CLIFFORD'S ASSIGNMENT: 'GIVE ME THE LESSER OF EVILS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360053-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: October 26, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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STATINTL pproved For Re1easeg2PQ /Q354: CIA-RDP80-0160
11.11 IiE:31
This is the 10th of 15 excerpts
from former President Joh.nson's
boolkJt "The Vantage Point,". an
account of his - presidency, to be
published shortly.
"TIlB 112AKING-,(ii' A DECISION"
VIETNAM 1904963
(Mart Two)
The two 'weeks before and two
months following Tet represented a pe-
ciod of activity as intense as any of my
-Presidency. Illy advisers and I followed
developments in Vietnam on a daily,
:sometimes hourly, basis.
I had decided by this time to send,
General Wheeler to'Saigou for consul-
tations wth. Bunker and Westmoreland,
I thought we would benefit from a full
C assessment by this level-headed and
experienced soldier. I asked hire to go
over the entire situation with West-
moreland and to form his own judg-
ment of what should be done. I in-
structed? hint to find out what West.
moreland felt he had to have to meet
present nceds,?and what he thought fu-
ture needs would be for troops, equip,
ment, or other support. Finally, I
wanted Wheeler to And out how To
South Vietnamese army was perform-
ing and what additional help we could
provide to enable it to fight more
effectively and improve more rapidly.
Wheeler and Westmoreland nndoubt:-
emy presumed that a large buildup of
our armed forces was possible, if not
likely. They also anticipated a high-
level review of our war- strategy? This
had influenced their suggestions as to
what could he done to strengthen our
position in Vietnam,
-Their. preliminary proposal was that
we consider assigning about 108,000
men over the next two months, pro-
pare another 42,000 by September,?and
program a final group of 55,000 by the
end of 1968. The total to be readied for
possible ascirsnnierrt U',C; cir ?"1rt1 Ig e
5 or
that point Husk stated that if we made group's written report wa,tfsCiibuted
a peace proposal, it should be specific. to everyone at the table The report
He suggested that we might stop' first described the Wheeler-Westmore?
bombing at the 20th parallel, or stop land proposal for troop increases and
bombing altogether if Hanoi would Wheeler's suggestions for building up'
withdraw military forces from Quang, our strategic reserves at home, By call-
T'ri province, just below the lliiIZ.ing up reserves, increasing draft calls,
McNamara's third option was to main- and extending terms of service, the
fain the status quo on troop commit-- total package would have increased
ments and change our strategy, pro- our armed forces by 511,000 men by
testing only "essential" areas and re- June 30, 1969,
ducing offensive operations in unpopu- The Clifford group reconi.mended:
fated regions. an iuumediatc decision tp send ap-
I returned to Washington at 2 girls, proximately 23,000 additional men to.
on February 28. 11 'heeler arrived from Vietnam;
Saigon our hours later, and. we met a strong representation to the South
for breakfast. Vietnamese urging them to improve
it was Wheeler's judgment that
tilrestnior eland needed a reserve force
of "about two divisions." lie recoil-.
mended that we seriously consider the
'three-phase increase he and 1Vestinore-
land had worked out,
I asked Secretary McNamara 'how
we could raise the troops to meet the
Wheeler-Westniorclanci proposal, if we
decided to do so. McNarnara said that:
we would have to call up about 250,000
reserves for all. services, mostly for the
.Army. We would have to extend enlist-
ments by six months for men already,
in service. He estimated that we would
have to increase our budget by $10 bil-
lion in 1969 and by $1.5 billion in 1970,
I asked him whether lie accepted the
forecast that' we would have to expect
to give up territory if. we did not send
men in the numbers being diiscussed.
McNamara said he disagreed. He
thought that adding 200,000 risen would
not make a major difference, since the
North Vietnamese would probably add
men to meet our increase. He believed
that the key was the Soutli Vietnamese
army--how fast it could he expanded
and how well it would fight.
I told my advisers that I was not. pre-
pared to make any judgment at that
Lima. 'I Te needed answers to many
questions. I asked Clark Clifford to
head a group to consider these de-
manding problems. The last thing I
than 205,000. ? y said was: "Give me the lesser of evils.
At the February 27 meeting n'Ic Give me your reconiimendations."
presented three options for I know . that one of. the first things
Namara
the consideration. One was to accept the e Clifford. dr onn had done was s-make 1 ,J Wheclcr-Westmoreland proposal.. This cut a needs sharp and capabilities between etween and pre the
e
the
would require an increase in military exit
strength of about '100,000 Wien, he said longer-run question of strengthening
and an expenditure of an additional our overall military position during
full. report I i:e-
i
0 billion in fiscal 1969. ''lTie second the nest year. The
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option was tA? ol' v~'I'per t Iea~,~ 1 b1 d
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crease with a v peace Initiative. At
their'perforrriance;
early approval Of. a reserve call-up of
about. 245,000 men;
reserving judgment on the total
205,000 package and examination of
requirements "week by week";
an in-depth study of possible new
"political. and strategic guidance" far
our operations in Vietnam and of
our overall Vietnam. policy; -
"no new peace initiative on Viet-
? m?ni,''
On bombing policy, 'opinions in the
Clifford group were divided. Some
wanted a "substantial extension of tar-
gets and authority" including mining
Iiaipii mg harbor; others proposed
only a ''seasonal step-up through the
spring," without new targets.
The i;cport and its attachments ad-
dressed the various questions I had
raised in my directive of February 28.
Sonic questions were answered in de-
tail; others required additional study
and analysis, As I read the Clifford
group's report and its attachments and
listened to the discussion around the
Cabinet table, I detected among a few
advisers a acme of pessimism far
deeper than I myself felt. I had much
greater confidence in Westmoreland
and his staff in Vietnam than many
people 111 Washington, especially Pen-
tagon civilians. I also had more confi-
dence in the ability and determination
of the South Vietnamese people to de-
fend themselves. On the other hand, I
was deeply conscious of the growing
criticism we were receiving from the
press and from some vocal citizens.
The aspect of the Clifford group's r.e-
,liort that troubled me most was its to-
tally negative approach to any possible.
negotiations. On the basis of remarks
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made earlier by
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