NIXON'S 7-POINT DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360091-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: July 14, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

T&A.For Release 20JM/A3 O ~?CIA-RDP80-01601 R
AN AGONIZING dilemma
has been created for Presi-
dent Nixon by the Commu-
nists' new seven-point peace
proposal which, when read
carefully by expert eyes, is
fully as hard and perhaps
just a bit harder than what
has preceded it from Nano!,
What makes North Viet-
nam's ploy so clever is that
the seven points seem
softer. That places Mr.
Nixon under growing pres-
sure from the Democratic
opposition, worried Republi-
can politicians, some admin-
istration officials; and the
American public generally
to accept the seven points.
But careful analysis shows
that even the grudging
White House response (re-
layed through press sccre--
tary Ron Ziegler) that the.
seven points contain `posi
Live, as well as clearly un-
acceptable, elements" is
overly charitable. Rather,
Hanoi's new peace plan con-
tains no assurance that
American prisoners of war
will be automatically re-
leased because of an im-
mediate U.S. troop pullout.
I:lanoi still appears to be de.
manding a new government
In Saigon as the ultimate
ransom price for the PONVs.
THUS, the dilemma for
the President: to negotiate
seriously on the seven
points undercuts the Saigon
regime's hope for survival;
Evans, ai- d ] oben; Novak
ini 5 -L _L o,
to reject the seven points
out of hand threatens Mr.
Nixon's paper-thin popular
support ill a war-weary na-
tion, Moreover, this dilemma
i.s tinged with a double
irony.
First, the intense political
pressure undercutting the
anti-Communist effort in
S o u t h Vietnam coincides
with continued military dif-
ficulties for Communist
forces. Suffering acute prob-
lems of morale and logis-
tics, Hanoi's legions could
not soon achieve a military
victory over South Vietnarll-
ese forces still supplied by
the U.S.
Second, the beguiling na-
tm'e of Hanoi's seven points
can be traced partly to the
White House. Against the
better judgment of some
State Department officials,
the President tied the
highly emotional POW ques-
ton to the Paris negotia-
tions. For months, experts
here have expected Hanoi to
exploit this by, in effect, ask-
ing a high ransom for the
prisoners. Now, the worst
expectations of the experts
have been realized,
Actually, the seven points
do not significantly enlarge
on Hanoi's past offers
merely to "discuss" POW
release if the U.S. sets a
troop withdrawal deadline.
Point No. 1, merely says that
If the U.S. sets a date "for
the withdrawal from South
Vietnam in 1.9'11 of the to-
tality of U.S. forces," then
"the parties will at the
same time agree" on a re-
lease of the prisoners. To
hardheaded analysts, this
wording does not guarantee
an automatic freeing of the
POWs.
More important is the
meaning of "totality of U.S.
forces." Hanoi is not talking
about merely U.S. soldiers
and airmen but also "weap-
ons and war materials of the
United States" and "all US.
bases in South Vietnam." In
other words, Mr. Nixon
would have to condemn to
death the huge, westernized
military machine of South
Vietnam which had been
built to Washington's speci-
fications.
TILE CRUCIAL POINT
No. 1 also begins with a de-
mand for the U.S. to "put an
end to its war of aggression
in Vietnam." Does that
mean no more sponsorship
of Saigon's military activity
and, therefore, require a
purge of President Nguyen
Van Thicu? Almost surely,
Hanoi will demand precise.
ly that before POWs are re-
Indeed, some experts out- the face of American public
side the government even
disagree with the Central opinion open to Hanoi s
Intelligence Agency's assess- V' blandishments and ninter-
ment that, at the least, the ested in past national con, 1
Communists no loner do- inltments.
g ?1971, Publishers-Hall SYndfcato
mand a coalition govern-
ment. In Saigon. The CIA
view is contradicted by a
South Vietnamese Commu-
nist spokesman who cie-
clared, just after the seven
points were unveiled, that
the coalition government re.
mains an essential goal.
Nor is any serious creel=
ence given to present prom-
ises by North Vietnamese of-
ficials that they merely
want "an independent neu-
tral South Vietnam." In fact,
no serious Ilanoioiogist
doubts the permanent goal
of a united Communist Viet-
nam in the immediate fu-
ture. N o r t h Vietnamese
-leader Plham Van Doug re-
cently expressed' hope that
the city of Hanoi "proves it-
self worthy of being the cap-
ital of the Socialist North at
present and of being the
capital of the entire country
in the future."
THE COMMUNISTS
count on American war-
wea-riness to overlook these am-
biguities and contradictions
and, instead, swallow the
seven points whole, So far,
they have been entirely cor-
rect. That establishes a pain-
ful test whether Mr. Nixon
can continue his courageous
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300360091-3