BREZHNEV ASSURES KISSINGER ON TIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300170006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 5, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

W.&S11I1lCTCid POST
Approved For Release 2001/Q/fy: '7A-RDP80-01
STATINTL
%
1"1
rez h v Assures hiss
By Jack Anderson
Kremlin czar Leonid I3rezh-
o.ev used tough language to
Impress upon Ileiiry Kissinger
In Moscow that Russia will
continue to support North
Vietnam.
But Brezhnev assured the
President's peripatetic foreign
policy adviser that the Viet-
nam war need not stand in the
way of better Soviet-American
relations.
The conversations contin-
ued, off and on, for four days.
Sources privy to the secret de-
tails tell us Brezhnev was fu-
rious over U.S. suggestions
that the Soviets had equipped
Hanoi for an invasion of South
Vietnam.
President -Nixon , himself
served an oblique warning
upon the Kremlin that "great
powers cannot avoid the re-
sponsibility for the use of
arms by those to whom they
give them."
Brezhnev offered no apolo.
,gi.es for furnishing Hanoi with
the T-54 tanks, heavy artillery
and other sophisticated weap-
ons that have shown up on the
fighting fronts. The North Vi-
etnamese have used. these
heavy arms to spearhead their
new offensive.
Brezhnev not only acknowl-
edged that Soviet military
shipments to Hanoi have been
Increased, but he made it,
plain he would risk alienating
the U.S. before abandoning
North Vietnam.
He suggested, that a Viet-
nam settlement can still be ne-
gotiated. However, there was
no Soviet offer to soften Ha-
noi's terms. Brezhnev and Kis-
singer merely agreed that the
two superpowers shouldn't let
the Vietnam war disrupt their
efforts to seek a Soviet-Ameri.
can detente.
Back at the White house,
Kisringer apparently has per.
suaded the President not to
let the Vietnam fighting Jeop-
ardize relations with the Rus-
sians. Nixon's first reaction
after the new North Vietnam-
ese offensive was to hit back.
Ile said privately that he
wasn't going to permit the
U.S. to be pushed around.
But the original hard U.S.
line, at least so far as Russia
is concerned, has now been
softened.
A,iiswver: to Thailaml
The government of Thailand
has accused us of "slanderous
accusations" for reporting how
prominent Thais help to hus-
tle heroin to U.S. markets.
Through Its embassy in
Washington, Thailand angrily
charged that our recent col-
umn on the Thai drug trade
was based "merely on hear.
say."
In fact, our report was
based upon a thorough field
investigation by American
narcotics and Intelligence
agents. The Central Intelli-,
genee Agency has published
five reports dealing wholly or
in ? part with the Thai dope
trade. These reports, classified
"Confidential" and "Secret,"
substantiate our charges.
The Thais claim, for exam-
ple, that they "began an inten-
sive campaign against danger.
ous drugs more than ten years
ago." They say the Bangkok
government has taken "effec-
tive measures" against drugs.
A prograur to get hill tribes.
men to stop growing opium,
they add, has "met with suc-
cess."
These statements are flatly
contradicted by the five CIA
documents, dated from Octo-
ber, 1970 to October, 1971.
Far from showing progress
in the last ten years, Thailand
and its two neighbors, Burma
and Laos, have "evolved in the
past ten years from a major
center for the growing and
production of intermediate
narcotics products to a major
center for producing finished
heroin."
As for the alleged success In
preventing tribesmen from
growing opium, the CIA
states: "Government measures
to curtail the growth of the
opium poppy among the hill
tribes In ... 17hailand havro
been ineffective."
Thai law authorities, whom
Alie government claims have
cracked down on the drug
traffic, are actually in cahoots
with the smugglers.
Declares the CIA: "Officials
of the R,TA (Royal Thai
Army), the 13PP (Thai border
police) and Customs at the
several checkpoints on the
route to Bangkok are usually
bribed ...
There are, says the CIA, a
multitude of civilian and mili-
tary officials in Burina, Laos
and Thailand "who take their
cut to ensure safe passage of
the opium . . ."
The CIA operatives, unlike
the Thai authorities, Dave
carefully pinpointed poppy
fields, distribution points,
processing centers and smug-
gling routes in Thailand.
.Concludes the CIA: "Opium
or morphine base is delivered
to laboratories in Bangkok for
further refinement into mor-
phine or heroin Most of
the refined produce is then
smuggled aboard Honk, Kong.,
bound vessels-either Thai
merchant ships at the Cho
Phraya River docks In Bang-
kok or That deep sea trawlers.
"Such craft may then do.
posit the Illicit cargo on one of
the. several hundred small is-
lands ringing Hong Kong for
later retrieval by a Hong
Kong junk."
019'x2, unites P'eour s a ndicsta
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300170006-8