WAR REPORT ANALYZES SOVIET, HANOI STANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350071-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: April 27, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

.BA.L.Tl.;,4Q.7s3 SUN
Approved For Release 2001/03/042:7CM 80-0160
War p?epaoat arcalyz,es
Soviet, Hanoi stc?nce
Washington-A secret' 1969 re-
port on the Vietnam war said
the Russians were playing a
key role as mediator in the
Paris peace talks and that the
North Vietnamese were negoti-
ating seriously.
Neither point has been fully
reflected in public statements
by. the Nixon administration.
BY_WALTER R. GORDON
Washington Bureau of The Sun
ly believed that the Russians 7On an extraordinary number
were trying to facilitate peace
talks, the full text of the report
documents for the first time the
depth and significance of the
Soviet role.
And while the report suggests
- STATINTL
"reject the view that an
-vorable settlement in Vietnam
will inevitably be 'followed by
Communist takeovers outside
Indochina."
.1 1
Majority view
4. "The enemy is not in Paris endorsed the view expressed in
primarily out of weakness." the National Intelligence Esti-
These conclusions from the mate 50-68:
report's summary are based on "A settlement which would
hundreds of pages of detailed permit the Communists to take
analysis by American officials control of the government in
in South Vietnam and in such South Vietnam, not immediate-
Washington agencies as the ly but within a year or two,
State Department, Defense De would be likely to bring Camho-
partment and the Central Intel- dia and Laos into Hanoi's orbit
of other points these agencies
were at loggerheads, and fre-
quently various sections of the
same agency disagree with
each other. Moreover on a star-
tlingly high number of issues,
at a fairly early stage, but
these developments would not
necessarily unhinge the rest of
Asia."
The reports contain some in-
triguing statistics on the mili-
tary and pacification situation
as of early 1969.
t
th
e Ul(1, Jc"
o
nlcluaing the Z)OUCil vicinamese r1c4Viuu,~
was merely one aspect of a.! political situation and civilian than one per cent of the nearly
serious bargaining stance, Nix- casualties, the authors confess 2 million allied small unit oper-
on administration officials have) ations
to having little reliable data.
th
repeatedly denounced the Nor Vietnamese for wain a -I On a wide range of issues the ceding two years had resulted
wag in propa in contact with the enemy.. The,
ganda war in Paris. J I federal establishment divided] percentage for South Vietnam
neatly into two' camps nnti-
Th
_
ese
a ' long list of items covered in
National Security Study Memo-
randum 1, a 548-page document
1written in January and Febru-
ary of 1969 and bearing a "se-
cret" classification.
It consists of 28 questions
directed by Henry A. Kissinger,
President Nixon's national secu-
rity adviser, to government
agencies involved with the Viet-
nam war, the detailed answers
of the agencies and a summary
apparently written by Dr. Kis-
singer.
The summary chapter says
there is "general agreement"
among the agencies on the fol-
lowing points:
A. "It is not certain" that the
Saigon go.ernment "will be
able to survive a peaceful com-
petition" with the Viet Cong for
political power.
2. "All agree" that the South
Vietnamese Army "could not
now, or in the for,~seeable fu-
ture, handle both the VC [Viet,
'Cong] and sizable NVA (North
Vietnamese Army) forces with-
out U.S. combat support," in-
eluding artillery, aircraft and
Thus American military offi-
some ground troops. GVN [Government of South] (took the opposite position.
? cers in Saigon, Hawaii and the
3. The North Vietnamese Vietnam) as we withdraw, the, Military officers in Saigon)
states. Pentagon say the South Viet.
would be able to induct newt summary , and Washington said "a vigor-! namese Army, under the mod.
soldiers faster than the United I Concerning the dominio theo- ous bombing campaign could ernization program in effect in
States and South Vietnam couldi ry, ttthhe summary says judg 'choke off enough supplies to Januar , 1969 "would not be!
kill them j FO fttNA eta -QHe c IG$,A-RD 8O O O O(~b1a r3~0bTitt&ly indige-
casualty ra e a cntinued. R mg, while the CIA an en a- nous VC forces without U.S.
th on adds that all the a encies
t
mists anu pessimists. Attnougn
appearing objective, the sum-
mary chapter generally gave
slightly greater weight to the
pessimists.
ese operations was one tenth of
one per cent.
The CIA also concluded that
the Viet Cong had "a signi#i-l
cant effect on at least two-
thirds of the rural population."
nam as "continuing the strug-
gle even against unlimited
bombing."
The only agreement about the
effectiveness of B-52 strikes
was that there was insufficient
data to analyze them. "The
consensus," however, was that
they were "very effective when
directed against known enemy
troop concentrations or in close
support of tactical operations."
B-52 strikes against infiltra-
tion routes or enemy base
camps, however, were de-
scribed as "much less effec-
tive."
Considerable evidence
There was also wide disa-;
greement in the report on the
number of casualties inflicted
on the enemy by the B-52's.
Nor could the agencies agree
on whether the bombing cam-
paign to interdict the flow of
supplies down Laotian and
Cambodian jungle trails' had
succeeded.
One major thread running
through the report is the impor-
tance of the program, launched
in the last year of the Johnson
administration, of "moderniza-
tion" of the South Vietnamese
armed forces.
There is considerable evi-
dence in the report that the
Nixon administration's "Viet-
namization" program was little'
more than a continuation and
possible acceleration of this
"modernization" drive.
Iuc 11neup. Vi vi)UnLL1Jw auuI The office of the Secretary of
pessimists varied somewhat Defense put the figure at 50 per
from issue to issue. But in cent, and some other agencies
general the optimists included asserted it was even lower.
the American Military com-
mand and embassy in Saigon, 7~sfens Secretary s
ry
the Pacific command in Ha-, I iflee-consisting of Secretary
waif, and the Joint Chiefs of h Melvin R. Laird and his largely
I civilian advisers-also said the
Staff in Washington. . As a rule the pessimists in
eluded the CIA, the State De-
partment and the office of the
Secretary of Defense. !
ee
o,incr
co
.
.. Two points that the summa- T
he issue In
The the report that
ry, unlike the agency reports, generates the most controversy
make with clarity are the and the least light is that of the
doubtful prospects of an Ameri effectiveness of bombing. One
can victory and the hypotheti- camp finds it significantly
cal nature of the "domino theo- effective, the other describes it
ry," which holds that a North at best as marginally useful!
Vietnamese victory might top-, and at worst as counterproduc-
ple non-Communist regimes tive.
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The military continued to
"No agency clearly forecasts Ii urge an expansion of bombing
a 'victory' over the Comnm- in both Vietnams, Laos and
nists and all acknowledge the; Cambodia, while most of the
Both programs apparently
even had the same target date
1-1972. The Vietnamization pro-
Saigon government controlled) 'grans, however, appears to be
no more of the population thani slightly more ambitious than its
it had in 1962, which the author) predecessor.
Completion in 1972
While the goal of the Johnson
program was to allow Saigon to
deal with the Viet Cong without
American help, at least the
interim aim of Vietnamization,
as described by American offi-
cials recently, is to allow the
South Vietnamese to confront
both Viet Cong and North Viet-
with the help of Ameri-
namese
can air power, logistics and
artillery, but without American
gon civiliaps saw North L iet-
 VAST;iaGit POST-
Approved For Release2dJ?1/g1340M72CIA-Fff0Tdbti
'..
By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer
In early 1969, more than the Communists. "Our
seven years after the United . knowledge of the internal tributors to the study to "their shadowy nature
States made its initial niainr personalities n
oi) i
?
s All ese moves.
South Vietnam, the Ameri- fact very limited and specu- Explaining the Coinmu-
can agencies engaged in pro- lative," said the State Dc. nists' behavior at the Faris
secuting the war still knew parttncnt. The Defense Dc- peace talks, the State De.
virtually nothing about the partment concurreed ,partment said that they
Communist t enemy's leaders : "As
and their intentions. far as our knowledge of how were "negotiating tntder
. At that time, moreover, Hanoi thinks and feels, we pressure" ,and would be
these ?. various U.S. agencies see through a glass darkly, compelled to "modify their
often' disagreed among if at all." - own terms and conditions
Llacrose1ves in their evalua A summary of the stud over time". The U.S. .Ein.
Y bossy in Saigon echoed that
lions of North Vietnamese said the contributors agreed thesis, saying "the prospects
and Vietcong'military, pout- that . their intelligence - on oil the ground are bleak
teal and diplomatic policies the existence and signifi-
and enough for them so that
practices, the conflict.. The second coil. of "possible factions". they Will, in the end make Terence was convened by
The extent to which the
within the North Vietnam- r;,..,ifi...,?.
..___:_.
...
was 11Imp11'e- - -~~ aa,al"LU
In" the U.S. war effort cise". Nevertheless, the con Speculating on possible; Helms. '
lacked hard intelligence to - tributors tried to define the concessions the Communists But, according to the
guide their operations is re- rival Hanoi factions, and might make, the embassy White House study, the
Elected ? in a secret study their assessments varied. suggested that they "may agencies "failed to reach
compiled by White House even" abanclolt their efforts agreement on the elements
adviser Henry Kissinger's The State Department to gain a "favorable political included in the estimates of
staff not long after Presi- w'a's inclined to consider Le settlement in the negotia- enemy strength." At the
dent Nixon took office. Duan, the present First See- tions." Until now, however, time the study was com-
Contributors to the study, retary of Hanoi's Lao Dong the Communists have shown piled, therefore, the CIA es-
which was made public. this (Workers' Party), as a rela- no. disposition to compro- ttmate of Communist
week, included the Joint tive moderate while the misc. strength exceeded that of
Chiefs of Staff; the Pacific Pentagon described him as a The Defense Department the Pentagon by about 0,000. command in Honolulu, the militant' who favored "an estimated that the North Vi- `?J The -CIA
U.S. military and civilian extreme and agressive ap- etnamese and Vietcong went The also and the Pegon missions in Saigon, the Cen- proach to both foreign and to the conference table in "strongly also on d i s a' greed
tral intelligence Agency, domestic policy". Paris because they realized strongly Ca the amportt
anal the Defense and Stale These U.S. analysts, ac- that they "cannot in a war of ance h the Cambodian hon
Departments. cording to a, summary of the through large-scale, offen- of suppliesf as a can-
An official U.S, expert study, also "set forth sive military actions." , nel of supplies for the Com-
said yesterday that there sharply conflicting" ? esti-
In an monists. iha Pentagon eon-
mates of Gen. Vo Nguyen seems to assessment havve e co o ntra adicted v that vial Sinoulcv}lle to be
has been "no real improve- vital to the Communists,
ment" in the available Intel- Giap, the architect of by the present Communist while the-CIA regarded the
iigeoce on llanoi and the Vi- France's Indochina defeat in drive, the Defense Depart- port as a relatively un.irnpor-
ctncong since the White 1954 and currently. Hanoi's ment further said that taut enemy asset.
house study was assembled leading strategist. Hanoi would avoid "high more than three years ago. The U.S. agencies agreed, losses without commensur- - the complicity of menib}errs
"We probably know less however, that it was inaccur- ate' gains" because it knew of the Cambodian army in
about North Vietnam than ate to divide the Communist that "the effort necessary to the arms traffic to the
tzn}" country in the world," leaders into "pro-Peking" support large-scale fighting enemy "has been well estab-
ttae official remarked, ex- and "pro-Moscow" groups. results in a serious weaken. lished." The commander of
l'laining that the U.S. intelli. As the CIA noted: "In com- ing of the ideological strug- the Cambodian army at the
trrlce community relies al- peting'for influence, Peking gle in both North and South time, Gen._ Lon Neil, later
nt t exclusively for infor- i and Moscow tend to cancel Vietnam." overthrew Cambodia's chief
tnxuivn about llanoi on pub- each other out," Serious disagreements of state, Prince Norodom Si-
11211c1 Communist state- The contributors agreed also divided U.S. agencies in hanouk. Lou Nol's govern-
tttrntti hilt captured state as well that North Vietn9tn- their evaluations of enemy ment now receives about
menu.. ese President Ho Chi Minh strength in South Vietnam. $300 million per year in U.S.
wa
th
s
en acting, as the State , As the study shows, the U.S. military aid..
Several obsert ers of the
Vietnam conflict have at- Department put it, like a military establishment gcn-
tributcct U.S. miscalcula= chairman of the board, e r a 1 1 y underestimated
dons over the casting the deciding vote in enemy forces because. it
slalet-t failures years to per. case of disputes but letting "consistently clown-graded"
by succes- others air their views". IIo Communist units not "regu-
sive administrations to un- died in September 1969. larly committed to offensive
derstand the Communist hi. crurchy and its workings. In retrospect, the lack of action."
The different contributors information about the Com- In the view of U.S. mili-
with any precision."
The CIA and State De-
partment disputed the calcu-
lations of, the Pentagon and
the U.S. command in Sai-
gon. The 'dispute apparently
reached such proportions
that inter-agency . confer-
ences were called in Sep.
tember 1967 in Saigon and
in Washington eight months
later to attempt
to reconcile
to the 1969 ApPr figre1 ~ e~g q ? O ~y 5 O~'~0 111~601 8000300350071-6
their limited knowledge of to ommuntst units were
prompted some of the coil- also disregarded because