REASON FOR BEING IN VIETNAM: BECAUSE IT'S THERE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360066-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: September 9, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

3' SHING` O POS`i'
SEP -IM
Ap~TMY-Nr Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016018
0-. J to j n' H fi t-/
By Art Brichi.vald
The "Why Are We in Vietnam Conirnittee," otherwise
known as WAWIVNC, held its monthly meeting at the
State Department last week, and for the first time there
was an air of pessimism in the room. As everyone
knows, WA.WIVNC was set up many years ago to
(provide Presidonts of the United States with solid
reasons for American involvement in Vietnam.
Some of the reasons the committee has conic up with
in the past are:
? A. To halt Communist aggression from the north.
13. To let Red China know we mean. business,
C. To prevent Southeast Asian countries from falling
like dominoes.
D. To keep American boys from having to fight on
the shores of Hawaii.
E. To prove to Hanoi we are not a helpless giant.
F. To make sure the South Vietnamese people can
choose their own leaders in Democratic elections, This
last one was everyone's favorite, President Nixon kept
repeating it in every speech about Judo-China. Secretary
of State Rogers, Ambassador lsllswortlr Bunker in
Saigon, and Ambassador David Bruce in Paris, all said
the same thing: "The United States wants nothing for
itself. It is -only in South Vietnam to, assure that the
f1f'[,nle bexe can decide their own fate."
You can imagine what happened at the WAWIVNC
tsceting when they were informed. that President Thieu
would be the only one on the ballot in the presidential
elections on Oct. 3.
The chairman of the committee said "Gentlemen, I
have just heard from President Nixon, Ile is very
disappointed that no one has chosen to run against
President Thieu and is once again hard put to explain
what.the United States is doing in Vietnam."
"Well, it isn't our fault that Vice President Ky
wouldn't run against Thieu, or that General Minh bowed
out of the race weeks .go," an assistant secretary ' of
public affairs said. ,
"How did we know that Thieu would rig the elections
so badly that even the opposition would see through
him?" a USIA psychological warfare expert said.
"Thieu should have wanted Ky and Itlinh that they
either had to run against him in democratic elections
or they would be shot," a CIA man said.
"That's not the point, gentlemen," the chairman of
11 the committee said. "The fact is that.Thieu is running
jalone. This is not our concern except that since it's now
t`J r'?r I'
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1.-v 79 la p
difficult for President Nixon to defend the Arnerican
presence in Vietnam to guarantee. free elections, we
have to finch him another reason to explain why we
are still there. Now think."
"Suppose," an AID man said, "the President says the
reason we are in Vietnam is to protect the American
dollar?"
"I don't follow you."
"Well, we all know every high official in the South
Vietnamese government has a secret Swiss bank
account where he has stashed away millions of dollars.
Now, if these officials traded their dollars in Switzer-
land for marks or French francs while the dollar is
floating it could' hurt us badly." -
"But as long' as we remain in South Vietnam these
officials will have faith in its and will keep their dollars
in Switzerland." "It's too complicated," the' c'ncirrnan
said. "I want something simple."
"Suppose we say we're in Vietnam because we must
protect freedom wherever it is found,".a Pentagon man,
said.
There was dead silence in the room
Finally the chairman said, "there has to be a reason
that no one has yet thought of."
A State Department man scribbled something on a
sheet of paper and then raised his hand. "This is it.
The President must go on television tomorrow night
and tell tiie American people the only reason we are in
Vietnam is because it's there."
(n11r71. Los Angeles Tin, es. - - - -
I/
Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601'R000300360066-1
 S ATI.NTL
App'rdr Release 200k}f~RDP80-0
ran 1971
F ii 1 131, 11 ti A.1~ Y 1) 11_068 8
by John 13. I Ienry 11
Li the spring of 1970 John Henry, there a ji{nioir
at Harvard, began, on an "off the record" basis,
tuterviewr-ing the main civilian and military offi-
cials of the Johnson Administration. Mr. I-Ienry
had an undergraduate honors thesis to write, He
wanted to explore in depth how U.S. policy-makers
in February and March of 1968 reached a number
of critical decisions, culminating in President
Johnson's a)mounicen eilt of his political retirc-
ment. The result is a narrative reconstruction of
how U.S. policy was made from the tinge of the
Communist Tet offensive (January 30-February 4,
1968) up to the President's speech of March 31,
1968.
FOREIGN POLICY believes that the Hem)
interviews add an important dimension: to our
knowledge of the history of t;he period by shedding
new light' on the motivations and behavior' ,of
U.S. policy-makers. Therefore we are presenting
a significant portion of the 35,000 word .1Icm)''
thesis, cot'eriilg military decision-making during
February, ' 1968. Persons directly quoted in this
article have given the author permission for such
quotation. Further parts of the Henry study are to
be published in The Atlantic Monthly.-The
Editors.
1. The Tot Offensive
On February 3, four days after the outbreak
of the Tet offensive, President Johnson told
General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint
.Chiefs of Staff (ICs), to ask General West-
moreland "if there is any reinforcement or
help we can give you." In public, Johnson
said that the Tet offensive was a failure for
the Communists; but in private he prodded
the U.S. military for reassurance. Wheeler
cabled the President's question to Saigon,
adding a' note of special concern about -the
U.S. garrison besieged at Khesanh.
Since early 1966 Westmoreland's strategy
had been to divide military responsibilities
between American and South Vietnamese.
forces. 'U.S-. forces conducted most offensive
operations against the "bully boys" (the
'North Vietnamese and Vietcong main force,
units), thereby constituting a "shield" behind
which tl1A
Irate on providing area security and eradicat- accordance wit11 this estimate, lie. informed
ing the "temites" (ViCtcong guerrillas).
When the enemy simultaneously assaulted
most of the cities in South Vietnam at Tet,
We*tmorelancl was forced to redeploy his
troops in. order to compensate for the ARVN's
failure to provide adequate protection. As a
result, \Vcstmoreiancl's campaign plans for
1968 were severely disrupted.
Westmoreland reported to Washington that
the enemy had dealt the cvv a "severe blow"
by bringing the war to the towns aiid cities
and thus inflicting. costly damage and casu-
alties on the population. CIA reported that
the enemy intended to instigate a popular
uprising in South Vietnam, and that the
Vietcong were spreading th1C.Tumor that the
Americans supported ve efforts since the
Americans wanted to stop the war through
encouragement of a coalition government.
Back in Washington, news of the stunned
South Vietnamese government ? and the
enemy's costly assaults on the cities had
caused serious worry. If things continued to
get worse, a shaky South Vietnamese govern-
ment ,night fall. and be succeeded. by coali-
tionists, jeopardizing American goals in
Vietnam. President Johnson and his advisers
also had another fear: that the enemy might
concentrate on the takeover of a South
Vietnamese city, run up a North Vietnamese
flag, and proclaim to an attentive world the
first liberated zone and the true capital
.of South Vietnam. On February 8, in a mes-
sage to Westmoreland, Wheeler expressed
Washington's fear of a forced coalition gov-
ernment:
There is a theory, which could be logical,
that over-all enemy strategy is to attack and
attrite the ARVN and thereby destroying
them and ultimately gaining acceptance by
the people of the coalition government
which would request the withdrawal of
U.S. forces in South Vietnam.,
After five days of heavy fighting, West-
moreland had rooted out the enemy from
most of the cities it had occupied. At this
point, lie indulged in a guarded optimism--an
optimism that was to characterize all. of his
subsequent messages to , Washington. On'
February 41, in a message to Wheeler, West-
moreland stated that the "enemy has failed in
his objectives and has not been able to sustain
.his attacks. Thus, he has demonstrated the
lack of a basic capability to do so." Westmore-
land indicated that lie considered the greatest
tlirca? existed in I Corps--the northern
provinces-where lie accorded the enemy the
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