HANOI SIGNALS VIEWED NOT SERIOUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300170003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 18, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 20Q4 AIp R C RDP80-01601
18 AUG 1972 STATINTL
The, Wtshhhgg talk N e err y-C."J au.ncl
cly
..By Jac1d 4ndei'soft He held. out hope the North
Vietnamese, despite loudar
We have had access to clan-growlings from Iianoi, would
sified documents which shed
new light on the controversy
over whether President Nixon
"missed" an opportunity to
end the Vietnam War in 1969.
`?' The North Vietnamese sent
out several signals after the
1.968 election that they were
willing to make peace with the
new Nixon administration.
These ranged from guarded
messages to military pull-
backs,
The messages, some more.
vague than others, reached
Washington through a variety
of channels. But more impres-
sive.w,as the withdrawal of 22
of 25 regiments from the two
northernmost provinces of
South Vietnam,
The key to the controversy
lies in the interpretation of
these moves. The new Pr osi-
dent chose not to regard the
messages as serious peace
overtures. He also interpreted
the withdrawal of the 22 regi-
ments as a military redeploy-
ment rather than a' political
signal.
The minutes of a secret
White House meeting on Oct.
28, 19169, summarize the Nixon
attitude. Speaking for the
President, Henry I issinger de-
clared:
"We have mentioned 'cease-
-fire' (to Hanoi) in various con-
notations. If they want a rea-
sonable compromise, we will
meet them half-way. If they in-
sist on American humiliation,
:we will resist,"
come to terms. "The Hanoi
tactics are the use of unbri-
dled ferocity," Kissinger said,
"until just before they are
ready to settle."
He outlined a two-track
strategy for peace, "The rapid
road would be negotiation," he
said, "the slow road Vietnami-
zation."
Slow toad
President Nixon. has trav-
eled the slow road. His intelli-
gence estimates warned that it
Communist takeover in South
Vietnam was inevitable. His
Vietnarnization policy, there-
fore, was aimed at delaying it,
not avoiding it.
The President was deter-
mined to hold off the day the
Communists took power in
Saigon, we must conclude, for
his own political reasons. He
simply didn't want the Com-
munists in control of the south
while he was running for re-
election in 1972.
Ile had reason to regard
Communist control more as a
political problem for himself
than a serious menace to the
U.S. For at the time of his in-
auguration, the National Intel-
ligence Estimate was cau-
tiously optimistic about the ef-
fects of a Communist take-
over.
There would be damage, ac-
cording to the estimate, to
U.S. prestige and credibility
among other Southeast Asian
a
nations. But the document
stressed:
"While some Southeast
Asian leaders would probably
entertain doubts about the
will of the U.S, to play a secu-
rity role in the area, we do not
believe that they would "be
panicked into precipitate
changes in policy or posture,"
Instead, tile document pre-
dicted these leaders would
take a wait-and-see stance.
The estimate also offered a
virtual point-by-point rebuttal
of the so-called "domino
theory" whidi the Johnson ad-
ministration had so often used
as its rationalization for con-
tinuing tile wat.
The document declared, for
example, that Hanoi uo doubt
hopes to extend its control
over Laos and Cambodia but
would probably bide its time.
"They might fear some risk
of a new U.S. military re-
sponse," it was suggested.
"Moreover, Hanoi would be
preoccupied for a tune 'at least
with the formidable task of
consolidating Communist rule
in South Vietnam."
The estimate gave this fore-
cast about relations between
Hanoi and Poking in the event
of a communist triumph In
the south:
"It is possible ... that the
two countries would drew
ploser together ... It seems
more likely, however, that
Hanoi would wish to take the
opportunity to establish quite
clearly its independence of the
Chinese, relying on continued
Soviet and available Free
World" assistance. .
The document said Peking
could be expected to beat the
propaganda drums over the
expansion of Communist con-
trol. But it added signifi-
cantly: "Current Chinese
strategy does not appear to
call for overt aggression, and
we do not foresee a change in
this strategy."
As for Moscow, the docu-
ment predicted: "?rhe Soviet
Union is not likely to become
a major supporter of Conirnu-
nist subversion in Southeast
Asia after Vietnain."
The CIA's Office of National
Estimates concurred in 1969
that if Saigon fell, "North
Vietnam would consume itself
in Laos and South Vietnam.
Only Laos would definitely
follow Into the Communist
orbit."
This would leave Southeast
Asia, in the CIA's opinion,
"just as it is at least for an-
other generation."
Whatever the intelligence
assessment, however, Presi-
dent Nixon's political assess-
ment was that he couldn't af-
ford to lose South Vietnam to
the Communists before ilia
1972 election.
Perhaps he is right that the
"rapid road" to peace, via ne-
gotiation, was illusory. But the
"slow road," which he elected
to take, has cost more than
1.5,000 American lives since he
took office.
ya 1Y12, United Feature Ayndioat*
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :. CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300170003-1