'69 REPORT TO NIXON WAS SPLIT ON WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: April 25, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

.STATINTL POST
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 MIA?A[ RO-01.601 R000
Tone Pessimistic
I By Murrey Marder
washlneton Post Staff writer enemy forces (B-52 strikes are currently
President Nixon received "profoundly being conducted for the first time against
different" judgments from key govern- the North Vietnam heartland and on a
ment agencies at the start of his adminis- different strategic rationale) was rated
tration about the state of the.war in Viet- "impossible" to achieve. However, "the
that some strikes are very
4 that some strikes are very
nam, the consequences of a Communist,
.takeover, and the actions he was urged
to take. -
This is disclosed in the summary of a
government survey ordered by the Presi-
'.dent on Jan. 21, 1969, the day after his in-
,auguration. The study was National Sc:
curity. Study Memorandum No. 1, as
sembled by the National Security Coun-
cil staff headed by presidential adviser
Henry A. Kissinger.
Many of the conclusions
CIA "decidedly more skeptical about the' in this study; 'although his-`
present and pessimistic about the future." public explanations of his.
These are some of the major dis- actions have reflected more,
closures in the summary: of what the optimists were
? "Sound Analysis" of the effectiveness claiming in 1969.
of American B-52 bomber strikes against In the process, the Presi
consensus
effective, some clearly wasted, and a
majority with indeterminate outcome."
. --- 0 In early 1956, the opti-
,mendations in it have been altered or,
overtaken by events in the intervening
three years of U.S. troop withdrawals
from South Vietnam and International
-'shifts of position by China and the Soviet.
? Union in their relationships with the
United States. But some of the findings
`shed light on new actions now unfolding,
,such as the current Communist offensive
' and the, renewed U.S. bombing of North
Vietnam's heartland.
One of the most striking disclosures in
the study is the evidence it contains of
great 'splits inside the federal bureau.
cracy between optimists and pessimists
in assessing what had happened in Viet-
nam up to early 1909 when the survey
was completed. While some of these dif-
ferences have become public knowledge,
especially with publication last year of
the Pentagon Papers, which carried the
war history up to 1908, this study reveals
how these differing viewpoints were ex-
tended into the Nixon administration.
Two broad schools of assessment
emerged among the' policy planners. In
the first group, more optimistic and
"hawkish," were the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the U.S. military command in Vietnam,
the Commander in Chief of Pacific forces,
and the' American Embassy in Vietnam
headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.
Often conflicting with the judgment of
`those advisers was a second grouping
composed of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the State Department and
the Central Intelligence Agency.
dent cut U.S. forces in
South Vietnam from over a
half million at the time he.
took office to about 80,000.
today.
While the NSC summary
discloses sharp disagree-
ments three years ago on
the effectiveness of U.S.
bombing of North Vietnam,
,the current battlefield situa-
tion in Vietnam is much dif-
ferent from the situation in
early 1909 and U:S. airpower-
is being applied in different.
ways,
In contrast to tkie 'lie
rilla attacks or hit-and;run
actions by larger units
which have dominated the
enemy's strategy until now,
the current Communist of-
fensive is much more like a
conventional battle with
tanks, artillery and massed
troop concentrations stand
ing and fighting.
Thus, it is reasoned offi=
cially, bombing now is more
imporatant and potentially
more effective because big.
conventional battles need
large quantities of fuel and
ammunition to be sustained
for more than a few weeks.
The NSC summary out-
lines sharp differences of
opinion in early 1969 over
the fighting capabilities of
Saigon's forces, the import-
ance of the Cambodian port
of Sihanoukville as a major,
entry point for enemy sup-
plies, and the overall effec-
tiveness of U.S. bombing.
To a surprising extent, the
document portrays the Pen-
tagon's civilian heirarchy
within the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense as more
cautious and skeptical in all
of the major assessments af-
fecting the future course of
the fighting than the U.S.
Military -Command in Sai-
gon or the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
The document also seems
the stud view of ,. e ovig~`fuPtu~rrfZL*Ib ts'in2001/03/0+4tl OlA by, RDP8"t 01'000 00060Q29t'y
Vietnam," with State, Defense and the
mists concluded that on the
basis of programs then in
existence, it would take "8.3
years" more "to pacify the
remaining contested and
Vietcong controlled popula-
tion of South Vietnam. The
pessimists estimated it would
take "13.4 years" more to
achieve that goal.
? In "sharp debate" over
the validity of the "domino
theory" consequences of a
Communist takeover in Viet-
nam, military strategists
generally accepted that re-
bounding principle, but
most civilian experts con-
cluded that while Cambodia
and Laos could be' endan-
gered fairly quickly, the loss
of Vietnam "would not nec-
essarily unhinge the rest of
Asia."
? On Soviet and Chinese
military aid to North Viet-
nam, the Joint Chiefs and
the U.S. military command
in Saigon said that "if all
imports by sea were denied
and land routes through
Laos and Cambodia at-
tracted vigorously, North
Vietnam "could not obtain
enough war supplies to con-
tinue." But CIA and the Of-
fice of Defense, "in total dis-
agreement," concluded that
"overland routes from China
alone" could supply North
Vietnam with sustaining
war material, "even with an
unlimited bombing cam-
paign."
President Nixon's stihse-
auent actions in Vietnam