REFLECTIONS ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S ESCALATION OF THE INDOCHINA WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350049-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: May 22, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN

E 5574Approved Fore gM9 @ Ag3fMC'CSR"-pzAogf11 g 9 e 500. i, 22,. X972
Following are the questions for Your
Opinion, Please-1972:
YOUR OPINION, PLEASE
(1) Do you favor busing school children
for racial reasons?
(2) Should draft evaders and military de-
serters who fled abroad be allowed to return
without penalty?
(3) Do you favor a nationwide, federally-
financed child care system?
(4) Do you favor legalization of marihuana
for personal and private use?
(5) Do you favor total abolition of the
draft and reliance solely on an all-volunteer
Army?
(6) Environmental spending is high, and
climbing. Federal outlays went up 600% be-
tween 1969 ($431 million) and 1973 ($2.5 bil-
lion proposed). Private, industry will spend
$4;9 billion this year and must spend another
$22.8 billion to meet current anti-pollution
regulations. Do you feel this -indicates pro-
gress? -
(Please write the number of the question
most important or of greatest interest to
__Zou .) -
REFLECTIONS ON PRESIDENT
NIXON'S ESCALATION OF THE
INDOCHINA WAR
HON. ROBERT F. DRINAN
' OP MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE IIOUS11 OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 22, 1972
Mr., DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, since May
8, when President Nixon qualitatively es-
balated American military activities in
Indochina, I have 'received more than
2,000 letters from constituents in opposi-
tion to the escalation. More than 98 per-
tent of my mail on this issue opposes the
President's actiont.
I have today sent to a number of con-
stituents my thoughts on this tragic war
and our failure to end it.
I would like to share those thoughts
with my colleagues.
Fifteen months ago a small group of
Congressmen and myself had breakfast
with Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN. On that
occasion Senator MCGOVERN predicted,
with sorrow but with certainty, that the
war in Vietnam would be the key issue
in the Presidential election of 1972.
I am not certain that I agreed with
Senator McGovERN on that occasion
but his logic was flawless and his predic-
tion accurate.
-The speech of the President on the
evening of May 8, 1972, demonstrated
what Senator MCGOVERN predicted. Viet-
namiza,tion has failed, the invasion of
Cambodia was fruitless, and the revisal
of the air war was as unsuccessful as the
officials quoted in the Pentagon Papers
had predicted.
The president stated on May 8 that he
expects to use "decisive military action to
end the war." He categorically rejected.
the other two options of withdrawal or
negotiation.
The first 2 weeks of reaction and de-
velopment after the unprecedented esca-
lation of the- war announced on May 8
unfortunately yield no evidence that the
mining of Haiphong harbor will do any-
thing except involve the United States
in Indochina on a virtually indefinite
basis. Any intimation of hope that the
Nixon administration had worked out
some informal arrangement with Rus-
sia to bring the war to an end cannot be
substantiated by any credible interpre-
tation of whatever facts are known. '
The mining of Haiphong Harbor is pos-
sibly the most egregious error ever made
in the long history of this war. Russia
and China may not have the naval pow-
er to respond in kind but there is no rea-
son to think that they will not continue
to escalate their own efforts to send more
sophisticated weapons to North Vietnam.
The mining of the harbor, an act which
brings great risks for almost nonexistent
benefits, is militarily unsound since it
simply will not work. The Central Intel-
ligence Agency-CIA-stated, as quoted!
in the Pentagon Papers, that:
The mining of the water approaches to the
major port ... would not be able to cut oft
the flow of essential supplies.
A statement in a National Security study
prepared by Henry Kissinger, as pub-
lished in the April 20, 1972 Washington
Post, corroborates this conclusion bye
stating that the office of the Secretary
of Defense and the CIA:
Believe that (if all imports from the sea
were denied) the over-land routes from
China could provide North Vietnam enough
material to carry on, even with an unlimited
bombing campaign.
In a statement on May 9, I concluded
that the action of the President was il-
legal, unconstitutional, and totally un,
justifiable-even if one accepts the valid-
ity of President Nixon's stated military
and political objectives in Indochina.
The determination of the President to
engage in "decisive military action to end
the war" has had a broad impact on offi-
cials in the administration. Secretary of
State Rogers has testified before a con-
gressional committee that the President's
proposed withdrawal 4 months after a
cease-fire does not mean that the 100,000
Army, Navy, and Air T: orce personnel in
and around Indochina would refrain
from hostile military action if it ap-
peared that the status quo in South
Vietnam were being changed. The Navy's
top official, Admiral Zuunwalt, in response
to a question at a press conference,
stated that the United States will stop
all ships even though it is known that
these ships contain only food for civilian
consumption. - .
WILL TIIE PENTAGON EVER LEARN?
The President's determination to en-
gage in "decisive military action to end
the war" can hardly be achieved by the
military forces of South Vietnam. A
study prepared for Henry Kissinger has
recently revealed that in 1969 the South
Vietnamese Army had the astonishingly
high desertion rate of 34 percent on an
annual basis. This means that during
that year the South Vietnamese Army
was losing the equivalent of one division
a month.
There is overwhelming evidence, more-
over, indicating that the Army of South
Vietnam has the most serious morale
problems-attributable in part to the
fact that the regime, of President Thieu
has followed the old French custom of
not allowing peasants to become military
officers. Consequently the core of field
officers, selected in part for political con-
siderations, did not surprise anyone in
South or North Vietnam when they
broke and ran ahead of their troops in
retreat from the battle at Quang Tri.
The cumulative. evidence of the un-
willingness or the inability of the South
Vietnamese to carry out the objectives
arrived at by the White House and Pres-
ident Thieu was overwhelmingly clear
long before this tragic moment. That evi-
dence was clear a generation ago when
the Truman administration in the years
1950, to 1954 paid three-quarter of the
total cost of the war of the French which
1used at Dienbienphu!
The political and military experts at
the Pentagon, furthermore, cannot be
unaware that the demilitarized zone,
.agreed to in the Geneva accords in
August 1954, was an arbitrary line de-
signed to be enforced only until an elec-
tion of all of the Vietnamese people would
occur. Since that election was prevented
by President Diem, with the hell) of the
United States, the 17th parallel has no
legal or, political or moral meaning for
any nation in the world. Consequently it
is contrary to fact to. state that the North
Vietnamese have been "an aggressor."
AN ANGUISHED AND BEWILDERED CITIZENRY REACT
I received at least 2,000 letters and
telegrams in the 2 weeks following the
President's May 8 reescalation of the
war. I doubt if more than 10 of these
2,000 urged me to "support the Pres-
ident." At least 10Q implored for the
impeachment of the President.
Thousands of students, clergymen, and
others have conic to Washington in a
desperate hope that they would be able
to accomplish something. It is increas-
ingly difficult to know.. what to advise
these devoted persons. I have spoken to
many groups including 'students from
Kent State, clergymen from all over the
Nation, and a group of some 300. physi-
icans that gathered in Faneuil Hall in
Boston bn May 12.
I urged all these groups to become bet-
ter informed about the tragedies in Viet-
nam with the hope that they could per-
suade Members of Congress and others
that there was no, reason under the
SEATO Treaty why the United States
should have intervened in South Viet-
nam originally nor is there any national
interest of the United States involved in
the political ideology of an area of the
world smaller than New England and
more than.10,000 miles from our shores.
I also remind the many audiences who
ask me to talk to them that they should
be fully aware of the provision in the
SEATO Treaty to the effect that each
signatory nation agrees to intervene only
after all of the constitutional processes
of that particular nation have been com-
plied with. In view of this fact and many
other circumstances it is clear beyond
doubt that the President has no author-
ization for the institution of a blockage
or the broadening of the war in such a
way that a confrontation with mainland
China and Russia is not impossible.
I also point out to the countless in-
dividuals and groups who desire peace
that in the ultimate analysis it is not
merely the President and the Congress
that have continued the war in Vietnam'
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What President Johnson
dared not attempt, President
Nixon has done: He has taken
measures to seal the harbors
of Haiphong and other North
Vietnamese ports. Senator
Henry Jackson (D., Wash.)
and others say this should
have been done six years
agog and so it should: But
Richard Nixon was not Presi-
dent then.
If 'mining those harbors.will
not suffice, it is quite possible
for the American fleet to
commence a regular block-
ade. It is not in the power of
Russia to defy such a block-
ade. How long could the Com-
munists of Hanoi continue
their invasion of South Viet-
nam with such an interrup-
tion of military supplies?
An old CIA report, leaked
to the press, argues that IIa-
noi still could obtain heavy
weapons and ammunition by
the land routes through
China. Yet that ,would he a
slower and more costly route,
especially since the North Vi-
etnamnese now depend more
heavily upon Russian artillery
and tanks and trucks.
And can Hanoi be confident
that China would permit Rus-
sian materiel to pass un-
impeded through their territo-
ry from Soviet Asia? Peking
has much to gain from an
understanding with the United.
States, and might rejoice in
the humiliation of Moscow.
North Vietnam is Russia's
client state, really, not
China's.
President Nixon would not
For - the American public
desires orderly withdrawal of
American ground forces from
Vietnam, but it distinctly
does not desire American de-
feat or the brutal conquest of
Saigon by Hanoi. If the Nixon
Administration continues to
withdraw troops while it
blocks the North Vietnamese.
ports, Mr. Nixon need not
dread any general public dis-
approval of his strategy.
Violent collegiate demon-
strators - against the Nixon
strategy actually achieve just
the opposite of what they de-
sire: They cause the general
public to rally behind the Nix.
on administration. -Blocking
highways, burning automo-.,
biles, and smashing windows
are tactics politically mad, in
this country.
venture to mine and bomb
close to the Chinese frontier,
were, he not reasonably sure
that Peking will refuse to
assist Hanoi substantially.
There exists reason to sup-
pose that the masters of Pe-
king now desire some com-
promise settlement in Viet-
nam. To put it mildly, Mr.
Nixon's action against the
ports must mightily distress i
the Communists of Hanoi.
The North Vietnamese lead-
ers, civilian and .military, ap-
parently had assumed that
peace sentiment in America
would restrain President Nix-
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strategy. h Ai c~1~at
American public opinion.
 COLUMBUS, GA.
ENQUIR roved E Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RD*6Tdk d-1 R
MAY 218
M 32,231
given the present situation.
ML D
Ow 'to D_ e a k- res eye, Since the Soviets themselves
seemed to have been the -great
Some sober and objective re- - Closing of North Vietnam-
authors and subsidizing power
ese p rts.
Elections on the exact manner r $Additional troops to ex- for the North Vietnamese East-
r.s in. which the President man- tend the war into Cambodian er offensive, what difference
'.aged his tour de force concern- and Laotian sanctuaries. did it make, except to our ad-
ing Vietnam seem only proper. possible invasion of vantage, if Hanoi became a Pe-
t' Whatever the outcome con- king dependency? The Presi-
North Vietnam. We may wish.
cerning an end of the Vietnam dent had already prepared for
fighting, this has been one of to take offensive action against that eventuality with the great-
the (north) with g r o u n d
the most skillful exercises in est of skill.
s
"
troo
.
p
i executing a difficult and com- Reaction from Hanoi and
We know how that all
plec strategy made by an turned out. Indeed, the Penta- Moscow was less vehement
American president. Ron papers state that after than from doves in the United
First, it is instructive to refer hearing General Westmoreland States Senate. The President of.
to the old.nine-days wonder, the the President remained ? the United States had moved
Pentagon Papers, which are a skeptical to say the least." first and prepared his diplomatic
mine of information. In that They noted that when the gen- battleground. Russia and China
study, a memorandum of May eral spoke to Congress the next had too much to lose to make
24, 1967, from Undersecretary day, "he mentioned the bomb- a crisis out of it.
of State Nicholas Katzenbach ing only in passing as a repris Revisiting the Pentagon Pa-
went on the record. He sug- al for, , VC terror and depreda-.: :pers and reviewing the most
gested (as one alternative to tion in the south." recent developments in the In.
the course of action then being Nov consider President ix* 'dochina War can only bring
proposed by the military) that these conclusions: -- Lyndon B.
bombing of North Vietnam be on's careful preparation. Johnson took the wrong advice,
either limited -or stopped, aid. There have been warnings took the counsel of fear, and
that a request for 200,000 more since January oL a North Viet- ' thereby allowed a war - to drag
troops be held down to 10,000. namese buildup for some kind on which his soldiers, airmen
The CIA backed the accepta- of conventional attack on the and sailors were asking to be
bility' of, suc a new alternative South. (A typical analysis print- allowed to win for him five
for President Johnson's consid- ed in The Enquirer in Febru- ' years ago.
eration with an estimate that an ary flatly stated it would in- - Richard M. Nixon res-
intensified air attack "would volve armor and accurately cued a situation by using the
confront the Soviets, with diffi- predicted the specific points of tools of a 1967 victory to ob-
cult choices, although the CIA attack and the objectives if it tain a 1972 respite. More than
expected that in the end the were attempted.) ' that was ' d e r, i e d him by
Soviets would avoid a direct President Nixon opened new changed ,circumstances. What
confrontation with the U. S. and dramatic relations with . he did, and how he did it, how-
and would simply step up their Red China. ever, should make his pursuit
support through China." He pushed a diplomatic of- of an end to Vietnam a text-
This CIA memo was-reported fensive in Europe which-made book example of how to be a
in the Pentagon Papers as stat- it imperative to the Soviets president,
ing that mining North Vietnam- that the hoped-for results, of
ese ports "...would put China mutual great a d v a n t a g e,
in. a commanding political posi- wouldn't be jeopardized by oth-.
tion, since it would have con- er events.
trol, over the remaining supply He then o rd e re d intense
lines to North Vietnam." bombing of the North, of the
This flurry of May notes kind advocated by our military
came in response to a visit to in 1967, and mined the harbors,
President Johnson in Washing- as advocated by our military in-
ton on April. 27, 1967, by Gen- 1967.
eral William C. Westmoreland,, Russia can hardly achieve
that country's 'transport system,
who, tke-
these & 8STc 'o lea e2b04?6~'Ib1n di 0-01601 R000300350049-1
in supporting I11ano t oug
Continued and. intensified
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The Danger o Definitions
The latest address by the President and briefing by Dr.
Kissinger underscore the near impossibility of carrying on
with them a critical dialogue about the war. The more one
reads and hears what they have to say, the clearer it
becomes that U.S. policy is almost hopelessly enshrouded
in myth and illusion. From the outset, American policy
in Vietnam has been based not on misconceptions or
erroneous judgments but on willfully false definitions.
Over a seven-year period, these definitions have been
endlessly repeated and are now firmly imbedded in in-
numerable policy statements. By dint of bipartisan repeti-
tion at the highest levels, these definitions have, to some
extent, been accepted by a large section of the public
as unassailable propositions. Still worse, the decision'
makers are so entangled in these false assumptions that
they habitually deceive themselves.
A fundamental rule in the rational handling of embit-
tered controversies is that each party should be able to
give a fair and accurate statement of the other's position.
Neither the President nor Dr. Kissinger is capable of
such an exercise. They cannot or will not see the situa-
tion as the North Vietnamese must see it or, for that
matter, as the Russians or Chinese may see it. Or if they
.can, they are so caught up in their own mistakes that they
cannot afford, to make the effort. Worse, they must cling
to these accumulated false definitions in order to avoid
.acknowledging profound misjudgments by themselves and
their predecessors. So they take new and steadily more
dangerous risks in a desperate effort to redefine the situa-
tion in away. that will rally domestic opinion and shore
tip a disintegrating political position.
Thus the President's latest gamble is not primarily
designed to "win" the war-his own actions and state-
ments imply that it has been lost-but to make it possible
for him to journey to Moscow without. the stigma of de-
feat. It would be difficult to negotiate with the Russians
about anything just when, say, the North Vietnamese were
entering Hue. At the same time he assumes that he can
count, at least temporarily, on a section of the public
rallying "in support of the President," as it usually does
in a time of national crisis. So he is willing to accept the
risks because, as he sees it, he has run out of options.
But what if the Russians elect not to stage a direct con-
frontation? What will the next escalation be? A landing
of some kind in the North?' A threat to use nuclear
weapons (as Dulles once threatened the Chinese through
the - Indian ambassador?) Or the actual use of tactical
nuclear weapons?
. Bemused by 19th-century notions of power, Kissinger
believes that if preponderant power is escalated, a step at
a time, and- if the "carrot" is seemingly sweetened a bit
at, each escalation; the enemy must eventually do the
bidding of those who turn the screws. It was Metternich's
notion that, in the end, "things" (power) are more im-
portant than people. But that, too, is a false definition.
Ronald Sampson reminds us that the British Empire began
with the plantation in Ulster in 1609. But the trouble in
Ireland has not yet ended nor will it until the British
quit deceiving themselves about the Irish. General de
Gaulle tried to hammer this point home to President
Kennedy about Vietnam but without success. In Memoirs
of Hope, he quotes himself as having said to Kennedy:
"You will find that intervention in this area will he an
.endless entanglement. Once a nation has been aroused,
no foreign 'power,. however strong, can impose its will
upon it."
Kissinger's strategy of escalation also assumes that the
way to win in the nuclear poker game is to raise the ante,
at the right time, in such a way as to force the opponent
to make the hard decision of acquiescing in the ultimatum
(the bid for power) or of staging a counter-escalation.
But suppose the other party elects to do nothing for the
time' being? Suppose the Russians and the Chinese believe
(and in this they would be supported by CIA and other
"evaluations") that mining the harbors of North Vietnam
and bombing the rail links to China will be as ineffective
as Vietnamization in solving America's dilemma? No one
pretends that the recent actions can have any short-term
effect on the war, and substantial expert opinion on
logistics believes that the long-term effect will also fall
short of the goal. Mr. Nixon, then,.will have "spent" one
of his few remaining options to no avail, and will. be
faced with the need to employ some still more dangerous
escalation. It is a progress from unjustified aggression to
complete outlawry.
There were, to be sure, some new elements in the
offer which the President tried to bury beneath the bluster
and arrogance of his address, but the North Vietnamese
are not likely to take the bait. So then what? He could
try to take the entire issue to the Security Council, but
he won't. There is, of course, the possibility of a coup in-
Saigon. .Thicu's. declaration of martial law is evidence
that he senses the- danger. If the present regime were
tossed out,. the successor regime would not need to he
called a "coalition" government even if it were that in
fact.
In the meantime, the war continues, the number of
POWs is increasing, the destruction. is mounting and so
are the casualties, and Nixon's Vietnamization policy is
in tatters. Why, then, doesn't the President show real
concern for the American honor about which he talks so
much? Why doesn't he follow the examples of Mendes-
France and de Gaulle, who saved French honor by bowing
out of Indochina and Algiers? The answer, in brief, is
that they were not self-deceived, whereas the President
has so entrapped himself in a weight of dogmas, promises,
affirmations, threats, declarations and false definitions that
he is incapable-psychologically, morally, intellectually,
politically-of'facing the reality of defeat.
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TULSA, OKLA.
TRIBUNE
F. -- 79,425
MAY 22197
`ACCEPT HANOI TERMS'
Editor, The Tribune:
Nixon has replaced one risky policy decision
which failed with another risky and even more
dangerous one. The CIA i?1969 advised the
President against =oekade, certain that it
would fail. In light of the reality that South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will eventually
come under the control of Communist regimes
(our top officials have already accepted this
fact), the best solution appears to be the pull-
out of American troops and the creation of a.
coalition government in South Vietnam.
This way we can be reasonably certain of
getting our POWs back. But should the block-
ade fail (and the odds are against it) we prob-
ably will never see our POWs again. Therefore,
as a loyal American, I feel that our best policy
would be to accept North Vietnam's terms for
a settlement, and get our troops and our POWs
out forever. This will be a painful decision, but
under the circumstances it is the only practical
Tulsa $.H. .
V
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