CIA QUESTIONED ON INDIA POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300100014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 18, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

W4SHII GTQN STAR
Approved For Release 2001/008)4JA(C.I DP80-01601
KASHMIR FUMBLE?
Cod I A
Uestioned
By HENRY S. BRADSIIER
Star Staff Writer
HONG KONG--Recent revelations about Central Intelli-
gence Agency estimates on the India-Pakistan war raise curious
questions.
How balanced are the sources of the CIA's information in a
place like New Delhi? In other words, how vulnerable is the
agency to one-sided rumors?
Sonic of the CIA estimates
contained in the Anderson pa-
'pers disclosed in Washington
amount to rumors circulating
in the Indiana capital at the
beginning of the war last
month. They were rumors
that well-informed I n d i a n
sources flatly denied at the
time-and their denials seem
to have been borne out by de-
velopments.
The CIA thought India was
going to make an all-out at-
tempt to smash the military
power of West Pakistan and
capture the Pakistani-held
part of disputed Kashmir
state, according to the Ander-
son papers. This was reported
as an Indian goal after captur-
ing East Pakistan,, which is
now Bangladesh.
Helms Quoted
J Richard Helms, CIA direc-
tor, is quoted as telling a Dec.
8 meeting of Washington's spe-
cial action group on the India-
Pakistan war:
"It is reported that prior to
.terminating the present hostil-
ities. Mrs. (Indira) Gandhi
(Indian Prime Minister) in-
tends to attempt to eliminate
Pakistan's armor and air
force, capabilities."
Helms and Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger, President Nixon's
national security adviser,
thought India intended to
seize the rest of Kashmir, the
Himalayan state which India
claims but Pakistan has held
part of for a quarter-century.
The U.S. government's
"tilt" toward Pakistan appar-
ently was based on these as-
sumptions of Indian intentions
to try to smash West Pakistan
into "an impotent state," as
Kissinger put it.
But were those ever really
lit terp retation
Report Cited
This correspondent reported
from New Delhi Dec. 9, and
The Star published Dec. 10,
that "the best available indi-
cations are that India will
want to bring the war to a.
speedy end once Bangladesh is
cleared" of Pakistani troops.
The dispatch went on: "In-
dian military commanders
have been itching for a chance
to smash Pakistani tank and
warplane strength in the West
with major battles which they
are confident of winning. But
political control of the situa-
tion, heavily influenced by
the Soviets, is against provok-
ing big battles."
There was considerable So-
viet pressure on India to hurry
up and capture East Pakistan
and then end the war. Both
Moscow and New Delhi envis-
aged the capture "and then
cease-fire on the Western
front," that dispatch said.
India declared the cease-fire
the day after Dacca fell.
The dispatch, and several
others that repeated the same
points as background to devel-
opments, was based on high-
ranking informants in both the
Indian government and Soviet
mission in New Delhi.
What they said would hap-
pen is what happened, contra-
ry to the Helms-Kissinger ex-
pectations. The question is
what sort of sources the CIA
was using.
Embassy Locked
One correspondent, even one
with the kind of contacts built
up, by five years of reporting
from New Delhi and almost as
long from Moscow, cannot
compete with the CIA's exten-
people who controlled policy in sive system of sources for in-
New Delhi, rather than b i~~gg formation. That other political
simply the roQan rtors 0 04
than hawks w o did not make l~ew DeIti%he one t na Peeps
policy? its doors locked, as .distinct
from the political section witn
an open-door policy-picks up
all sorts of information.
Maybe the problem is evalu-
ation. If the CIA hears Indian
generals talking ,about smash-
ing Pakistani military power,
maybe it believes them rather
than believing those quieter ci-
vilians who hold them back.
The armed forces in India
never have been able to do as
they pleased regardless of ci-
vilian politicians, unlike a
number of other undevel-
oped countries and overdevel-
oped generals with which the
CIA is a lot more familiar.
And Mrs. Gandhi is not the
personality to let her armed
forces start such impudence,
as anyone who has been in
India long should know.
Weather Problms
As for India's trying to take
Pakistani territory problems
of winter weather and the lo-
gistical situation of the Indian
army were involved.
Perhaps Helms and Kissin-
ger had noted the Indian state-
ment that India would no long-
er respect the old United Na-
tions cease-fire line dividing
Kashmir and they had made
the herotic jump of logic-or,
considering the georgraphy,
winter and logistics, illogic-to
conclude that India wanted to
capture everything beyond the
line.
But in fact, as reported from
New Delhi, Indias' ambitions
were limited to clearing out
some Pakistani army outposts
that endangered Indian com-
The U.S. government has
argued that its estimate was
right and, that only its efforts
prevented the larger war
which it foresaw. Thus, the
dispatch of a naval task force
built around the nuclear pow-
ered aircraft carrier Enter-
prise to the Bay of Bengal has
been claimed in Washington to
have had the effect of limiting
India's war aims. And Ameri-
can influence, in Moscow got
the Soviets to restrain Indian
according to claims.
Perhaps this. will have to be
marked down in the doubtful
column on U.S. policy influ-
ence and results. Perhaps
Washington more influential in
STATINTL
10,000300100014-6
Delhi.