HOW TO BE A PRESIDENT.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300340035-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: May 22, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
EN 5"o roved oved For'Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
ENQ
MAY 2 2 1972
11 32,231
How to Be a President
Some sober and objective re-
flections on the exact manner
t. in which the President man-
aged his tour de force concern-
ing Vietnam seem only proper.
Whatever the outcome con-
cerning an end of the Vietnam
fighting, this has been one of
the most skillful exercises in
executing a difficult and com-
plex strategy made by an
American president.
First, it is instructive to refer
to the old.nine-days wonder, the
Pentagon Papers, which are a
mine of information. In that
study, a memorandum of May
24, 1967, from Undersecretary
of State Nicholas Katzenbach
went on the record. He sug-
gested (as one alternative to
the course of action then being
proposed by the military) that
bombing of North Vietnam be
either limited or stopped, ai)d
that a request for 200,000 more
troops be held down to 10,000.
The CIA backed the accepta-
bility' o suc ~new alternative
iii for President Johnson's consid-
eration with an estimate that an
intensified air attack "would
confront the Soviets. with diffi-
cult choices, although the CIA
expected that in the end the
Soviets would avoid a direct
confrontation with the U. S.
and would simply step up their
support through China."
This CIA memo was-reported
','In the Pentagon Papers as stat-
ing that mining North Vietnam-
ese ports " ...would put China
in a. commanding political posi-
tion, since it would have con-
trol over the remaining supply
lines to North Vietnam."
This flurry of May notes
came in response to a visit to
President Johnson in Washing-
ton on April 27, 1967, by Gen-
that country's transport system,
given the present situation.
Since the Soviets themselves
- Closing of North Vietnam- seemed to have been the. great
authors and subsidizi
ower
ng p
ese parts.
- Additional troops to ex- for the North Vietnamese East-
tend the war into Cambodian er offensive, what difference
and Laotian sanctuaries. did it make, except to our ad-
- "...possible invasion of vantage, it Hanoi became a Pe-
North Vietnam. We may wish. king dependency? The Presi?
to take offensive action against dent had already prepared for
the (north) with g r o u n d that eventuality with the great-
troops." est of skill.
We k n o w how that all Reaction from Hanoi and.
turned out. Indeed, the Penta- Moscow was less vehement
gon Papers state that after than from doves in the United
hearing General Westmoreland States Senate. The President of.
the President remained the United States had moved
skeptical to say the least " first and prepared his diplomatic
They noted that when the gen- battleground. Russia and China
eral spoke to Congress the next had too much to lose to make
day, "he mentioned the bomb- a crisis out of it,
ing only in passing as a repris Revisiting the Pentagon Pa-
al for VC terror and depreda ; pers and reviewing the most
tion in the south." recent developments in the In.
Now consider President Nix- ..dochina War can only bring
on's careful preparation. these conclusions: -- Lyndon B.
pT-I, ,--- L--?- At_
There have been, warnings took the counsel of fear, and
since January of a North Viet- ' , thereby allowed a war ? to drag
namese buildup for some kind on which his soldiers, airmen
of conventional attack on the and sailors were asking to be
South. (A typical analysis print-
ed in The Enquirer in Febru-
ary flatly stated it would in-
allowed to win for him five
years ago.
-- Richard M. Nixon res-
volve armor and accurately cued a situation by using the
predicted the specific points of tools of a 1967 victory to ob-
attack and the objectives if it tain a 1972 respite. More than
were attempted.)
President Nixon opened new
and dramatic relations with
Red China.
He pushed a diplomatic of-
fensive in Europe. which made
it imperative to the Soviets
that the hoped-for results, of
mutual great advantage,
wouldn't be jeopardized by oth
er events.
He then o r d e r e d intense
bombing of the North, of the
kind advocated by our military
in 1967, and mined the harbors,
as advocated by our military in.
that was Ider.ied him by
changed . ,circumstances. What
he did, and how he did it, how-
ever, should make his pursuit
of an end to Vietnam a text-
book example of how to be a
president.
eral William C. Westmoreland,, Russia can hardly achieve
who, the papers say, requested great cooperation from, China
these things: in supporting Hanoi throw h
i~90ease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300340035-7
bombing.