SENATE MEETS IN SECRET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350064-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: May 5, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

BkLTIMOPE SUN
Approved For Release 2001/03104Y: CIA-RDP80-016
senate
By ALBERT SEflLSTEDT, in,
-
Washinpton Bureau of The Sun
Washington-The Senate held
another secret session yesterday
to discuss Senator Alike Gravel's
efforts to make public a classi-
fied assessment of the Vietnam
war prepared by the White
House three years ago.
The Alaska Democrat's pro-
posal was the subject of a two-
hour, closed-door session. After-
ward, Senator Robert C. Byrd
(D., W.Va.), the Democratic
whip, said the secret proceed-
ings would be published in the
Congressional Record's Saturday
edition.
Decision not clear
The Senate al o had met in
closed session Tuesday to de-
bate the Gray el proposal, and
the proceedings pf that session
will be printed tr the Record,
too.
However, it was not clear If
the Senate v ould agree to the
publicafion of the White House
study which Mr. Gravel wants.
The substance of the Vietnam
review, called National Security
Study Memorandum No. 1, al-
ready has been published in sev-
eral newspapers.
Last week, Senator Gravel
asked for the Senate's unani-
mous consent to make public a
section of the study dealing
with the bombing in Vietnam
but Senator Robert P. Griffin
(R., Mich.), assistant minority
leader, objected.
28 questions posed
Senator Gravel has not said
how he obtained the copy of the
study.
The Vietnam assessment
evolved from a series of 28 .
questions about the war which
had been posed by President
Nixon's foreign affairs adviser,
Henry A. Kissinger, to the State
and Defense departments and
the Central Intelligence Agency.
The questions dealt with the
,effectiveness of the bombing,
the viability of the Saigon gov-
ernment and other matters.
After receiving answers from
STATINTL
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ry of the. responses for the Pres-,
ident's use.
 a JAp?5?xed For Relearn 1 p / Act f J9Q_Q k 000,3 `350Q64-4 . S7383
May AP?5?xed
STATINTL
I think if we pass the section that the I have more optimism than pessimism.
Stennis amendment would knock out, I think Victnamization of South Viet-
this would add immeasurably to the nam forces has been more successful
chances they will give up. Mr. President, than many people believe. I 'think in
you cannot blame these people. There is many respects their air force equals ours,
not a living man in all of South Vietnam their naval force, for practical purposes,
who has not been in a war. They have does a better job than ours, and their
_:~~,..,,,,,naf;nne a,?n ~s annrl as"nnrs. TYYC
office at this particular time, and rec-
ognize, too, that the President is about
to embark upon what could be a very
meaningful visit to the capital of corn-
that could be of embarrassment to the
President, and I would say that if the
President happened to be a member of
.. the. opposite party. After all, the Presi-
dent, is an office; he is not a man, he is
an'ofTice created by our Constitution.
. I think the least that we Americans,
particularly those serving in the Con
gress, should do is show respect for that
office and recognize the problems of that
I think the least we can no 1s w utr
this language out and then after the
conflict has been decided, have those
people on this floor who want more con-
trol over the presidential war powers in-
troduce an amendment to the Constitu-
tion that would change the intent of the
Constitution which now, in my opinion,
confers the exclusive right and power of
wai? and peace,to the President; but let
us not- act' at this time on the matter
pal we V1. -1iae ,wuou - ,?----- - ---_ - - - -- - -
These people are tired of war, and the going to find that out in the next week or
people of North Vietnam are tired of war. 10 days.
We are learning through Japanese in- This is a weekend to do a. lot of big
telligence sources that they are about thinking-thinking about whether we
ready to quit. Their economy has suf - should be voting for something that
fered to the point that it would probably could be of utmost damage to the United
take five uninterrupted years to get it States, or should we be wise and not
back on its feet. They suffer losses of vote on this at all, but strike the lan-
food, and as in the case of all people, guage from the bill and allow the bill to
they have grown tired of conflict. pass in the form that would enable the
I would hope that over this weekend State Department to continue to operate.
all of my colleagues would give this mat- I yield the floor and suggest the ab-
ter real study. I know how tempting it sence of a quorum.
Is to stand on the floor of the Senate and The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
offer suggestions on how to end the war; will call the roll.
I know how tempting it is to vote for The second assistant legislative clerk
these measures; but we are at a point in proceeded to call the roll.
history where I think that even having Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask
this language spread on the RECORD and unanimous consent that the order for the
having this language contained in a bill quorum call be rescinded.
will be detrimental to our efforts not only. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
munism, and realize that he, through his
actions, has reduced our forces in Viet-
nam from over 550,000 down to 69,000.
We have to think of those 69,000 men.
As J I said the other day, if they are
trapped at Danang, that is an almost in-
defensible point. The airfield could be
destroyed, in my opinion, from the sur-
rounding hills without too much effort,
and the_ embarkation of ships from the
harbor could be controlled by the Com-
munists at the narrow mouth of the
harbor.
The same applies to the concentra-
the country without any resistance.
.tions at Camranh, where we have bil-
lions of dollars worth of equipment that
we want to protect and bring home as
much as we can. This is also an indefen-
sible area, different in nature from
Danang, but nevertheless indefensible,
and our men would be there at the mercy
of the Communists should anything hap-
pen that would allow them to come down
AMENDMENT OF THE RAIL PAS-
SENGER SERVICE ACT OF 1930
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask
the Chair to lay before. the Senate a
message from the House of Representa-
tives on H.R. 11417.
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before
the Senate a message from the House of
Representatives announcing its disagree-
ment to the amendments of the Senate
to the bill (H.R. 11417) to amend the
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 to
provide financial assistance to the Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corporation
for the purpose of purchasing railroad
equipment, and for other purposes, and
requesting a conference with the Senate
on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses thereon. -
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate insist upon its
amendments and agree to the request of
the House for a conference on the dis-
agreeing votes of the two Houses there-
on, and that the Chair be authorized to
appoint the conferees on the part of the
Senate.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Presiding Officer appointed Mr. MAGNV-
SON, Mr. IIARTKE, Mr. HoLLINGS, Mr.
BEALL, and Mr. WEICKER conferees on the
part of the Senate.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
A message in writing from the Presi-
dent of the United States was communi-
cated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one
of his secretaries.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The. second assistant legislative clerk
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
FOREIGN - RELATIONS AUTHORIZA-
TION ACT OF 1972
.The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (S. 3526) to provide
authorizations for certain agencies con-
ducting the foreign relations of the
United States, and for other purposes.
VIETNAM: IN THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE
AMERICAN ORDEAL -
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, last
month, still another voice was added to
the chorus out of the past, when the cur-
rent Secretary of State solemnly testified
that the war in Vietnam had entered a
new era. In an attempt to justify the re-
sumption of massive American bombing
of North ' Vietnam, Mr.. Rogers argued
that the Hanoi Government had now :in-
vaded its neighbor to the south; that its
indirect aggression had become direct;
and that the Vietnamese struggle could
no longer be regarded as a civil war.
Thus was delivered up, in hearings be-
fore the Senate's Committee on Foreign
Relations, the latest addition to our col-
lection of myths concerning this misbe-
gotten war. The mind boggles at. our
seemingly limitless capacity for self-de-
ception.
It is no new war, it is the same war
still. The introduction into South Viet-
nam of regular troops from the North
began years ago, and their numbers have
steadily increased. As early as 1969, for
instance, ? North Vietnamese regulars
comprised about 70 percent of the enemy
forces inside South Vietnam. Tile mag-
nitude of the -present invasion may be
greater, but the character of the war is
no different than before.
The reasons for our, intervention, -
grown hollow over the' years, have long
since been discredited. One by one, they
have fallen of their own rotten weight.
The latest excuse for the renewal of our
bombing and shelling of North Vietnam is,
utterly unresponsive to the only sensible
question left to be asked: Why are we
still there?
Why has Congress supinely supported
our,part in this disastrous and divisive
war, after three Presidents have failed
either to end it or win it? Why do we
keep on voting the money? Are we so
timid that we dare not cross a President?
If so, we have sunk to the low estate
of the British Parliament at the turn of
the 19th century, when England and
France were locked in protracted war.
Charles James Fox arose to address the
House of Commons on February 3, 1800.
His words apart from the elegance of
phrase which graced his period, are so
uncannily relevant to our own predica-
ment that. they could be uttered in this
chamber on this very day.
- Listen to his words:
Sir, my honorable and learned friend has
truly said that the present is a new era in the
war. The Right Honorable Chancellor of the
Exchequer feels the justice of the remarks;
for by traveling back to the commencement
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 GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
N>; A ~pM For Release 2001/0~/04 : CIA-RR
M191 01
Dy Anthony Marro
Newsday Washington Bureau
Washington-Through . both thej
~~~/// ~/
7.,1,rrn ti and Ni rr n nrlininistrations_ 4r~' I V-1
I y
t11e Central Intelligence Agency and going conversations on ABMs,' 1e21 low draft lighters could be used to!
': the Joint Chiefs of Staff have disagreed proliferation, etc.)." unload unload cargo from, oceangoing ships
sharply on the benefits of mining the The Pentaercn Papers also show that anchored.? outside the mined harbor
'North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. this CIA analysis was later buttressed areas.
The joint chiefs have favored the ac- ~bv then-Ambassador to the Soviet o That even if all imports from sea
The have long maintained that Union Llewelyn Thompson, whp wrote were blocked, all of the war-essential t
if all imports from sea.were cut off- on March 1, 1968: imports could be brought into North
and if land routes through Laos and, ' -fining of Haiphong harbor would Vietnam over rail lines from China.
Cambodia and rail lines from China'c.rtainly provoke strong Soviet reac- o That while air strikes would des- -
were vigorously bombed-the North;
ti( n. As a minimum, I would expect troy transport facilities equipment and
Vietnamese could not obtain sufficient' them to provide minesweepers, p.>.i- supplies, they could not successfully
supplies to continue the war effort. prevent supplies from reachin.- the
~.? _ sibly with Soviet naval crews . .
The CIA has opposed:1t. The agency Two days later, on March 3 1968, a ' ;North.
has argued that even even the combination pentagon staff group working for then- The Joint Chiefs of Staff position
of mining and unlimited bombing in NSSM-1 was that the flow of sup-
could not halt the flow of supplies, secretary of Defense Clark Clifford also be stopped to the
shot down the proposal, saying first plies could point
and that the results would not be worth that "it has become abundantly clear where the North Vietnamese could not.
the risk of provoking the Soviet Union. continue the war in the South, but
A secret National Security Couuicil that no level of bombing can prevent only by preventing both seaborne 1111-
staff study commissioned by presi the North Vietnamese from [carrying
on the war in the South]," and then ports and rail imports from China.
dentaal adviser Henry A. Kissinger in The joint chiefs estimated that "a
1969 showed the,CIA and joint chiefs turning to the port. minimum of chief.-,
attack sorties per
"in total disagreement" on the ques- "The remaining issue on interdiction 6,000 1
Lion. Unless the CIA position has of `supplies has to 'do with the closing month would be required against the
changed since then, it appeared last of the Port of Haiphong," it continued. two rail lines from C11ina.
night that President Nixon had cast "Although this is the route by which The bombing the be rl and road
his lot with the generals. some 80 per cent of North Vietnamese systems would "free of the
imports come into the country, it is not militarily confining constraints which.:
The dispute between the surfaces gb both the point of entry for most of the mili- have characterized the conduct of the
agency and d th e'ge t soth tary supplies and ammunition. Those war in the North in the past," they
in the so-called ".`Pen Pentagon aces n Papers,"
materials predominantly enter via the warned. "The concept would preclude
which are still classified top secret attacks on as a target, routes from China. .." population g .t, but
even though large segments have been This was the argument the CIA re- would accept high risky of civilian,
published paperback editions, and in turned to in the 1969 study, when it, casualties in order to achieve desiruic-
ttle National Security Council study the State Department the Defense De- tion of war-supporting targets ...". '
commissioned by Kissinger. Newsday
garment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
was among a number of newspapers to others all were asked to submit
obtain portions of the latter study, their evaluations of the merits of min -
,which was titled National Security ing the port.
Study Memorandum No. 1, or simply The NSSM-1 papers obtained by
'TS,SM-1. Newsday show that the CIA position
The Pentagon Papers show that, as in 1969 was this:
early as May 23, 1967, the CIA opposed ? Total interdiction of seaborne lm=
proposals by the military to mine the ports would be. difficult because shat:
_: v r
harbor as early as May 23, 1967. An.
agency memo then warned that such
action "... would place Moscow in of
particularly galling dilemma as to laow}
to preserve the Soviet position and
.prestige in such a disadvantageous
place."
-It added that if this were done, the
. Soviets "shou)d be expected to send
volunteers, including pilots, to North
Vietnam; to provide some new and,
better weapons and equipment ... and,
to show across-the-board hostility to
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