JOHNSON HID INVOLVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350122-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 122
• Publication Date: June 16, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2Od19O b41 t IA-RDP
'Mr. Johnson's decision was re- The original purpose of the.
T corded in a National Security March deployment had been do-
TO
U 1 !4 $~ Action Memorandum dated lease of the air base. ?~
April 6, 1905, signed by Me_ It had become clear during
'I George Bandy, and one of the
ile South,
eriod that the frag
t this
p
I
HIT 1, 1 }AI[ a huge numbers of utmcnis tine Vietnamese government and its:
ublished ed Mr
Bundy
has
Ti
.
.
p
mes
as President Johnson's special Army faced collapse and that)
w
~'1mes eport I laces St .'+"t assistant for national security. the "Rolling Thunder" bombing
. The memo was addressed to campaign against the North,
11j1~1t i;Cle
G
'
01
Of Ma;01
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, tartecl in February, 1965, would
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary lot prevent it.
BY U1A10,ES W. coii1iDr.s' of Defense, and John A. Me- -The Pentagon study said "the
Was/cingtoaf. Bureau o! The Sii.rn Cone, director of central intelli- bombing effort seemed to stiffen
Washington, June 15---Pcnta- gence. It reported decisions tak? rather than soften Hanoi's back-
gon, records : published today on April 1, including expansion bone," and optimism waned aft-
show that President Johnson of the forces in Vietnam, espe- or a month of the air campaign.
made his momentous decision to dally including additional mar The choice then was to with-
use United States ground troops, ine battalions, and, a 'change of I draw, or togoto war on the
for offensive' action in Vietnam mission" for the Marines. That' ground. There were deep differ
on April 1, 1965, but banned any change called for "more active ences within the administration,
immediate publicity or official use" under condltio11 s to be the Times noted, citing views of
concession that a drastic policy andxed hu usrsk. Secretaries McNamara George W. Ball, then under see-
shift shift was involved. The Pentagon study called rotary of state, and Mr. Me-
Events surrounding this major. this a "pivotal" change and a Cone.
departure from the revel "departure from a long-held pol- Mr. Ball believed neither
again" attitude against. ground ley" with momentous implica-. bombing nor ground fighting
war in Asia, which had persisted tions. But the Bundy-memoran- . would solve. the problem and
from the end of the Korean war, dum said Mr. Johnson desired,. proposed in a memorandum
formed the highlights of the' that "premature publicity be June 26 that the United States
third in a series of New York avoided by all possible precau "cut its losses" and get out,
limes articles, tiops." according to the Pentagon ac-
are based'on "top The military actions were to count.
alt
secret defense department ' be taken rapidly, ",but in ways Mr. IvlcCone, on the other
stuciie.s of American involve that should minimize any ap- hand, had argued in April that it
ntept . in Indochina from \,'orld ' pearance of sudden changes in
War II to micl-1963. The govern policy." Mr. Bandy wrote that would be unwise to commit
meat, obtained a federal court "the President's desire is that ground troops unless there were
these movements and changes willingness to bomb the
order . in New York today sus also
pending further publication at Korth
should be understood as being with minimum re-
`least until Saturday. gradual and wholly consistent strains in an effort to break
Much Already Known - ' with existing policy." . Hanoi's will.
Much of what has been pub- The public learned officially of But at that time, President
lishcd, .in news reports and tex- the shift of ground forces to a Johnson was accepting the. couu-
teal material, documents in Cle- combat--rather than defensive so] of Gen: William C. West-
;tail what had been generally -role almost ' inadvertently morelancl, then American cotn-
known on the course of the war when the State Department re- manclei? -in.Vietnam, using coin-
-particularly from the time ferrecl to it vaguely on the fol- I.bat troops, and was in no mood
just before the Tonkin Gulf opt- lowing June E. I for compromise, the Pentagon
sole of August, 1964, to the By that time, however, ob-. 'account indicates.
post-Tot offensive studies in the
winter and spring of 1963 which servers recall, Mr. Johnsons Regarding the commitment of
ended the U.S. build-up in Viet, course was beginning to be ap7;1, ground forces, the Pentagon
nam.' parent, for all the lack of effietal1 papers say there was a "subtle!
But the secret documents and comment. In IF ebruary, Marin61 change in emphasis.
accompanying narrative in the antiaircraft units had been de-. "Instead of simply denying
Pentagon papers also c remati , ployed at Da Nang to protect the the enemy victory and convinc-
cally expose instances 'when ma- air base from which bombing ing him' he could not win," the
jor policy shifts were concealed, originated. .. study says, "the thrust became
one was the decision on corn- In March, a battalion of Mar- defeating the enemy in the
mitment of ground forces to Of-, ine infantry had been sent to South. This was sanctioned fm-
fensive action, described in the Vietnam, followed in May by Illicitly as the only way to
Times as a result of the Johnson
ac lminisfi?ation's discovery that activation of the big Marine, non1ComtnuuUk SouthlveViet
the bombing of North Vietnam headquarters in Da Nang, and
in early 1965 would not prevent arrival of Army airborne troops. Dam.
the South's collapse.
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0..Whatever the outcome of the pub- their part that the difficulties facing
IicaEon by The New York Times the U.S..ard so great that U.S. will
of a secret documentary on the and ability to maintain resistance
in that area can tie gradually erod-
American presence i n Indochina ed-without running high risks than
may be in the light of the granting this would wreak heavy destruc-
of atemporary federal court in- tion on the D.R.V. (Hanoi) or Corn-
jurict[on sought on the ground that munist China," the panel said.
the law had been violated, one "..: We do not believe that such
:thing already- is very clear. That actions (farce scale bombing of in-
is; the role ascribed by its critics dustry) would have a crucial effect
to the Central Intelligence Agency on the . daily lives of the over-
as the evil, genius of U.S. involve- whelming majority. of the North
ment proves to be more myth than Vietnam April, 1965, John M c C o n e,
reality.
The fact is the record now re- then head of ?the CIA, w a r n e d
vealed shdvrs that the CIA warned against plans to undertake combat
against deeper involvement as ear- operations on the ground against
ly as November, 1964. In describ- Viet Cong guerrillas without com-
ing the attitude of the intelligence mensurate increase in bombing of
community, the T i in e s says the North Vietnam; in short, -we can-
study shows the people involved not win cheaply and to win at all
t Q`t, e n d e d. toward a pessimistic we~mu s f got~llvout.
will find ourselves
view."
An intelligence panel composed mired down in combat in the jungle
of members of the three leading in a military effort that we cannot
agencies-the CIA, the State De- win, and from which we will have
partment's Bureau of Intelligence extreme difficulty extricating our-
and Research, and the D e f e n s e selves." .
(Department's) Intelligence Agen- These advices are hardly what
c y.--o r d e r c d to study a Joint one would expect from an organi-
Chief's recommendation that North zation so many believe is at the
Vietnam be bombed into surren- bottom of all our overseas adven-
der, concluded that there was no tures. In fact, instead of urging the
"strong chance of breaking Ha- U.S. to escalate the war, the CIA
noi's will." - was warning the U.S.not to in-
"The course of actions the Com- crease our commitment. It ran up
m u n i.s t s have pursued in South the danger flags, and acted as re-
Viethain over the past few years sponsibly as its harshest c r i t i c s
implies a.fundamental estimate-on could have hoped it would
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By Marilyn Berger we know where all. the
and Michael Getler 'sets are supposed to be and
Washington Post Staff Writers we think we ought to be
t There are 15 "legitimate" able to track it down,"
topics of the controversial The Vietnam study was
Pentagon report on Vietnam, ordered by former Defense
the administration disclosed Chief Robert S. McNamara
'yesterday, and a massive and entrusted first to the
,hunt is on to identify the one late John T. McNaughton,
to which The New York Assistant, Secretary of Dc-
Times was given access. fcnse for International Se.
Sources at the Justice De- curity Affairs, and later to
partinent said that the. Fed- Paul C. Warlike, his suc-
eral Bureau of Investigation thcessor. Overall direction of
was ordered Monday to call the -study was given to
. Leslie H. Gelb, a staff mean-.
on all persons who have ber of ISA who is now at
legitimate' copies. It is as- the Brookings Institution.
sunned that these calls were Others who worked on the
made yesterday. study to a greater: or lesser.
According to adniinistra- degree include Morton Hal-
tion sources, the copies are perin, who worked with
.distributed as follows: six Gelb in ISA and is also at
White House, one each in. Common Cause; Daniel Ells-
the State Department files berg, now of MIT, who
former Under Secretary, and Lansdale of the CIA in
William Bundy, former As- Saigon; Richard Holbrooke,
.sistant Secretary for Asia formerly on Katzenbach's
and the Far East, one in the staff and on the U.S. dole
LBJ library in Austin, Tex., gation to the Paris peace
,two in the National Archives, talks, currently with the
two with the Rand Corp. and Peace Corps in Morocco;
one With former Defense Col. Paul Gorman, also a
Secretary Clark M. Clifford. former staff member of the
In the Xerox age, no one ISA and of the peace talks
has ruled out the possibility delegation, now serving in
that the report could have Vietnam; Mel Gurtov of
been duplicated, or photo- Rand; and Richard Moor-
graphed, but officials note stein, former ISA staff mcm-
. that it would be a tre- ber, currently at Rand.
mendous undertaking to Secretary of State Will lam
assemble a complete set of P. Rogers said that 36 per-
the 7,000-page, 47-volume soils worked on compiling
report. the documents.
Government officials said The disclosures in the doc-
they. were reasonably confi- uments contained in the
dent that. they could find Pentagon study have
the source of the leak of
the top-secret documents.
"We know who worked on
? the study and who had ac-
cess to it," said one official.
which came off well in the
disclosures, said only half in
jest, "Whoever. (lid it ought
to be shot at ,dawn at the
Washington Monument," On
second thought, he added:
"High noon will do; more
people will see it."
Is well known, said that
everyone with anything to
do with government is upset
about it. One current official
said, "If this doesn't get
tracked down, then nothing
is safe."
"The problem with. the
study," said one official not-
ing the critical remarks by
the analysts writing the re-
,port, "is that it is a prosecu-
tion brief masquerading as a
dispassionate study."
There were some in town
whom the report came as
'no surprise. The President's
national security adviser,
Henry A, Kissinger, was
quoted as saying he first
learned about it when he
picked ' tip his copy of the
Time; from his doorstep,
and it was said that Secre-
tary of State William P.
Rogers was similarly, un-
aware of it,
. But Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Chairman
J. W. Fuibright (D-Ark.),
longtime critic of the war,
had long ago written to Sec-
retary of Defense Melvin I.I.
Laird in search of a copy.
He disclosed in a speech on
Aug. 7, 1970 that he regret-
ted that the Pentagon had
withheld it.
"As the old saw goes," he
told the Senate
"nothing is
,
brought widespread expres secret for long in Washing.
sions of concern In official ' t i." Ile added: "I hope that
Washington. . ie first enterprising report-
One official of the CIA, .r who obtains a copy of
one of the few organizations this history will share it
Even Nat Hentoff, In a
May 20 column in the Village
Voice, reported that he had
heard that the New York
'l'imes had gotten, hold of "a
breakthrough unpublished
story concerning the White
House, the Pentagon and
Back in October, 1(070,
Parade Magazine reported
that an in-depth study had
been undertaken at the be-
hest of McNamara 'by a
"task force under Les Gelb."
The magazine said: "There V
are no plans to make it pub-
lic,"
Filially there is the hn-
pac:t of the disclosures on
those authors whose books
have been completed but
have yet to be published.
Chief in this category is for-
mer President Johnson,
w h o s e administration is
shown to have said things in
public that were substantial-
ly different from private
plans disclosed in the Penta-
gon report. His book, "The
Vantage Point: Perspectives
of the Presidency, 1,9113.1969,"
is said to contain much about
the Vietnam experience.
book is finished and will be
published as written," he
said, "No changes are being
contemplated in the text as
it now exists." y,
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turn public opirilon against them.'
Like small boys bolstering their
;-own confidence, they traded their prej-
udices and ill-informed conjectures
pumping one another
back and forth
,
was to be u
to the point where they could all
d
ll
cl
p
e
of the so - ca
? r "Ml,
great
peace 7 esker (as McNamara Report, which traces great "hawkish demands for air march off ins search of Lyndon John-
the origins of this nation's.maxirnuin sons famed coonskin hat.
commitment to the survival of South toattacks the orthiVietn a m"). He anwas d Hungry to assert American power
'Vietnam, should 'remind Americans in a way that would demonstrate once
But by and for all that the United States was
once again of how poorly they are kept restraint."
this time, the Joint
Chiefs the biggest power on earth, they took
l ad-
ti
id
a
en
.informed by any pres
d
had already recommende a ministration - and how lightly, almost us into the quicksand of Vietnam
'off-handedly the government moves to systematic air offensive against North most of there whistling a merry tune,
deceive the American people when this Vietnam, which in turn led to a White certain of their predictions, and ap-
4seerns necessary. House strategy meeting on Sept. 7 at ' parently free of any guilt over their
Thoughtful Americans have known ..which the "provocative strategy" plan deceptions.
for years that the truth is simply not was discussed. Throughout September, It was the sorriest episode of that
.in most government officials when as plans were shaping up for initiating whole sorry era; and it should remain,
they are discussing U.S. policies in air attacks on North Vietnam in early for us, the most instructive.
Vietnam. For them, misleading state- 1965, the White House was piously
s
Goldwrater'
Sen
l
i
m
.
n g
ere
y b e m o a n
ments and outright lies are
handy cattle prods of public opinion. suggestion that the war would even-
What was not realized, perhaps, tually have to include the bombing of
was the extent of these fabrications. In North Vietnam.
the sense that it details the two levels It was an elaborate ruse de guerre,
of our growing involvement in Viet- and it worked. President Johnson was
nam -- one level dealing with what the re-elected by a landslide.
public knew, the other level dealing There are other revelations of this.
with what the public did not know -- nature, such as the uses that could
this voluminous, detailed report is a be made of the press and television
unique document of the war. by the White House; and the need to
Primarily, these disclosures show begin making "presidential noises"
that the White House and the Defense that would prepare the American
Department were jointly planning people for the coming "action"
"covert" military operations against statements.
i North Vietnam as early as February, There was also one prime example
1964, some seven months before the of stubborn ignorance: The White
Tonkin Gulf war resolution. House intellectuals, led by Walt
Throughout the spring and summer Rostow, refused to heed the Central
of 1964, in fact, elements. in the U.S. Intelligence Agency's warning that air
ter- Id iot briii North Vietnam
n
k
,/
s tiyou
attac
government favoring massive i
vention developed "scenarios" of what to its knees; on.the contrary, said the
ought to. happen in Vietnam, and CIA, such bombing might provoke
detailed plans for provoking the North maven heavier troop intervention' from
Vietnamese into attacking American the north. But so certain were they
forces. of American power and authority, and
And on Sept. 7, 1964m,. a week after so eager they were-to demonstrate it,
President Johnson solemnly declared that the White House advisers simply
that he had rejected advice "to load rejected the findings.
our planes with bombs and drop them. ~t
on (North Vietnam)," the White House y
was developing a I 'p.r o v o c a t i o n But it was the Gulf of Tonkin
strategy" designed' to steer North "scenario" (using one of the Pen-
.Vietnam into attacking U.S. forces tagon's favorite euphemisms for war
-first --- which would give Washington plans) which indicated how furtively
its excuse to bomb the North. these high-level officials moved toward
And through it all, operating on the a broader, deeper involvement in
assumption that the American voter. Vietnam. It is as though' they knew,
was a fool and Sen. Barry Goldwater, deep down, that what they were
the Republican presidential candidate, doing was wrong, that any exposure
an expendable dupe, the White House ton the heir plans sly would provoke No almost h surely
'_busily devised an_ .."image" - for earn y
Tnb , '"'n,
1
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