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October 12, 1972
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Approved ForRelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8010193(11R00 JOURNAL 43,-1 ?a,0-7-2-- E 2'4,3 60 TiVho else would be first to is ublish We sometimes get copies of memos sent from wire service reporters to their basses. They often contain interesting lit- tle tidbits not significant enough to the world to be included in stories. For example, one of the first American reporters into Red China during the "ping pong diplomacy" stage mentioned that he was finding his way around (and learning facts about the country) from a CIA atlas. We knew the CIA was into a lot of things (purely military operations, assas- sinations, etc.) but: we never dreamed that the successor to the puristic OSS was competing with Rand McNally.. . So just on the off-chance we sent a note to the superintendent of documents in Washington asking for a copy and a bill, just as though we had a right to se- cret documents. ? Then we forgot about it. It arrived this week, price $5.25. As is apparent in the photo of the cover, there's Central Intelligence Agen- cy imprinted as big as can be, and no -secret or top secret stamp. It was compiled and published well prior to the first American visit, and bears a November, 1971, printer's date. There's no reason it should be stamped as secret, but its obvious that it repre- sents a workmanlike job in a library well-stocked with publicatons from inside then-closed China. There's everything in it you've always wanted to know about Red China but didn't know how to ask. It doubtless is the best thing out, and it's worth the $5.25 several times over. Its maps, art- work,. photos and text are magnificently done. Chapters go into forms of govern- ment by various levels, languages, dia- lects and subdialects? climate, metals, industries and the people themselves. There's even a tourist's guide to Peking. The last item is the only part that gave us a start. The Peking guide is a huge double-spread painting of the scenic city. It apparently is drawn to scale and looks much like an aerial photo. On it are 81 numbered circles ? just like a Stra- tegic Air CAppinivecEFarRellease12001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 closer look' we see that all 81 numbers refer to palaces, .ancient temples, .gar- China atlas? denS, sacred gates and other points of historic and sight-seeing interest, unless someone considers the Soviet embassy to be a target. You find out from reading the skinny print hidden in the corner that the painting itself is taken from a 1957 publication of Peking Publishing HoUse, Inc., or whatever the Chinese version of Inc. is. We have three points to make: (1) It's an excellent publication. (2) The CIA shouldn't be in the pub- lishing business, using taxpayer's' money to put out fancy books (that obviously cost more than $5.25 to make). (3) The CIA, much to our surprise, has the soul of a poet ? or at least one CIA man, the editor of the atlas, has. Between the terse preface and the introduction is something in the nature of a dedication. It's a Chinese poem, written by r latter-day Communist about the "c goals of a commune. It urges hustle in ""L"- harnessing the land and its wealth, and ends wilh: a An inch of lime is an inch of gold, That's the value of yesterday. Time's word] today Is an inch for ten thousand pieces of gold. Can it be that the anonymous editor is spy-poet who came in from the cold? Asian PEOPLE'S EPUBUIC OF CHUKI,A Atlas ? ... Central Intelligence Agency WASHINGTON POST Approved For Release 20011/6344 :16A-RDP80 STATI NTL The Washimeton Itlerry-Go.Round ? Kissin,ler's Command Is a o pot ...., . , .... . By Jack Anderson arch enemy, President Thieu. Soviet Shipments--A class!- a CIA report suggests all We / In the secret truce talks, fied State Department analy- attention has merely enlarged: Every day, coded messages 1 North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho sis charges that Israel's forays ego and flood into Washington from , has emphasized that the Saigon across her borders against the his go made him more our embassies, - military corn- regime must be dismantled and Palestinian guerrillas have difficult than ever. . mands and intelligence out- replaced by a tripartite gov- given the Soviets a pretext for Castro "Uncouth" ? Intern: posts all over the world. The ernment dominated by neither strengthening their foothold most urgent telegrams are side. But he has indicated that in Syria and Iraq. Military gence reports acknowledge a funneled into Henry Kissm- Saigon can choose anyone it shipment have been sent not rise in anti-U.S. feeling: gees command post in the wishes to the new government, only to Syria and Iraq but to throughout Latin. America. that neither side should have the Palestinian guerrillas White House. Digests of over- But apparently Cuban Dicta-. 1 ch- i night intelligence reports are a veto over the ether's an- rectly. Contrary to press re- tor Fidel Castro's attempts to' delivered each morning to pointments. The implication is ports of a Soviet "airlift" to exploit U.S. unpopularity for President Nixon. that Hanoi would not object if Syria, however, the airlift his own purposes have failed. - From sources with access to Saigon appointed the hated co n s 1st e d of only four A typical message from our this.intelligence flow, here are Thieu as a member of the tri- transport planes, which have defense attache in Ecuador, some recent highlights: partite government, ceased to make regular deliv- where Castro visited last year, New Offensive??Privately, Mao's Vow?China's supreme cries. But the shipments, describes the top Ecuadorean Henry Kissinger is optimistic ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visit- though no more than token military brass as anti-U.S. but about the prospects . of a ind Japanese Prime Minister military aid, have had the ef- also anti-Castro. The message cease-fire in Vietnam. Yet in- Kakuei Tanaka fiercely that feet of strengthening Soviet quotes them as calling Castro tercepted messages indicate the Chinese would resist to bonds with the Arab hotheads. "uncouth" and "not the great that North Vietnam is prepar- the death any encroachments The analysis concludes, never- leader that many people con- ing- for a renewed offensive. by Russia. A CIA ' report ontheless, that Russia wouldn't dider him to be." Our military intelligence has the secret Mao-Tanaka talks likely risk war for Syria, Iraq found no trace, however, that quotes old Mao as saying or any other Arab country. Russia has replaced the tanks China would sacrifice its own African Wildman?The ef- and artillery the North Viet- people to prevent soviet domi- forts to placate Uganda's wild- namese lost in their spring of- nation. He cited the fate of his man, General Idi Amin, ap- fensive. They were able last former heir apparent, Lin pear to have backfired. Ile has spring to sneak heavy hard- Piao, who died in a plane ordered the Asians, who had ware into . South Vietnam vir- crash fleeing to Russia after become the backbone of Ugan- tually undetected. But the attempting a pro-Soviet coup da's economy, out of the coun- best available intelligence sag- against Mao. try. He has made impossible gests that both Russia and C h o u 's Opposition?The demands upon neighboring China have cut back military Central Intelligence Agency Tanzania. IIe has made and shipments to North Vietnam. reports that Chinese Premier broken promises to visiting Hanoi's military preparations, Chou En-lai is still encounter- mediators. He has imposed therefore, may be for a lim- ing opposition inside Peking's harsh martial law upon his lied attack upon a political ruling circle. Chou's opPo- country, charging that Tanza- target, perhaps even Saigon it- nents are upset over his policy nia, India and even Britain are self. But no one really -knows of detente with the United planning to invade his small whether the guns will be Si- States, Japan and the 'West. country. For the sake of black lenced . or booming when the They contend that the detente African solidarity, a host of voters go to the polls on Nov. 7. has hurt China's credibility black African leaders have ? Soft on Thea?Hanoi may with revolutionary forces made pilgrimages to Uganda be softening slightly on its around the world, to placate General Amin. But Cuba-Panama Friendship? A secret CIA cable, reporting on a conversation with a Cuban intelligence officer known only as "Alfredo " quotes him as saying that "the Cuban government generally supports the RIG (Panama's military junta) and General Omar Torrijos, the head of Panama, but wants to find ways to encourage Torrijos to move further to the left. 'Al- fredo' suggested that ... left- ists in Panama form a Pana-, ma-Cuba Friendship Society, which could promote friend- ship with Cuba, put pressure on Torrijos from the left and possibly be. used as the center for certain unspecified Cuban activites." 0 1972, United Feature Syndicate Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 BESt CIi Available Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 DATui: nimp Approved For Release 2001/01/04,:f-CIRDP80-0160 STATINTL -1\-1--- ,t- 4 ! ."' --:',f :,.! .,...?.:.7.,:?,:r:,',-,' ?.!;:., , By U. lANI MOSCOW Imperialist circles are using any and every expression of anti- Sovietism in strngle against socialism. The anti-Soviet policy of Peking directly serves the needs of imprialisin: and reac- tionary Western propaganda is using it to divert the attention of the peoples from the contra- dictions rending capitalism, to justify imperialist ag4ression and to slander the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist com- munity. In the United States the Pen- tagon-reared news analyst Joseph Alsop especially feeds on fabri- cations about Soviet-Chinese re- lations. A few days -ago he pub- lished in the inetropolitan news- paper Washington Post a loud. article under the heading "Polit- ical Hallucinations.- Whose and what hallucinations? It turns out that nearly all except the author have them, and they consist in that honest and decent world pub- lic opinion is indignant at U.S. .aggression in Indochina and the U.S.-protected expansionist policy of Israel in the Middle East: whereas. says Alsop. the main feature of the world landscape is not at all the war in Vietnam and not even the dangerous situ- ation in the Middle East. ? No. in the Alsop ''landscape' the main feature is a Soviet "red threat- to China. In the CIA and the Pentagon there are very sen- sible inen who have explained everything to him and asked him to give an account in public. And this old hand at provocative things tried his best to calumni- ate the Soviet Union, accusing it of nothing less than preparing a "preventive attack- on the Peo- ple's Republic of China. The hallucination prompted by the "sensible inert- so much caught the turbulent imagination of Alsop. the hater of socialism. that he tried to present the im- agined picture as a reality, in %.1 I Fl I 1 1 `I I I- front of which he and his friends sat as the "third rejoicing... lie even yelped v:ith rapture. This patholcyical article of .\l- sops is not unique. Back in Feb- ruary this year he tried to fright- en the woi.ld with his extravagant fancy of t he "cast ration of China.- Finally. two days after the above-mentioned article, in the same Washin;r,tun Post, Al- sop made the crazy allegation that Pravda was advocating a "reduction ol Soviet support- for- the heroic Vietnamese patriots. This goes beyond all measures of falsehood. But then, apart from Alsop, not so rudely and less noisily. other U.S. journalists and news- papers almost simultaneously spoke out on the Soviet ''threat'' to China, also. apparently. on the advice of "sensible men" of im- perialist reaction. As we see, there is a certain strategy at the bottom of all this. It consists. first of all, in an attempt to discredit the actual policy of the Soviet Union vis-a- vis the People's Republic of China. This policy rests on a de- sire to normalize relations, to restore good-neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet. and Chinese peoples. The reactionary imperialist forces are well aware of the fact that the improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC would accord with the vital, long-term interests of the two count ries, the interests 'of world socialism, the interests of struggle against imperialism. The Soviet Union has placed be- fore the PRC concrete and con- structive proposals on non-aggres- sion, non-use of force, settlement of border questions, improvement of relations on the basis of mu- tual advantage. These proposals have not been accepted by China as yet. The Peking leaders think it ,unprofit- able for themselves to speak the truth about these proposals of tile Soviet Union--that would be their self-exposure as great-power ex- pansionisls ;nut splitters ing..!ra- vating international tensioas and relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Alsop and his col- leagues are also aware of all this. but deliberately pass it over in order to warp the real state of affairs. The anti-Communists and anti- Soviet propagandists. in pablish- ing their inventions ibout th,., So- viet "threat.- do not abai:cion their attempts to discredit Soviet foreign policy as a whole. They are out to question the U.S.S.R.'s consistency in the struggle for stronger world peace. to present the Soviet proposals on European security, collective security in Asia. bilateral declarations on the non-use of . force and other measures to ease internatienal tension and to achieve disarma- ment. put forward by the Soviet Union, as allegedly prompted only by: tactical considerations. There is nothing new in these methods, Imperialist propaganda has long been resorting to slan- der concerning a "red menace" in its unsuccessful struggle against socialism: What has been new here in re- cent years lies elsewhere. It con- sists in :that the Peking leader- ship willingly echoes slanderous concoctions of all kinds concern- ing Soviet foreign policy. Peking brazenly -draws on and spreads in from filthy sources of imperialist propaganda, adding to it its own inventions tbotit. the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. Therein lies the nutritive mc- di urn for the hallucinations of Joseph Alsop and the "sensible men- froin the CIA and the Pen- tagon, who are backing him. That is the v.?ay the Peking "propagan- dists.' and the poisoners of pub- lic opinion, who are filling the orders from the aggressive im- perialist circles, are assiduous- ly assisting each other. (Pravda) Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 STATI NTL ? . . Approved For Release 2001/03/04 ?DL., CiA41110P80-01601R0 u 1 -- .1.I ...,-,... , .../4?40 'Cl?...e.' frl erlt- 11 1 ti , . n t rti By Stanley Karnow trol the Chinese fleet and re., replacement by a single sue- wriir ftiEed, Chou explained. cessor was "one of the plots" Chinese Premier Chou En-1 Chou svict tintChIna concocted by Marshal Lin .lai has indictated that net a collo> ? . ?..,. ? ,? itestcit In up; Plan. a .named 7tran's offi- powec in Pet,iinil aiter .1010t ifidtviirial develo111 e11:1 vial heir in the Chinese Com- Commuitist. Party (ilinirtnzin I ventures s?vith the Unitedi munist Party constitution pro- Tr,e,turt7, die? St-ates as a rest.tli, Q.:: its bad c!s..-1 mu rgated in .\pril 3f;139, is al - Chou has suggested,. Inr.v.i wjth ,rtoiects es-i le?e0 to have been killed in tn ever, thiA a lt.ey tha ; , ' ti future hk.ch to ttiJited wit n the Sovietl airplane crash after an abor- tive attempt to seize )O iii the Yao n'lailvc.h? Union. young offieial ...vim The Wall Street Journal ati-I Despite this disclosure by pilved It tr000rtai.it 1.4t1.-7. courit cited C1 i. rri,?yinli Chou, most Ch ' cpecialists tuimilttiens Cnitorat 141 tho mon who plannedi here: believe that Mao person- :Revolution. ii,Itto is 'hi run the. ,tisiassi)tation" of riresIdentlaily supported Lin'A desi Chou i;; 74. ,na- The Premier discussed Ped -1-`7-"1c.?Y hita no,a?r been cap-1 tion 111 his fitleefor hut later que.ilkni in aI turcid. Aecitiitdir.; to the ,lour?1 changed his mind ;01.10.v...int,/ an ,witle-rtni.t-tt rig converFatioll lifts rill's represmdative, Chou said ;internai power strit;gle that ?ict,u?crerle;et,;:idy. L .ee y 0 v , a 1. in the 1.1llottot, of n Chou, t,tvii0 likes miL1 Ii I 'cunt dn't . . . the one %vholltrii. ISome China experts: here tallted tti his for ireaiI.C' him". neatly lour hours until: past 1 Sptiaking in a litt.liter vein,' also believe that Chou's refer- tWO o'clock on .bunday morn- C,toti told the editors that tho i. c to Yao Wt7n?vuan as a "Folio mostkooi-vied.,e-thie on key figure in the future rnay pa according to accounts or he ? (liscussion y s Niy China's Conimuniq Party or-i4tho be related to internal ten- by AV all Street jourilati Cl' it islie thtit. Central; .101is still no.telm,, China. .As 1; ;I s rl I .1'f-.)11,:, ix011,;. J. to ;,ut toat its set.. (...tiou may t r.:toner, ,:g cy ert uni i l ii t ll, , PAs?:0ejete Sotc1:.!ti Linlon koew least tiveni L'a atiteratPitrt; to PL"teate ham iul z," Gt-tier Cdi,05.;;I?titotigh it ims the largest ein-1 cal acti vists' vt-ho came to the !tore during the Cultural lievo- present, Chou discussed nlat-i in Pel!":.trr--:. tors as divt,1,, as Pt (ii Clow jol;.cil that lut could itution. econoilly, It(.?ti?ing's not vh.-,it the United s'uflos ;Is; Yao, a young Shanghai pub it the SlIVIC.t. Union ;Inci !Ion:: as Chiang ntrA" about 40 who 111(1 New 'iTork trncrie. vivnt Iraxe Cl I The edit( 0.6 rcl)un C(I milis Arnorien,. but oarned hino.,;,(?li ininoi. repo- Chott thouwii a? si.411 P.nd tt memhor 101011 as a radical lilerztry "Th :critic, Was apparently Wsenv- pitcter, (11-hi:ied hits velum neo Ic pred hy \l to ? C'hi- rt. Cit. and ellitrin throw:hunt TiAt premier s:tid that China i ?; ',`-- - ? meeting. Whon e(i;ir:u Cva:) in no litorry to replace its tn ti a? 11-1;tt tney get do \Y!1 II) 1);cycj(!s th"t tilne "soriete; ler ; coint-pelitine that -Iteltin.2.,:?.1` 11161'. to in1i'itel. ''111111111.1 rut. Pie, Chou replied: ..tylly rtct t,t ould lteecnie Ne,str York ?,??,'a?',.`v}"1 \?'.:111 1.1"11 0")1)uscci kterions7" in terir.s oi- at.?3 itO , Communist Party apliara- '1US11Pi .:king. With apparent seriotisnoss.1 '\,`-'1'',111 1, 1'1- `11""' t() Itn" Accordinga to ccounts puh- fliout,th, Chou disi:10,ed ink.) s'...1:eots." lislied in Chin Ch a. iang Ching (1101', III ,.tutptit 0.1 ; int 3.;j,sity,1,.er Is Crtib delegiited Yao to write an al-j 3S )C( (I If) e (1 (till his imprestitott of ir.ek against Ihir ilet)tity ntayor I lion Int-'erie Ci 0 dcq'itr: P'"ii.! White lionsc foreli-4n 110111 ioc pttkittg,, wtt jrz-mi, who Ii 1(11 vcather conoitiors. out- t 1(11 CI It 11 1 ii unnroduccd a historical Pot Inst. 2413 nuiIIiunwhom lie has seen i'requently t play that obliquely criticized tonF; and 40 million in ! : over he past year. "ti no, The teat pin;p;ise of. the Joint Navv that he -can trill; toll', atiack 1-4:11051 Ilan, how- Chou also that fur..! you for hail on hotly and 110..! (.....:or, '1?55 to depti;111(P. Peng mer Sot jet t'rentier 1nrim, the decade agreements wece sialle,t with the for t tic const rutin of 1).91 nit jor inLlust inst it I- int ions in ('Itina. lIy the end eiluipment vnitted .1.3.) billion had 'wen yew,' and. about 130 were completed. Agreements \Vero also signed Nvith Eastern Euro- pean count rios l'or the const ruct ion ()I' at least WO major prot- ects and about 11\-4)-thirds ()I' thei-q, tverc, completed by fI addit Toll o ying (atuipment for those installat ions t.lie Soviet Union orovided China vit Ii valuable 1(4111CP-ill aid in- cluding: pr) bliworinls zind technical information. (b) some 10,000 Soviel technicialis and mh.ors. lll1 (r I raining f "1:).00() Chinese technicians and academic sindent:i in the ( rsack and 1;;Itsavage,1). 34\4) 'Elie impact of Soviet ai(1 termination in mi(1-1 960 on Chinese in- dustrial out pia Nt":1S SOoll in coining: ID 1961, indust rial product ion fell sharply to a level slightly above that of 19,',7 but only t \vo-thitals of the peal; reached in net.' the wit hdriiNvitl of the Soviet technicians in mid- 1960, the t'llinese found that they could not operate 111.:111.1. 1110heuv111(111S1 1)11111s :IS Z-406(1 ;lit' project S, ;tiiI (hey Were fOreed ell( prOdlIct loll drastically. ( Vield? p.641 Tfo?vever, the shift to non-Conurtunist sources of assist:Luce in the 19(30's took away part of the sting, as in the electronics industry: The NVIll1(1111W:11 of Soviet aid in 19(;() force(1 China to turn to the tion-t'ommititist countries for assistance. These coun- tries, principally Japan. AVest German,v, the United King- dom, France, and SA??itzerlancl, are currently the source of Approved For Release 2001/03/0437 CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 more t n four Hillis or ('Ilina's imports of elect runic prod- ucts and product ion equipment. lit lut;t) -1970 more l '....2t H) million or lerlinologically advanced elect runic product ion Niniiiinetil was imported from 1110 114111-0111111111111:-41 '11'111'141. The imports consisted primarily of modern military and indus- trial elect ronics NV1111'11 (1111111 4.()11.141. !HIV(' 1/111(111red 4101110S1 I- Calk 01113' a Nei. a long development period. These imports ;Is %veil as imports from the \\rest of sin,?.ial ?leo rii mnierntis and technological Iniow-how ta ht ('Itina to forego I he lengthy and expensive process or prototype d,velopment and to expand its 44(1 ronies produet ion hnse front (I1) 11111.161' elec- t 'tonics plants in Wm) l 200 in 1971. Years %Vero saved in establishing t lie pro(Itict ion of advanced elect Tonic products ror industrial and military programs. ueiehm.s, p.p. 87-88) Tdeallv, continual ion of Soviet a i(1 to 1967, that is, through three yea r plans \'011141. 1111 yV. Se1.11'11 ( 'hinese economic interests best. Yet, as Ileichers suggests, the fOrce(1 shift to 1Vestertt im1ustri;i1 sources had tangible long-run benelits to the Chinese. 3. In r;en, of it. Imegeeminu popnlotion eon the ('hitiese eco.noin.y RitNillin With t eXript 1On of the 1 hree disaster years of 19:i9--61, C'hina has fed its ..linge and growing population currently estimated to be 44S million.1inappr()ach to ( neo-Ma It husian problem has been Nvo-protiged --a ne?v investment st rategy for agrtetill sporadic birth control proprams. 'rho ne\v investment st rategy adopted in he Nvake of the Great I.eap ForNvard involved an increase, in chemical fert ilizers, pumps for Nvater cont rol, improved t ranspor - tation, and so fort and a concent ration of thes(. addit ional resources on potentially high-yield rice land in the southOf ('hima : The response of agricult itral product ion to the 11411' St 1'14- egy including t he substant 11 I increases investments in agriculture and the concent rat ion on high-yield acreage? resulted in (it) t 1u restornt ion ()I t u 1957 level of grain pro- duel ion by 196 I. and (1)) gri)wi or gra ,ii prodlic( ion at a smliewhal Nst('l tHu Iit j t III i I 1. a result or the (.11ii2v1 st rategy, a new t rend line has been established ill it.,ricitlt tire. dist Met Iv higher and more steeply pitched II that prevailim, H11111'1'1114) 10)X-111\'('S11111)111 1)4)114?\'ol 1114? 1111 1411V01' (111111 111z11 \\'111C11 could 1,0 readily realized given (wen lar,...,(rer and better-bid:l ured inputs. Out put \yid exceed he t rend vain(' %dam weat her is better i norma I and fall below t lit I rend value lo the extent \\Tallier is unfavorable. Erisnutil, p.1.14?) three birth con( 1.01 cam pit i(rils have luul no appreciable effect Ott demographic rates. loreover- ;lilt' this is the iimst st ril;ing point in I he popuhd ion paper a successful attempt at fert ility reduct i(m prob- ably would have lilt le effect ort I he total size Of the populat ion over the next wo decades. .1 ird's fonr population project ions for 1990 range only bet \\Tell 1,319 1111111011 111141 1,334) 1111111On models imply t hal even a major and successful (dVort al forl ility reduct ion in t ITC is 111)t. 111(4'1,1' 10 111111:11) 111111'11 1111rAn.i))1111? 4'111141' 111 111t. S1Z(' (if 111(' 101111 1/4/1/111A11111 4)1' 111 1110 Approved For Release 2001/03/0tr CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 s:ize (d. the .voimgcr age groups. hence it cannot afford much relief from population pressure iii ,general or from such spe- cific problems ;is I nerd for etIoeutioll, (miployment. housing and other services for .%.oung people. To escape from Iiiitt mid rather discouraging prospects, the PIZC would Iii to find H uIt some of the factors that have thus Iii?detenliined defflographie experiein, in other developing countries. The principal reason ?vIly these models slioly so little differ- ence even for successful ellorts ;it family limitation is that they assume enrriat inn het wee!, Jei dit,y___.and mortality I reildS. in faet, hard 1,'ffl1ttf nioe 0.> flgel1C1';11 acccp1;111C(4 01 fit li)ily lii iii tu I iou V1licll (10 1101 :1180 in i1111)1'0V(111(111 in general health and a loNver- Of 1111)11;111tV. The lliSS(.111111a(11)11 ralility t110 1)1\C tell ntiSOrinted and IS currently heing com- bined with general 'drive for better medical care and sani- tation Eliroughout t lio countryside. ( A i rd. p 330. ) ,Insummary, the main line of thitilim, hi these papers k that ne)y inveStment \vitt I:eep iigriculture up \vith population but that agricul- tur(' \vitt i)rovide no extra margin for stopped-up economic groNvilt. 4. Wind /n/0/(7,x (hi 11117 ilftry (le cc f orei yn ,,l?the /W P( ()pie n1 efl prof:Ira nix-- ',loot' on economic (I,' OCT!) l)/ne n I ,) .1. rending of the papers suggests that- the Chinese have been gen- erally successful both in building up a heavy industrial base and in gradually modernizim, their armed forces. the major factors c()ntriliiiiing to this success IN: (it) the (?ontrol of consumption at relittive13-, VIIIS1(.1.(k. egalitarian levels: (6) the use of foreign trade to got high-teclitioloiry nnichinery and materials. which could in' pro- dur"1 t 11()"1(' erv Iligh cosi thul after lung delay: and (o) the. partiaI insulation ()I (he nuclear an(1 ot her higli-technolo!).,y progt.ams from political I urmoil. 'HIP military prmtranis command roughly one- tenth of China's GNP .1shbrool;, p.45 faint the foreign aid programs approximately11)1) million an or aliont one-third of 1 percent or chinn.s cransky, p.371 Idurine- the next (leeade. when the c()st, of series manufacture and 1:n7e-scale deployment of modern weapons will rise sharply upward, 1 he leadership ma v face a 11111(.11 tighter squeeze on resources needed for growth. This squeeze ?A-ould be com- pounded hy the insistent pressure from the population to raise the level 4)1' C1)118111111)6( ill. T. 110 ?/' netY ??????,; 'tax Peki n y bee-n de owl() ping IhP ri0118 OW- IlOn1141' Iry;(111.,: 01 (11;11(1.1 The allthill'S tgi.t.t? that Peking (aii point to substantial suceesses in building up regional transportation an(1 industrial facilities: When the Communists came to po\?-er, they inherited :III In1(1d-()1"1 ;m11 1111(11Y (1:1111:1g1.41 tralls1")11:1t inn net \VW.k? Ili.c011S11'11(1i011 of much of the old net \vorl: w;is undertalom durinie and hold plans \veil, formulated for the exten- sion of ip rail, higliwa,v, and inland Nvatenvay systems. Sul's("1 .1"'"gr''N'' \vas made (Itiriti!, the Itwo's and. ,Ifter a pause (1111111,o' ourly 19(.0)?S, ('XpallSiun V;- IIi11 i\('Ii 11.1,"11orLwiIv n (II(' 1;11(' 191;0*S. "nw wori: extended into the soutlm-esiern and northwestern sections of. the. Approved For Release 2001/03/041-CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001.-5 could iv.IId111(iii colinerl 'mg. links w(.1%, 'wilt norl lwast. Thi? highway nig \vol.!: \vas expandod and inipruvi.(1 11 l'S10111 ;111N1-4 SI1V11 11S '1'11A?1 1V111?11? 110 1?1111?0ads proz,0111 iv .1?11e ?Vz111.1'?Vay net ?Vork \V;IS 1o4hm.(1, .m11)1.01'141, :111(1 vX11111111141. 11111111d :11111 i'MIS1:11 WVIV 1110(k1111Z141 :111(1 I heir illcrottseti. and \\igv I 147 ) ti summary, the ( 'hinese hay() persisted hi their 1)1;111 for 111t, 11'g1011:11 (1011.101)1111111 01 OW C011111 l'y 1111'01111 1111C1 11111 111111. Tilt) original plan NN fir;-I (() repair flu) hull's- rial centers damaged during \Vorld 1Var 11. then to build ne?v Imses in North and ( 'ent rid Chinn. and tinnily to develop the Southwest and the Nort li \vest has certainly keen delayed, Init the dev,dopimsni Iv_ tainisd. roil and. \Vn-lian, for examplo, aro no\V esialili:-,11),(1 'Indust ria.I liases, and a lar.ire muffingr of industrial vonst ruct ION 1)1'0.1(`CIS :11V 111110111y 1111(101' ih.vt?11)pmen1 in switim,,s/('liiita.1,.71) PROSPErrS AND l'itont,Ints The Papers in the vt-iltime. alnmst certainly will prove of value to anyone interested in the relationship of the lJnited States with the People's Republic. of China. 'rho authors have provided a surprising- :11,1(unit of detailed information on the People's Republic of Chimi's ()commie history, ib-; current economic situation. and its future eco- m)ntic prospects. Although it has not been the purpose of the authors to spoil out the implicat ions of their findings for U.S. pc)licy, they have iwovidedus \vith an informational and analytic basis relevant to that important taslc Some future prospects and pm)blenis may thus be idont l'ast. ll'estern projections of Chinese performance. have ilften seri- ously ()vorst ted or understated I he actual ruturo 1)er1.01110111e0. In 1"1111eS of disrupt ion and poor performance the recuperative capabilities of Chinese society ha NT, :1pp:111'111 ly, often liven undert.st invited. Now, in fl period encouraging favorable birecasts it is \yell to be cautious. A number of problems may :iris() to dist till) ;111 etilrapolation of currently favorahle economic trends; ?N.111'111111 c;1 I:111111 is 111;IV 1)1:1V 1hvir roles as tlit)v hay() throughout Chinese history: for isxample, floods, droughts, earthquakes, epi- demics, and so fort I). 0. The lOod..1)0p111:111(111 1)1111)(1, 11111?' 1)0. (1iS1'111)1.0(1 cansing short or 'longer term (n.)noini4. retard:II ion. O The military burden on economy may sharply rise in resp(ins() pansimi. ;Ind ht mop' I i)i) Soviet (0 "ed:11111.r wpa puns r(os in I heir nuch.:11. programs force ex_ border or in I he T:ii St (IT ()I lir porn?v ivasons. ?Leadership strtiggIcs pitlit)r It) develop lielter 'Maoist state or choose successor to M:10 111:11. diS11111/1111' 4.111.11911 stability. ci 1 list it ional changes, as 'hina proceeds on its course Id' 1 111S1.01.- 111;111011 rroil (IiiiIlII n, a 111.1,1.11 s,witsty, may v11,11(.10,1,1. lwri()(1,- or and di,riipt ion. Tilt, ;-;ovio oxpori- Approved For Release 2001/03/04 tIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 , t Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Nice hasleen mixed .blessing as a guide to Chinese institutional accommodation to change. From the rejection of tlw Soviet model the ('Itinese turned to a "search for a l'aoist model". (Jones p. 58) An assumption that the search has ended and institutional saI)jhtv\vill now facilitate ('hinese economic development would scent premature at this point. liepublic of China has become an economically stroncr, unified iffition. Its capability simultaneously to meet re(piirements ot feeding its poptilat ion, modernizing its military forces, and expanding its civilian eccutomic base must now be )issunted' from its recor(1 to date. 11foreover, its expanding ec(morny and military establishment provi(le, a base for project 111(1V:14114r 1)0 \Ver ill COIISOMIllee with it V11011110118 littionn resources. (.'hblese nia:c ulso be felt both t 111.(nig1t direct use a cron()Iiiie and iiinitm.y ;111(1 the indirect example of its model of development?Thus China may in the next decade or IWO join the 'nited States. the Soviet I 'ition?lopan. and the \Vest Euro- :peatti. community ill a pentag(m ()I world powers. Approved For Release 2001/03/04; CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 WASHIbl TON POST Approved For Release 2001/013kOMYC12RDP80-016 L The Washington Nierry.Go-Ronnd STATINTL 0S0, Notes By Jack Anderson : There is evidence in the se- cret U.S. cable traffic that President Nixon's Military moves .in Vietnam may be driving the two great Commu- nist antagonists, Russia and China, bacietogether. ? We.have been able to trace the dismaying developments through secret documents,. which the White House has carefully withheld from both Congress and the public. These. documents show that the.. Kremlin reacted to the Chinese-American rapproche- ment by making its own secret overtures to Peking 'last Au- gust. The Soviets worked through Lin Piao, the acerbic defense minister, who has been designated by Mao Tse- tung to become his successor. Encouraged by his Soviet contacts, Lin opposed inviting President Nixon to Peking and advocated restoring the Chinese-Russian. p artnerihip- This put .Lin ire direct conflict with Premier Chou En-lai, who had issued the invitation to Nixon. Lin lost the showdown and mysteriously disappeared. The crafty Chou spread the word to the party faithful that Lin had died in a plane crash after attempting to assassinate Mao. Chou's version, which was whispered around China and reached CIA ears, had it that Lin attempted to waylay Mao on the way home from South China by train last August. %????=1MINIMINN, JIISMINarwl ? Knowing Mao's itinerary would take him through Shanghai and Wuhsi, Lin al- legedly arranged an assassina- tion party in Shanghai?and aft- erward planned to blOw tip a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck Mao',s train. Both plots failed, according to the story, and Lin attempted to flee to Rus- sia by jet on Sept.-13. The plane supposedly crashed in the Wenteukhan area of Mon- golia. The whispers of the plot to kill Mao, who has deity status in China, apparently was in- tended to cow Lin Piao's sup- porters. So monstrous was the thought of assassinating, the great Mao, in Chinese minds, that the Lin faction was sup- posed to be intimidated into silence. But the opposition to Chou continued to simmer under the surface, and the Russians quietly pressed for better rela- tions. The plenum of the &v. viet Central Committee, in an unpublished action last No- vember, sought to restrain the ideological struggle against the Chinese. Still, other events inflamed Chinese-Russian relations until the State Department re- ported in a confidential sum- mary last December: "Sino-So- viet international polemics as distinct from domestic propa- ganda have risen to the highest level since 1969 . . . Peking, however, has so far avoided whipping up a war scare within China, and it appears to be attempt- ing to restrict increased ten- sion. with Moscow to verbal fireworks on international questions." Significantly, Chou is in charge of China's interna- tional affairs and,. therefore, was responsible for the rising rhetciric. President Nixon's air attacks upon North Vietnam, however, have made it awk- ward for Chou. . China and Russia have been competing for Hanoi's favor, as the two titans of commu- nism maneuver for influence in Southeast Asia. Rivalry in Hanoi The Central Intelligence Agency, in a secret report, has declared: "Following Dr. Henry Kissinger's July. visit to Peking, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai made a Secret visit to Hanoi to reassure the Govern- ment of the Democratic Re- public of Vietnam, (DRV) of continued Chinese support. "The Chinese emphasized their support by increasing their assistance to the DRV_ for the 1971-72 period. This in turn resulted in an increase ity Soviet assistance to the DRV for the same period. ... "The DRV expressed its ap- prehension to Chou regarding a ' U.S.-Chinese detente, and stated that the DRV is still suspicious about President'. Nixon's visit to Peking." In view of the Chinese-Rus- sian rivalry in Hanoi, Nixon undermined Chou and justi- gna lied Lin's poSition by .orclers air strikes against North Viet- nam, Thi i has strengthened Lin's - survivors inside the Chinese policy councils. As a result, Lin's idea of re- pairing Chinese-Russian rela- tions is gaining support. At the United Nations, for exam- ple, the relations between Chinese and Russian delegates are warming. . . A Soviet delegation, on: tour of China, has Also been re- ceived with unaccustomed cordiality, in realm, there was no Soviet denunciation of the hinese at the Lenin Day cele- ration on April 21. . There are now hints of Chinese-Russian cooperation to route war supplies overland to North Vietnam. If this de- velops, ? the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors will cost the U.S. far more in world strategy than is likely to be gained on the Vietnam- ese fighting fronts. - 1972, United Feature 82ridieate Approved For Release 2001/03104: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 ? OicsHINCTON POST, ? Approved For Release 200/0314 INA-RDpRiC111\16/111 The Washington Merry-Goatound jIy Jack Anderson Secret intelligence reports declare that President Nixon's high-risk military moves in Vietnam have undermined those in both Moscow and Pe- king who want to ease ten- sions with the United States. Although there had been no visible opposition to the Presi- dent's trip to Peking and invi- tation to visit Moscow, the Central Intelligence Agency claims the detente was fierce- ly resisted inside the policy councils of both governments. To protect our sources, we cannot quete directly from the CIA documents. The CIA maintains, however, that the decision to invite Nixon was by no 'means unanimous in 'Moscow or Peking. Citing "reliable" sources, the CIA claim's the Soviet mil- itary hierarchy has opposed doing business with Nixon. De- fense Minister Andrei Grechko, apparently, has be- come the principal spokesman for this faction inside the Kremlin. The Russian marshals, .ac- cording to the CIA, are eager to share credit in Hanoi for the North Vietnamese sue- t fiFr Nixo cesses. For the military equip- ment, which has smashed the South Vietnamese defenses, was made in Russia. The Soviets, in the bidding against the Chinese for influ- ence in Hanoi, had offered the North Vietnamese a $110 mil- lion military loan. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Viet- cided to spend it for tanks, heavy artillery and anti-air- names? military genius, deci- craft missiles. The Soviet military brass would like to see a setback for U.S. interests not only in Viet- nam but the Middle East. The CIA warns that the Russians may counter U.S. moves in Vietnam with new initiatives in the Mediterranean. The CIA offers fewer specif- ics about the opposition within the Chinese leadership to the Chinese-American detente. But bitter opposition, says the CIA, is simmering beneath the surface. Laird's Good Humor Our recent columns on the misuse of the Pentagon .auto fleet has drawn a good-humor- ed reaction from Defense Secretary Mel Laird and or- ders from on high to start obeying the regulations. Slightly 1 But the Pentagon bigshots, as usual, are reading the regu- lations to suit their expensive tastes, not to save the taxpay- ers' money. Result: most of the staggering waste contin- ues. ? We told, for example, how gon cars, intended for use only on pressing official busi- ness, had become a luxury lim- ousine service for military po- tentates and their congres- sional friends. Laird, meanwhile, still has two limousines at his constant call in case one should de- velop motor trouble. His spe- alai assistant, Carl Wabace, is also picked up each morning and delivefed hoine each eve- ning by a military chauffeur. The men who toil in the Pentagon garage, however, were getting the word to put an end to excursions that vio- late regulations. This, presum- ably, riseant stopping the prac- tice of routinely chauffeuring members of Congress around Washington. But when the motor 'pool tried to follow orders, it found itself in hot water with She Pentagon's congressional liai- son office which is resisansi popularity rating high on Capitol Hill, The clash between military regulations and congressional relations was quickly resolved in favor of keeping the Con- gressmen happy. The soldiers who man the motor pool were ordered to provide whatever the congressional liaison of- fice wanted. - So military vehicles con- tinue, for example, to bring in large quantitieS of liquor from. the Pentagon's Washington supplier so there will be plenty to serve to thirsty Con- gressmen when they attend a military reception or take a military flight. . The fact that such trips in- volve an apparently illegal. transportation of liquor across the Vieginia border from Washington doesn't bother the Pentagon brass. Apparently, the abuse of military cars is not confined to Washington. At the U.S. naval base in Bermuda, for 'ex- ample, the brass ride around in full-size American sedans despite the fact that such large cars are legally forbid- den to other residents of the resort island._ , ble for keeping the military's 41;? 1972, United Feature Syndioete . Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 -oa../ear3x2s Approved For Releage zuui/u /04- C1A-RDP80-01601R 14 MAY 9/2 CIA SPY KIT ? CHINA ATLAS PUT ON SALE WASHINGTON (UPI) ? --7-For $5.25, any citizen can have his own Cen- tral Intelligence Agency document. 7:The Government . Printing Office in Wash- ington iS offering for - sale 30,000 copies of the CIA's new 82-page, mul- ticolored atlas of the People's Republic of -China. Officials at the GPO said that except for an annual four-volume se- -.ries listing the broad- casting stations' of the ? world, the atlas was the only CIA document they had produced for sale to the public. ? In addition to maps of ? modern China, the atlas, with the CIA's seal on the cover, also contains ? historical maps, a num- ber of charts describing the growth of the Chi- nese economy and a nar- .:...r a tiv e accompanying the maps and charts. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 ? '17/151,-IIIKITOIT T,'03T? STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001433/W: taTA-RDP80-01601R00 Mines Divert More Ships, ,U.S. Reports The ma-verrient. of 'tile. two ships, however, could repre- sent the start of a gradual So- viet naval buildup. Contrary to some reports from Hanoi, Friedheim said the North Vietnamese have ? ?..4,... . made no effort to clear the . By Michael Getler tinines from their harbors and ',. ? Washington Post Staff Writer 'reiterated that Hanoi has no I The Pentagon reported yes.; ships actually equipped to get I these deadly and hard to re-' terday that "several more ships" that were. en route to harbors. , : North , Vietnam have . appar- , Another sign that .Commu? ently been "diverted" because I nist ships bringing supplies to of the U.S. mine barrier. the North may go to China in- Pentagon spokesman Jerry stead was reported by The As- W. Friedheim announced the sociated Press from London changes in the ship move- yesterday. ments, but refused to provide According to the AP, senior any information on their : Communist diplomats 1 there? courses. unidentified in the report? Other sources said, however,' named two South China ports ' that "it is possible, and it is le- that could, handle the ship- - gitimate speculation" tba,t ' ments. They forecast that de- - . some Soviethloe ships may be 1 spite the continuing Sino-So- vie feud, mining will lead move explosives out of their 'headed for Chinese ports near : ' pal d , 'North Vietnam to union their ? cargoes for transshipment to: icy almostcertainly North Vietnamese offensic7e": which relies heavily on tanks, trucks and mobile artillery' and air defenses. A Soviet end-run around the Haiphong mibe fields would get the fuel intolhe area just north of the border and sub- ject it to bombing?the less effective of the two-pronged U.S. effort to shut off the sup- plies. - .? There were about 25 ships heading toward North Viet- nam before the mines were laid, about half of them So- viet. About five or six turned back toward the Soviet Far, East port of Vladivostok. Friedheim also disclosed yesterday that two and possi- bly three more ships got out of Haiphong just before the 'mines were activated at 7 a.m. I (EDT) Thursday. These are in addition to five ships that . were previously reported as: having left. That means that - 28 or 29 shivs are .trapped by to extension of the existing the mines in Haiphong. %their original destination, rail-supply agreement among At least one and possibly . .These sources caution that "it China, Russia and North Viet-, two of the three and, Is too early to tell" -with cer- nam ? to include use of Chinese that also got out are Russian. . ;tainty. ports. The other was flying a Somali' . If the ships do head for The Soviets for years have flag. - China, it could signify a So- made extensive use of two Friedheim also revealed . viet intent to outflank the U.S. main rail lines through China that two Chinese vessels were , . . mining operations while avoid- ,to North vietnam bottled up in Vinh, and two ing a naval confrontation with The two ports named by the Soviet ships at Campha be-, ? the Americans. C ininunists are Peihai and cause of the mines. Thesd are I . Two Soviet warships--a cruiser and a missile-equipped .? destroyer?were reported yes- terday by the Japanese Self- Defense Agency to be steam- ing southward through the Tsushima Stfait between Japan . and South Korea, an area more than 1,500 miles north of hanoi.- The ships, from the Soviet port of Vladivostok, were said to be the first Russian naval vessels seen going south through the strait. since the Pakistani-Indian war last De- ' cember. But officials here said there was no way to tell where they were headed. They noted that Ch'irihsien, both near major smaller coastal type freight-1 road and rail networks about ers, The two ports are among ' 100 miles north of Hanoi. six other relatively small Mr- ' Peihai was mentioned along bdrs that were mined in.addi- . with the larger ports of Can- tion to Haiphong. _ ton and Fort Bayard by the U.S. Central ? Intelligence Agency in its report to Presi- dent Nixon's National Security Councl in early 1969 on Viet- nam The CIA estimated then that "all of the war essential imports could be brought into Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were suc- cessfully denied." The United States is now heavily bombing those over- the ships were steaming at 10 land lines, but defense anti- . knots, .far less than their top , lysts are far less convinced speed of about 30 knots. ; that the bombing will work- as . ?To pose any' serious dial- . well aS the mining to shut off lenge to the mine barrier and supplies. the vast U.S. armada in the ! The CIA still contends that area the Soviets would have most of the actual arms?guns to send scores of ships, planes, and ammunition?continues to submarines and, most impor- arrive overland. The major fuel, food and So far, informed sources say tantly, minesweepers. ? no major Soviet naval move- truck shipments arrive by sea ment is underway nor do So- through Haiphong. The fuel, however, is viewed as . PaPKRN,Ri trMd tSrticu4- viet ofC libiof?, IA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 appear t the area. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000 CLEI/FLAND, OHIO PLAIN DEALER MAY 1 2 1972 m - 409,414 S ? 5 4 5 , 03 2 CIA Atlas on China' 'Looks Like 'Sellout' The first Centr..@LIL14,11 gence_4groner-. publication el/17T? be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office "looks like it might be a sellout," Robert Kling, su- perintendent of documents, told The Plain Dealer yesterday. ? The Government Printing Office already has received more than 6,000 orders for "The. People's Republic of China Atlas," an 82-page, six-color book, designed ori- ginally as briefing material for President Nixon's trip to Mainland China. It was put on public sale a week ago. ? GPO ordered 30,878 copies o f - the atlas printed, with delivery slated for late ? May. ? Kling, phoned in Washing- ton, said he now believes advance orders could total 25,000, and, ? if, so, "We'll have to go back to press with it." The atlas, priced at $5.25, measures 101/4 by 17 inches, and contains foldout maps as big as 101/4 x 34. It employes a number of unconventional graphic techniques, in addition to standard regional and the- matic maps, charts and photographs, . and "is de- signed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the People's China." The atlas parisons of States and Republic o contains corn. the United mainland (Communist) China to make its statistics more meaningful to the? average American. A CIA spokesman said the agency had never before of- fered ally such publication to the American public. But, he said, President Nixon showed the atlas to reporters and before live TV cameras before his trip. So the CIA decided to make iI public. Orders for the atlas can be sent to the Superintend- ent of Documents, Govern- , ment Printing office, Washington, D.C. 20402., STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 NEW N,ORK TIUES 2 Approved For Release 200/_ i_.0Fc . _It17.R.FRM1601 -A C.I.A. Atlas of China ,Goes on Sale for $5.25 WASHING? TON, May 6 (UPI) .?For $5.25, any citizen Can have his own Central Intelli- gence Agency document,. ? The. Government Printing Office is offering for sale . 30,000 copies of the C.I.A.'s . new 82-page, multicolored at- las of the People's Republic of China. Officials at the printing of- fice said .that except for an, annual four-volume series listing the broadcasting sta- tions of the world, the atlas ;was the only C.I.A. document they had produced for sale to the public. " In addition to detailed maps.' of modern China, the atlas; : which has the C.I.A.'s seal ?? on the cover, also contains historical maps, a number of. charts depicting the growth ? of the Chinese economy, and ". a narrative accompanying the .:maps And charts. . Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 6 I MAY 1972 STATINTL ADVANCE ORDER FORM Approved For Release 2001/%0VEME86-VSTRO PEOPLE ATLAS Issued by the Central intelligence Agency, this colorful publication goes beyond the scope of a conventional atlas. It represents a wider variety of information, including geographic, economic, historical, and cultural data. In the interest of simplicity and clarity, it employs a number of unconventional graphic techniques in addition to standard regional and thematic maps, charts, and photographs. This publication is designed as an introduction and general reference aid for those interested in the People's Republic of China. To make so much information about such a complex and little-known country as meaningful as possible, a great deal of it is placed in a familiar context?that is, by drawing comparisons between China and the United States. 1971. 82 p. ' $5.25 Place your order now for copies to be mailed about the latter part of May 1972. "wiLav ? a Approved For Reiease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP8a-.01601R000200340001-5 ? MAIL ORDER FORM To: Pu bfigircro veal frtrit' rThelipagen20,CP14611104LtsOMPRDP86413016100a2ocom000l:5 Fun uSE OF SUPT. DOCS. Enclosed find $ (check, money order, or Supt. of Documents coupons). Please send me copies of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ATLAS, at $5.25 per copy. (Prex 3.10:C 44/3) (S/N4108-0112) ? PLEASE NOTE: Copies are scheduled to be mailed about the iptter part of May 1972. Please charge this order to my Deposit Account No. Name Street addtess Enclosed To be mailed _later -_-_Subscription Refund Coupon refund Postage_ *GPO 780-984 City and State ZIP Code FOR PROMPT SHIPMENT, PLEASE VERIFY ADDRESS ON LABEL BELOW, INCLUDING YOUR ZIP CODE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER PUEBLO INDUSTRIAL PARK POSTAGE PUEBLO, COLORADO 81001 AND FEES PAID U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL BUSINESS PRINTING OFFICE e ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: ClArRDP80-01601R000200340001-5 ? WASHINGTONIAN ?972 Approved For Release 2001/03 AY 3.=4 : cIA-RDP80-01 STATINTL The Voice of ? Toe Alsop Power Glory By Tom Kelly it Joe Alsop's pleasant garden room I four plump caged doves are cooing. Joe says when asked that he does not like doves?that out of their cages , they are dirty, mean, and hard to man- age. Joe sits under the skylight sipping a tisane from a huge blue and white china cup and the doves in two large, elaborate cages pay him no mind. They're in and Joe's Out but nobody's free. Joe i a blue blooded falcon, a rare and endangered species. He is a falcon by inheritance, .a member of the estab- lishment, a natural born leader, a cousin ? of leaders, a classmate of leaders, a for- mer roommate of leaders, and the chosen voice of the pedigreed "first-rate men" for thirty years. For generations we've all been run by the East Coast cousins. The first cousins went to Groton and the second cousins to St, Paul's. The Irish Catholic fifth cousins were named Kennedy?but that ? was later. First they were coachmen and named Pat and Mike. They went to Choate. It is difficult to tell the cousins without an alumni bulletin. Cousins are not mea- sured by blood alone, but establishment cousins do tend to marry establishment cousins and produce geneological cousins. There are several (de facto) Jewish cousins named Lehmann, Ochs, and Mor- genthau, but there are no Italian or Polish or Bulgarian cousins. Black people .are not ready to be cousins though some can be classmates. It is customary to speak well of the late Frederick Doug- lass. Some cousins chuckle a lot and Joe's blood cousin Teddy Roosevelt grinned and shouted "Bully" but most were serious faced and did not laugh out loud. This was partly because many were from New England but also because they were born to assume the awful responsi- bility .of running the world. , ? Running the world' is not easy. Joe took up the burden in 1932. He was a strange youth?fat, an honor graduate of Groton and Harvard, son of a roar- ing Connecticut reactionary father and a mother who was as well connected as the Connecticut Light & Power Co. - He was cousined to everyone important south of Portland and north of Phila- delphia. He was literally a cousin to all t the Roosevelts?Teddy, Franklin, Elea- nor, and Alice Blue Gown. When Joe was ready for the profes- sional world his grandmother (a cousin of God's) decided that he was not to be a businessman, diplomat, banker, Episco- pal bishop, or president of Harvard. It was suggested that he get a job on a newspaper, a startling idea. Cousins and classmates owned newspapers, of course, but they didn't work on them. Joe had a few precedents. Alexander Woollcott, who if not a cousin was at least invited to cousins' homes, was cutting a choleric swath through New York culture, and Bob Benchley, a blithe spirit but a Har- vard boy, was working for magazines. Ogden Reid hired Joe at Joe's grand- mother's suggestion and sent him to re- port to the Herald Tribune's city editor, a disenchanted man. named. Stanley Walker. City editors are all low-born. Stanley had difficulty believing his own ? eyes since Joe, though only twenty-two, was 245 pounds, dressed in well-cut vest and watch chain, and possessed of an extraordinarily arch accent that sug- gested simultaneously the Queen Mother, Cardinal Newman, and the fatigue of a gentleman who'd just swum the English Channel backwards. He also couldn't type. Still, no one is perfect. Joe was broadly read and he could write a clear, ominous sentence. Alex Woollcott decided that Joe was the only educated youth he'd met since his own college days. Alex was given to extraordinary judgments?he was against sex and he believed Louisa May Alcott was a great writer. Joe was soon a featured byline writer at the Herald Tribune and in less. time \ than it takes to add up the Vietnam elec- tion. returns he was the co-proprietor 'Of a Washington column?his partner being a gentleman named Robert Kint- ner, a non-cousin, who would in time become head of NBC and an advisor to Approved For Release 2001/03/04: bIA-RDP80-016011T-000200340001-5 Go loom Doom - ,4?1- 7?Slf ? Maw r". .006**?????1101111?11?? continued Approved For Release 200M3 naTIM3158194114-611 THE TAU OF THE TOWN !Studies ,ON it recent Tuesday evening, we spent an hour in the Grand Ball- room of the Waldorf-Astoria listening to graduate students, lecturers, pro- fessors, and an assortment of scholars . and specialists unwind from a day's work. It was the end of the second , day of the twenty-fourth 'annual meet- ing of the Association for Asian Stud- , ies?with headquarters in Ann Ar-. bor?and more than half of the two thousand conferees- were relaxing at a reception after spending the day in such seminars as "The Emperor's New Clothes: Symposium on Interpreting the Meiji Restoration," "Continuity and Change in Princely India," "Lu listin: The Man, the Artist, and His Ambiguities," "Judicial Conscience in Modern Japan," "Wang Yang-Ming (1472-1529): In Commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of His Birth," . . and "Yogaciira Buddhism." . When we got there, at about five- thirty, the ballroom was teeming with white Americans (who were easily in the majority), a handful of black Americans, and a liberal sprinkling of Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Indians, Burmese, and other Asians. At the center of the large stage that is a fixture of the ballroom was an elfin young Japanese lady?Fusako Yoshida, . we learned?plucking classical Japanese music from a long stringed in- strument, whose ends were resting on wooden horses covered; with red cloth. There was nothing on the stage but Miss Yo- shida and her instrument. She had on a sea-green kimono with a broad gold- colored obi; her hair was piled high in what looked like a spiral of buns; and her feet were shod. in a pair of wooden clogs. Miss Yoshida was treated as a pleasant background to the evening, her music competing with the babble of .chatter, though in her demureness, the delicacy of the sonnds she brought from the instrument, and the economy of her physical stature she .quite domi- nated the stage. . . ? So as ilk to look to_so, puch,4 stran- ger in afnPIRTCP(19uEFsgcnNaigaS pherc, we went over to a bar, bought a bourbon-and-water, and, glass in hand, walked around, either listening to what people were saying or talking to them ourself. The first man we went up to was a short, middle-aged American who was sitting at a table in the vicinity )f the stage, seemingly engrossed in the music. He was a Bostonian, he told us, who had studied at the University of Wisconsin and was now .a professor in East-West relations at Cheyney State College, in Pennsylvania. "What instrument is that?" we asked. "A koto," he replied. "It belongs to a large family of traditional Jap- anese stringed instruments, one of Which is the samisen?considerably smaller." "Good music," we observed. "Exquisite," he replied. "You know, I adore Orientals, feel very much at home in their company, and am just as fond of their culture. I even took up karate. Not to use it, mind you?or, at least, I hope I'll never have to?but to keep in touch with the Oriental spirit and sensibility." . ? We told the professor that the meet- ing seemed remarkably well attended and asked him what had brought so many people out. "All sorts of things," he said. "There are some people here looking for jobs; some looking to change jobs, some looking for intellectual rejuvena- tion, some just looking for old friends, and some, like me, hoping to meet scholars whose work we've admired. You might even find people from the federal government here. Take the C.I.A.?they have an inter- V est in what goes on here." "Scholarly?" we asked. "Sure, scholarly?why not? Some of my best friends are in the C.I.A." At this point, seeking to broaden our acquaintance, we turned to a man standing nearby, who may or may not have overheard the conver- sation. We hadn't broad- ened things very much, it turned out, for there on the man's lapel badge along with his ? CC a he was wearing a black suit' and a narrow, red-and-gray striped tie, and under tortoiseshell glasses was the gentlest pair of eyes we had seen that day. We asked him what he did for the C.I.A., and he said he was a China-studies specialist, doing research and analysis in the Agency's geography department. He had been there since the end of the Second World War, after he came back from New Guinea, the Philippines, and Japan, .where he had served in the armed forces. "What is the C.I.A.'s interest in this meeting?" we asked. "This is where you find the best minds in Asian studies," he replied. "They are my brethren. From time to time, We have to get in touch with them to find out what the new fron- tiers in research are. In our business, accuracy is the name of the game. We can't afford not to keep up with what's going on." We said "Fair enough," thanked him, and moved on. Sauntering in the direction of Miss Yoshida, who, we had noticed, was taking a breather at a table near the stage, we passed two happy-go-lucky- looking young men in cfumpled sports jackets, battered old suede boots, and collars open at. the neck?a uniform identifying them as graduate students. "Why are all the attractive girls in South Asian studies?" one of the young men said. The other laughed before he answered, and we didn't wait to bear what he said. Next, we overheard a fragment of another conversation, among a nearby foursome consisting of a Japanese, an Indian, and two white Americans. One of the Americans was saying, "Did you See all those professors run- ning around with their bright graduate students in tow? I hear the job pick- -.ings are slim this year. In fact, they seem to be getting slimmer every year. A few years ago, there was a great demand for Asian scholars, but apparently that was in anticipation of the postwar baby boom, and the boom has. trailed off now, leaving smaller classes and a surplus iiiilottigett-1;relyi to-131601R000400340001aecrs." tlF1?vine- m E ired nian in is ear y ties, Miss Yoshida smiled Mod- ac#PeOtrAa?fPant ki9uiceese 2001/03/04: C IA-RDP80-01601 R000200340001-5 ourself.- She seemed to be in her early-thirties, and her mouth and eyes were lovely and expressive. She told us she was not in Asian Studies but was appearing at the reception under the auspices of the Japan Society. We asked what she had been playing, and she said, "A number of modern and traditional Japanese pieces." She hand- us the program of .a recital she had gen at Carnegie Hall last November, alo lg with Sumiko Murashima, a vou lg Japanese soprano. Most of the pee s she was playing at the reception vver on the program, she said. NN4 chatted -next with a tall, be. spectacled, clerical-looking man, who, indeed, turned out to be a Presbyterian minister, and also the Southeast Asia :specialist at Illinois College, in Jack- sonville. He had returned a while ago :from Chiang Mai, Thailand, where, he said, he had done community-de- veropment work for more than twenty years. We asked him what had brought him back to the States after a lifetime in the East. "Success," he said. "I worked my- self out of a job." ? "Is that success?" we asked. "For me it is," he replied. "As a foreigner M community-development work, you are not doing very. well if the local people can't get alongwithout you after a reasonable time. You are expected to train them to the point where they will literally take over your job." We helded for ? an exit, slowing down to follow a conversation be- tween a couple walking alongside us?a smiling, open-faced Chinese girl and a short white American with a tooth- brush mustache and a pair of granny glasses. "I've about had it," .the man said to the girl. "The first-day was great, but around about now I just want to go home. I'm tired of running around talking to people." ? "Ah," the girl said, smiling. "You miss your wife, perhaps?" "No, I don't miss my wife," he re- plied. "As a matter of fact, my books are what I miss. I'm dying to get back to them.". Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 WASHINGT0.3 Pc.):ST Approved For Release 2001/031644t1Aa#DP80- STATINTL The Washington Illerry.Go-Round Chineseder Ab By Jack An4orson t?-? A confidential Senate mem- oranda, citing a source in- side the Central Intelligence Agency, reports that the Red hinese are "wondering" about American Ambassador Arthur Watson. He is the International Busi- ness Machine's heir and big Republican contributor whom President Nixon has put in 'charge of exploring diplomatic relations with the Chinese in Paris, We reported that ? he had become gloriously drunk on at least two trans-Atlantic flights. On the plane that brought him to Washington to confer with the President about his sensitive new assign- ment, Watson tried to stuff 'money down the blouses of :stewardesses. And on an ear- lier flight he petulantly pelted ,a stewardess with grapes from the fruit basket after she turned down his invitation to become a mistress for his .teen-age son. Such drunken conduct of- fends the Chinese and could jeopardize the Chinese-Ameri- can negotiations in Paris. For in the Chinese culture, anyone who becomes drunk in public would be ashamed to associate again with his former friends. The confidental memo, writ- ten by Senate aide Torn Din to Senator Frank Church (D- Idaho) declares: "From people who know Watson at IBM and those who have dealt with him in France, no -one says he can handle the important, sensi- tive and delicate job that the President has now placed in his less than steady hands." Dine urges the Senate For- eign Relations Committee to phone foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger and urge him to encourage the President to "bring Watson home swiftly and send a very top, man in his place." Explains. the Senate 'aide "A CIA source in contact with the Chinese delegation at the United Nations and with oth- ers who are in contact with the Chinese in Paris, talked with me about the charges that Jack Anderson has made against Ambassador Watson:. ? t Elra,VOy Wa1son sonaily onght to do something Watson relieved from his posi- viftly and effectively to have ion. The charges are correct; more important, the Chinese are wondering what this all means... "Several Chinese diplomats have approached our people in Henry Kissinger and rge him New York and in Paris want- ing to know what Watson's be- havior means. If Watson is not very smart, if he is a drunk- ard, and if he is licentious, too, then are the Chinese being used in the negotiations in Paris? "While President Nixon was in China, he found negotiating with Chou En-lai and' others most grueling experience. Each detail is discussed and only the fop man discusses them. "For instance, in Paris, the Chinese will not deal with any- one but the ambassador. Our negotiator, therefore, must be persistent, tough, of sound mind, highly respected and show physical endurance as well." Instead of removing Watson from the delicate negotiations, however, the Nixon adminstra- tion has decided to cover up `Well?Cminected' "This source, whom I have checked out and found well- connected and straight, be- lives the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee or you per- his inadequacies. CIA Director- / Richard Helms wrote a hasty, private letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Insisting "We can find no in- formation in this agency" to. support Dine's claims. "In fact," added Helms, "there has been no report of- any PRC (Chinese Commu- nist) reaction to the publicity: on Ambassador Watson's con-..i duct." - Watson himself wrote let- ters of apology for his "rude" conduct on the PanArn flight to Washington. Finally, Secre- tary of State Bill Rogers, the nicest guy in Washington, used his amiable relations on Capitol Hill to persuade both the Senate and House to call off their investigations of Wat-. son. Footnote: Members of the PanAm flight crew, who were questioned privately on Capi- tol Hill about the Watson inci- dents, completely confirmed our charges. State Department aides Robert Aylmer and Frank Dempsey, who picked up Watson at the airport, also wrote a confidential report saying he was "heavily intoxi- cated." 0 1912, United Fetture GT:idle-Os ? ? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 for-siinslFoT-Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 cLE1IFT, PLAIN DEALER . STATINTL !AAR 6197a ? 409,414 ? 545,032 Ccriu tit osils mons sunAe ' ?. By Russell VV. Kane " being' paddled across water on structure below his level and that in :()Well, President Nixon should be barges, rioting dragging out land- the shakeout .the bad elements back from China by now (we write lords and other backward types, would be disco)iered and destroyed Way. ahead, so we are never really painting slogan posters?but never a or re-educated. ,sure of anything). It is too bad that word about the .why of what was So he closed the schools down and ? i he has so little time for reading other really going on there. Ken Ling and millions of other kids - than the CIA advisory and the other ? Now, and I believe only now, is a started raising hell up and down that little condensations that his aides comprehensive version available, or vast land. It was just what Mao want- poke toward him, hoping he will be at least available to. those who do not ed, "continual revolution," but it able to at least glance before he read Chinese, because got out of hand, naturally, and even- there was tually the Red Guard "little gener- finally nods off of an evening after a some source material available to als" themselves had to be repressed busy top executivish day. Chinese scholars. earlier, and there . d even.killed. a , ? If he did in fact have lots of time to was even some scholarly work availa- Pd read he alight have read "The Re- ble on a narrow basis to persons who From the evidence it would ap- venge Of Heaven" by Ken. Ling. Its do not read Chinese but who were pear that Ken Ling was one of few subtitle is "Journal of a Young interested. (We must also assume the young defectors, that most of the Chinese." It contains about 400 State Department and CIA were in- Red Guards never realized that they ,pages (lots of them are forewords terested, and perhaprrnew what had only been used by Mao to rid , and notes), it came out in January, was happening in mainland China at ? himself of potential opposition, and "Putnam published it and you can buy that time. they and their youngei brothers and 'tone for $8.95 from your friendly Ken Ling, author of "Revenge,"is a sisters. are ready to go again whenev- neighborhood bookseller or per- pseudonym. But there is no reason er they get the word. It is the sort of haps you can borrow one at, the to question the authenticity of the profligate politics that can be afford- library. Or wait for it to emerge in book because it took its U.S. transla- ed only by a backward nation with paperback. tors and perfecters three years to 800 million persons. ... . Anyway, it could be worth your wade through the 500,000 Chinese Here are some passages from the while, because it covers that most characters that made up the journal, book, which is the expansion of a confusing period of modern Chinese They also conducted many inter.- daily journal Ken Ling kept up dur- history, the Great Cultural Revolu- views with Ken Ling and his brother, ing the Cultural Revolution. tion of 1966-67. That convulsion was both of whom fled Amoy in Fukien When the students began to ex- reported by the western press, but province for Taiwan after the Cultur- pose their teachers as revisionists "inadequately, and we never -quite al Revolution. and "capitalist road followers": knew what was going on, particularly Ken Ling was only 16 when the "Beatings and tortures followed. 1 since the Chinese were uncommuni- revolution erupted, instigated, it had never seen such tortures before: . . ? cattve and as mysterious and inscru- developed, by Chairman Mao him- eating nightsoil and insects; being table as always. But even the close-up self. Mao apparently thought revi- subjected to electrical shocks; ' China watchers, such as those in s i 0 n ism, or the changing and forced to kneel on broken glass; Hong Kong and japan, were baffled softening of the Marxist-Leninist being hanged 'airplane' by the legs by developments. The picture agen- line, was rampant. He figured the and arms." ' cies mo vkriritottitti Fitn- ktrages tioeiolatitattpAo. octrildoitego# . ? hordes of ife . uards mare mg, ' make rebe lio-n""on : .. power t ights:oi :ft:Lt.:471.1y, is gr rribi snake de- ? TIE AMERICAN MERCURY Approved For Release 200936Y1641?aA-RDP80-0160 ockefellers tile the Roost Our new China policy is actually the same old Rockefeller policy STATINTL BY JOHN MITCHELL HENSHAW HE ROLE of the Rockefellers If f . in shaping America's Red China policy rCveals an amazing story 'of behind-the-scenes power. The gene- sis of. Rockefeller interests in China dates' to around 1886. And around 1890 the "philanthropist" John D. Rockefeller, Sr. gave the Chinese 300,- 000 small kerosene lamps to encourage them to use his oil. At the turn of the century, the Chinese were buying over 100 million gallons of kerosene annual- ly, more than 90 percent of which came .from Mr. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co. Rockefeller had already secured a' monopoly. of the American oil market ? and was embarking on a. campaign of world conquest of the oil market. He had the 'help of the U.S. Department of State. . "One of our greatest helpers," Mr. Rockefeller, Sr. candidly stated, "has ? been the State Department in Washing- pan.' Our 'ambassadors, and ministers, and consuls have ?aided to push our way into new ?markets to the utmost corners ? of the world." The State Department- Rockefeller partnership has continued to this very day. The global expansion of Mr. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Co. has resulted in that company becoming the dominant power in the internation- al oil cartel, which controls develop- ment, production and prices .in the world oil market. ? ? Access to Markets ? At the behest of Mr. Rockefeller the State Department established t h e "Ch;na Open Door. Policy" warning European nations against compromising the territorial integrity of China and es- tablished the principle 'of .free access to her vast markets. Principal beneficiaries of this policy were John D. Rockefeller's 'Standard Oil and his brother William Rockefeller's fledgling banking firm now known as' the First National City Bank. de- scribedPresittagrefrsaoy open. do& 'to ? the goods of America." The elder Rockefeller and his descen- dants are primarily responsible for the internationalist policies of the United States, which impels us to constantly meddle into the internal affairs of other countries. While many other American firms entered into China trade field, none became so well ensconced as the two Rockefeller giant financial institu- tions, First National City Bank and the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the mighty Standard Oil. Historians have failed to adequately portray the Rockefeller sce- nario in China affairs. Perhaps the de- ficiency is due to the largesse of the Rockefeller Foundation to the scholarly gentlemen who write the academic text- books of history. In fact, several widely used textbooks of oil history have been written without even mentioning the Word "cartel." State Department Coverup There is a dearth of detailed infor- mation about the Rockefellers' manipul- ation of U.S. China policy due to a. de- liberate coverup by the State Depart- ment. Ironically, Japanese scholars are more conversant with the Rockefeller machinations in China than American students of economics and history. But it can be conclusively established that the Rockefellers and their entourage have definitely shaped and reshaped U.S. China policy overa long period to meet the exigencies of their operations. For the sake of brevity, we will omit a half - century of Rockefeller philan- thropy, encroachment and aggrandize- ment in China, and come down to the third generation of the Rockefeller clan, namely, the five sons of John D. Rocke- feller, Jr. ? David, Winthrop, John .D. 3rd, Nelson A. and Laurance S. Each of the five brothers are reputed to ? be worth over one billion dollars. Their grandfather, John D. Sr., was the world's first billionaire. Collectively, the five brothers control a . financial-industrial ? Lions like politics, philanthropy and conservation, but their principal occu- pation .is to aggressively expand theit? private empire. In .late 1949 when Mao Tse-tung seized control of Mainland China, John D. Rockefeller III declared the Cold War against Red China in these words: "On U.S. trade with China, my own 'reaction is, that it should be limited. It seems to we that the fastest way to con- tain Conznitinisnz is to discredit it in the eyes of the people of China. It seems to me if the economy worsens, 'that this will 'arouse opposition.to it, and as I see it, the opposition is essential if new leadership, is to develop in China, and I do feel that this. new leadership is tre- mendously important." ? Historically, this was the real begin- ning of the Cold War and the 20-year embargo of Red China.. While John D. III modestly said he was speaking for himsclf,. actually he had conferred with his four brothers, whose own funds were invested in the great Rockefeller Trust. The Rockefellers never act im- petuously in' making momentous deci- sions. And in their deliberations they always hold protracted consultations, with their coterie of specialists. Usually the Rockefeller concensus is accurate,, but it is' not always infallible as was cer- tainly proved in this instance. Polig ? of "Containment" It will be noted that John D. III spoke of developing "new leadership" in China, Which meant that the Rocke- ? fellers were disenchanted with their old friend, Chiang Kai-shek. .It will also be noted that John D. III said: "the fastest way to contain Com- munism is to discredit it in the eyes of the people of China." This Rocke- feller advice quickly became the "pol- icy of containment" of the State Depart- ment in the Orient. ? NOTE: The aforegoing quoted Rockefeller advice was offered in a roundtable discussion in the, office of Secretary of State Acheson. (Minutes of the meeting have now been declas- sified). Others at this meeting included Raymond B. Fosdick, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, Philip C. Jes- sup, an Ambassador-at-large, who was connected with J, P. Morgan & Co., and Everett N. Case. Both Jessup and Case were tied in with the pro-Red Institute of Pacific Relations, which had done so 200001/0Yr: tPAAEYPti-614011110013200340001a5g Kai-shek. Al- door tO the rights of Chi na,but the cot., n ?engage in a wide variety oT avoca- so at the roundtable was leftist Prof. BALTIMORF, 10;13 EIERICAI Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01 f), 8 i_Li3 1972 HENRY J. TAYL6R. STATI NTL e Sino.Sovielt ? . ? President Nixon knows that his leverage on the Soviet Union by his Peking trip has several unrevealed limitations. The first is the U.S.S.R.'s widely reported fear of China on Russia's 4,150-mile border; Nikon. regards this as hokey, hokus, hokum. In only the 31'years, '-'77,veen 1870 and 1901, Great Britain acquired 4.7 million square miles of territory; France, 3.6 million; Germany, one million; Belgium, -one million ? 77 times Belgium's own size. Most of these were in Africa and Asia. But Russia had been in there carving up China for nearly two centuries. The result is today's 4,150-mile Russian- Chinese border, the longest in the world. It runs something like the distance from New York to Honolulu. WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON obtained from Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms' final briefing at the White House before he left is that Mao's military position on the Russian border is much weaker than sup- posed. order -issue I War starts with terrain. The Soviet axis for its position opposite China is Khabarovsk, 400 .miles north of Vladivostok. The bdtder friction incidents have been . concentrated i n Heilungkiang Province ''and along the Ussuri River, which is a part of the border. MR. HELMS told ?resident Nixon that the Soviet has 22 crack divisions on this border, ' controlled from Khabarovsk. Nine are mechanized. The terrain, he said, is excellent for their deployment. We hear much about So- viet intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers. But Mr. Helms emphasized that the Soviet has a large and.extremely effective tac- tical air force for troop support as well. Mao has none. .. ' What Mr. Nixon is trying to determine in the border issue is: Who is provoking whom? China can do the shouting and talking and street demonstrating, as. for a long ? time. But President Nixon believes that if anybody is really picking a fight in this situation the weight of evidence is that the one who would pick a fight as a precaution against the future is the U,S.S.R. *Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Releaseeirdaid/C4-iii51668-01 8 E.LIB 1972 Inum recupollateeo mote-N?34 By John Burns Special to The Christian Science Monitor ? 1972 Toronto Globe and Mail The writer is a resident correspondent in the Chinese capital. Peking To somebody seeing him for the first time Mr. Nixon is a sur- prise. He seems to be taller, slimmer, and better tailored than he looks on television, and altogether more relaxed. He arrived in Peking with a healthy suntan, which reportedly he has been careful to cultivate since 1960. On arrival in Peking, and at several public functions since, he has appeared to be wear- ing television makeup. A A A ? -The President's arrival was an occasion of disappointment for several hundred Peking diplomats and their families who were refused permis- sion to drive to the airport to watch the arrival. Some of the diplomats have been in Peking for years and could hardly believe that the Chinese would bar them from the most exciting event in all their time here, especially when the whole world would be able-to see the -arrival on television. . Since Chinese television carried no live coverage, the diplomats had to rely on descriptions from resident corre- spondents who were allowed to see the ;arrival. ? A A A , It was no coincidence that Mr. Nixon referred to the worldwide television au- dience? "More people are seeing and hearing what .we say than on any other such obcasion in the whole history of the world" his opening remarks at the state banquet the night he arrived. Throughout the visit he has seemed very conscious of the television cam- eras, and the banquet speech seemed to have been written as much for con- sumption by the television audience at home as it was for the Chinese leaders listening to him in the Great Hall of the People. Certainly its delivery was tail- ored for TV, with Mr. Nixon running straight through the speech in English first, rather than having the Chinese in- terpreter translate it a paragraph at a time. A A A According to Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, the banquet speech was finalized only hours before it was delivered, with the President sitting down over the draft with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger immediately after returning from his epic meeting with Chairman Mao. ? Many observers here were critical of the speech, feeling that its mixture of sentimentality and heroics were ill- suited to the situation. "A mixture of Gettysb r r4GivAkg.r,C.Ica MO" one di to the President's borrowing of a phrase from Abraham Lincoln's famed Civil STATI NTL War speech ("What we say here will not be long remembered") and his television address during the 1952 election cam- paign when he mentioned his dog Check- ers while defending himself against charges of receiving improper financial assistance frbm friends. ? Whatever the Chinese leaders may have thought of the speech it seemed to be a hit with ordinary Chinese, many of whom expressed pleasure at the President's quotation?"seize the day, seize the hour"?from a poem by Chair- man Mao. "It's a good thing he should do that," said one educated Chinese. "The Chtlirman has written many great things, and everybody can learn from him." It was noticeable that the quotation brought one of only two bursts of ap- plause from Chinese leaders which inter- rupted the speech. The other came when the President complimented the Army band for its professional handling of old American melodies. The guest list at the banquet was led by a galaxy of Chinese leaders includ- ing Premier Chou and two other high- -ranking members of the Chinese Polit- buro, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien. Other interesting guests were several former generals in the Nationalist Army of Generalissimo Chiang Xai-shek, in- cluding Fu Tso-yi, the military governor who surrendered Peking to the Red Army in October, 1948. The presence of the generals ? all old men now, at least one of them on crutches ? was seen as a means of demonstrating to the world and to the Nationalist leaders on Taiwan that the Communists honor their word when they say that Nationalists who ?repent and give their allegiance to Peking will be treated with honor and respect. A?A A ? One of the remarkable features of the President's meeting with Chairman Mao was the ublication in the Peoile's Nixon relaxing with Mr. Mao in the the first time in at least ,10 years that the Chinese press has shown the Chair- man at home, and it served to break the silence Chinese officials have always maintained on where the Chairman lives. A A A Chinese officials have been candid and relaxed toward correspondents during the President's visit. Normally the offi- cials are unfailingly courteous but are careful not to encourage any familiarity. While Mr. Nixon has been here, the officials have been markedly more con- vivials stopping the press center to chat easily with correspondents and joking with them in a manner that was previ- ously .quite rare. One official startled a correspondent he had known for eight months when he addressed him by his Christian name, the first time it had happened. Another sign of relaxation has been the absence of Mao , badges from the tunics of the officials from the Foreign Ministry's in- formation department who are on duty in the center. A A A ? All week the U.S. correpsondents have been leaving the green looseleaf briefing books lying around the press center. The books contain several hundred pages of information compiled by the White House, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, includ- ing a run-down on the Chinese leader- ship. It is intriguing to note that the section omits all mention of Defense Minister Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's nominated successor, and of several high-ranking military officers who disappeared with him last fall. One correspondent has a pamphlet on the leadership, with the photographs of all the missing men and women crossed out in red ink by the CIA. 20011/02/6 4pheclAaRDPSIZInCi 201 R00026ti340001 library of the Chairman's home. It was riLfl:O?E isAlr'. Approved For Release 2291fril.3jOrti2CIA-RD STATI NTL 111EIVErii7 J. TAYLOR J .1 /-k I IIN IL -ixon's Peking Talks Jolted / The CIA has reported to President Nixon in / Peking that, as we withdraw our troops, the Red forces?are moving over Southeast Asia like termites on a log. The current alarm concerns Cambodia, Thailand and Burma, all three. , Cambodia is only the size of Oklahoma but it has 6.7 million people. The President's Vietnam pull-out was threatened b.? ?30-,-000 North Viet- namese in Cambodia. Our incursion into Cam- bodia was a spoiling action covering our rear guard in Vietnam. But since then the keystone of the Nixon policy ? Vietnamization ? was tested by the Vietnamese Army's protectionary assault into Cambodia. And, as a demonstra- tion to support the hope of Vietnamization, it was tragically unpromising. The CIA advised the President that the disintegration heightens. The Cambodian Army has only 33,000 men. Phnom Penh, the capital Is Cut off, of course, except for a single uncer- tain road, but the Reds have now finished for- tifying even fabulous Angkor Wat apd corn- pletley control strategic Tonle Sap, the great lake of Cambodia. Premier Lon Nol is pressed toward a cease-fire. . THAILAND BORDERS on Cambodia; it stands between Cambodia, Laos and Burma. The Siamese (34.7 million people) call their ? country Muang Thai, meaning Land of the Free People, It has always been fiercely independent. In fact, Thailand is the only nation in the entire area that never has been ruled by a foreign power. But the CIA has notified Mr. Nixon that Thai Army Commanding Gen. Prapas Charusathien reports that his units have intercepted Red Chinese and North Vietnamese soldiers cross- ing into Thailand's Sisaket and Surin prov- inces, 250 miles northeast of Bangkok. General Charusathien has .only a 141,500-man force to meet this expansion. U." S. AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA Emory C. Swank, in turn, apprised of this, is urging General Charusathien to add an army of ethnic Cambodians to meet Mao Tse-tung and Chou en-lai's expansion. ? Burma, about the size of Texas, has a long common border with Thailand on Burma's Shan states. But ? Burma (27 million people), fabled in Kipling's verses, is as different frpm Thailand as day and night. The home country of vacillating, mercurial former United Nations Secretary General U Thant, Burma is one' of Southeast Asia's most inaccessible and mysterious countries Its actual name is the Pyee-Daun,g-lu Myanma Nainggan-Daw Union of Burma. The country is utterly provincial, totally fatalistic and unalterable Burmese. Neutralism, which likewise mesmerizes U Thant, is a fixation and isolationism a creed. BURMA CIIIEF OF STATE Gen. Ne Win, 60, his lidded eyes as rich as jade in a face as ? pale as bread and a man as wily and suspicious as U Thant himself, once told me in Mandalay, "Only Buddha can help anyone." And, not sur- prisingly, Burma's Marxist economy ? 'ap- proaches absolute thrombosis. " ? '? Burma has a wild, mountainous 1,200-Mile frontier ? a third as long as our Canadian border ? with Red China. Its armed forces total 137,500 men ? 6,500 of them iu a .com- pletely meaningless Air Force. ? The. CIA reported to President Nixon In Peking'that 20,000 China-armed insurgents 'are now battling these forces. They are in a Major engagement near Lashio, close to Red China's border. And, . reported the CIA, 3,000 North Vietnamese are heading into Burma ? Shan state. ?. Ne Win incessantly travels abroad always flamboyantly ? plays golf and hobnobs :With world dignitaries whenever possible and 15re- fers the city of Mandalay where "the dawn comes up like thunder" to his capital' of Rangoon. And until now Red China has adopted a restrained role toward Burma. The CIA opin- ion is that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai felt that they can wait until Ne Win dies or ,is booted out, as he booted out predecessor 1.1 and then Red China will be sucked into Burnia as in a vacuum. The CIA message to .the President changes this. Unrevealed, Cambodia, Thailand ,and Burma alike suddenly jolt Mr. Nixon's Peking talks and further complicate his success over there. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0002003400015 Approved For Release 2001iO3/04 d3 ? CA-RDP80-0160 t. 'Bob Wiedrich Richard M. Nixon is on Red Chinese soil this morning, preparing to walk a tight rope mankind hopes .can lead to 'convincing the leaders of some 800 mil- lion people that capitalism and Com- munism can live together in peace on. the same globe. Understandablv. the President is per- haps tense. But olk route to Peking, Nixon carefully guarded his thoughts, whatever they may have been. His fa- cade, if it was that, was one of good humor. While still in flight, someone showed the 'President a map of mainland China whose cover bore a legend indicating it had been prepared by the CIA. ? "I wonder if they'll let that map into Red China," quipped an observer. Nixon laughed and then exclaimed: "That map probably will show how much we don't know about China!" Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 WAS1T,ING9ON POST Approved For Release2b61k6/01W: CIA-RDPR-A:46\0+1R00 wsmen ne Up for 'Chin Ex Washington Post Foreign Service . tween ancient and context- Aboard the ' aircraft, for HONOLULU, Feb. ? 18 ? porary China. _ instance, is Theodore H. Most press airplanes accom- A select number of report- White, who was a cone- panying the President on his, ers are also armed with a Ispondent for Time Maga- trips look like holiday excur- new atlas of China prepared zine in China during World .. sions, with newsmen drink- by the Central Intelligencoj War II and afterward wrote Ing, playing cards or joking Agency. A pool of newsmen the bestselling "T h u n d e r `with the stewardesses. But aboard the President's air- Out of China." Henry Hart- the reporters currently going plane, the Spirit of '76, asked zenbusch of the Associated with Mr. Nixon to Peking Mr. Nixon if he thought the Press was born in Shanghai strangely resemble a class- Chinese would tolerate such and lived there for years, 'room of China students material in their country. and the Wall Street Jour- cramming for their final The President, who appar- nars Robert L. K e a t 1 e y .exanis. - ?ently had not seen 'the atlas spent a month in China in ? Instead of trading old anec- before, examined it, then May. dotesabout previous presi- laughed loudly and quipped: The language capability dential voyages, as reporters "This will probably show of the reporters is virtually. 'usually do on such journeys, how Much we don't know zero, however. To improve , the journalists on this flight about China." . this gap somewhat, news- ' aie talking about such eso- The main collection of re. men have been issued man- terie subjects as Mao Tse- search matter provided re. uals featuring such phrases ? Tung's relations with Chou porters by the administra. as "Wo Yau Yi Tau Mao En-Lai, Sino-Japanese trade tion is a handsome, loose. Jrfu," or "I would like a and the composition of the leaf volume containing in. Mao suit." Chekiang Province Cornmu- formation about China rang- The manual also advises Mgt Party. committee, whose ing from its literacy rate reporters how, to order leaders,. the President will and Gross National Product bacon and eggs in Mandarin meet when he visits the re- to the line-up of its leaders. Chinese. But it does not sort city of Hangchow. The roster of leaders has contain the phrase "Long, ' The newsmen on this trip _ been carefully brought up Live President Nixon." are also voraciously reading to date, since it does not books and articles on China. Include Defense Minister The most popular book on Lin Piao and 10 other full the aircraft, a Pan American and alternate members of Boeing-707 converted to con- the ' ruling politburo who thin only first-class seats, is have been purged. This also "the U n it e d States and suggests that the administra- China" by Prof. John Fair- tion o f f i c i all y considers ; bank, head of Harvard's East them to have been elimi- Asia Research Center and nated?though the subject dean of American China ? of domestic Chinese politics cholars. t is rarely mentioned by Another reading matter White House spokesmen. 1 being absorbed include the The' research' material recent articles in the Atlan- provided by the administra-, tic Monthly by Rose Terrill, tion also offers some po- also a Harvard China sihol- litical details. Among other ar, who spent 40 days tray- things, it says that high-heel eling around China last shoes "are extremely dan- summer. , gerous" at the Great Wall, In addition to these obvi- which the President and ous works, more e x o t i c Mrs. Nixon will visit. books are being studied by Most of the newsmen en a few ambitious newsmen, route to Peking candidly John Chancellor of the Na- concede to their ignorance tional Broadcasting Corn- about China. But a hindful pany, for example, is buried u" ,,, the press airplane can in the "I Ching," the classic claim to varying degrees of Chinese book of changes, expertise or at least famili- searching , or parallels be-1 ar..y t with China. -\ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 plart,z; Approved For Releate-2011 i446eNDP80- FEB 972 Briefly Peking ... The President brought along an atlas of Chi- na prepared by the CIA. On the plane he won- dered whether he would be allowed into a communist country with a book bearing the CIA legend: ? STATI NTL. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 irEvcomnikr17-11r.7.rg . E9 ,Approved For Release 20811c0 THE ROAD ? ?? STATINT ( TO PEKING 2 0 By STAN CARTER. NEWS Diplomatic Correspondent Fifth' of a series UNE of the eight black-bound loose-leaf volunieS that President Nixon studied in preparation for his journey . to Peking contained a top secret analysis by the Central j Intelligence Agency of the strange and still only parti- s" -ally explained events in China last fall?and the effect that the internal power struggle they revealed may have on his summit talks with the surviving Communist leaders. What went on in China in mid-September is still shrouded in mystery. Communist cadres in the provinces have been told ? that Defense Minister Lin Piao?until then the regime's no. 2 man?was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate party Chair- man Mao Tse-tung and that when tee plot failed, Lin and his cohorts were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union. A British-built Trident jetliner, one of four purchased by -China from Pakistan and used exclusively by high-ranking - Chinese officers, did indeed crash in Mongolia, 100 miles be- yond the Chinese border, on the night of Sept. 12. But American analysts doubt that Lin was among the seven men and two women whose bodies were recovered from the airplane, burned beyond recognition. . ? But it is clear that the power struggle has ended?at least .for the time being?and that a moderate faction led by Premier Chou En-lid triumphed over a radical faction led by Lin Piao. ' ? 'Lin and hundreds of his followers have beenn purged, but are though to be still alive. Whatever the reasons for the purge, the timing for it seems -to have been sparked by Chou's invitation to Nixon to Visit the People's Republic of China. ? Quarrel over resources Despite ApproviecifForaReleasTe'200410304n: elusions are probably similar to those of analysts from other. , government agencies and from experts outside the government, - For example, Rand Corp. Sinologist William' W. Whitson ? has come up with a theory fitting the known facts. It suggests that the power struggle was the culmination of a debate within tho Chinese hierarchy over allocation of resources to China's ,? nuclear weapons program?and that Chou's victory - over Lin ? will make China less of a threat to -U.S. allies in Asia in the .immediate future than it has been considered in the past. r-- Whitson, a military specialist, is one of those China ex- perts who.does research for the government and also maintains ties with the academic community. Ills new book, "The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971?a History of Communist Military Politics," will be published this spring. According to Whitson, Lin Piao vigorously opposed last year's decision by Chou?with Mao's concurrence?to reduce tensions with the United States. . - The reason was that Lin and his supporters ? in the Air Force and Navy needed the supposed American threat to justify development of bigger and bigger nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them. The cost of China's nuclear and missile programs are 2% of the still underdeveloped country's total national product? . ?so high that Whitson argues that "some peeple across the river (a euphemism in Washington for CIA headquarters in Langley, ./ .Va.) say that we ought to encourage them to keep at it, because it will make them go bankrupt." Challenge fo Lin ; Whitson's contention is that Chou En-lai, in contrast to Lin, ;recognized that the real threat to China was from Russia? ! which had massed one million troops on China's northern border ?and threatened a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear in- stallations?instead of from the United Sates, which the premier 'could see was in fact withdrawing from Southeast Asia. To cope with the Soviet threat, China needed tactical nuclear weapons as well as more modern conventional armament?not necessarily long-range ICBMs. Therefore, it is Whitson's belief that Chou wanted to slow down the costly advanced weapons program and thus welcomed Nixon's overtures tn.end the 2:1- year-old confrontation between the United States and China. - But the invitation to Nixon presented a challenge to Lin and the generals associated with part strategic planning. Whitson ruts it this way: many of the Senior officers of the .secOrid 2%4 ? ation, probably including. Lin Piao, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng and Huang Yung-sherg, the? historical image of the United States as the principal adversary most heavily armed with nu- clear weapons targeted against China must have been the cor- nerstone of their premises for strategic planning and weapons development. "President Nixon's visit to China could not have been a wel- come shift in the image that had presumably guided their strategic thinking for 20 years." Smaller bangs Since the mid-1960s, China has exploded 13 nuclear devices, including three hydrogen bombs with yields of three megatons each,-in 1968, 1969 and 1970. But the last two tests, in November, 1971 and January of -this year, were of smaller devices with yields of 20 kilotons or less?the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb. According to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the latest two tests could either have been of triggers or larger thermonuclear weapons or of prototypes of comparatively small, tactical nuclear warheads. If they were the latter, it would tend to confirm Whitson's theory that 'Chou, after defeating Lin, has shifted priorities ? to concentrate on medium and intermediate range missiles instead of a costly intercontinental missile - . arsenal. "Such an emphasis would provide an immediate deterrent against the Soviet Union," Whitson says. "It would also promise the greatest intercontinental utility once an appropriate sub- ? marine or two had been built." If Whitson is right; this will be disconcerting to U,S. mil- ' itary planners, who have advocated construction of an anti-' ballistic missile defense system for protection of the United States against Chinese ICBM's expected to be operational as -early as 1975, as much as against the nuclear-tipped Soviet intercontinental rockets already in their underground silos. . Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird acknowledged to Congress this week that "it is difficult to asee i h_er the strategic C IPliaFfa0 -10 *6 (MR0002003 ialtina, or how that threat will evolve through the 1970s." But Laird said the GOntinuod RAI/WARTS Approved For Release 20Eling ?"612A-RDP80-01 STATI NTL The Chin Sch. and S. Intelli ' EFORE ACTUALLY BOARDING AIR FORCE ONE for his February meeting with Chairman Mao, Rich- ard Nixon will be forced to run a gauntlet of in- telligence briefing sessions designed to bring him up to date on the latest Chinese developments. The cram course on contemporary China, programmed by CIA direc- tor Richard C. Flelms,will range from an elementary Who's Who in the Chinese government and questions of unfamiliar proletarian protocol?e.g., What should Pat Nixon say to Mme. Mao, the militant leader of the Peking Red Guards? ?to more esoteric information not generally found in either the New York Times or the Peking People's Daily Sunday Supplement. More or less hard answers to questions like "Whatever happened to Lin Piao, Chairman Mao's ex-close- comrade-in-arms?" "What progress are Chinese rocket ex- perts making with their long range missile systems?" "How do the factions within the People's Army and Communist Party line up in the present leadership struggle?" In order to provide Nixon with the data he needs on this trip, Helms is able to cull the output of hundreds of mil- ...what we have in China stud ies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured, and directed an entire academic field.' ? itary and civilian radio intercept operators, who listen-in on a rotating shift, round-the-clock basis to Chinese radio trans- missions. Also mobilized are the battalions of cryptog- raphers at Fort Meade, Md., trying to break Chinese mil- itary, diplomatic and commercial codes; the covert opera- tors in such places as Hong Kong and Singapore, busily sub- orning Asian journalists; and, more prosaically, the dozens of linguistically trained Ph.D.'s hard at work in Langley, Va., translating Chinese telephone books. But there is an- Approved For Release 2001/03/ nce by David Horowitz other intelligence network on which Nixon will rely which is just as vital, if somewhat smaller and more loosely artic- ulated. This is the academic phalanx of American China scholars: the once scorned and now twice-rewarded denizens of a startling variety of scholarly and semi-scholarly institu- tions. These range from conglomerate think tanks like the RAND Corporation, and elite centers of corporate-academic cross-fertilization like the Council on Foreign Relations to seemingly more chaste academic set-ups like the East Asian Institutes at Harvard and Columbia. But the distinctions are more apparent than real, for what we have in China studies is the clearest case yet in which the big foundations and the State Department founded, funded, nurtured and directed an entire academic field, providing at last a defin- itive answer to the age-old question: "Who shall educate the educators?" ? [AN INTELLIGENCE WHO'S WHO] "r""7 OLLOWING THE MC CARTHY FREEZEOUT China schol- ars began to come in from the cold in the early Kennedy years. Something of the origins of the American China scholar intelligence network that subsequently developed can be gleaned from a private letter written in 1962 by the head of the State Department's Bu- reau of Intelligence and Research (BIR), Dr. Allen Whit- ing. This letter, made available by its recipient, who at that time was the head of Berkeley's Center for China Studies, aimed to recruit him to the BIR's "elite project." Who was going to take over after Chairman Mao?, the BIR wanted to know. "Experience with post-Stalin Russia," Whiting wrote, "has shown the importance of anticipating succession crises in communist countries and especially of understand- ing the significance of their outcome in terms of changes in communist policy." American intelligence had already sifted prima facie evidence suggesting conflicts within the Chinese leadership. Whiting complained, however, that inadequate attention to the make-up of the factions "has left us with no firm picture of attitudes held by competing groups on such cont1nu-4 04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-6 HousTohPIKQW0d For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016 STATINTL POST JAN 16 19-12- 294,677 s - 329,710 By DARRELL IIANCOCK Post Reporter ? '"Although it probably did not cross (Daniel) Ellsberg's mind when he released the Pentqgon papers to the New / York Times, he succeeded in si doing what. the (Central In- telligence) Agency, on its own, has rarely been able to do for more than 20 years: ? He made the?XIA, Joek good," ?, writes Chester L. Cooper of t h e: Institute for Defense ? :, Analysis in the January "For- eign Affairs." . In is article,. "The CIA and Decision-making," coop- er describes the elite Office of National Estimates org,a- , nized within the CIA in 1930. ?. T h e small groiip of in? analysts prepares ? about 50 "estimates" annual- ly on foreign policy problems, ? . such as 'Chinese . communist ?nuelear, capabilities as they may develop over the next several years ..? *sti- 'mate is a projection, an opin- ? ion or a judgment, Cooper fl2ut is lilt el_y_ to kg make The Pentagon papers revealed that the government went on to support Ngo Dinh Dieni in South bUC-- the :CIA . .....showed 'willingness make (irztelligenC e) 'estimates very much at variance with the current policy line. ?. - the best-informed and most. objective view the decision- maker can get." ? Citing 13 items from the Pentagon papers, Cooper shows that the policy-makers were apparently warned again and again against the hope of easy U.S. military victory in Vietnam. The re- servation "apparently" is necessary because, as Cooper admits, the selection of esti- mates by the writers and re- porters of the Pentagon pa- pers May have been highly selective. But the evidence at hand includes: . ? _ ? 0 A 1954 report to the Eis- 0 A joint intelligence panel dissent in 1964 to the view enhower administration that that bombing would break "even with American support it was unlikely that the French or Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government and that the situ- ation would probably continue to deteriorate." The government went on to support Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, but Cooper says the CIA then and after' wards showed a willingness rrlUch at variance with the current policy line." A 1961 warning to the fledgling Kennedy adminis- tration: Diem tolerated cor- ruption and relied on one-man rule, casting doubt on his ability to lead the govern- ment. ? ? ?. A later 1961 report that American military escalation ? in South Vietnam would be matched by similar escalation by Hanoi. Ilanoi's will .to continue the costly war. - 0 Repeated reports during the bombing that the North Vietnamese were continuing the war with "resolute stoic- ism" and with relatively un- changed strategy and materi- al resources.. But would the professorial estimators lose their prized ! objectivity in the quest for greater influence? Possibly, Cooper concedes. But if that issue can be resolved, a new int014.tence arrangement "would make available what very President since Tru- man has said he. wanted, but what none of them has been ble to obtain on a routine - ? a Events, to one -degree or basis ;??? the best possible another, confirmed the "bear- ' first-hand intelligence. judg. ish" intelligence estimates, rn cnts .on critical - int-crn. Cooper noles,wondermg_aloud: _ational problems. how the "yawning gap" be- tween the intelligence struc- ture : and the foreign . po- licymakers could be?closed. Basically, he proposes face- to-face meetings between the two groups, possibly by put- ting the estimators within the National Security Council, .Which may have a ?stronger Voice with the President. "Clearly if the" are to play. a more direct -Am; useful role, thestimatOTS must be brought ?out of their cleister Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-8 7th Fleet T rce Ends Approved For Releasej2=03)9T4 : CIA-RE(WM NEW YORK TIMES -,Patrol in the Indian' Ocean ' By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Jan: 10 ? That statement was seen as The United States Navy, task an assertion of principle that force led by the nuclear-pow- the United States did not intend efed carrier Enterprise sailed to leave the Indian Ocean to Out of the Indian Ocean today the Russians, who normally after a month of patrol duty have a squadron of 10 to 12 min war had blocked its pro- gram. In the last year, however, relatively unpublicized exer- cises were carried out by ves- sels of the Seventh Fleet includ- ing the carrier Ticonderoga in April and the Enterprise in begun during the Indian Pakis-i ships there. P ? The Nixon Administration has tani war, the Defense Depart- Today, Mr. Friedheim said that never i publicly stated why t A M Eastern standard time, the task force had cleared the Malacca Strait and had ment announced. at 6:30 A. M. The. return of the nine-ship squadron to regular service with the Seventh Fleet in Southeast Asian waters ended a controversial aspect of United States actions during the war on the subcontinent. ". The presence of the task force in the Indian Ocean was never fully explained by the Nixon Administration. Because of Washington's condemnation of Indian actions during the war, many Indians looked upon the task force as a provocation, a view that set off anti-Ameri- can demonstrations, an official Indian protest and a worsening of Indian-American relations. Pentagon sources and secret cablegrams made publib by the syndicated columnist Jack An- derson indicated that the car- rier -force . had at least three objectives; possible evacuation of Americans, showing the flag in view of the presence of So- viet naval forces in the area and deterring India from any 6 combat vessels-2 light crius- tbought of extending the war I ers and 3 or 4 destroyers. In ad- 40 West Pakistan once East Palt',- istan fell. Course Changed After Truce S for the Enter- was neces ary prise to enter the Indian Ocean, but Administration officials, entered the South China Sea, re- who declined to be Identified turning "to normal operating 'said the United States had relia- control of the Commander, Sev- enth Fleet." The Enterprise is due to ar- rive Wednesday at Subic Bay In the Philippines, where the crew is toreceive five days of liberty. For a month before going to the Indian Ocean the Enterprise had been in the Gulf of Tonkin In the position known as Yankee Station near North Viet- nam. Mr. Friedheim said that there According to another C. . . report, attributed to "reliable" sources, Ambassador Nikolai M. Pegov of the Soviet Union on Dec. 13 told the Indian government that the Soviet Union "would open a diversion- aryaction" again the Chinese and "will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene," Mr. Ander- son said. ble information that India, with Soviet backing, had planned to attack West Pakistan. They contended that the presence of the task force, as well as a series of messages. from President Nixon to Soviet leaders, succeeded in restrain- ing India. The Indian Govern- ment has denied it had planned an all-out attack on West Pakistan. -Mr. Anderson, in a column published Dec. 31, disclosed whaet he said were the top- secret orders to the Enterprise's were no immediate plans to teask force. The alleged orders send in another task force, but said: added: "I have every confidence "Situation U.S. citizens may have to he eVacuated from the U. S. Navy vessels will operate area affected by the ' present In the Indian Ocean during the Indian-Pakistan conflict. The next year to 18 months." situation may also arise which "We will do that from time will require the presence and to time; on no fixed schedule, utilization of a CVA [the Navy's no fixed force level," he said. designation for an attack air- Mr. Friedheim said that 15 to craft carrier] to insure the pro- 20 Soviet vessels remained in etection of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean, including 5 or the area. "Mission: To form a con- tingency evacuation force cap- able of [helo] evacuation of civilians, of self-protection, and of conducting naval air and surface operations as directed by higher authority in order to support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area." In his column today, Mr. Anderson published what he said were Central Intelligence Agency reports about signs that during the war the Chinese might intervene on behalf of the Pakistanis. "The Chinese have been passing weather data for loca- tions in Tibet and along the rines and support ships. 1S comber," the C.I.A. was said ' since 8 DC-? , dition, he said, there are subma- ino-Indian border Pentagon officials have said to have reported. "The con- privately that the United States tinued passing of weather data had plans as long ago as 1965 for these locations is considered to seinadhips from the Seventh it5musuai and may indicate some se 1103i000 'MLR P80 -0 1.601 RW0200340001 -5 urn of alert posture." that requirements or tne .v let- The task force entered the' Thdian Ocean on Dec. 14 in the direction of East Pakistan, but after the cease-fire on Dec. 17. the ships changed course and patrolled at a distance. Last Friday, when asked how long the task force would re- Main in the Indian Ocean, Jerry W. Friedheim, the Defense De- partment spokesman, declined to give an exact time, stressing that the United States intended to send units of the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean from time to time, now that Britain was withdrawing from tfipproved For Rele $34..MACIVI .mortas .. ,. IS. . arraTcor INDotAsto.:.! Indian Ocean The New York Times/Jan. 11, 1972 ' ( ? BOSTON GLOBE Approved For Release 20011Q3014.: 131A-FECTINIONRIl601R ? STATINTL a o Jo n Gardner, head of Common Cause; Richard Ellman, lit- erary critic; Hugh Gregg, former gov- ernor of New Hampshire; Dong King- man, artist; Leroy Anderson, com- poser; Eugene McCarthy, presiden- tial candidate in 1968; George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO and Everett E. Hagan, head of MIT's Cen- ter for International Studies and Daniel Ellsberg's boss ?have in corn- mon? Well, they're all loyal Americans and they all share space in a remark- able reference work called "Who's Who in CIA." ? For at least a decade, broad areas of American intelligence operations have been known intimately by mem- bers of the press and by leading newspaper, magazine and broadcast- ing executives. Some of these people .were iiv the service of the CIA them- selves. Others presumably allowed members of their staffs to cooperate with and report to the CIA. This information does not come from The New York Times or the Co- lumbia Broadcasting System. It does not come directly from classified doc- uments within the CIA. It does not come from a gossip column or a late- night news show. It does not come from the Rand Corporation. ? It comes from a 605-page book ti- lled Who's Who In CIA and subtitled A Biographical Reference Work of the Officers of the Civil and Military Branches of the Secret Services of the USA in 120 Countries. Dan Pinck is a freelance writer, teacher and education consultant who lives in Belmont. Graphic art is by Herbert Ro- 9alski. Who's Who's In CIA was pub- lished in English, in 1968, by Julius By Dan Pinck In his introduction publisher Mader refers to the United States' "disposal-subversionist war" and he writes that "the intelligence service in the USA is the largest and most in- fluential in the imperialist- world" ?and further observes that "the intelli- gence service of the USA has always been the domain of the fanatical ene- mies of democracy and a stronghold of the anti-communists." There's no doubt where Mader's sympathies lie. In his introduction he also notes those who helpea him compile the book. These include Mohamed Abdel- nabi, of Beirut, Lebanon: Ambalal Blib.tt, of Bombay, Fernando Gainar- ro or Mexico City, and Shozo Oliashi, of Yokohama. There are 3000 entries in the reference work and they range from US ambassadors, artists and museum curators to the directors of Asian and Russian research centers at leading American universities to political affairs officers,. cultural af- fairs officers and AID controllers at various US embassies overseas to em- ployees of The New York Times and CBS. The listing is an impressive one and even allowing for errors that even intelligence services can make, it is likely a reasonably accurate ac- counting of certain leading opera- tives and associates of the CIA. I bought my copy of Who's Who in CIA in a book shop In Georgetown, in Washington, D.C. for $4.95. The bookshop is not a subversive one; its main fare is academia, fiction and lit- erary biographies. It was bought be- cause of my curiosity about intelli- gence services in general, an interest that began when I was in the OSS in China, as the nearest American to Hong Kong. A cursory sampling of names were recognizable to me, bear- ing out my own personal knowledge Mader, 1066 Berlin W66 Mauer- of' selected C tiv strasse Approved For Release 20011kga : e1A-RDP80- In the intervening months I read the book through, and with the publi- cation of the Pentagon Papers, it be- came a lively and fascinating re- source and complement to the pub- lished secret documents. In one embassy with approxima- tely 55 staff members, for example, the book picked out one person as the CIA operative. Since that particular name was known to me it began to give a ring of authenticity to the en- tire listing. When it noted certain US officials that I had met on several tours in 16 African nations as being CIA-associated, the sense of authen- ticity grew firmer; when it listed the name of Dan A. Mitrione, who was kidnaped antl killed in Brazil several years ago and who was identified at that time as an AID official, as an op- erative of the CIA, it's additional evi- dence that the work is as legitimate (and as nefarious) as it can reason- ably be. The book lists the operatives who have served throughout the world. The German Federal Republic leads the roster with 264 operatives. Mona- co and Antarctica bring up the end of the list, with one each. In between: Ghana (14); the Union of Soviet So- cialist Republics (99); Mexico (90); Barbados (22); Ireland (17); Nige- ria (32); France (141); Uganda (8); Vietnam (133); Ethiopia (24) Chile (42); and Hong Kona (71). The book lists operatives in news- papers and magazines, including Time, Life, Fortune, Newsweek, Sports Illustrated, US News and World Report; in a number of indus- trial firms, including Bankers Trust, First National City Bank, Westing- house, RCA, NBC, CBS, Gulf Oil Corp., Standard Oil Company, Bank of America, Litton Industries, Kim- 01601 R00020U34II001-5 berley-Uark Cornoratinn:orif tcinuoil an ada, Approved For Release 2001 STON GLOBE ; 1?IFIRDP80-01601 STATI NTL ?w TfrumneoClii shadow William Worthy, correspondent of The Baltimore Afro-American, was the first US newsman (1956-57) to defy the US travel ban on China. The resulting legal hassle over his pass- port, which was not renewed for 11 years, is recounted in "The Ballad of William Worthy" by folksinger Phil Ochs. A year or two after returning from China, while I was lecturing for a day at Texas Southern University, 'a:Negro faculty member came up at the end of a seminar and identified himself to me as an economics pro- fessor. In a- voice audible to everyone, and. with a broad "I know all about ? you" grin on his face, he said: "You know, Mr. Worthy, when you were in China, I was working on the CIA's China desk in Washington. Every morning, we used to receive a top-secret report of your movements in Chinn the day before." . Presumably, CIA operatives still function inside China?possibly in the two-payrolls role that Khrushchev once joked about with CIA Director Allan Dulles. "Oh, I know you," Khrushchev kidded when they were introduced at a Washington reception: 'We read the same reports from -the same agents. Why don't we get to- gether and pay those fellows just one combined salary?' So I can't help but wonder if the (Or did the CI r Kissinger, too . By William Worthy and filed hourly reports to the top- level computers in Washington. The speculation isn't entirely far-fetched. After all, however politically primi- tive, US spies are efficient in fact- finding, and Lyndon Johnson did sus- pect that the CIA tapped his Whit House phones. The day after Mr. Nixon an- nounced his Peking travel plans, NBC New g contacted Chinese author- ities about the possibility of satellite television coverage. Flow different this journalistic initiative from the time when I was there. In the 1950s, the mass media consistently played footsie with the Washington myth- makers about the non-existence or the "imminent collapse" of the Peo- ple's Republic of China. (Ditto revo- lutionary Cuba not long afterwards.) The gospel according to Secretary Dulles was that any journalistic visits would "lend respectability" to what he decreed to be a tottering, outlawed regime. Under this stern edict, CBS News, which in its 1955 "Report to Stock- holders" had cited me for having made.. the first. broadcast from Mos- cow in eight cold-war years, ada- mantly refused to let me take along to China any of their cameras or tape recorders. This was to protect the net- work from any official charge of "col- lusion" in my going. But the under- standing was that, if I could borrow someone else's equipment and ship back film and tapes, they would be more proficient of them got 1.,2ii,s2f iisobaitgAii..Ttlavgiteoks Dr. KissineePPRIFMer sar -.6dOs ylBreAli Dulles. ? Twice from Peking and once from Shanghai I was also able to broadcast for CBS. The first .voicecast was, of course, a journalistic scoop, and the cablegram from the New York news desk several hours later expressed professional delight. The signal to Oakland had been clear, the content satisfactory. But there was one prob- lem. Not being attuned to the State Department "non-recognition" non- sense, I had used "Peking" in the broadcast, instead of the old Kuomin- tang name for China's capital. _ Thus the punch-line Suggestion. In future voicecasts the news desk - would prefer "Peiping?pronounced B-A-Y-P-I-N-G". If acted upon, the suggestion would have been totally self-defeat- ing, and I hadn't the slightest inten- tion of heeding it. Justifiably, the Chinese would have been offended. and studios for future broadcasts would not have been made available. Knowing that David Chipp, the Reut- ers correspondent in Peking, would be both amused by and scornful of this typical American childishness, I let him read the cable. "I'll tell you what you should do, Bill," he said. "On your next broad- cast, when you reach the return cue, just say: 'This is Bill Worthy in Peip- ing. Now back to CBS News in New Amsterdam.'" To be fair, the bad case of media jitters was not wholly self-induced. A 'l ?e s? "DPI o A loll ArcDulles. was HAN foreign as- ' contiLuc. iY.21SHIg,`T.0.11, P.OSZ Approved For Release 20619/g6419.1A-RDFS81041100-11R0 -sr1(74,rr- WASHINGTON, D.C. 7.41he most elaborate security precau- tions ever devised for a Chief of State will surround President Nixon when he arrives in Peking for his historic meeting with the mainland Chinese leaders. And this may come as something of a surprise to many Americans: the 'United States Secret Service, traditional guardian of the President's safety, is leaning heavily on its Communist Chi- nese counterpart to make certain that Mr. Nixon's visit, however sensational its diplomatic implications may be, is absolutely uneventful from the stand- point of his personal security. "No matter how you slice it," a top U.S. security official told PARADE, "we must depend on the host country to assume the major burden of protecting our President. And the Chinese have been cooperating magnificently." Many of the details of the protective measures arranged between the Secret Service and Peking's -security forces are wrapped in secrecy, but this much can be told: The advance security preparations are not confined to the streets along which Mr. Nixon's party will travel through the Chinese capital or the quarters in which he will stay?they ex- tend around the world. - Ever since the dramatic announce- ment of the American President's forth- coming journey burst upon the world last August, U.S. and Chinese security :experts behind the kenos have been checking and cross-checking every- thing and everyone he is likely to come in contact with, from his drinking water to the elevator operator in his Peking guest house. These are the key areas of security concern: TRANSPORTATION?Mr. Nixon will It,, from 4Vashington to Guam aboard "I 11.;r1rir rfInr [ ...v: , t;- 1 ij/Lk 1: f ./. . by Fred Blumenthal one Peking landing under his belt, hay:, ing flown Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger to the Chinese capital last Oct: 20th. The President's 707, which has a range of 7000 miles, an 11-man crew, and room for 59 passengers, will fly from Guam to Shanghai, where it will pick up an English-speaking Chi- nese navigator for the final leg. ? . Navigator knows Col. Albertazzie has no qualms about the professional ability of the navigator, the same officer who guided him into Peking on the Kissinger flight. "I was delighted with him; he's an excellent navigator," the American pilot told PARADE. "And the Peking International Airport has all the neces- sary facilities, including electronic equipment. They have been handling Air France and Pakistani 707s on a regular basis, and they know what they're doing." Other American aircraft will precede and follow "The Spirit of '76" into the Peking Airport, including a still-un- known number of press- planes and a cargo jet carrying four White House automobiles?one of them the armored Lincoln limousine in which the Presi- dent rides wherever he goes, at home or abroad. Gasoline tested On the ground, the Presidential plane will be guarded around the clock by U.S. Air Force police and Chinese military detachments, as will the jet fuel for all the U.S. aircraft and the gasoline for the White House cars. The Chinese will supply a full load of 24,- 000 gallons of fuel for the return flight, but every drop will be tested and fil- tered before it goes?under guard? into the tanks. This is crucial to the President's safety in the air, but it is no slap at his Chinese hosts: the same pre- PEKING PROBLEMS?The routes over which President Nixon will travel from the airport and to and from his various official meetings and receptions in the Chinese capital are still secret and may not be divulged until the last minute? if at all. But Secret Service agents, in cooperation with their Chinese oppo- site numbers, will go over the ground many, many times before his arrival to familiarize themselves with every inch of the way. Every manhole the Presi- dential party will pass over while driv- ing through the streets of Peking will be. inspected and the cover sealed to make sure that no one has planted an explosive device in his path (a routine Secret Service precaution taken on Presidential trips in the United States), and even the utility poles lining the streets will be examined at the very last moment, just in case someone might decide to saw three-quarters of the way through a pole with a view to toppling it into the street, thus block- ing the cavalcade and "setting up" a dangerous opportunity for an attack. More routinely, Chinese security agents will keep an eye on rooftops and win- dows along the way. Elevator feared If plans call for Mr. Nixon to enter an elevator at any time, the Secret Service wants the Chinese to check not only the mechanical equipment, but the oper- ator, too. "There can be nothing more hair- raising," says one veteran security agent, "than to have the President of the United States stalled in the narrow cOrifines of an elevator, especially if the operator might turn out to be un- friendly." During its stay in Peking, the en- tire American delegation, including the President, will have its own drink- ing water supply, not because they "The S )irit of " cautions allidiecei4evele lime "The have reason Astispect the quality of Ralph D. Albertazzie, who already has Force bases in the United States. that all experienced travelers are wary of unfamiliar water. ApilefiiettY rr els* 20 2003400tai-I5ason One), piloted by Air Force veteran Col. rY Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016 HONOLULU, H.!. ?1 STAR?BULLETIN DEC 15 tazi E ? 115,688 ' S ? 166,171 STATI NTL _ Diplomats as Spies Washington, with the welcome mat out for the Peking Chinese, now on American soil for the first time in over 20 years, has been somewhat taken aback to learn that the leader of the advance party is one of China's top spies. He is Kao Liang, who with five other officials arrived in New York last Monday and paid his first visit to the United Nations Tuesday. Now out own intelligence people, pre- sumably the CIA, have caused surprise and concern by let- ting it be kn8rct'n that Kao has had the following assign- ments: Under the "cover" of being chief African correspondent for the New China News Agency, he 'traveled extensively through Africa in the early 1960s as Peking established it- self on the continent. He was the prime mover in the pro-Peking uprising in Zanz'ibar in 1964, passing out arms and money to the insur- gents. When it was over, the local agent Mr Kao's news agency emerged as foreign minister of the new govern- ment. Nobody should be surprised. The Russians regularly use ' members of their diplomatic missions as spies. One such,. recently revealed by the CIA, was Vladimir Pavlichenko, director of external information of the United Nations Pub- he Information Office. Pavlichenko, said the CIA, is a "vet- eran officer" of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency. Furthermore, it must be presumed that our own intelli- gence agencies take advantage of the cloak of diplomatic immunity in foreign countries. Just about everybody else does it, so why shouldn't we? On the ,other hand, there is no United Nations headquar- ters in China to which we could send a mission including spies. It is one more reason for establishing diplomatic re- lations, so we can get our intelligence people in Peking. , . . " ...? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 MIAMI, FLA. HERALD IDEc 1 3 i918.1 ? - 380,828 B - 479,025 ;1,6#6?61.....,OillMIMAIIIIIITifii111111111111111,111113111111111111plillITIN-1111MIIII11111151;111171.31SIglIfft_... ? /?....01/ etO,Pki M ._ ? The Central Intelligence were supposed to know. ' Agency has laid off 5,000 And, what about the Bay spies, and only 134,000 em- of Pigs? There was a perfect- ployes are left on the payroll. ly fouled up job, based on Nobody knows how much the completely unreliable intern. CIA costs us, because it gence. We don't seem to be doesn't have to account pub- getting adequate information holy for its spending. The ex- for the billions we're spend- penditures run into billions. ing. The spies, who managed to keep their methods secret for years, haven't been success- ful at that recently. It has been disclosed in Vietnam that torture is one of their 't gimmicks for obtaining infor- Illation from close-mouthed people. They've ordered mur- der, as in the case of a dou-, ble-crossing agent in Viet. nam. The CIA apparently is V answerable to no one, which makes?it the most dangerous government agency the Unit- ed States has ever known. The intelligence beagles haven't been as successful as they'd have us believe. Pearl )-larbor should have been an- ticipated. Douglas MacAr- thur scoffed at Chinese inter- vention in Korea two days before the Reds moved in. Ws G2 should not be saddled with all the blame, for the buzle4,1111Elaris of the CIA. Jack Hofoed Says STATINT Is th,e Secretive C orth the Expense? a? Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Appr9yed_egf,R,,91.e, c ey,M7 ) re4P - v'f?jrsi' - - ? ' ' ' , Ed ? ? ?-? 0,kpptoved,For Release 20'01/03/0 k?A .1,%:.? 4 IA :02K TIES Approved For Release 2001/O3ipitpliv1RDP8TCOMIT4000 - ' C ird I Nt A S AID TO TELL - !- , .and Premier Chou lin-lai have Political assassination is "out . They note, however, i hat ,.won the battle against Mr. Lin of character" in China. . . . lir fr 111741171:.,1 intelligence community is that - , , 0 ot Iko and, his civill.un and military The view in the American , . ._......_........____ ' The judgment in Washington the September crisis was, in .. .. . Officials Reported Informing ? Party Units Across Nation :4pcdal I 'rile N.' Yorl; TInm; WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 ? The United Ste es intelligence community is cc 'dyinga grow- ing volume of reports on spe- cial meetings -throughout main- land China in which leading Communist warty groups are said to be advised by top party 'delegates that Lin Piao "no longer holds power." - The White House has im- posed a ban on public t'omment by American officials an political events in China. fIowever, reliable intelligence sources in Washington pri- vately say the reports of the Communist party briefings are the most convincing evidence so that Mr. Lin has fallen into political disfavor. It is believed that Mr. Lin has been re.: Little Red Books Vanish moved as successor to Chair-i American officials' said that is that M. Mao and Mr. Chou prat, an attempt by leftists Ire in the process of con to regain positions they lost to bolidatinri their power through Mr. Mao, the advocate of more a reshuffling of key army and enigmatic policies, during the narly posts. Cultural Revolution.. American specailists said, however, I hat wide gaps re- mained "in the knowledge on what has happened and may still be happening." These specialists said that further evidence of ,Mr. Lin's downfall came on Monday at the United Nations when the Peking delegation made its debut.. They pointed out that chief delegates for Communist countries and some of the so- called "third world" nations, close to Peking pointendly omitted, any mention of Mr. Lin in speeches welcoming the Chinese, although greetings were expressed to Mr. Mao and Mr. Chou. Communist diplo- mats said later that "word had been deceived" from the Chi- nese delegation that Mr. Lin's, name should not be mentioned. man Mao Tse-tung, as the sec- ond-ranking member of the party's Politburo and as 'De- fense Minister. The Administration is known :to take the view that any pub- 'tic comment on Chinese inter- nal problems may complicate President Nixon's plans to visit :Peking. Mao and Chou Are Winners But intelligence specialists believe that the crisis around l\lfr. Lin reached its climactic , point between Sept. 11 and 13. The A,(Iministration is reported ; to assume that Chairman Mao Mr. 1,in s apparent elimination was being indirectly communi- cated to the populace in China through what diplomatic and intelligence sources described as the sudden disappearance of the little red books of Chair- man Mao's thoughts from the places where they were usually kept or distributed. The book- let carries an preface by Mr. The specialists said that it .was impossible to d etermine whether the 64-year-old. Mr.. Lin, who had been ill for at least a year, was dead of alive. "We -incline to think that he is physically alive but polit- ically- dead," an expert here said. . have so'. far not mentioned Mr.. Lin, but the experts believe that the Chinese people are being prepared for a public accusation through a series of obliquely worded articles and broadcasts. , The version of Chinese events most generally accept- ed by American intelligence specialists?although they ad- mit it is highly speculative-- is that Mr. Mao and Mr. Chou. deliberately brought about the crisis on Sept. 11 to "smoke- . out" Mr. Lin and his associ- ates. The offieialls say there are . unconfirmed reports that Mr. Lin's group had planned to' assassinate Chairman Mao and probably. Premier Choq. They then speculate that the Chair- man and the Premier, on learn- INCORRECTLY PRINTED Ree Associated Pressvo , Approved For lase 200 3' 4fzn-CfkrilaalP80:131i 01 R000200340001-5 tary men to panic." CHICAGO, ILL. SUN?TIMEtkPPrOVed .Fo - 536,108 S ? 709,123 NOV 1 2 197t STATINTL Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01604 .- t ....? i By Thomas B. Ross F.. ? l'. -,. Sun-Times Bureau ?? , WASHINGTON -- Central ' Intelligence , Ageney documents describe a 'key2,Chinese ; --. delegate to the United NEtti0115 as a "master subverStve" who was invalved in maneuvers .ttlat led to the assassination of ark African' . , prime minISter in 1965. 1 . . ;:. The documents indicate that Kao Mang, ,1 ' '?head of Peking's advance party at the UN, ? .mtty have secretly outranked all Chinese UM% :. :cials in. Africa during g his service?theiTe, as- . . Jensibly as a corre.spondont for the New China News Agency, in the early 1960s. ..-: The documents carry the implication that ( -Tao may be One of the most important mem- ,. i bars of China's UN derogation even though he: ? Is listed as only a routine functionary. - :,"Kao Mang," one of the documents de- . , dares, ."deals in "disruption and chaos. . . . 7 The tough NCNA reporter has planted the .. ? -seeds of subversion on three continents and - has achieved some success In dealing with , both recognized diplomats and furtive mal- contents." --,...n . . ? ; Prior to these new disclosures, Kao was asked by NBC News in New York to comment :? on the original story In The Sun-Times Wednesday identifying him as "a leading 11 ' Chi- _nese intelligence agent." He replied that the ' report was "entirely slanderous._"' ' '..--.. The thick CIA intelligence file on Kao con- Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and 7 Uganda. Nepal, the Indian government refused to ex- tend Kao's visa, demanded the closing of the NCNA office? and ordered him out of the country. _ "Although the spokesman- of India's 'Min- istry of Foreign Affairs publicly accused Kao 'Nang only of 'tendentious .and malicious' re- porting, the newsman's activities were known to be regarded as serious interference in the Internal affairs of the coulktry," according to the CIA file, Following a. brief stay in China, Ha() went, to Geneva, Switzerland, in the spring of 1961 to represent the Peking People's Daily at the International conference on Laos. "During the Geneva sojourn, Hoe Limn, en- tertained. generously and reportedly passed along substantial funds (in Swiss francs) to friendly African contacts." _ Short stay in Mauritius In July of 1961, Kao was assigned as NCNA's chief African correspondent with a base in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania. En route he tried to enter 1,1aUritius to make ? ? "He is known to have Passed large sums of money to antigovernment.. dissidents even ,while attending independence day celebra- tions in new African capitals." In 1964 he was judged the prime mover in the pro-Peking coup in Zanzibar, passing out money and arms to the insurgents, including Sheik Abdul Rahrnan Muhammed (Sheik Babu), a former NCNA stringer who emerged as. foreign minister. ? -? Implicated as plotter ? Later that year, Kao served. as head of an advance party that prepared the way for the ? establishment of a Chinese embassy in Bur- undi. 1n.3965; Prime Minister Pierre Ngen- dandumwe was :assassinated and Tung Chi- ? p'eng, a young defector .from the Chinese em- bassy, implicated Rao in the maneuvering that.led up to the assassination. Burundi severed diplomatic, relations with Peking and oradercd the Chinese mission out nor the country. ? , contact with its "large 'overseas Chinese pop-7 'dation." Refused entry, he flew, to the nearby island of Reunion and then returned to Mau- ritius on the next flight. This time he man:: - aged to stay oveniight before, being expelled a second time. ? - 'During his five-year -stay in Africa, Kaowas involved ? in coups, countercoups, mu- tinies, gun-running and straight-forward tains this chronolon,y of his activities: plomacy in Angola; Burundi, 'the two Congos, ? By then, Kao was established in I3Kazzaville in the former French Congo, teaching at ? an ideological training school and providing aid ? for the insurgency in the neighboring Demo- cratic Republic of the Congo. ?. ? ? Kao returned to China at the time of the )966 Cultural Revolution and dropped from view until his appearance _Monday in New ? York at. the head of Peking's advance party i to the .UN. , He took up his first foreign assignment in --- rIndia ?' in .1956. i ? . tnn- "He 'did a little reporting on India but his main task was to cultivate India's Communist and left-wing journalists, to, find suitable out- tniets for propaganda and subversive literature, ,r'and to channel funds to dissident groups (es- pecially in sensitive border areas)." In the spring of 1960, Kao accompanied Pre- mier Chou En-lal on his visit to Nepal and. "paid certain sums to leftist. editnrs .of Nepali t.-publications." - ? ? , . n ? In July of 1960, shortly after his return from . . . . , Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 IfEw, M1LY1-111,:c1 STATINTL Approved For Release 20C11101304/901A-RDP80-01601ROJIIIIII vont inued Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 77:1 7 0 ? 'I t. Washington, Nov. 10 (NEWS Bureau)?Kao Liang, head of Red China's advance party at the United Nations, is an espionage expert who once sckcted African recruits for guerrilla training at ChineE,e camps in Cuba, United States officials disclosed today.. These officials, revealing Kao's role as a top Chinese intelligence agent, told THE NEWS that he was active in East Africa between 1961 and 1967. While ostensibly serving as a . journalist for Peking's New China news agency, they said, Kao was a major figure in a pro-Peking 'coup in Zanzibar in 1961, then moved to the French Congo (Brazzaville), when he advised the government's counterespion- ..age police and served as China's chief guerrilla recruitey for East - Africa. - Kao arrived in New York Mon- day as head of a six-man advance party for the offiCial. Peking UN delegation scheduled to arrive to- Morrow. He paid his first visit to UN headquarters yesterday. U.S. intelligence maintains a fat file on the Chinese diplomat- - journalist, who was kicked out of India in 1960 for "tendentious reporting." Kao had arrived in New Delhi as a New China news agency correspondent four years earlier. About a year after his expulsion, he surfaced as a roving corre- spondent in Africa. Soon after, Western intelli- gence identified . him as the principal Chinese Communist es- pionage agent in East Africa. Ile was expelled from Mauritius, an island nation in the Indian Ocean off the African mainland, in 1961:. He was reportedly active in Nepal and in Switzerland, where he attended the 1961 Geneva con- Chiao Koan-hua ference in Laos. his most recent User to he newsman hirnself public appearance was last spring, when he accompanied the ChineSe,Ping-Pcmg team to Japan for a tommament that led to the historic. invitation for a U.S. team to visit Red China. . . SourceS said that Xao pastexl out Money and arms to pro-Chi- nese insurgents in Zanzibar in 194. One of them was Shiek Ab- dul Ralunan Muhammed, a New China news agency stringer who emerged as foreign minister after' :the coup. While in Africa, Kao lived lay- .ishly, maintaining a large house' and car and throwing expensive parties. He left Africa in March 1967, ' - Began With New China . The Chinese news agency, like the Tass news agency, its Soviet -counterpart, is considered by United States intelligence as a front for espionage activities in some countries. Red China's dep- "uty foreign Minister, Chiao'Kuan- hua, who heads the official dele- gttion . to the :UN, began his career as a correspondent for the agency before -entering the diplo- matic service. ? Using the UN as a cover for :espionage is not new, according to, .U.S. sources. Last month, Ameri- can intelligence sources leaked a charge that Vladimir Pavlicheako, . a director of the UN public in- formation office, is an off jeer of the Soviet intelligence agency, the- . C'ClAin31.erican intelligence estimated ? that at least half the Soviet of- ficials at the UN are KGB agents. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000200340001-5 NKR DAILY. ITEiIIS Approved For Release 260063/ail:STARD-F180- -7.72.-n ,../..i.,. r -; . . ??:? I, 1, ft -4 ...,,, ....n. I ' '