WHY NOT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350102-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 102
• Publication Date: August 2, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2001/03/Q4LI. IAMUP80-01
STATINTL
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Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired
for his good common sense, has offered P. good cornnlon-
So Ise proposal to the Congres , namely, that the National
S curity Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central
futelligence Agency to keep the "germane" committees of
t1 u- Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of
"analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the
intelligence gathered by that agency.
The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Con-
gress is entitled to the same information that the executive
receives in order to pass considered judgnrentj on clatters
pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surpris-
ingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dis-
selnination of CIA-fathered intelligence to Congress, but.
neither does it rec'ire. that Congress be informed. So, by
P. familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of
using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Coll-
gres-s 0111 . in the cold. to scrounge around and get what
intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of
tile exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to
start wars and when to end them. Of coarse it retains the
power of the purse, but few members of either blouse are
Courageous enough to stop a war by % ithholdillg funds----
it leaves them open to the' accusation that they are letting
dov,11I "Out boys)," which can prove fatal at election time.
Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would
have limited Congressional circulation. It would be made
available to the. Senate and I-louse Foreign Relations and 1//
Arced Services Corlllriittees, whose members could pass
along partinent Portions to other legislators and staff rllerl-
bers wonting on national security matters, subject to the
normal security rec}uircnlents.
Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under
the present arranger -ent. The President, for his pu;-poser,
I ealks a CIA report to, say, The New York 'l'imes on, say,
the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government.
Does the Presided' call in the reporters and tell them
candidly that ll re :: `;~ report of general interest which
I }1` divulging to al:: t"._)u? Ile doles nothing of the kind
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to leak it wiled it serves his purpose to do so
.
The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The
Congress and the public are denied information oil which
Vital decisions are based. The denial apples pat only to
Military information but substantially to a;l data except
What the executive chooses to share, which is always what
will benefit hire politically by enhancing his image and
making him look-, if not infallible, at least pretty close to
it. The effect is to multiply errors as rich. ;.1s to hide them.
The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from
the public and the press.
Senator Cooper. has taken an important first ste}, to }unit
the s: crecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations.
His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy and'
.save us from involvement in another Indochitla dress.
Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350102-1
. ~~oll
u i~ther }? the leaking game. That is one
Veasou why the executive prefers to hoard the information
and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able
 Approved For Release 2001 /0 /P4`)(c RDP80-0'
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dociti;lenis not pii,blisiled by the New York Times
and the Washington Post, leaked to NATION I11L REVIEW
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.In early September, 1964, 1'resiclent Johnson appointed a special imtcr'-deparYnnen-
tal, inter-nt,ency committee, referred to as OVERLOOK, to review the record of
US activities in, and in relation to, Indochina from 1950 (tire date of US recogni-
tion of 13ao Dai, the first active intervention in the Indochinese conflict). The comr-
tnittee was instructed to submit its report and conclusions to the NSC prior to the
end of the month, in conjunction with the new policy directives under discussion
and due for decision in the first week of October: It was the normal practice of
such committees, special or standing, as it wets of the NSC, JCS, etc., to reach
rnal agreement on a single report through discussion and, when necessary, Com-
prornise of. any divergencies in viewpoint. In the case of OVERLOOK, however,
VVVVVV two rneiabers?----not named, but identified as from the Air Force and CIf1--cle-
clined to endorse the report, and insisted oil sub;nittirr, a "rriirloi-ity" document,
not so mach disagreeing with the approved text as adding a further section. It is
trot clear whether this appendix was ever actually placed before the NSC or seen
by the President.
J. As in numerous other reports, nraii~- and analysis, and therefore cai not serve
oranda and recommendations drawn up as a correct guide for policy and plans.
Since 1951 for.JCS, NSC, SD, ttlc*Pros-
ident, various ad hoc committees, etc.,_ Prom 190 on, the nature and Sig-
.the report of OVERLOOK fails to cc ni;icance of US interest in Southeast
C:11 i 1, ,
out essential dispute. E.g.:
iLlenro?andumr from Secretary of De-
fense Al('Nanzca-a to President Ken-
ttedy, 8 Nov 1961: . The Joint
Chiefs, Mr. Gilpatrick and I . . . are
inclined to recommend that Nye do com-
mit the United States to the clear ob-
jective of preventing the fall of South
Vietnam to Communism and that we
support this commitment by the neces-
sary military action. . . . If we act in
-this way, the ultimate possible extent
of our military commitnicut must be
faced......
Memorandum from Secretary bf
State Rusk and Secretary of Defense
McNamara to President Kennedy, 11
Nov 1961:
a) UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTia:--
r_srs IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
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