SECRET 1969 WAR STUDY SHAPED 1972 STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350068-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: April 30, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

(J
CHICAGO TRJuy
Approved For Release 3Q? /19V_: CIA-FTPQI- Y601
By 'John Maclean
Mr.' Maclean is a member of The
Tribune's Washington Bureau.
WASHINGTON - It was a confusing
week. The war in Viet Nam was being
carried on in the air, on the ground,
at the negotiating table, and probably
in secret talks. And each of these situ-
ations continued to change almost daily.
-Injected into all of this has been the
disclosure of _a secret National: Security
'Council memorandum prepared when
President Nixon took office in 1969 to
apprise him of the situation in Viet
Nam.
Henry Kissinger, Nixon's chief adviser
on national security, setn 28 questions
on the war to the State and Defense
Departments, the Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA], and the United States
embassy in Saigon.
What Does It Mean?
. What does this study mean to us today, . The report shows that President Nixon
three years later? THE CHICAGQ TRrn- was being advised almost from his
UNE obtained a copy qf? the report, as first day in office that Communist
did several other news organizations. sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were
The study concluded that Hanoi's an essential reason for the enemv's
leadership was independent of Moscow ability to control the rate at which
and Peking, altho the tendency had Americans were killed.
been toward the Soviet direction. Mas- On the controversial subject of a
cow, for its part, favored an early ne- residual force of American military men
gotiated settlement, with the best pos- in South Viet Nam, the report disclosed
sible terms for Hanoi. that the Defense Department recom-
The intervening years appear to have mended that 19,000 military advisers
changed this assessment little, and would be a "continuing requirement" of
events of the past few days appear to the war.
underscore its correctness. However, in his appearance on tele-
Kissinger made a secret hop to Mos- vision and radio last week, Nixon said,
cow, not Paris or Peking, when the "We can now see the day when no more
going got really tough as a result of the Americans will be involved there [Viet
recent Communist offensive. Altho part Nam] at all." In his only other public
of his reason for going was to see that response to.tl~e residual force question,
there were no hitches in Nixon's visit Nixon on Jan. 2 in a televised intervie\v
to: Moscow in May, a Soviet diplomat said all American forces would not be
boarded a plane for Hanoi within hours withdrawn "as long as the enemy holds
of his visit. one American prisoner of war."
Two days later the White House an- The report also covered the political
nounced that the suspended Paris
peace talks were being reactivated.
Effect of Air War
The 1969~r~ep~r h kno as
Security S~Nd~~77 111k'11 a M
tNSSM 1], provides a searching
ward look at. the effectiveness of
massive American bombing of North
Viet Nam and Laos.
The reporting agencies agreed the
bombing punished the North Viet-
namese. Lives were lost, materiel de-
stroyed, and supply routes battered.
But the agencies agreed also that the
bombing had failed to break the en-
emy's spirit, kill more 'troops than
could be replaced, or cut off supplies.
Russia and the People's Republic of
China could move in more supplies than
the B-52s could knock out.
"During four years of intensive coin-
bat in South Viet Nam and' un-
precedented bombing, of North Viet
Nam and Laos," a Defense Depart-
ment analyst wrote in frustration, "the
enemy has more than doubled his com-
bat forces, successfully sustained high
casualty rates, doubled the level of in-
filtration; and increased the scale and
Intensity of the. main-force war."
.
.
ca
a
ec
n
many
rams in South Viet struction and. development of the North
ro
d
Two Schools of Thought .
A summary wtiitten by the White
House identified two schools of inter-
pretations within the government. The
summary said there. were "some diver-
gencies on the facts, [but] the sharpest
differences arise in the interpretation of
those facts, the relative weight to be
given them, and'the implications to be
drawn."
One school was the military and the
U. S. embassy in Saigon. They took a
more hopeful view of current and future
prospects in Viet Nam, the summary
said.
The other included the more policy-
minded, agencies, namely, the CIA, the
office of Secretary of Defense,,and to a
lesser extent [the summary's qualifica-
tion] the State Deuartment.
The study probably reached Nixon's
desk in February, 1969. Here, in part,
is what it said:
Question: Is it clear that either Mos-
cow or Peking believe they have, or are
willing to use, significant leverage on
Hanoi's policies?,
State: Peking has been against a nego-
tiated settlement of the Viet Nam war
from the outset. We believe that Peking
has brought pressures to bear upon
Hanoi ... but that the pressures have
fallen short of major threats.
The Soviets have experienced the full
degree of Hanoi's ideological rigidity and
distrust of the West, and on occasion
they have privately deplored excessive
North Vietnamese stubbornness. With the
beginning of the Paris talks, the Soviets
began a new and decidedly more asser-
tive phase of their diplomacy. At sev-
eral points [they] intervened construc-
tively.
Saigon embassy: We in Saigon have
no evidence that Hanoi is under active
and heavy pressure with respect to the
Paris negotiations from either the
U. S. S. R. or Communist China. In fact,
situation in South Viet Nam, the negotia- we believe that the North Vietnamese
tions as they were then in Paris, and make their own decisions on the negotia-
tions.... The need for economic recon-
S
tters of the U
l m
h
i
t
g
p
presence an
Nam. he stud is more than 500 96-'01 ? should also tend to heighten the Soviet
~qe se 20611/03/04: CIA-RD 601 R00030050068-0
back- non 1na0d
 GARDEN CITY, N. Y.; IMMISDAY
30 April 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000
THE BACKGROUND: President
Nixon told the nation that Vielna-
rnization had "proved.itself suf fi-
-ciently" for the continued with-
drawal of American troops. How-
ever, North Vietnamese forces con-
tinued to score decisive gains,
particularly in the Central High-
lands and to the north near Quang
Tri. Air strikes, Nixon announced,
would continue as the U.S. re-
turned to the Paris peace talks.
But in view of the North Vietna-
y rnese military successes, Washing-
= '.ton's, "bargaining position seemed
to have worsened.
'By Ernest Volkman
Newsday National Editor
Washington-In 1962, faced with an
increasingly critical Southeast Asia
problem, President Kennedy called in
two of the government's best known
Asia experts, who had just returned
from a fact-finding tour of Vietnam.
Exactly what, Kennedy wanted to
know, was going on out there?
The first expert spoke optimistically
of progress by the Diem regime: The
Communist guerrilla army was being
subdued. The people's standard of liv-
ing was improving. And the country-
side was coming under government
control.
The second expert said the country
was falling apart, the people detested
the repressive government regime, the
oral newspapers. Designed to deter-
mine the effectiveness of all American
military measures, the study`
amounted to this: The Central Intel-
1; J
ence Aenc
the Penta
on a
d th
g
y
g
n
e
g,, explain what he meant by "signifi-
State Department often had very dif- cant."
ferent views on the U.S. role and its On the battlefield, meanwhile, the
effectiveness in Indochina. In one omi- situation was somewhat unclear, but
nou-9 example, the CIA and the De-,the one incontrovertible fact was that
fence Department cotilcLnot even agree the' North Vietnamese were undaunted
on the number of combat troops in the by any attempt to stop them and were
North Vietnamese Army. Specifically striking aA will. The most significant
the difference between the two esti- move was to open a new phase of the
matey was 90,000 men, almost nine offensive in the Central Highlands,
full combat divisions. To this day, the.
two agencies still don't agree. smashing the South Vietnamese regi-
Even' if North Vietnamese capabili mental headquarters at Tan Canh,
ties and intentions are difficult to as- capturing firebases that threaten the
sess, it seems reasonable that informa Infiltration routes from Cambodia, and
Con on the Communist offentiive, a'drawing a tight noose around the pro--
public act, might be readily available. vincial capital of - ISontum. Other
But such is not the case. The key Communist forces routed the South
question during the offensive is: 1-10"'. Vietnamese defending the east coast of
well are the South Vietnamese doing? the region, and the' Communists now
Last week, the Defense Departmot~ are close to cutting the nation in two.
n
said the South Vietnamese armed That would be a monumental di. ester
forces were doing fine, and Ithe North for the South Vietnamese army.
Vietnamese would be defeated with The action in the Central Highlands
heavy losses. At the same time, an overshadowed. equally ominous moves
American adviser with a 10,000-man from the north. There, despite major
.South Vietnamese relief column, on its U.S. air strikes, the. North Vietnamese,
way to break the siege at An Lop, was moved the last of the 13 combat divi-
fuming publicly that the South Viet- sions across the DMZ, smashing Donn
namese general in charge of the opera- Ha, a key defense plant, and attacked
tion had simply decided not to go any the provincial capitol of. Qdan Tri
farbher because he would suffer too from six different directions. In the
many losses in trying to get through south, the Communists spaced forces :
d
b
d '
A
L
d
aroun
em
attere
n
oc an
the Communist encirclement. An-
other adviser noted pointedly that if threaten Saigon from at least three +
the countryside, and the situation tivas~ the South Vietnamese were doing so I even porn s. n , e?pi e ileavy
P nearly hopeless. well, he was at a loss to explain why U.S. air raids in North Vietnam, the
Kennedy looked at the men ,u vis- then they were not taking any counter of- Communists apparently have plenty of
said, "Are we certain both of yo fonsive action. lies and ammunition.
ited the same country?" Partially, Nixon's nationwide speech Above all, the fact was that nobody
Ten years have passed since that last week on Vietnam, his first major really knew what was happening,
revealing exchange, but as current "public utterance on the situation, re-which means nobody really can gees
events demonstrate, the picture that ?flected the confusion in Washington what will happen. As one senior U.S.
Y officialdom is getting from Vietnam over what was going on. Ile talked-adviser in the Central Highlands put it
today is still murky,. In point of fact, 'about the South Vietnamese fighting: last week: "Tomorrow? I don't even
as senior officials admit privately, the "courageously and well." know about today. I don t even know
U.S. has virtually no idea of what is His statement that there would be a what' is happening one mile frown
really happening in Vietnam. continued step-up of U.S. naval and air here-" 1 _w
Like Kennedy, President Nixon strikes, raised the question of the need
faces the task of knowing what is for escalation if the South Vietnamese
happening on the battlegrounds of were fighting so well. The speech also
America's most critical foreign policy cited the estimate of Gen. Creighton
issue. jAbrams, the U.S. comman r in Viet--
Those are vital decisions that require nam, that "some battles will be lost
hard information, but, as if to under- and others will be wan..." In, a pre-
score just how cloudy things are, a speech briefing for newsmen, Kissinger
secret 196 review of ~mil r o!- s t hr
icy in v AWONSegi~r14U'? OW ' ~' j14 rl ~~ -~ t b01 R000300350068-0
.was somehow leaked last week to sev- nificant" number of South Vietnamese
provincial cities,. although he did nat1
 NE'/ 3.ORKC. 5JMES STATINTL
Approved For Release 20%1d0AQ41gVlA-RDP80-01601 R
wows ,Rodberg wat hired by Senator Gravel
R9r~itai~R
e
n
aid consultant at the time
b
. en u
p
Blackmun later questioned the validity
Q, oft his employment, but Mr. ?Rodberg
k for Senator
Senatorial
has continued to wor
was a legitimate staff member.) Mr.
I.badberg negotiated with Beacon Press,
f
i
bli
on o
cat
for pu
Inirnunity a~Boston concern, the documents in book form. When a
Federal grand jury began investigating
the release of the papers to the public,
.James Wilson 'jf Penrfsylvania, one it sl:bpoenaed Mr. Rodberg to ask him
not the framers of the Constitution, questions about the securing and dis-
tlwrote iri 1790: "In order to enable
land encourage a representative of the
,public to discharge his public trust
.with firmness and success,...he should
!enjoy the fullest liberty of speech
[on the floor of Congressl, and...he
should be protected from the resent-
merit of everyone, however powerful,
to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense."
Senator Mike 'Gravel of Alaska
greatly offended the executive depart
mot last summer when he released
significant portions of the "Pentagon
Papers" to the public during an im-
promptu meeting of his Senate Sub-
committee on Building and Grounds.
And last week, he committed a sim-
llar "offense,",releasing another secret
study of the Vietnam war written early
in the Nixon Administration. Based on
it series of questions posed to various
departments and Government agencies
by the President's national i security
adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, the study
revealed deep splits within the Govern-
ment on war policy in ? 1963. Among
other points, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
urged strongly the immediate and de-
termined resumption of bombing while
J other agencies, including the Central
warned that the
enc
A
lli
y,
g
gence
nte
;word of strategic and tactical bomb-
ing over the years showed, that an
air strategy had failed to achieve any
conclusive results. When Senator
Gravel attempted to gain the needed
unanimous consent to place 50 pages
semmatmg of the papers. But . 1atbr
Gravel intervened in the proceedings
to block the subpoena, claiming that
any questioning of his aide would be
an unconstitutional infringement of
his own Senatorial immunity. A Fed-
eral Court of Appeals issued a quali-
fied protective order blocking any
questions into. Senator Gravel's mo.
tives Or actions in securing the docu-
ments and making them public. But
the court would allow questions about
Mr. Rodberg's arranging for the pri-
vate publication of the papers after
that initial disclosure.
Neither the Government nor Sena-
tor Gravel was satisfied with the order
and both appealed to the -Supreme
Court. In an unusual move the Senate
took two separate actions with regard
to the litigation. First, it appointed a
bipartisan committee to file a brief
with the Supreme Court which would
present the Senate's own interpreta-
tion of the scope of the Congressional
prerogatives. Second, it agreed to pay
the relatively low printing costs of
Senator Gravel's brief, after voting
down a proposal to pay the more ex-
pensive counsel fees. The Supreme
Court gave permission to Senators
Saxbe and Ervin to present oral argu-
ments in the case.
At issue is a clause of the Constitu-
tion (Article I, Section 6) which pro-
vides that "for any Speech or Debate,
in either House, [Congressmen or Sen-
ators] shall not be questioned in any
other Place." The clause has its origins
in the 17th century conflict between
Charles I of England and Parliament
when the Stuart King arrested and
imprisoned legislators for their re-
marks in Parliament opposing his pol-
icies.
The "Speech or Debate" clause had
previously been interpreted to bar
any investigation into a legislator's
motives when he spoke on the floor
of Congress, even if he were accused
of taking a bribe to make such a
Committee and the Democratic caucus) speech. In the Gravel case, Senators
,from appearing in his behalf before Saxbe and Ervin asked the Supreme ?
the Supreme Court in an important Court to expand the protections of the
and unprecedented case growing out clause.
of the disclosure. They insisted that it should cover
The case which was argued before not only Senators and Representatives
Some Senators thought Senator Mike Gravel's release o the Pentagon Papers and, last week, of another score
Government war study "outrageous" and "reprehen
sible." Yet the Senate is supporting his claim before thi
Supreme Court that constitutional immunity protect!
him and his aides from answering any questions abou
the source of the documents.
conduct it largely through his aides.
If the Speech and Debate Provision is.
to be meaningful, it must apply to
aides acting for their employer-Mem.
ber in any situation where it would
apply to the Member acting for him-
self."
Furthermore, they claimed that the
dissemination of information on mat-
ters of Congressional concern was an
important legislative function. Mr.
Rodberg, officials of Beacon Press and
any other witnesses they insisted,
should not be questioned by a grand
jury on efforts by the Senator or his
assistants to publish the material even
after it. was made public.
No Supreme Court precedents are
directly in point on the last issue, but
lower Federal courts have held that
there can be no interference with pub-
lication of any information obtained
by members of Congress in the exer-
cise of their legislative functions. Most
of these cases arose out of efforts to
block reports, issued by the Senate
and House Internal Securities Commit-
tees, labeling individuals or groups as
subersive. In the light of positions
taken by these committees, there
would be some elements of irony
should such decisions serve as the
focus for protecting Senator Gravel
and his aide from grand jury question-
8101 601'R00030136Q & Q
r
Mr.. Friedman is n la4vyer on the
staff of thc-association of the Bar of
is~ative .aide of Senator (ravel. Mr. [of CongressT, cannot conduct all of
~.
his business himself: he .-",:list and does
of the secret report In the Congres-
sional Record, he was defeated.
Leading members cI the Senate have
charged that Senator Gravel acted im-
properly and perhaps, even illegally.
Republican Senator William B. Saxbe
of Ohio called his release of the Penta-
gon Papers "outrageous" and "repre-
hensive." But that has not stopped
Senator Saxbe and Senator Sam J.
Ervin Jr. of North Carolina (represent-
ing respectively the Republican Policy