'69 MEMO TOLD U.S. PULLOUT RISKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350070-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: April 28, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

CliIC.AUU, 1L"?
SuN_TIle 'pproved. Fo,r\Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP80-
X36,108
S _ 109 , 123
APR 28 1972
By Morton Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross
? Sun-Times Bureau
WASHINGTON -- President Nixon was
withdrawal of U.S. troops would leave the
Saigon government vulnerable to political col-
lapse in the countryside in the event of an
enemy offensive like the one now being con-
ducted. - against 1961 or J901, but it has been slow,
The State Department, Central Intelligence
/ Agency and Joint Chiefs of Staff joined in
sounding alarms about a too-large or too-sud-
den-pullout of U.S. troops. - The joint chiefs _ replied: "It is hiconceiv-
The civilian leadership of the Defense De-
partnment, on the other hand, called for "de-
Americanization of the war"-and Saigon's
"takeover of its responsibilities."
Mr. Nixon obviously sided with the. Penta-
gon civilians and launched his Vietnamization
and withdrawal program. Including the. 20,-
000-man cut he announced Wednesday night,
the U.S. troop level. will be clown to ;19,000by
July 1 500 000 less than when lie took office
STATNTE
pects for increased political mobilization."
The CIA_? replied: "South Vietnam has
shown (political) progress whether measured
fragile and evolutionary. It is difficult to see s
how the U.S. can largely disengage over the
next few years without jeopardizing this."
able that the essential (political) conditions
'could be realized as a result -.of an early
unilateral reduction of U.S. military effort."
Avoiding perpetual dependence,
The civilian office of the secretary of de
Tense replied: "If the GVN does not improve
as an effective non-Communist political sys-
tern, even its military effort is bound to suffer.
as it has in the past.
three years ago.. "Americanization of the war in Vietnam
The debate over the relationship between was made necessary because of near-collapse
the U.S. military presence and Saigon's politi- of the GVN in February, 1965. The U.S. mili-
cal control is contaitied in National Security tary effort has provided the shield behind
which the reconstruction of the GVN has tak-
Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM 1), a secret
document on the war prepared by national
security adviser Henry A. Kissinger in Febru-
ary, 1969.
-
'Await reciprocal cuts'
Copies of the study have been obtained by
,The Sun-Times, New York Times, Washington
Post and Jack Anderson, the syndicated col-
umnist.
Kissinger asked the `various agencies to
comment on how the U.S. military effort re-
lated to prospects for "either 'victory'. or a
strong non-Communist political role."
The State Department replied: "Any reduc-
lion in the level of our own military. effort
without a corresponding reduction in pres-
ence and activity of North Vietnamese
forces may reduce the likelihood that the
GVN (the government of South Vietnam)
would work toward political mobilization....
"On balance, we conclude that a policy of
maintaining the current level of military ef-
fort while preparing for.possible reciprocal
reduction of that level affords the best pros,
en place.
"De-Americanization of the war has to go
hand-in-hand with the GVN takeover of its
responsibilities if it is to survive in its own'
right and not he perpetually dependent on the
United States military presence."
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ass Qorr~bings DicJ't orb:
has mot achieved its intended objectives.
Itc;The State Department judged that
tito.~boailbing had strained North Vietnam
bit: had not "paralyzed" I-Ianoi.
-:'[,?o ==The. Defense Department concluded
that`despite, its adverse effects on the North
Vietnamese, the bombing seemed only to
have rallied the people behind the Ilanoi
D-Alas}a, has set up a fuss,in Washington
b y. w a v i n g a Vietnam war document
aroiiaid,the Capitol. It is a "National Securi-
ty :.Memoranduni prepared for President
Nixon' in 1969.
PUBI,IS11ED REPORTS of this docu-
mo'*say U. S. bombing of North Vietnam
. m_.a. n cl . rnass-bombed
Haoiburg, Germany.
Military minds are usually just about
oite:lvar behind. They suffer from scientific
;'Bombing North Vietnam may be hichly
or-'completely ineffectu-
all;. ,.:....
wThose Who ordered
bombings of Ilanoi and
Ilaiphong may have
bdeq;_repeating a mis-
take ; made in July-Au
giist,:''.'1943, ' when the
lIAF=Boreber, Com-
War,effort.
The Central- elligence Agency de-
citi
dth
t""
i
did,not erode significantly North Vietnam's tvai ? No more than the German mass bomb-
military defense capability or Hanoi's de- ing of Coventry had been before. -
texminatianns persist hp in the or H All the bombing of North Vietnam has
Yet this report in 1969 came about a be t the brought
.S. war aim: ltTobpr prove to I anoi
quarter of a century after 1945 studies in that its aggression (direct or indirect via
the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, which the Viet Cong) does not pay.
made a detailed investigation of the effect One's trust in military. thinkers and
4f :.tlie monster three-night air bombard- their most advanced war instruments has.,
menu of. hamburg which indicated a to remain lugubriously low, as long as that
shocking failure.
The mass bombing wiped out one-third
of that big industrial and shipping center.
It probably lulled as many residents as
were destroyed in IIiroshima.
As John Kenneth Galbraith tells it, and
-he was a director of the U. S. Strategic
Bombing Survey, the net result was to
drive living standards in Hamburg down -
near a bare minimum - but to shift more
rnanpo\ver into war production.
That. resulted in "a distinct possibility
that the attacks on Hamburg increased
-Germany's output of war material and thus
It e r military, effectiveness," Galbraith
wrote,
Yet more than".20 years later .mass
bombing raids on major North Vietnam'
cities were made. This month again they.
were repeated despite the 1945 report on
-11 a m b u r g and the 1969 memorandum
drawn tip for President Nixon, saying such
mass aerial strikes may well be a military
futility.
Answering this, a State Department
spokesman, Charles W. Bray, this week
.said there is no comparison between the
pre-1969 bombing tactics and today's air
war. Bray said the enemy now presents
m o r e accessible conventional military
targets.
PUT THAT WAS SURELY true of the
Hamburg arms factories and docks and
submarine pens, back in 1943. Yet that ter-
e
a
tl
air war did not seriously p ychologicaltleffects and of co se the awe
affect the flow of men and supplies to Com- ful loss of life, was not a successful act of
munist forces in Laos and South Vietnam
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350070-7