THE DIE IS CAST, BUT POSSIBILITY OF TALK REMAINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300340038-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: May 12, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

12 STATI N
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01601 ROO
By TED LEWIS
:; Washington, I',lay J.1-We are
inow committed as a nation to seek-
ing an end to the Vietnam war by
halting the flow of supplies to'
North Vietnam from Soviet Russia
and Red China. Whatever the risks
in .this enterprise, the American
people must accept them, for the
gamble has been taken by an ad-
ininistration they elected and en-
trusted their security to.
It follows that on this one issue, now
.,that it has been joined, there is no pull-
ing back. We have a fait accompli. The
'harbors have live mines. What responses
cone from Peking and Moscow must be
'based on the fact that the (teed is clone.
So it is futile to raise voices, either
in protest or in support, for there are
going' to be no changes made in this
Nixon effort "to end the %var" in this
fashion. Having said that, in connection
with the all-out naval and air action to
'deprive Hanoi. of military supplies,
there are two aspects of Nixon Vietnam
policy, both tangential to the decision to
expand the war, that c:uinot come under
the national unity, motif no matter how
much the administration tri>s to include
them.
What is past is prologue. And there
is no 'question, despite Nixon's obtuse
evasiveness on the issue, that Viet-
namization as he had planned it failed
significantly to cone ip.io expectations.
If it had the South Vietnamese would
have been able "to hack it;" as Gen.
Abrams put it, and beaten off North
Vietnamese ground onslaughts.
And neither is there any question,
` despite the fuzzy denial by Defense
Secretary Laird, that our intelligence
apparatus misread all signals from
North Vietnam. The offensive power of
Hanoi was totally underestimated, in-
cluding its tank, artillery and antiair-
craft. strength.
Nixon's Offer to Hanoi
Sure, this is all. water over the dais,
but it is relevant. Had the Communist
invasion been checked, there obviously
would have been no necessity for the
U.S. to carry the war by sea and air
to the north, with the attendant risk
night announcement of his' harbor miii-
ing and rail interdiction decision. He of-
fered a "ceasefire throughout Indochina"
to accompany American military disen-
gagenient from the war on release of
American PWs.
This ceasefire proposal was sup-
posed to be a most generous offer. But
to this date, its terms have been shroud-
ed in deliberate ambiguity, Clearly it
was unacceptable to Hanoi if it required
the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese
troops from South Vietnam. For that
reason there have been hints here that
the offer could be a ceasefire based on
the present ground positions of the bulk
of the invading forces.
What goes on in this juggling of
semantics is almost beyond comprehen-
sion. But something is in the wind and
it definitely does not jibe with the .tough'
anti-invasion language delivered by
Nixon and Laird among others previ-
ously,
Any negotiations with Hanoi were
supposed to be out until North Vietnam
withdrew all the forces that launched
the "massive invasion" of March 30
across the demilitarized zone.
Currency for n iWrnor '
A ceasefire leaving the Hanoi Reds
in strategic positions they now hold
within South Vietnam could scarcely
contribute to the cause of an honorable
peace as envisioned by Nixon. Yet for
some unfathomable reason the adminis-
tration-including presidential adviser
Henry Kissinger-have allowed this pos-
sibility to be bandied about by de-empha-
sizing as a must the withdrawal of all
Communist troops from South Vietnam.
We bring up-these points of contro-
versy because they involve issues of
policy separate from the military effort
to halt the flow of war materiel into
North Vietnam. There is a strained
effort in the administration to silence
critics of these aspects as well as critics
of the- expanded U.S. air and naval
involvement. -
Bragged of Viefnarnizatiou
We have, for example, Treasury
Secretary. Connally accusing Senate
Democrats of "placing partisan politics
above the interests of this nation." And
Defense Secretary Laird saying, "This
p* t r y ~~ he was convinced the American people
mot in
57 support Gen. Abrams and our
,,ci?" Communist aggi`ession."
to Nixon's `generation of peace"
gestures to Peking and Moscow.
.But there is another tangential as-
pect to the carrying of the war to North
Vietnam that is far more pertinent and
l
i''
7
e~ 14 (mat: iJt./
UPI Photo
The Newport News-heavy cruiser on
duty near Haiphong.
Nixon's 1968 pledge to end the war, for
he "had a plan" that would do just that
nor the horrific mess in our intelligence
setup, including the CIA with its ignor-
ance of the vast Soviet-supplied, arsenal
of offensive weapons available for the
invasion.
Whether this war will be won, lost
or compromised is still up in the air de-
spite all the flamboyant rhetoric. Which
way it is going to go for the next few
months will not depend on how bellicose
the Soviet statements are' to the U.S.
crackdown on Red shipping, but on what
the North Vietnam invading divisions
do before Hue, An Lee and Kontuin
exing.
even more perp
l~;xThis A pirdme hh'iOlhrR,~ that ssile se 201OW/iO4i1.G4]itself c cannot be a 1" 01 R000300340038-4
tha ma r, ax
1972. Neither, for
Llltll: --
Abrams is the general WHO
again, with an echo from Nixon, said
Vietnamization was a success and the
troops of South Vietnam were capable,
on the ground, of keeping their country
V