NEW ANDERSON PAPERS TELL WARNING BY CIA CHIEF ON INDIA'S INTENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300100017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 16, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

CHICAGO, ILL. STATINTL
SUN-TIMES
yt _ 536,108
S -- 709,123
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
T't A N 161972
4 . By Morton Kondracke and Thomas B.' Ross
Sun-Times Bureau
WASHINGTON - Central Intelligence Agency director
Richard M. Helms told the White House that India did not
Intend to stop fighting with Pakistan until Pakistani air and
armored defenses were destroyed, a new set of Anderson pa-
pers has revealed.
Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger responded that
"elinsination of Pak armored and air forces would make the
Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client-
state ... a vassal."
The newest set of secret documents released by columnist
Jack Anderson tend to support claims by Kissinger that fear
of an Indian assault on West Pakistan was the motive behind
the "tilt" in US..policy toward Pakistan in the war.
The latest document, minutes of a meeting of the National
Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on Dec. 8,
is the first of the Anderson papers to give any indication of
U.S. motives during the crisis.
Amid -speculation that President Nixon acted against India
out of personal pique or to protect relations with China, Kissi-
nger'has been putting out word that the CIA offered "con-
clusive proof" of an Indian intention to demolish Pakistani
defenses and dismember Pakistan.
The Anderson document says Helms told the WSAG, "It is
:reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs.
Gandhi (Indira Gandhi, Indian prime minister) intends to at-
tempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capa-
bilities."
Kissinger and Helms agreed that India intended to seize
Azad Kashmir, that is, the portion of the disputed northern
'territory in Kashmir in Pakistani hands. The documents do
not make fully clear whether the Indians were intent on yet
,-further "dismemberment" of India.
Kissinger said that "if the Indians smash the Pak air force
and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian
;attempt to force the dissintegradation (sic) of Pakistan."
A dissent was registered by Joseph J. Sisco, assistant secre-
,tary of state for Near Eastern and South Asia affairs.
Sisco reportedly said that "if the situation were to evolve as
yDr._ Kissinger had indicated, then, of course, there was a
serious risk to the via1-ility of West Pakistan.
"Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had-this as
really d!Ay proved.for Release 2001/0T0X CIA-RDP80-01601 R00030010001.7-3
. After further discussion, Kissinger said that "what we may,
i'be witnessing is a situation wherein a country,-(India), e^uin-
ped and supported by the Soviets, may be turning half of
Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vas-
sal. We must consider what other countries may be thinking
of our. action."
Kissinger said: "We are not trying to be evenhanded. There
can be no doubt what the President wants. The President does
not want to be evenhanded. The President believes that India
is the attacker. We are trying to get across the idea that India _
has jeopardized relations with the United States."
The day before the WSAG meeting was held, Kissinger told
reporters at a backgrounder that "there have been some coni-
ments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally
inaccurate."
The WSAG discussed possible ways, in Kiss'nger's words, to
+'turn the screw" in the situation, apparently settling on none.
There is no mention in the document of the plan that {issiln-
ger now says was successful - a forceful messa'e to the
Soviet Union insisting that Russia stop her ally, India, from
attacking West Pakistan.
According to the documents, it was King Hussein of Jordan
who initiated an offer to provide eight U.S.-:uilt jet fighters to
Pakistan, another Moslem country. Previous installments of
the Anderson papers implied that the United States had
thought up the plan.
Kissinger, according to the document, "asked how we could
get Jordan into a holding pattern to allow the President time
to consider the issue." Representatives of both the State and
Defense departments urged abandonment of the idea.
RICHARD HELMS
HENRY A. KISSINGER
their objective. He indicated that Forpign Minister Dinesh
Bingh told Ambassador (Kenneth) Keating that India had no
intention of taking any Pak territory.
"Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Ka
 AiiG__i:1AI~,~~ES TILES
Approved For Release 20011& td~ i-C]A-RD $~9T 6~~1
SECRET U.S. DOCUMENTS
Iida A'nn Seen to Crus6~ ~akistan
Exclusive to The Times from
the Chicago Sun-Times
WASHINGTON -- CIA
/ Director Richard Helms
told the White-House that
India did not intend to
stop fighting with Pakis-
tan until Pakistani air and
armored defenses were de-
stroyed, a new set of An-
derson papers revealed.
Presidential a d v i s e r
Henry A. Kissinger re-
sponded that "elimination
of Pak armored and air
forces would make the
Paks defenseless. It would
turn Western Pakistan
into a client state . . . a
vassal."
The newest set of secret
documents released by col-
u m n i s t Jack Anderson
tend to support current
claims by Kissinger that.
fear of an Indian assault
on West Pakistan was the
motive behind the "tilt" in
U.S. policy toward Pakis-
tan in the recently con
eluded war.
First Indication
The latest document,
minutes of a meeting of
the Washington Special
Action Group on Dec. 8, is
the first of the Anderson
papers to give any indica-
tion of U.S. motives dur-
ing the crisis.
Amid speculation that
President Nixon a c t e d
against India out of per-
sonal pique or to.protect
relations with China, Kis-
singer has., been putting
out word that the CIA of-
fered "conclusive proof" of
an Indian intention to de-
molish Pakistani defenses
and dismember Pakistan.
The :Anderson document
says Helms told the
WSAG, "It is reported that
prior to terminating pre-
sent hostilities, :Mrs. Ghan-
di (Indira Ghandi, Indian
prime minister) intends to
attempt to eliminate Pa-
kistan's armor and air
force capabilities."
Threat to Kashmir
Kissinger and H e 1 m s
agreed that India intended
to seize Azad Kashmir, the
portion of the disputed
northern territory in
Kashmir in Pakistani
hands. The documents do
not make fully clear
whether it was thought
the Indians were intent on
still further "dismember-
ment" of Pakistan.
Kissinger said that "if
the Indians smash the Pak
air force and the armored
forces we would have a de-
liberate Indian attempt to
force the disintegration of
Pakistan."
A dissent was registered
by Jospeh Sisco, assistant
secretary of state for Near.
Eastern affairs.
S i s c o reportedly said
that "if the situation were
to evolve as Dr. Kissinger'
had indicated, then, of
course, there was a serious
risk to the viability of
West Pakistan.
Expressed Doubt
"Mr. Sisco doubted,
however, that the Indians
had this as their objective.
He indicated that Foreign
Minister (Swaran) Singh
t o I d ambassador (Ken-
neth) Keating' that India
had no intention. of taking
any Pak territory.
"Mr. Sisco said it must
also be kept in mind that
Kashmir is really disputed
territory."
After further discussion,
Kissinger said that "what
we may he witnessing is a,
situation wherein a coun-
try (India), equipped and
supported by the Soviets,
may be turning half of Pa-
kistan into an impotent
state and the other half
into a vassal. We mast
consider what other coun-
tries may be thinking of '
our action."
Kissinger said that "we
are not trying to be even-
handed. There can be no
doubt what the President
wants. The President does
not want to be even-hand-
ed. The President believes
that India is the attacker.
We are trying to get across
the idea that India has
jeopardized relations with
the United States."
The day before.the
WSAG meeting was held,
Kissinger told reporters at
a b a c k g r o under that
"there have been some
comments that the Admin-
istration is anti-Indian.
This is totally inaccurate."
The WS AG discussed
possible ways, in Kissin-
ger's words, to "turn the
screw" in the situation,
apparently settling on
none.
There is no mention in
the document of the plan
that. Kissinger now says
was successful-a forceful
message to the Soviet
Union insisting that Rus-
sia stop her ally, India,
front attacking West Pa-
kistan.
According to the doe-
unfents, it was King Hus-
sein of Jordan who initiat-
ed an offer to provide
eight U.$. built jet fight-
ers to Pakistan, another
Muslim country. Previous
installments of the Ander-
son papers implied that
the United States had
thought up the plan.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300100017-3
 tion" if China intervened in
the war.
The summary of the Dec. 8
meeting of key administration of-
ficials includes the widely quoted
remarks by presidential adviser
Henry A. Kissinger that Presi-
dent Nixon "does not want to be
even-handed' in his position on
the war because he "believes that
India is the attacker."
N,i. YORK DKIr? Pen,!'
i5 JAN ISM
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R00
lea
Yd P V7
3
Wt
STATINTL
Washington, Jail'. 14 (Special)-Columnist Jack Anderson released today the text
of a summary of another W,17hite House meeting on the India-Pakistan war. In it, a
senior administration official was quoted as attributing to Prime Minister Indira Gan-
dhi a statement that the Soviet Union had promised to take "appropriate counterac-
Stamped "Secret"
The summary was one of four
That Anderson obtained and used
as a basis for his columns earlier
this month detailing the adminis-
tration's attempt to cope with the
India-Pakistan crisis.
The documents received by
Anderson were stamped "secret
sensitive." Anderson published his
stories on the premise of the
public's right to know.
Kissinger charged that Ander-
son quoted him out of context.
Anderson then made public the
texts of the summaries of the
meetings, which were conducted
b th W h S ' 1 A '
t
"Dr. Kissinger said that we
cannot afford to case India's
state of mind. 'The lady' is cold-
blooded and tough and will not
turn into a Soviet satellite mere-
ly because of pique. We should
not ease her mind. Ile invited
anyone who objected to this ap-
proach to take his ease to the
President. Ambassador Ken-
neth) Keating, he suggested, is
offering enough reassurance on
his own."
"Next Turn of Screw"
The summary also shows Kis-
singer's deep interest in U.S. aid
to India and Pakistan. Pakistan's
aid was cut off before the war;
most of India's after it began.
Having been assured that very
little aid was getting through to
India, "Dr. Kissinger inquired
what the next turn of the screw
might be."
ZFIL
Jack Andersgn cussing the 1972 AID budget,
Releases another text 'Dr. Kissinger stated that cur-
y e as nrg
on pecra . et on
"She said that the Soviets had
Group of the National Security
Council. cautioned her that the Chinese
Attended by 20 might rattle the sword in Lad-
B e for e today, Anderson re- dakh but that the Soviets have
leased the texts of the group's promise dto take appropriate
meetings Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. counteraction if this should oc-
G cur.
rent orders are not to put any-
thing into the budget for aid to
India. It was not to be leaded
that AID had put money in the
budget for India only to have the
`wicked' White House take it
out."
The document recorded Kissin-
ger's interest in a suggestion
that the U.S. might get military
supplies to Pakistan by routing
The Dec. 8 meeting was attend- Mr. Helms indicate dthat there
ed by 20 representatives of such was no Chinese buildup at thisi
agencies as the CIA, Agency for time, but, nevertheless, even with-
International Development, Joint out a buildup, they could make
Chiefs of Staff, State Department 'motions and rattle the sword.' "
and Defense Department, accord- (Ladakh, a remote part of
ing to the summary. Kashmir n India, juts between
Among the main speakers at China's Sinkiang province and
the 70-minute meeting were Kis- Tibet. The Chinese overran the
singer; CIA Director Richard M. area in 1951 and, without the
Helms; David Packard, who re- Indians finding out about it for
signed Dec. 14 as deputy secre- a year, built a road from Sink-
tary of defense; Assistant Secre- fang to Tibet across -Ladakh's
tary of State Joseph J. Sisco; U. Aksai Chin Plateau in an effort
Alexis Johnson, undersecretary of to protect its Tibetan supply line.
.state, and Maurice Williams, dep- The Chinese last made a show of
uty administrator of AID. force in Ladakh in November
Seven-Page Summary 1965.)
The India-Pakistan war broke On the Kissinger remark, the
out Dec. 3 and ended Dec. 17. text reads as follows:
Packard announced his resigna-
tion Dec. 11, three days after he "Dr. Kissinger said that we are
attended the meeting. not trying to be even-handed.
The following are excerpts from There can be no doubt what the
the seven-page confidential sum- President wants. The President
mazy that Anderson made public: does not want to be even-handed.
"Mr. Helms then stated that "The President believes that
earlier he had omitted mention- India is the attacker. We are
ing that Mine. Gandhi, when re- trying to get across the idea that
ferring to China, expressed the India has jeopardized relations
hope that there. would be no Chi- with the United States.
xlese intervention in the We
them through, Jordan.
Question of F-104s
"Mr. Packard explained that
we could not authorize the Jor-
danians to do anything that the
USG (United States government)
could not do," the document read.
"If the USG could not give the
F-104s (American F-104 jets) to
Pakistan, we could not allow
Jordan to do so:
"If a third country had ma-
terial that the USG did not have,
that was one thing, but we could
not allow Jordan to transfer the
104s unless we make a finding
that the Paks, themselves, were
eligible to purchase them from
us directly.
"Dr. Kissinger suggested that
perhaps we never really ana-
lyzed what the real danger was
when we were turning off the
i arms of Pakistan."
Pressures on Aides '
The pressures on Nixon's ad-
visers to cone up with some basis
for Nixon's apparent support for
Pakistan was seen in the follow-
ing exchange:
"Ambassador Johnson s a i d
that we must examine the possi-
ble effects that additional sup-
plies for Pakistan might have. It
could be that eight F-104s night
not make any difference once the
real war in the West starts. They
could he considered only as a
token. If, in, fact, we were to
move in Wrest Pakistan we would
be in a new ballgrme.
"Amba.-sador Johnson said that
one possibility would he our rc-
nly to Foreign Minister (Indian
Foreign Minister Swaran) Singh,
in which we could acknowledge
the Indian pledge that they do not
have territorial designs. He also
stated we must also consider the
fact that the Paks may them-
selves by trying to take Kashmir.
"After discussing various pos-
sible commitments to both Pawis-
tan and India, Mr. Packard stated
that tre.overriding consideration
is the practical problem of either
doing something effective or do-
ing nothing.
"If you don't win, don't get in-
volved.
"If we were to attempt some-
thing it would have to be with a
certainty that it would affect the
outcome. Let's not get in if we
are going to lose. Find out some
way to stay out."
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