INDOCHINA AIR WAR FAILING, REPORT SAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350094-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: November 8, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

J3OSTOU MASS.
GLoBrAl3prOVPd ,For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-ROM-007W
1),,aks 0 t
M -- 237,967
566,377
;BY John B. Wood
.Q:lobe Staff
11 -
ICLI.21
. :-.-
:-While Ameriean ground troopS
- Its most telling quotes are frOill . "Mechanically. .c-Once.ti--
..
1. :are' 'coming home in increasing .num- i Laird and former Defense Secretary- , trated firepower Can de-
bers;. the air, war ,in Indochina, de- _ Robert McNamara; ethical considera- j stray objects and people,
? . Structive but ineffective, grinds on. tions and wide implications of the, air .1 but it cannot always bend
,.
. . ? ?. : .. war are relegated to a future report. wills - to - conform with
,. .? ." That is the conclusion of the first T tone of the study is military 'American aims; nation
- he
! detailed analysis of American. activl- ? -
building is a subtle process:
i.. ty, over Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and dispassionate, weighing the cf
. "Just as the senseless
Viritten by professors at the Cornell facts. of the air war against stated brutality of the Battle of
, - University' Center for International American objectives in Indochina. Britain, designed, to break
--Studdes and ?released this morning. the British will, was psy-
, It concludes succinctly : ."A IC 15- counterpro-
'-???The 200:-page document reports sessment of our position is Iong over- ductive, so the use of air-
?
that -
due." . - , power in Indochina may
?..,- _ ?
,,, ? 0 By- the end of .1971, American have similar consequen-
and South planes Will m
Aerial bombing is becoming ore , ces," the study saYs. , ..
? ' Vietnamese
,
have dropped 6 million tons of bombs important, the study. says, as the I3y any _standards, the
_. :on Indochina, twice the tonnage used United States turns increasingly to amount .of bombing in In-
in World War II and Korea combined. "capital - intensive 'warfare" sub- dochina is staggering. The
_ .. , ??
?
. 0 Although bombing often - stitoting massive aerial firepower study notes that while "no
,., ? single set of numbers con-
achieves its immediate military goals, for manpower.
veys the full picture ... the
- it is not winning the war. The casual- . Mechanized warfare saves Ameri- trends reveal such emphat-
ties, civilian dislocation and random can. lives, but. it, is proportionately ic features that errors of
destruction caused by the air war are more destructive of Asian lives and interpretation are unlikely
detrimental to "nation building," our resources. _
? ? ?to result."
, - ? -- ? A hand grenade contains
? professed goal in Indochina,
. Aerial bombing lias undeniable -
. . _ . --- about one pound of Nigh
' 0 No, end, to the air war is in military advantages in conventional .explosive. A typical mis-
sight. The South Vietnamese army :warfare, with massed bodies of sion of six B-52s employed
cannot. stand alone, nor is it being' . ? . , ._ in "saturation bombing"
prepared to do so; Defense Secretary ' . ? chops 300,000 pounds of
I-Melvin Laird has said American air In . guerrilla - warfare, the study similar explosive in less
and naval power will be required in ? concludes, it is inefficient and indis- than a minute. . . . ...
Indochina for at least a decade to In cr mi ten years of successful
in. .
,
maintain a policy of "realistic deter- i ate , ? ,..- _caoydan,tertinhseur gBalrlictirs hi ri usedl\ ir"cl-
.enee,"'
Concentrations - of enemy. re'-
3,
"In summary, the success of indi- , sottrces are ral:e in -Ind 3000 tons of aerial muni-
ochina.. .. ' tions. . In six years of
?victual air operations have not, in the fighting in South Vietnam
aggregrate,.. resulted . in. major pro- Viet Cong. generally do not mass
alone, air ordinance has to-
in the jungle; they are more likely to
gress toWard the achievement of stat- :tailed 3,600,000 tons. ,
ed US goals in Indochina," the study infiltrate civilian ? Villages,- . where Elsewhere, Amer i c an '
.says. ? , they tire ? indistinguishable from and South .Vietnamese
? fi-iendly Vietnamese to the American planes have d r o p p e d -
"On the other hand, they have in-eye 200,000 tons of bombs on
Meted grievous dainEige on the na- -? Cambodia, 50.0,000 tons on
'tions of the, region, leaving a scarred 'The beat weapon against a guer- North Vietnam, 500,000 .
-cOuntryside and torn societies for rilla is a knife, tiletons on Northern Laos, and worst is a bomber; .
ons -
' whom the task of political -accommo- the second best is a 1400000 t on theHo
. rifle, the second Chi Minh Trail, predomi-
clations and reconstruction will have worst, artillery," the study says: . nantly in Southern Laos. .
been made not easier, but more diffi- In 1987, relatively .in-
- cult." ?Even where bombing is militarily, tense bombing of North
, . effective, it may help defeat broader Vietnam required 200,000
Although it is billed as &sequel to Az,:nerican designs. - . .. ,,,,, tons of bombs per year.
the Pentagon Papers, the Cornell Despite elaborate civil de-
sc'tetincif317.deilailisilla "IV' c811 114?
lease 2001/03/04 : CIMRDP80-01601R000300350094-1,1
--i.nljed
i .. ,.? - - -
rAppro0006e; Release 2001/03/04:
GRAND FORKS, N.D. ?
IIERALI)
, ....n. . . .- .
- By WILLIAM BP,012h1 . : Johnsen AdministratiOn did in
.11erald Washington ' four," said the study. - ''' - ?,--fl,,F, ? ',_ s?,,,
Bureau: Chief . . U.S. an activitTin -South Viet- ) ti P n 1111
; .. WASHINGTON ? -The United nam has bO-cn eut,back, with the. - 4 11 .
;States is -substitutin mriseive
taking -up 'most. of the slack? on but only shifted it to Laos and' often necessary to deny use of .
- v '
-.aerial firepmver for the troops it tactical assignments.- U.S. : air the Ito Chi Minh Trail. an area, trail or illage for any
-is... Nvitlidrtrwing 'from Indochina, activity is coneenti'ated _on, Despite Nixon Administration extended time. The amount of
i
destructiveness required can be
denials, the. report said, U.S, a group of Cornell University saturation '.b o m hi n;g- by 152
. scholars reported Sunday, ' Stratofortresse.s. , . bornbing in northern Laos dur- intmense in comparison with
' "Contrary to reports' and im-- In .six years. of tlie Ido-china ing 3969 was as intense as the objectiye achieved."
'
pressions," the report said, "the War, the United States will have previously in North Vietnam, 2. "Air war is economical_ in
about 200,000 tons annually. Yet terms of American lives and
down' like the ground war." p
air , war is .not ' being. .?wound used 6.2 million tons of air-drop-
the massive bombing effort fail- dollars. Thce direct costs are far '
,ed 'munitions. By comparison
6
. _ ed to dislodge the Communist lower, per ton of ordinance
i' ? The ? study was sponsored by U.S.' plures dropped about ty;0
Pathet Lao, who now control delivered, than . for g r o u n d .
the. .Center for. International million tons in World War II,
More territory than before. warfare . . . more importantly .,
Studies at Cornell. More than SO and one million tens in Korea. In terms el-. military et, the number of American lives
!faculty members contributed to Air war cost was placed at
fectiveness, the report found lost in the air is only about 10
I it. The group worked without . abotit .$50 billion,. or one-fourth
. . that although . air po \ver achiev- per cent of the total , . . this '.
access to classified data,.. basine the war's total, , ed narrowly-defined military favorable evaluation rests on.
its study on ?published material ' Yet the report found that the missions, these succm.s did two gross ' simplifications: that
and inter i7:ws Thei finfiin military effectiveness of the. not add up to an overall position the , effectivenes can b e,
vi. r gs
bombing, has been scant. One. of
were compiled by a group of 20 of strength. It attributed the evaluated through counting suc-
academicians, many of - them Its main conclusions is that air failure to the "indiscriminate .cesses '.in military operational
scientists. . . war is basically mismatcheed to destruction resulting from ?.the terms alo.nc, and that only the '
Bombing in South Vietnam, the guerrilla' warfare by thee use of air power amidst civilian direct costs ill Anieican lives
enemy in. indechina.. and 'dollars are to be counted,.
populations . . . contributing to
Cambodia and Laos today con-
'pr e
During the - three yars of
times ?at ' about - CO per cent .of the continuinc: . weakness of not the costs borne by others
b
boming in ' North Vietnam, (the indigenous population)."
friendly regimes."
the war's peak -bombing, period . .
in. 1068, the report. said. In the about $500 million in economic In one way, the bombing was 3. "Costs of air' war to the
firt- eight months of 1971, more damage, and 100,000 casualties counterproductive. A ?. Defense *Pcople of Indochina ., are very
than 500,000 tons of munitions (SO per cent . civilian) vJere in-. Department study was found high. The damage includes
were dropped comparable flicted. But CIA can pe-fenserAhowing that massive American civilian dead .and. wounded,
, ? : to
the bombing rate in all theaters Department' -"Se7e:.s' were 01 C(1 bombing gave the enemy more refugees., villages and crops
of World War II, ? - . showing no iti75aSTrable reduc- than enoug,b2 explosives from destI?oyed, cultural treasures.'
-."Vietnamization has brought tion in North Vietnam's vill or dud bombs (27,000 tons in 1966 lost,' and ecological damage to
no-new restrictions on the capability for contilbutinc, to alone) to fulfill its needs for the countryside."
Arnerican airpower the report .
. use of
the war in the south. making mines'-and booby traps.. ii 4. "While the costs of the war
," ;
said. "Indeed:- the trend has The. credibility of ? the U.S. The _report raises questionsj mount cumulatively, military ?
been in. the. onposite direction." government _ .vas . called. into] about, the value of continued '. actions, though successful in
????- ? ...- .. ..._____.. . _.
For'1971, the report estimated
' That the tonnage of air .muni-
tions used in Cambodia, the Ho
Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and for
reprisal raids against North
Vietnam will increase over 1970
levels. The rate .will drop in
o South Vietnam to about 300,000
-tons, approximately the same
as HM, year of the war's big
'buildup, and increase . to about
.0,000 tons in Cambodia. Bomb-
ing along the trail will hit
about 400,000 tons and another
.S0,000 tons will fall in northern
? ?
:Laos. - ? . .
; "By the end of this 'year; the
'Nixon Administration will have
Ideployed in thrtie years, as
much ithrnage of bombs as the
question by . a . number "of bombing. With American troops i'livictually, may in the aggregate
disclesures in the report. - . . rapidly withdrawing a' renewal I fail to achieve the overall policy..
In 1969, when 200,000 tons -of
of communist ground war ao_i objectives. In Indochina where
. tivity would leave the United ! 'nation building' was described
boinbs- ' were d u nip e d , oA ? States little option other than' as the ultimate goal, this dictum
northern .Laos, . Washington. .0f- _re-escalating the air war, it ! applies with special force. As -a:
; ficially - ?admitted, to f 1 y i n g .said. Yet, the report points out, result, of its extensive and costly
"reconnaissance"' flights. - -Bp .such re-escalation is unlikely to' efforts in South Vietnam and
raids in northern Laos went on scare off the National Libera. Cambodia, the U.S. had gained:
for more than a year before of-,tion Front (Viet Congo 'or North (1) time to recruit and equip the
ficial acknowledgment. - iVietnam, having failed to de so South . Vietnamese and Cam-
It . was stated that U.S. planes , earlier in the war. i bodian armed forces, with as .
were not giving close tactical The conclusions of the report Yet uncertain military capabill-,
ground 'support when in fact were: - - :Ay; - (2) time to consolidate ,
they were. ? i 1. "Almost all air missions i. military-political regimes whose
It was'. discovered that the ,can be called ? 'successful in : -
stability is not assured, and (3) '
-196S. bombing halt, in pursuit of :terms of Their immediate opera. an apparent military stalemate,
.the Faris peace talks, 'did not tional criteria. . , . the existing . dependent on an indefinite con- '
redUce air activity in Indochina :technology virtually guarantees . tinuation of American air ac-
that the mission can accomplish tion. Whether these gains are
its immediate objective .i. . ..! worth the enormous costs . . . is,
where the target is human and An open question."
mobile,, repeated bombing is
. .
._
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601-R000300350094-1