now, Mr. Nixon says he has decided. "to accomplish as much as I can of that reolganization through executive action." Presidential powers. Opinions vary on how much the President can do widl- out the consent of Congress. One authority expressed this view: "You can't abolish or create executive departments without the consent of Con- gress. You probably can't merge some operating programs without congressional approval. "There are, however, a lot of internal structural changes within Depal?tments and agencies that could be done by ex- ecutive orders of the President." Another official claimed the President has considerable latitude to merge or Approved For. Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601 R00017~g6 Approved For Release ~OQ'~~,~~~Q~14~S5~~1~-~,~~$E~s Qty 6~~i~~~451 ~Q~~~~~e1 a~td tnatchirrg consolidate domestic' programs, and to spend or withhold funds.. IIc also point- ed out that the President possesses a veto power over legislation. T~evcrthelcss, it is expected that re- newed requests will be made to Congress for ?substantive legislation to accomplish major reforms in the structure of execu- tive departments. Clthenvise, the President may set up supervisors in the 't~'hite House to keep watch on operations of the bureaucracy in the lower echelons of Government. Cafi' to "revolution." '11'hite House officials emphasise that Government re- argani~ation is atY integral part of a much broader package of reforms presented to Congress in the 1971 state-of-the-union rnessagc. ~4r. Nixon called for "a new Anx:rican lievolution? to "return power to the pco- plc" through federal revenue sharing with States and localities, deceniralizatio^ of thi; fedc;.ral bureaucracy, and elimination or consolidation of a host of narrow-liur- pose grant=in-aicl programs that require matching money from local sponsors. A fiscal expert pointed out that the T~'ederal Government has snore than 1,000 aitl pa~ograms, costing taxpayers more than 40 billion dollars a year. "e'v'e have snore than 100 programs in the field of education alone," he added. 1971., 1'resident Nixon said: contributions on the part of State and "At the federal level alone, we have local sponsors. spent sotiYe 1.1 trillion ?dollars on domes- ?The money would be converted into tic I:u?ograms over the last 25 years, but special revenue sharing, or block grants we Dave not. realised a fair return on of fuucls, which political subdivisions this investment. ~ could use as local needs require, in six "The more we spend, the more it stems broad areas of government. we need to spend, and while our bills are Those areas would be: urban develop- getting bigger, our problems are getting went, rural development, education, man- worse." power training, law enforcenrcut and Among the cosh-oversial programs are transportation. welfare, medicaid, legal services for the Above all the President is determined poor, eonununity-action groups, man- to try to get control of "built-iu" escalat- power training, model cities, public boos- ors and so-called uncontrollable costs of ing, rent supplements, and "compensa- Government to keep the federal budget tory education." from skyrocketing beyond the meatYS of Spine llepartrncnts where the Presi- the taxpa}~ers in future years. dent feels that a "bloated" bureaucracy Caspar ~?~~. Weinberger, director of the bas failed to deliver services are these: Office of ivianagement and Budget, said: Ilcalth, Iducation and ';'ti'elfare; Ilousing "I i:hinlc the 1't?esident feels, first of and Urban Development; Labor, and .all, that- we need procedw?a] changes, 'Transportation, particularly in Congress, to get ]told of Rrvenue sharing. Shortly before the the budget and spending process, which Novcntber 7 election-after three years at the moment seems to be badly out of of debate-Congress authori?red a five- conh?ol. year general revenue-sharing plan. ~ "1'he President also feels that there funds arc to be sent from 1~'ashingion should he a lot more. clecisiou making at to States attd localities to help meet lo- the local level, and less reliance on an ca] ztcccls, with no string's attacltccl, ex- al]-powerful Federal Government." ceps that the federal money cannot be Outlook. The efhrt to reorganirc used to raise the pay of local officials. the Government, revise soci;il-welfare Now the Administration }vanes to get programs and ba?ing federal taxing and rid of a lot of aid programs of narrow spending under control is likely to be purpose that have not ?worl:ed to solve ~ the battleground for a continuing strug- social problems, but help keep a massive gle between Congress and the Aclminis- fcderal bureaucracy in office, with re~- tration iu the Nixon second term. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 STATINTL Approved 'For Release 20011R3~ '~ E P80-01 2 NG' . _ . .-~ ~ HeI>ts at Camp David. .. ~~~~ ~'ir~~ ~~ ~~~~~ man, ~aperates oft a much tighter leash (doing no more, it is said, than the ItepuUti- ~~ ~~~~ ~~~ cans are alleged to have done to the Democrats); that tihe old problems of policy control and separation of intelligence from operations are in hand; that the scroll and ~y ~C~~3131EL1 ~. ~t78~Y1~E'.16~ weak countries which once were the CIA's playgrounds are no longer so vulnerable Lo M13,. IIIs'L14IS, director of the Control Intel- its deeds. ,~ ligettce Agency, was publicly suurmoned to At the same time, one hears that the Pt?es- ? Camp Davicl this week to participate in what. ident's old anti-L'arnmunist juices ha~~e not STATINTL the 1'i'hitc house tet?ms its "major" reassess- altogether stopped fermenting and that lte ?Went of t:hc American foreign ].policy struc_ receives and. is responsive to reports that Lure. If his summons indicates that rho the.IZussiat s still play sonic pretty rotten - United States' large secret ?intelligence es- tricks and, by golly, a?c ongiJt to show them they can't da that to us and bet away with it. tablislmtent is to undergo the same Execu- - ' five sct'utiny beinh accorded the agencies >bledegc~nl: produced b~? all f;ucernntents at alt levels, this particular effort could only ha~?e been ?ntttrn by recent. honor students in the graduate sciwol of obftrscation at mud- died tc~atcrs state teacltcts college. ]lotce~~cr, and fortunatcl}?, militarc and cie~ilian burcaucrnts seem t-o he able to understand each other, e~ cn though f?ew of the rest of us do, and it's t.o be hoped that. the ncv: regulations covering security of? documents and equipmc?nC will make more sense than someLirnes has liecn true in thc? past. National security controls as the}' ~~?ere leagued, perforce, long ago l,y older, more sophi~ticatcd nations, arc ralati:cl}? nera to u:., t?;ern as recently as in the month; before I'carl Harbor we Deere nai~?e by comparison. lt. a: a, ilren, ii,r instance, in that hot summer of 1911, when llitlcr's force were sprav,~led fatly across most ut' Europe, and L'ritain stucxi alone, it}?iu? to Cashion a continuing militar}? miracle out ai' the escape from Dunkirk, that .: small, ne?? ?:meric?an af;cncy was set up in \I'a: hingtou by orclcr of ]'resident. I?a,st ~ cll. Its respon;ibilitirs t~crc sonx~what masl:c?d b~? its inuucunus title; Office o[ the Co-ordinatur oC lnfurntation ((~Ul). Alosil}?, ihou;;h, it ?a~ called "the Donovan Office" after its chief, Cul. (later major generjll \~'illiam d. (~1'ilci Bill) Dintuvtut. f?`rom it et~cnfually stemmed t~`.'u war?lime ageucic?s, the O(fice of Suate~;ic Service., (0:~~) and the Uffire ul? ',1ar Ltlornurtion (0\I I). ,~nrl from these emerged two post-year urgencies, the ('cntral )nt~=lii,~ence :1;~en- cy (Cla) and t1:r? l'nitcdat.;tes Jnforma- ~i'ell, the C'C}1 had a sectn?it.~, officer. In addition to seeiu~~ io i1 that all black.-glo?~ cd ~?uur:g ladies ~~, ho wanted i~~ become secret agents, a la \iata lf>,~ho showed it tip him had almadr? seen it?. 1'inell}?, in the months before \ur- mandy T)-llay, t)tere uas a speci:t! clas::ificatiun working on invasion plan. For rep+>ons that are shrouded in the mists of the past. this was calicd `bigot." Before sitting du~~~n to a meting nn, sa}?, the I:rojecied di_ U-ibu- tiou of i.oilet paper to liberated French- t;tcn in the neighborhood of Cherbourg, people asked each ut.her the somewhat incriminating yuestiun: ..Arc you bigoted'?" . In those simpler time, it was a proud thing io be able to soy ~?es. 1ou proved it b~~ sho~,viug a card that had been run off a mimeo;;raplt nurchir.e. As histor}? kill attest, I)-I3ay v:as an eminently successful operation, and our side won the war iu spite- of e~crythinr~. '1'lrc new Pentagon rc;;ulations recor- niur only "conl'iden(ial," "secret." and "top st?cret-." Fortuuatcl~-, the literal- mindedness of the CO1's securit}? officer in lU1] is sternl~? interdicted iti the ne~t? Gha;rtcr IV', ticction 1, f.'aragraph 1t-102, titled "Is'~ceptioa," t~hich states cate- gorically: "No article which, in tv)urlc or in part., has appeared in new,,pal>crs, ma;arir?c; or olse,vhcre in the public, domain, our any co}n? thereof, ??lcich is being: re~~iewcxi and evaluated by nny compu- neni of the l~eparhrtenl of L)c?fcnse to compare its content with oflicial infor- ntation ~~hich is being safeguarded irr the I)cprtment of llcfense b}~ security clan ificiUiun, may be. marked on its face with any security clatisificatiun, control or other hind oC re:arictive marking. The results ai' the review and evaluation shall be sclrarate f~rum the artic?lc in ttuestiurt," At. 'last the comic pares arc hontc .frees Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 2 STATINTL S 17~G2 Approved? For F~I~t:2~Q~CA0r3JQ~~.:QIA~RD~8~0'~01 tkte 23ritish, )aid the largest niincfield in ?JOii:N SI1ER'tfAI3 COOP1;I~t history to keep . C_crman submarines ItTr FULI~RIC:I~T..~Sr. President, bc- from traversin the Iorth Sca. fcre this Congress adjourns it is fittinc; 13ettecen thr.- tvorid wars a quest for thzt ~;'e pay ouI? rc.::pc?ets to tide senior h h t t.irrc;u~ p.erntanent peace .was soug the limitations of armanlertts. ~i'ar ~[ aitl came in 1839, and v:ith the colla;ae of Prance, the tempo of U.S. preps.rediless increased. Tiled inevitably, as in I9J7, the United Stat-es v: as drawn into the conflict. The country was en~a+:,ed i}.1 a nl.^,S~1l~C Shi))bt;liditlg pro;-rarn '.her. the Japanese attacked Pearl Ilarbor, bttt there was a d2.,pe_a.te n;:ed far more of everything. The regttirctnent to provide conveys, trans;~crt then and tnati>rials, end actively rnE;coz:}, as tollotvs: LISP OF Ct.s VAi: C7P5 INCi7n[LIn nY U.S. I}11J.I- '1'ARY I'1;[cbO\NF.L r'1:0AI 77iE STATE 07` ALA- ann7A IN 0007P Nr:CTION WLTII TI[r. CON P].ICT iN VIETN.4 ~l, JULY I, I^72, 'r7IROUG7i i]I7P- xsazneR 30, 19'72 ARMY C\vII t4%ittlRm C. Jrssc, h7[sband o1 Airs. Linda L. Jcssc. 3Ilddr.u ~'allc~?, 'I7allcr Court, Ir,7t 5, P.U. P.,~x 5T., Datcrtlle. 3G3'~2. Sgt. Jaror~ It. I,nytnn, son of hfr. ?nd Dlrs. }tnbcrt O. Ln~,[o:,, 20 Spclgncr 5lrcct, Ln- terprise,3Gaj0. t'~'O1 G~r.[Id A. Spradlin, sc>n of 5C3Ti (tJSA) [uu1 dirs. }:orbc[?L }i. $pradlln, 42 P:pps Drit?r, 1'c`rt Ruci:cr. 3G3G0. P'ir;t ht...t~+?+n A. 'rndcf, son of Col. (UFiA) and \II?s. ,l.?:7:7 A. 't'udd, 1~ Urrt;G 1VRy, fort li.tiCliC C, 3l~.tt+U. ' A CIIAht9Fa) litiL'11T0\5SF'NT I'012 TII1' '.}ItJJ1wC, INI-)U:,;'I'12Y ditiotial on file rcle:tse of American psis- Mr. I3I" ~L1;`I"]'. Air. President, Air. avers of v:ar itnd then, once attain, the Jolm 33. fit. Pl;u~c, pr,?sid+?nt :utrt rhic`f entire foreign aid bill was defeated. exccut:ivc +,,',~ cr of the ,4naconda Co., Wliiie his havoc will be niissng from our aflcr just. 'a nt,,nlh~; in hi.~ pr?[?::ent posi- futurc e:Torts t.o cud file tear, his spirit t.iun, is cmrl ctt+t; nr; aue of the krv :.)rc7;;tr;- will be sl~urrin tis on. morn fat' 1'.rr ]nlninr; huttt:slr5?. 1Zecct,tly, Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 7~A i-rl~rcTov P.oS~ Approved' For Release 2001/O~i1~~'gRDP80-01601 800 6~~~.? ~~~~.~i?~g By 1liarilyn Bcrgcr Washineton Post Statt Writer Democratic vice presidential candizlate Sargent Shriver Bald yestcrciay that a Ric- Govern administration would ."convert the State Depart- ment from a passive handmai- den of the military pursuit of 'potiver to a true minstry of peace" .. Chat?Sin ; that Ricltarcl Nixon had "failed the cause of peace" Shriver said: "~Ve n7ust If get away from our obession witlt polder which esclncles at?; tentiotr to 1>eoples' lives. A.nd we.must reform a foreign pol- icy bureaucracy which is a mechanism for tvar instead of a ministry fnr peace." In a wide-ranging foreign policy speech in PhiIadephia, Shriver cited L'.S, failures in Vietnam, where he said that over the last. four years "no le? gititnatc basis has c~istcd for ? perpetuutin~ that 7t?ar," and ; the subcontinent of Asia; Where ignoring diplomatic re- ports of "selective genocide" the U.S. continued sending arms to "Pakistan's dictator- ship" Tie also charF;ed that "for anilliozts in Africa, Latin America and Asia, we have be- come blind pursuers of power grid patrons of oppression.." ? Shriver said: "Over the past 35 years, military thinking has come to dominate our furcign ?policy machinery." As a result "the ?. State Department be- came a tail to the military beast, wagging at it.s master's :command." The Secretary of State, he said, "acquiesces si- lently in military solutions and .emerges only to de- mean his office by engaging in political attacks." (In Ncw York, a spolccsman t'or Secretary of State ZFilliam P. P.obers, said: "Secretary Rogers believes that the rec- ord of American foreign pol- icy in the last three years has been so successful as to speak for itself and not require a de- (tense. 1:Ie believes that the overwhelming majority of ,Americans support it" (The spokesman said Shriv- j er's comments on Pogers him- Iself Were "not Worthy of com= merit" Rogers fs in New York to confer With foreign minis- ters attending the United Na- tions.) Shriver said that although ~RIr. Nixon promised four years ago to "clean house" at the State Department, "that house is falling down." :lIcGovcrn' he said, "will clam house" and institute major changes. TYtere would be a strong Secretary of State "enj~yit?~ the Presi- dent's confidence, and wi3ling to take charge of all our civil- ian foreign activities:' He said policy Positions Would ?be staffed with '9n7agi-~ native melt and women," re- tirement age With pension would be lowered to 50 to "in- duce retirements by. super- fluous senior officers;' re? ct?uits With training in cultural anthropalogv and "theologies and philosophies of other na- tions" Would be welcome. IIe said the department ~3'ould be "streamlined" - meaning a cutback in personnel. Tlto State Department said Shriver, a former ambassa- dor to Trance, would take. charge of U.S, diplomatic mis- sions abroad. "Today," he said, "there are more CIr~ and De- fense Department personnel in our embassies than there are b'orci~n Service Officers." Taking a stvipc at the power concentrated in the hands of the president's chief foreign policy adviser Henry A. Iiis- sinocr, Shriver said: "A presi- dent needs a sarong State De- partment - to curb the impul- ses of our national security bureaucracy toward military intervention; to stop unin- formed meddling abroad; to coordinate our efforts toward peace so that the nations of the world know that peace is our encl, not polder for the sake of power." IIe also supported efforts to revive Congress' "cousiitu? tionai role on issues of war . and peace and new foreign enntmitments." STATI NTL Shriver, ~ti~ spoke to a' mostly studot7t audience in ~~ Con~vcll Baptist Chut?ch on the ; Temple University Campus, la- mented that "otir ieaclers no loner dream of ~ ivin~ our na- tion her truth." He said; "This is nat surprising. A bureauc- racy Wltich is built for war will make truth its first cas- ualty. Policies which empha- size power u7aneuverings in? vite the treatment. of the American public as brio- more pawn ozi ihc~ ii7tcrnational chessboard. Yublic_ opinion is ~ treated as an object for n:anip- iulation rather than a voice to be heeded:' Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 STATINTL ? ~ ~= Approved For Release 2001/0 ~~kD~~D-1601 R 2 0 AUG 1972 ~'l~e G`I~~ Foes r,~ noN~I,n I'~. )ZiQIIrIS s+?r~e l9?~ fp;~;;rte~ ~_ f'o3t Netts Ana.l3~st ,, > , ~ 1s still not common ~~;~t lcilo~vledge that in 1971 1'resi- deitf Ni~;on ordered the CIA to: join the fight against the itrtcrroationat narcotics trade, or that, according to John E. Ingersoll, director of the L'u- reaa of Na1-cotics and Dan- gcrotrs Drugs, "muc?h of the progress we are now mr.+king irf idenli[yin~ m~erseas traffic can,?,in fast, he attributed to C:IA cooperation." It seems, at first dance, a strange choice. The CIA has no executi~-e powers at home ? or abroad, and no expertise 3n narcotics or in criuinal po- lice work. 1Vhy, then, ~~?as it deployed on this particular .firing line, and what contribu-, tion has it made? ?-The answers can be found ~in the complex Nature of the drug tra.c~c~. Most of the world's raw aphnn originates in Turkey or ?iit the "Golden Triangle" of -the )3urma-T7ta~iand-Laos bor- der. Tightly organized and constantly changing channels bring iC to such diverse areas as Vientiane, l;angkok, Ilong -.Kong or ]Giarseillc for pro- : eessing, and equally complex routes via still other countries .. bring it to the borders of America. ~Tdte c~urrent? attacjs on the ;trade i~ two-pronged: Ily dip- - ]omatie pressures to reduce raw opium and finished he- 'roin .production, and, since production can never be elim- -mated entirely, ? to increase r,>.. _ the effecfivenesa of the U.S. 'Customs Bureau by timely forewarning of specific smuggling shipments. None ~f ttte countries touch- : ed by the trade ca.n do' this alone. The 1~trkish govern- ment can move against raw opium production; French., British and Thai police can crack down on processing and smuggling, with varying de- grees of success. .~oizte p?te~erless . ' Some countries can do little ' or nothing; Yhe.opiunt"areas in Burma and 'T'hailand are controlled by autonomous in- surgent groups depending on the opum for economic sttr- ? trival, while no government in Laos --there are several -- ? has any real control over the landscape. Other countries, used for transhipment; may not be aware of what is going ? on. ' ;filter down on the other side. ? i But, >ropltisticated or not, what Utese countries cannot do is cciordiriate their activi- ties; because with the best will in the world the Jiaison mechanisms oit the proper levels do not exist. The Frette_}t police, for ex- ample, can be as effective as any in the world. I3ut; if they are operating against a Itro- " cessing installation in Mar- ' seille with an input from Iz- mir, they simply cannot get do touch with the local Tur- kish police io coordinate their ? plans. They have neither the funds, manpower, nor chart~r'? to do so. They can only report ? within their own government, until ati the proper level their information is passed to the > T ur k s ;through diplomatic eltannels, after which it must The CIA is made to order ~to broker such exchanges. CIA stations and bases .throughout the world have di- rect liaison contact ~.vith local security forces, and they maintain a superb commu- nications network. The agen- cy can serve as a ]ink be- ttveen countries and organiza- tions which have never been in touch with each other be- fore, and which would -have formidable problems i1 they tried, passing timely and ac- curate intelligence to the ex- act level where it is required.- . 'T'he CFA also can collect op- ~erationai intelligence on the sprawling ramifications of the trade, especially in cotntries which cannot do this for themselves. F r o m raw production. through processhtg to the fi- nal smuggling attempt, a nar- cotics chain may ?htvolve scores of lieople in a, dozen countries, and because secur- ii:y is at apremiitm,. its orga- nization parallels that of a clandestine intelligence: net- work. The techniques employed to penetrate..both are identical, and the CIA's stock-In-trade is its skill in spotiing,~ devel- oping, recruiting and manag- ing agent assets for the col- lection of intelligence. The French and the British, of course, ca.n do this work themselves, and CIA entry lute their domestic criminal work is out of the', question. program , retiino up and maintaining the multi-national files involved, ~ ~r~init: ; traces and analyzing and collecting the raw information so that finished intelligence can be passed to appropriate author- ities for action: ~nor?dirFe~f%an The CIA, in fact, probably. is the only organization i~t the world that can do such a job, and it has recently estab- lished especial headquarters branch to coordinate the work. The field stations vdere long ago ordered into the battle. One of the first fruits of CIA labor has been a lengthy report to the Cabinet Com- mittee on International Iv'ar- cotics Control, which promis- es to become the guide book on which the fight will rent. 7n .considerable detail, it covers the entire world opium sil.uation country by country , Other, less developed coun- tracing out licit and i]~licit tries, however, cannot man- opium production, pmcessinry. age such activities them- and distribution, as weA as selves without the training summarizing the problems that CIA liaison can provide. faced by the indirldua] coun- The CIA also has the re- tries and the mr.tltilateral ron- quisite headquarters estab- trot efforts. The report is un- l i s h m e n t to support and classified. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA.-RDP80-01601 R000'!?00070001-6 Approv~d~forgRele COI~rn the principal };uar?r:ian of liberal ~~alues in the "intelligence commi~rrity." HE REb~2Ifv'IfS US that the CIA fflaght Sen. Joseph R. n?cCarthy, and'hc argues that the CIA.'s cartuaign to fu?xl anti-Communist liar-rats succes:,fully undermined international Centrnunist o,rganizatians artd disarmed fire pa; a- rlo?d anti-Communism of the Ft3I ~?ei?, killed by n)achine-gun. fire on Sept. 25, X945, near fiaigon. bett~ey tt?a.s shot \vhile pasin~ ihrouoh a Viet Minh "roadblock, liis iob: Liaison man with the Viet Dinh. }Ie n?as killed, Smith claims, because the \'ictnanl- ese sentry mistakenly thought he ' u?as )-French.. The OSS lt~as an advocate: of ex- fending aid to the Piet Itlinh in their fi;ht. first against Japanese occtt- piers and later against iJ)e Trench taho U?ied to reclaim their Indochi= alese en)pire. In his book "OSS: The Secret IIis:/ tore of America's 1' first Central ]n- iclli~ cnce Agency," published today. by the t?nit'crsit}~ of California Press, the 2:i-~?car-old her3;elc}- graduate student obscrt~es:?,"I,onn before the Japanese. surrender, OtiS? planners had suggested that 'Amcric~+n coop- eration tt?ith patriotic,. subt?er~it-e re- t?olutionary groups of Southea~tcrn Asia would appreciably increase our offensit?e pott~et~ a~ainsi. Japan."' Thus began the brief American association tt?ith 1Z uyen Ai 2uoc, sprung; froru the clutches of Chiang Kai-shek's secret. police chief by the Americans. . C~uoc later took the name Iio Chi Minh, Ho and his profs:sor-general \'o \~;u~-en Giap slott?1}' built their orcta- nization, cooperating tt?ith the OSS, and sabotaged the Japatlese and STATINTL 1'ici?` l+'rench. llo's \?ix?t \iit)h sccn)z to hate been the onl~? ort;,(niz;c[ion for t~-hich _Amcrican:= in Asia had ~{n~? rc~pect. Smith': book iti based ot7 ? more plan ?Ut) inicrt~ictt? ~?: ith f+u?n,cr O:;S opera- . tit?r~ frclm all. ihc?aiers of t~?tu? and oti nearly all ta~aiiab)+~ ??ocunlt:ut~, sonm oi? then:. secret. It c?oter.~ all 05:~ uctit~itic~~ in ;ai the tire:+ter.~ ol? 1t: orl(i \\'ar I1 +nd unveil; fa~ir,atilt~ dc- tail~ of heretofore :reset. op(rr;ition;, . Smith alo tell. for the ? first tin^. the p;u?t that. ?.lon;i~ttor Giot?anni 1);a- lita \Icntini pla~?cd as a ]:er \~sy I;a~~I>; 3ELLINBI~ OSS. The Secret History of America's ? First ?Centrat Intelligence Agency. By R. ffarris 'Smith. lllnstrated. 45S Pages. University of California Press. X10.95. In 1941 a British Naval Intelligence offi- cer named Ian Fleming recommended to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan that he recruit as American intelligence officers men of "absolute discretion, sobriety, de- ' votion to duty, languages, and wide expe- rience." Donovan, a ~~'orld War I hero and successful ~xJall Street laveyer, understood the fantasies of writers and Presidents, 2nd in a memo to President Roosevelt promised an international secret serl~ice. staffed by young officers who were "calculatingly . aeckless," with "disciplined daring" and ' trained fUr'`aggressive action." The Office of Strategic Services came to iitclude ?suci; James Bonds as John Birch, Norman O. Frown, David K. E. Bruce, Dr. Ralph J. Bunchc, William Bundy, Diichael Burke, Julia Child, Clark Clifford, Sohn . Kenneth Galbraith, John W. Gardner, Arthur 'J. Goldberg and Murray Gurfein. There were others-Sterling Hayden, Au- . ?gust Heclcscher, P.oger O. Iiilsman, Philip Horton, Ii. Stuart Ilughes, Carl I~ aysen, Clark M. MacGregor, Iierbert D4arcuse, Henry Ringlinl; North, Serge Obolensky. ? And still others: Johrt Oakes, Walt W. - 'Rostov, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlesinger 'Jr., Paul Sn?cezy, Ralph de Toledano-,--to name just a few of the hundrads in this `book by R. Barris Smith. teered to collect and pass on firsthand in- telligence on strategic bombing targets in Japan. Cardinal 2~4ontini is now Pope Paul Even C.LA, liberal criticism of the ??ar VI. - in Vietnam seems to liave had little ef- O.S.5, agents had to compete as much feet on policy. Ali might be fair in tune with their allies as with their enemies. In of ?>ar, but D4r. Smith ought to have France and Switzerland, where Allen scouted the need for a pennancnt bw?eauc- Dulles operated, the British S.O.E. (Special racy part of whose function is officially Operations Executive) was especially devoted to' clandestine political ma:ipul5.- grudging. In Germany itself, the O.S.S. Lions abroad in time of "peace," Jost out to more orthodox American mili- tary intelligence, though paradoxically they were strongly' represcn?ted at Nurem- berg, where General Donovan was himself a deputy prosecutor-at the same time that the head of the Nazi Secret Service, Gen. I:einhard Gehlen, was under O.S.S. protection in exchange for his intelligence network in Eastern Europe and Rusia. Role in the Far Fast From present perspective the most (literally) intriguing story is that of the O.S.S. in China and Indochina. There were both pro-Communists and anti-Commu- nists in the U.S.S., and most agents sym- pathized with Asian .nationalists, so that the O.S.S. aided Thai partisans against the British and. of course more famously, the Vietminh against the French in Laos and Vietnam (an O.S.S, medic saved Ito Chi Dlinh's life). Dlr. Smith's retelling of the tragicomedy .of ]ndochina after the Japa- and with Vich 1945 d i y n , er Mr. smith, wno was m the trade ]-rim- nose surren self, resigning in 1.968 after a "rery brief, Gaullist French, British, Chinese and the uneventful, and ~ undistinguished ^ssocia-~ Vietminh jockeying for control, makes a tion with the most misunclerstaod bureauc-~ fascinating setpiece. roc of the American Government," the: The book ends. with an account of t}re Central Intcili~ence A enc now lectures transformation of .the O.S.S. into its "mirror in political science at the ~ University of irnagc," the C.LA. Mr. Smith's admiration f 1 O S S' ~ t? mati4m its ar me ra p g .. r or tie . s ~, ? California's Extension Division. "This his?? "tradition of dissent" and its anticolonial- tory of America's first central intelligence: ism su agency" is "secret" because Dir. Smith tugs ggests his thesis: that the O.S.S./ denied access to O.S.S. archives, and. so C.LA, has been made the straw rnan of had to rely on the existing literature sup- the radical and liberal left. In fact, he ?' plemented by some 2G0 written and verbal asserts, the C.LA. has been the principal recollections of 0.5.5, alumni. guardian of liberal values in the "intel- ligence commm~ity." He reminds us that Both Fntls h.gaittst the blicirfle the C.I.A, fought Senator Joseph R. Mc- The book is densely packed with the be- Carthy, and he argues that the C.LA: s wildering variety of O.S.S. exploits in campaign to fund anti-Communist liberals World War II: spying, sabotage, prop- successfully undermined international. oll- Comrnuni t organizations and disarmed the issions i i li , p ng m n tary tra aganda, mi ticking and codrdinating resistance froups Paranoid anti-Communism of the F.B.I. against the Germans. "Casablanca" caught and others at home. He notes that C.LA. the" spirit of the Byzantine plotting in liberals worked against Batista for Castro, French North Africa, with the O.S.S. who betrayed them, allowing the C.LA. trying to undermine the Vichy and German conservatives to plan the Bay of Pigs. authorities, while various resistance groups FinalIy,~ he points to the evidericc in the ~- th t tl C 1 ~ has been a o ~ ? STATINTL? .. . in Italy, Yugoslavia, China and Greece, Pentagon Pap:,r~ a t tried to use the O.S.S. for their own ends. critic of the Vietnam -war from the begin- O.S.S. agents played both ends against th3 Wing. middle in the virtual civil wars beriveen Put the question remains whether the conservatives and left-wing partisans. In O.S.S. "tradition of dissent" is meaningful, one ?holy alliance worthy of Grahar.~Y whether it doesn`t compromise liberals as Gree e, the O.S.S, ratefull accepted the much as aid them. Ddr. Smith's book is full cont~t~t?t~'~t~u'e>~~a:3t~'~01 ~~I`;d~;.~, ~;~,~-9~, ~~Q~00100070001-6 Montini, teamed with Earl Brennan, Amer- business ar:d finar:cc. C.LrI. liberalism has icon politician and diplen;at (arcn frirnrl Of ?R?~~~,rn; :,n~ the Canadian Diafia, and not prevented a nuntl;er cf C.LA.-fou;ented COLUrdBUS, GA. - ? LEn~proved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601 R00 E - 30,665 LEAGER~ENQUIRER 8 - 57,646 J UL 18 197- . Naonal security ,~c~'s ~,roYisions Dim~nis~ir~g oa~v s c~edibili~y There is too much coincidental Simi- arity ?to certai.n publishing exploits fo:r ..a pattern to emerge, a pattern which ;';,seemingly argues that a deliberate and ,;,step-by-step assault is being made on .;the National Security Act. That law 2,5 ;,years ago created great changes in the '; role of the military forces and gave this country something it had never '~ had before-an effective intelligence establishment. ``~ The National Security Act, passed July 26, ].947, created a National Mili- tary Establishement which later be- came. the Defense Department. Three bodies were then set up which have grown in. im~~ortance over the years: ?-The Joint Chiefs of Staff teas cre- ated as an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of Staff set up by us and Great '~ Britain in World War II. These men are responsible for preparing military plans, reviewing over-all military re- ` quiremeilts and directing unified and specified combat commands. - -The National Security Council teas created to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, F foreign and military policies relating to the national security ... io assess and . appraise the objectives, commil:- ments and. risks of the United States j in relation to our military power." so as to "have -The Central Intelligence ,Agenc;;~' .CIA x~ established to "correlate and evaluate intelligen ~~ relating t~ t'r,e national security" but specifically lirn- na; law-enforcement ty functions." actual and pcatential Robert MacNamara, Secretary of De-; fense far both President Kennedy and Johnson from 1961-1968, merged De- fense Department intelligence agencies and otherwise used the terms of the National Security Act to streamline and concentrate the power more effec- . Lively in the hands of civilian directo-. rate. The present critics of our defense, intelligence and foreign policies---to name only a few of. the chosen targets -have turned away from their own. past creations with great zeal on all fronts. As the latter-day concentration of power in the Department of De- fense and the other two agencies named was the essential creation of the New Frontier, where the great mass of critics involved have their ori- gins either firsthand or as latterday heirs, it is characteristic that they would turn on this ugly reminder of their own bast. C. Marton Tyrrell, in a book pub- lished in 1970, gave a good, typical statement of the reason that the Na- tional Security Act of 1947, tailored into modern application by the New Frontiersmen when they held the White House in the 1960's, is now anathema, when he wrote this: "(Pentagon officials .and military Tanners, etc.) have tended to diminish ale role of the State department and p'l~ce the Department of Defense in the quasi-official position of suggesting foreign policy actions." His book also charged that the CIA and the National Security Council no police, subpoe- .have "chipped away" at the State De- or internal secur:i=~ partment's policy-making powers. The power so carefully concentrated in the hands of the leading figures of the New Frontier went into other ? hands when a? Republican administra- tion entered tie White House. There is hardly any certainty that it will be Approved For Release 200t4~fl~i~li4 tom-R~~80?O~h60Clfdd~00 100070Q~1~~inueu Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 day frontiersman .this fall. They wish to at least destroy the instrument if they cannot seize the levc-.rs again. De- struction in the legislature of ~ the Na- tional Security Act, which enabled us to become a true world power, is the real critical goal they must have as a minimum if the White House is again denied them. The public record shows clearly enough that the Senate' committee with ~ the most vested interest in the State Department's pre-eminence, the . Senate 1'i'oreign Relations Committee, in this campaign against the National Whether this is a contrived and co- ordinated pattern or whether the terms . o? the opposition to the crea- tions of the National Security Act dic- tate the manner in which the attacks are made, we believe that the ultimate target is now very clear indeed. This country will be put in jeopardy assault on that law is madr.. We warm of it now. Security Act's provisions. ('That is the '? basic point of the entire exercise, we ', ;` believe, to attack that law.) Political rhetoric ranging from dia- logue to diatribe has been lavished on the targets provided by the terms of that act. A political campaign is essen- tially based on a great drive to throw that law out and do away with its ac- complishments. All o? this is the ob- vious. What is not so obvious is the pat- tern involving actual violations of se- curity provisions an,d thei~? calculated effect to demean and diminish the law's credibility and to make it an easy tar- get when the appropriate time in the YIouse -and Senate comes. There have been those Pentagon Pa- pers, publication of secret minutes of the National Security Council, and publication of many things of that ilk. Now a purportedly full and detailed disclosure of the method and results of the most sensitive operation imagina- ble, the_ interception and decoding of Russian secret communications, can be read in a magazine vaith a. long past record of such "scoops." The material involved is carefully judged, we think, to provide maximum. embarrassment, to provide material for ridicule, a:~d to give the least possible chance of viplators of technical securi- ty regulations being punished or rec- ognized as traitors by the American public. It's sensitivity and its real im- portance has escalated, however,. with each'escapade's success. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 Approved For Release 20U1/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01 HARRISONl3UF~G, VA. NEWS-TtECO}~ ~ ~ au~ . t~a~ionc~l ~~e~rEf~f ,~~# '' The national security act, ~ta~hich became laly 25 yeaz?s ago, ;:has been dcscrib.~d as "perhaps ,the most far-reaching measure in :? its effect upon the role of the military in American life since the fornr,tion of the Navy Department in 1196." B}? .n?in~ in~* the three branches of the armed services toether in ~, single department, the act armed to eliminate inter-serc?ice ~ d'uplicatian and rivah?y, l,trt it. also had the unintended si;ie?? ? effect of prafornxily altering thc~ ~ process of forn:ulatinb U.S.- r foreign policy. In addition to creating a r National Military l~stablishrnent; ilalcr to become the Defense :Department, the rational Security Act set. up three bodies that have grbti~n in ~iml~ort...ricncing a generation gap, they were - pia, wuci~ o.. ..?.. ??~-?? '---?' -----i~ - lafeSS1011S and t1iC felt that Judy? Garland would probably p ~ y even had tihoir own have been a very nice girl from Nebraska women's liberation movement." married to a gns jockey if it had not been 'I'he generation gap was in the form of the for her pushy mother. Miss Csarland ended up Young non-believers rebelling ?against ? the famous and on `.50 amphetamines and 12 orthodox Jewishness of their parents. "They Seconals a day," Mrs. Pinchot said. were dropouts from the Yeshiva," Levin said. The author let her audience of about f300 =`1`h~y had enough of strictly formal diacus- persons in on the quirks of some of the famous lions of Talmudic lacy ... and they were. people with whom she has Fvorked. ~ti'rit.in; looking for a valid way of life. They were with Jackie Gleason, she said, was "a fort- tire,:i of the professions they were forced into . night of a nightmare," Tile late Bishop ,they wanted to work with their hands, James A. Pipe ".told me he believed in they wanted to reestablish their contact Fvitlt .premarital sex. After Fvorking Fvith Norman the soil. ? Vincent Peale, Mrs. Pinchot decided he "ha' "The young girls who came along wanted. ' fantastic succe.~.~ because ht's his ocvu best to have absolute equality," he said. Girls friend: "She also collaborated with Irwin assigned kitchen duty one day stood their Stillman on "The Doctor's Quick ~'Vcigllt ground and demanded "No cooking uhtil you .Loss Diet" and it didn't seem to ,work anY teach us to plow." Rlost of them learlied to better for her-than it did for the rest of us? loFV but dI"dn't stick =..?ith it, he said. Many Ladislas Farago, said his field made it of the early Palestinian JeFVish girl settlers difficult to come up with -the expected lwok- refused t.o go through marriage ceremonies. attd??autlior circuit jokes. Espionage is not ter- Levin said the charactc,rs he drew upon for ribly funny, he said, but he related his non- "'I'h~ Settlers" Fvere rarely treated in litera- official experience of finding an apartment. He said in 1958 re read a headline stating tore. "'Phey were the ones Fvho Fvent to Pale- that Myra and Jack .Sobel had been indi- Stine instead of the U.S. These people came toted as shies, so he headed directly for their to a fresh situation and molded it to their address, "figuring they wouldn't be needing it, own desires." Levin, who lives both here and for a while," and rented the apartment. in Israel, said the book was "heavily based on Much has been made about the fact that real characters and situations. /Il[ ~ - l~arago accidentally st-.tmbled upon trunks in tha NatcP'db~ltt~' T ~`"E1~~1 ld` ~g1~ 1 /03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 films an e 1 ~ a c ~ ~`~~~ c-f the Foxes." But, he pointed out, "that was STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP8O-01 CHICAGO, ILL. SUN-TIMES M - 536,108 S - 709,123 .. ~~'[~ ~ 0 19. ~~ t`~ ~ LI ~ G ~ Li' Ls $y Thomas B. Ross ~ Amendment as upheld by the -' Sun-limes Eureau Supreme Court in the Times ? . ,WASIiINGTOi; -The gov- ~ case. CIA director Richard M. er i t' ff t il t e . a men s e or s o s enc a former ]nigh-ranking official of helms supported the govern- the :Central Intelligence Agen- ment suit with an affidavit as- cy took on the dimensions of a serting that Marchetti s pro- ' 'ma'jor constitutional test Posed book and art unpublished Wednesday when two of ttte magazine article, "Twilight of nation's Icadin~ First Amend- the Spooks, would com- ment lawyers entered the Promise "currentay classified case.. ~ -., intelligence (and) cause grave Noi?mari Dorscn, law profes- and irreparable harm to the sor at New York University national defense."' and, general counsel of the The suit demands that 'A ni e r i c a n Civil Liberties Marchetti turn over all classi- Union, disclosed that he has , Pied documents lte took with --.------- - _----- _ .him on leaving the CIA in 1969. agreed to defend Victor L. He 1s expected to respond that Marchetti, onetime executive the only documents in his pos- . assistant to the deputy director session -- all unclassified -- of the CIA. .? are a page from the CIA phone At the same time, it was book with his former listing, a learned. that Floyd Abrams, friendly letter from Helms to one of the New York Times' I Marchetti's children, and alet- lawyers in the Pentagon- pa- ter of commendation from his f ?b ~Ad Rf' V to challenge the "secret char- ; ter" under-which the CIA con- ducts major clandestine oper-. ations as not in keeping with the spirit of the 1947 law which created the CIA. The action against Marchetti ` represents the first time the government has moved to si- lence aformer government of- ficial who had access to classi- fled information. ? Former U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was not chal- lenged when he published a book that was tnildty critical of the agency. Similarly, several high-rank- ing officials, including at least three Presidents,. have drawn on top secret information for their books without any legal' action against them. rce. m. a us ,..pers case, has bce3n retained ormet oss, ` by Alfred A. Knopf Inc., ,the Taylor, retired deputy director) j New .York publishing house of the CIA. ~ , 'that has a $50,000 contract to Secrecy pact violated? publish a book by Marchetti on The government contends . the CIA. that illarchetti's decision to borsen was also involved ~in publish and his numerous in- the Times' defense as a friend terviews with th.e press vio- of the court for the ACLU. late a secrecy agreement he The Justice Department got signed promising not to "di- atemporary restraining order vulge, publish or reveal . . a g a i n s t Marchetti Tuesday classified informa.tion." from U.S. District Court Judge ~ Albert V. Bryan Jr?. of Alexan_ His defense is expected to be: F dria, Va. ~ that he has not and does not IIearing set April 28 intend to disclose any secrets Bryan has set aclosed-door but merely give t:he American hearing April 28 to determine people a legitimate inside look whether Marchetti will be per- at the general Svay in which t the CIA acts in their name. manently.prevented from writ- The outline of his book, r n g ~ or talking about in- which the CIA obtained from a j `: telligence activities. Dorsen is understood to be "confidential source" and sub- i 4 weighing a prior motion that' mitted to Judge :Bryan for his ~ Bryan throw out the govern-. private perusal, ~?eportedly in- ment's suit on the ground that! dicates that Marchetti intends ! , it violates ~h_g frgedom ~~r Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP8O-01601 ROOO1OOO7OOO1-6 4~peech guar p~~~~~i s _~ . rascaw nt~?r rrxr~s Approved For Release 2001~'~/P~'~~I~~P80-016 ~I~ alzlf t~? Major General Vernon A. Vlaltcrs, U.S. rniii9ary attache in Paris, has been appointed Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. press noses that under the rccenlly adopicd plan (or the rcorganizailon of the U.S. intelligence community the importance of ibis post haz gre~lly in- creased. 7hc Dcpuiy Director will be in charge of ~~irlually all t'ie current oper- afions of il;e CIA, vrhile the Dir~clor will be mainly concerned wiili the co? ordination of the operations of all the espionage agencies, including the Defence Inteliigence Agency gad the S1aie Department's Office of P.esearch and Intelligence. Yfaliers, who is 55, has been military altach~ and performed intelligence func- tions in Italy, [3razit and South Vietnam. lie fs fluent in Russian, french, German, Italian, Spanish. Poauguese and Dutch, and accompanied P7esidenis Ttuman; Risenhower and Nixon on foreign visits as their personal interpreter. The New York Times" says chat General Walters has been "personally ideniiticd with Mr. Niznn for more lhan twenty years;' end that the President did riot consult iviih C1A Dirccior Richard Helms when making the appointment. STATI~NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-01601~R000100070001-6 Z WASirQ1~ON OB,SER~ER PIEWS%L~'TER r~~For Release 200'R1~3~~.~-t~~tDP80-01601 'r ~ ~ ~, !~ Although officials at clap Head- p~~~~v~Q Y quarters recently came out with fir; . ~~; "' the "information" that Sean. Edward ~~~~kn~~~ A1. Kcrmedy (D-Mass) would at the ]ast moment storm the Democrat Convention and grab 'the Presidential nomination; according to political insiders no such move is in the making. They cite the following fact, which has been kept secret far nine years, to back their certitude that Teddy will remain on the sidelines during the coming Presidential election, regardless ~of whether the Democrat Convention in Miami will want to and copies of the letters are turned over to the U.S. Secret Service. None of the culprits have been apprehended. Incidentally, it has been decided that Kennedy does not need Secret Service pro- tection since he is a "non-candidate." All the other announced presidential candidates have a Secret Service detail assigned for their protection during the campaign. Significantly, as previously reported in CVO, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger exercises direct control over the CIA, FBI, Secret Servic and all other security and intelligence agencies draft him or not. " Back in 1cJG3, shortly after President Kennedy's assassination, Robert r. Kennedy, while he was still Attorney-General, conducted his own investi- gation of the death of his brother. That private in- vestigation, which ran parallel with t:he official inquiry into the magnicide conducted by the ~Var-? ren Commission, was ?featured by trips to this country by an Inspector Iamilton, former Chief Inspector of Scotland Yard. Hamilton, an old friend of Joseph P. Kennedy, with whom he had " many contacts during the ]otter's ambassadorship in London, ]lad been retained by Bobby to help unravel the real truth about the murder of J.r.K. After long conferring with the merr-hers of the Kennedy family and making a few discreet sotuld- ings with liis own contacts, Hami]ton zeroed on the fact that the assassination of 1olrn Kennedy had occurred very shortly after his brother Bobby had made some preliminary moves of taking direct, personal control of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, whose leadership he blamed for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Hamilton, following the "cui pro- = lest" ("whom does it benefit?") reasoning, reach- ed the- conclusion that Bobby's move t:o seize con- ; ~ trol of the C.LA. had something to do with the ~ - " murder of his elder brother. After Bobby's own assassination in 1'68, it is not ' known whether Teddy has the documentation Bobby had collected in his private investigation or whether it has been destroyed. But apparently Teddy has become convinced of the correctness of Hamilton's conclusion, and furthermore, considers it to have been further vin- - dicated by Bobby's own death-which occurred . within a matter of days after he threw his hat into . the presidential ring and was on the way to put himself again in the position to take over the free-spending, powerful cloak-and-dagger agency. Teddy Kennedy receives an average of about ten death threats a week via anonymous phone calls and letters. Vo' e m s of the hone calls ' - Approved- ~or~e~ease 2001 /03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 ST. IAUIS POST-DISPATCIi STATINTL 12 April 1972 Approved For Release 200103/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601 RO 4Bring The ~I~1 T o Heel Although Congress ~~ti the foreign aid `authori.zation bill signed ear:ier this year im- posed some controls over the Central Intelli- gence Agency, the free wheeling CIA still operates without much accountability to the legislal;ive branch of government. Its budget remains secret. And only last month a study by the General Accounting revealed that for International Development funds enc A y . g intended for public health use in Laos were being diverted to the CIA for use in the guer- rilla war in that country. The record of CIA disdain for the will of '~Cgngress underscores the importance of Senate "Foreign Relations Committee hearings on a bill proposed by Senator John Sherman Cooper which would oblige the agency to provide congressional committees dealing with armed .services and .foreign policy "fully and cur- rently"' with both i~itelligence information and aluations affecting foreign relations and na- e v ~tional security. Two former ~ CIA officials, Dr. ~ Herbert Scoville and Chester L. Cooper, testi- fying for the bill, said the agency should pro- vide (fongress with the same analyses it now regularly provides the tiVhite House. At present CIA briefings of Congress are ~provicled only as sanctioned by the White House;. Since Congress also has authority in foreign relations and military affairs, there is justification for giving the legislators access to CIA data. Indeed, its machinations in the mili- tary amd political affairs of other countries sug- gest that it has arrogated to itself so many im- . proper policy-making initiatives that the agency 'should be either be abolished pr restricted by haw. too intelligence gathering alone. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 S7.'. Y,fl~TIS PaaT-DISPATCH Approved For Release 2001~/~4j'~' G~`~i~~RDP80-01601 R _ _~ ____ _ _ _ STATINTL ?~ ~ ~ ~ .?~,.F'tect the CIA to make vat a e 2 ~ ~ ~!~ . ~ ~ ' J "facts and analyses" to Senate '~~ ',~- ?~~.,~ and House committees dealing _..t??;,,.,~ anti the - ~ ?,., ~ armed services. The C1A re- ~j, -,' p o r t ~ would include material ?? e, ~ ~ ~, produced by all agencies. W,H A T COOPER and his as a practical iates want ' ~ F , assoc 13y ~'ILLIA3I Ii. RYA.\T JIt, matter, is the same basic intel- '' A ~'ashiugtoae Correspondeul of the Post-lai~patci- ligence that is disseminated to WAS~,iINGTON, April 11 the White House, the Pentagon . ~ . - and other branches o{ Govern- t . CONGR)/SS CAN be gimlet-eyed when looking at welfare projects, ,pent. 'they do not tivant to b 1-but thus far has played. the doting, indulgent parent if cloak-and-dagger fed tidbits carefully selected b, ----__.. .,.h.. ..,~.. haves am a' j WVi~K 1J t11VVL. !l. 1J uau iviiii tut a ic:~t~iu~ui w i~i~iucic n~ ~u iiuw i~laiiy t0 grltld. - ~ . billions the intelligence agencies are geeting, or a'sk for a peek at what Vast sums have been -voted they find out. ~ about ilie~ lletense Department's habit of by Congress to buy weapons That i4s changing. Senator John Sher- reporting a new Russian "threat" at t}le systems that insiders main- STATINTL :man Coo er Re tamed were essential to counter p ( p.), Kentucky, appears to time the Pentagon's money bill is going perils that turned out to be ? be making good progress with his propos- through Congress. Congress, some Sena- illusory. Critics of such spend- al that the Central Intelligence Agency. tors complained, is asked to take these ing want to be able to question make available to Congress what it knows so-called threats on faith. .the CIA, which has the reputes-1 about matters relating to foreign coun-~ "We all know," said Senator George D. tiom of putting out sound and tries and the national security. -Aiken (Rep.), Vermont, "that when the honest reports. Proponents of the Cooper bill say it wily appropriations bill is pending, the Rus- Among witnesses??who have prevail because the existing situation does signs in particular become exfremelY ,testifiedb f a v o r a h 1 y on the not make sense. ?Congress needs light to powerful ..." ~ Cooper bill are Adam Yarmo- i make its decisions. SVhy should Congress linsky of Harvard Law School, i be ignorant of facts and analyses assent- THE COOPER BILL gave the public in- 'a former assistant secretary of bled by the United States at great cost? sight into the curious procedure under .defense, and Herbert Scovillei >/ . Congress now operates in the dark. As which, for security reasons members of Jr., former director of science, ? Cooper noted when the Senate Foregin the Senate and House are asked to vote and technology for the CIA. Relations Committee opened hearings on multih~~ii~~n-rlnllar defense issues-in- "IT SEEMS TO ?VIE," Yar-~~ March 2$, the foreign intelligence infor- eluding the funds to be spent inolinsky said March 30, "it is~ oration developed by the CIA and other on intelligence -without being rather inappropriate for the agencies is available only to President ,able to know what they are do- Congress of the U:sited States Richard IVI: Nixon and the 1: x e c u t i v e tng' to be in the position of the Branch, as a matter of law. For example, the CIA, the schoolboy. who is lectured by "I contend that the Congress, which National Security Agency, the his instructors rather than in . must make decisions upon foreign policy D e f e n s e Intelligence Agency the position of ~ t]ie .graduate and n a t i o n a 1 security-which is called and others a?re said to cost up studetlt who 'is able to go into upon to commit the material and human to six billion dollars a year, but the library and look . up the resources of the nation-should have ac- nobody in ahe Senatee;~cept.? sources." cess to all available information and Intel- five' senor rnembers.of thzAp-; Scoville noted that the CIA propriations Committee:is privy frequently biiefed congressional ligence to discharge properly and morally io the amount, of: money- spent., committees but said this was , its responsibility to our government and Mammoth sums are hic~den.in'` 'not so satisfactory, in his opin- its people," Cooper said, ffie federaLbtidg~l. ~ '? ion, as the situation would be ' SENATOR COOPER'S proposal would Senator .-Syn~ington.~li?ied'tm-.. if the CIA had a legal duty to successfully late last?~ove:mber keep Congress informed. He amend the National Security Act of ].997, to.put a fopr.'billion dollar a~n-. .pointed out that measures must under which the CIA was established. Hugs ce;ling' on otitlays_of the be taken to safeguard the in- There is a precedent for what he tivants to do, in that Congress required in 199& that CIA, NSA,;.DIA?ari;i military in-; formation. telligence ;activities.'` lie was fe-? "I believe the regularized pro- fits joint Committee on Atomic Energy be feeated 3l'to ~6. Symington told vision of national intelligence kept fully informed of the work of the to the Congress b the CIA Atomic Energy Commission, a federal the Senata,:he~ had tried--to get. b y information'- about intelligence would improve security," he agency. '. said, not compromise it." It was remarked at: the hearings by outlays from the Appropriatans ..In the Eouse, a companion Committee" staff, but it was de- , Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Mis- bill to Cooper's has been intro- souri; amember of the Forei n Relations Hied him. ~ ;duced b Representative Paul g This was called liy Sena't~r J:, y and the Armed Services Committees, that ~ William Fulbright (Dem.), Ar-i .Find?ey (Rep.), Illinois. he had beerr unable to obtain nuclear in- kansas, chairman of the For- - ~ ,. formation as a member of those commit- eign Relations Committee, "a .tees. He became a member of the Joint shocking and unprecedented sit- ~Committee an Atomic Energy last spring. nation." "I learned more about the true strength Senator Cooper's big[ would of the United States in sip days in Europe not throw light on intelligence- about this tinge last year than I did in my gathering costs but would di- previous 18 years as a member of the ~ '- - - Armed Service, Committee," .Symington said. .? Testimony ~P~#~Ig9e~C~>1al?faf~~lease 2001 /03/04' :CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 S e n a?t o r s a pportunity to complain NATION Approved For Release 2Q01~0~~4~g~lA-RDP80-01601 ~c~~ ~~~ . Mr. Marchetti was on tl:e director's staJJ of the C!A when he resigned fro-n the agency two years ago. Slnce then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on abook-length critical m~alysis of the CIA. , The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.,'>. foreign af- fairs is, like the .organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of ttien- deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its au- thority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be-the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal alfairs of other nations. In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the C!A acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special .Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its oper- ational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional lead- ers. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influen- tial individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personalty and for the agency, by not gaining ,specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more care- ful than arc administrators in other areas of the bureau- cracy to inform the 1Vhitc House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a`srnall price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress. The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower- Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.- Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny respon$ibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 prof;ram against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by mantled aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, neverthe- less, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere J After the~Bay of feel the sting of Pre; the agency had its because it failed in overthrow Castro. C the top of the agent committee, which tit tration, the agency tices. Throughout th tine operations again the same time, and a agency deeply invoh ing regimes in Laos When the Nations the CIA in 1967, s exposed the agency' labor and cultural ~ funding conduits, ne tried to restrict the Senator Fulbright's a trot over the CIA h; was simply told by P and get on with its b~ formed to look into Secretary of State, th of the CIA. Some ~ because they had be .longer thought worth continued under improvea cover. ,~ sew ol~ the Larger operations went .on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the. CIA' was conducting a 5500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/ assassination programs in Vietnam. The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence commu- nity late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the finan- cial management of the community, especially in the mili- tary intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product tivith national security planning and to provide tt~e White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency otlicials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Admin- istration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should con- centrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying- more on private U.S, corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016018000100070001-6 Ya:-'ulf .?i ir.i l/.l ,x.11 ~.~ Approved For Release 20~~/(~~~4~~~~IA-RDP80-01601 y Stanlry .l~ai?now ? ~ Washington'E'octStattW 1 i ration of potit~ers bet~ti?en tine Itavutg Congress provide .the Legislative and Lr.ecia.tive public With information given' to its committees by the intcl- 13ranches.". ligence community. Chester .Cooper, 55, a yet- Sources close to the contmit? ei?an ot, the CIA, the State De- tee also expressed fears pri- paz?ttnent and the lvhite t atcly i.hat any inleution on the part of Congress to release House ,who now works for t}ie CL~ intelligence to the 17ublic institute of Defense tlnalyses, might restult in the defeat off recouuitended yesterday tltat a the bill. t special staff, of "carefully" . chosen officers serve as liai= son rrieti between the .CIA. and er ii H 'lwo f o r iii a i? ~enio}? em- Cogress "would raise a con ' Both former CIA nteii cao- .~ro~ees.SQf the;Central lntelli-lstitutional question as to sepa. tinned the committee against' ~,ejr,ce tlgencv ud?ged a?esterciay i? ttZSailt~ l~clect~d? congi~essioiial o~`nutte, s i}c, pzoviclect i?cou- ~~rly wrt~z CIA information. ,c~ an?il~srs,concernjng t7.S.. Qre%gn i?elalroiis and 'hnatters t ~' ir~atioiial.sect?ity:" _ ~ tint R,clatigits, ?Cgmntittee o z~ti~,.cozti?eneci to discuss a rl~. }t)troduced ~by Sen. Johat ~5~,e~mau- Cooper. (R-I{y..) io ~zlzicllcl :the National Secui?iky the -con,ressional committees. 1Ie Warned against Congress dernaridurg access to all intel- lirencc studies,- saying that ~ 1 . Y1,~l~~,G4nrressional efforts to ! "the mind boggles at the th ht f r ~upe>f:,visc the U:S, intelligence ~,gmmunity, calls for the CIA a ~~?; d"mfot?m fully.. and cui?? ~~;~ti~ ~ .,tltc Armed Services ~rtcl ~'oreigii : ilffairs Commit- ~~e,~~,of~,lehe , IIousc_ _of I3epre- ~g~tta~f~?es as_Well as .t lie Sen- pte~, tltrt?ecl Services aitd For? ei~t Rrlations Couiinittees. , pr~~cakzng, in c~efeitse. of his pi~rrpolsal,., Sen. Cooper said ~)j~t t rt, `~~~?ould riot affect in ~{~y way or inquire iittu the in- ~urcthe =CIA, its .methods, so}}~~tices;,funds or personnel." c,It~..,nlai~z purpose; the seita- o~,explainecl; -is to give Con- ~}?e~ '.`access., to all available 3{}~o}matign and intelligence" Bp_~ 11tat -;the legislature .can ?n11~ ,has responsibility.".. _ . . ~,'~~~;~-Nixon administration ~a? ;voiced its -hostility to the ill r.n a State ~epai?tment let- ~,e~,;.se~zt in 3anuary to Sen. J. ~,~',ilam- _ Fulbright fD :ArkJ, ~e ozeign Relations Commit- ~ec. chairman; saying that re- ~piring _ the CIA to inform tC~n~ress t is -- "incompatible" rvY~tli;. tlio~ Secretary of State's ~?tlle_asprincipal foreign policy adviser to the I'resideut. t,,;~l}G ; Sti