ONE THING IS LEARNED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360100-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 100
• Publication Date: July 10, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL ,r~:, ,~~ Y.,.,, ~,~,,.~,., ~_,-~~..-,n
ApprovedoFor Release 2001/03/0 :~~~1:A-~D:P80-01601 8000
STATINTL .
t.;.,y !~
C>1).c,' tllinlr is clearly ascca~tained
by a p:~rtJSal of the Pcrital;on
study, about the llublica.tion of
which so much contr.over~~.y has
arist.n.
'L'llat thing is the pt~rceptive ].ev.
el of: p~.rfvrlllance of t.hc. Cclltral.
Intelligence Agency as t.o In-
cloclli.na- ill the :i.SG~-forward 1)eri-
od in which Itlnerican illvolvcinent
in. Vi~~tnaJll vas nnl:,llroomin~.
Tht: CIA clearly "read" ve1?y
well t.lar inclicatiolis of t.~hai lilight
develop in Intlvchina as tht: Amer-
1Ca11 Con111]1tll1E111; tva5 CStLi"l~leti.
111 specifics, the CIA rejected
the domino theory --- that 9f
South Victnarn fell., there would.
also topple )'~aos, then. Cambodia,
then other Asian states, line a fall-
ing rote of d.vlninoes. The CIA
saw only lin)itcd da.11)age to Amer-
ican ilite_+.'ests fl?onl a Red vicl.orY
in South Vietnam. This still could
ha~re been a fault.;; cvllclusivn but
;t;lle intelligence on which it was
based was sound.
Again in specifics, the CIA e~-
pected ---- and rJghlly -little, inl?
pact on the tear potential of T~wrih
Vletnan.l tllrougll restricted bornb-
ing. It did not believe I~vrth Viet-
nam tvoulcl be inti.n)ate.d by tl)e
poSSiblt' loS5 Of 1tS 1n111U5Cn1C 111-
--. a
dnstl?ial conlplc~ --. ii: llatl tliE So-
viet UJJion. and lied Cliin~:. vlx
tti'111C11 to rely. las ol:~n production
tt'aS a tll'Op 111 tbe; bllCl~t'.1: 11)2a-
sured against the outpouring " of.
]llart.ial and indnstri.al. aici fronx
tho 13i~ Il.eds.
Alost. of tb_c~: strateg is conclusions
made by the CIA were rejeci:ed by
the policy makers and tlxe rejec-
tion tvas ratified lly action vl: tliEli
Pl?esicient .7olulson. 't'his incJ.udecl
the CTA ciissellt. to colllnlitauent. of
U.S. foJ?ccs tv of.f.ensive combat
operations tvithvllt, any ch~~.n~;e iJ).
the limited tempo of bonlbin~; op-
eratiolls being conducted. An
April, 1~C5, memo from the CIA:
director, Jolnl /i. )'`~icCone, put the
dissent illi~ v~Ta}~: In effect if the
planned ground opcrai.ioll goes iJ.i
motion vrc will find vurssle+vs
nlireci. do-svn iJx combat in the
jungle in a luilita.ry effort that we
cannot twin anti frvrn wJ.licil the
evil] have e~trerne difficulty es-
tricatina ourselves."
lIlndsJght being ?0-?0 in?
variably, ono could tvisll that. 1tiTr.
1',7c:Cvne might have been a little
]Wore persuasive vr~ith Ivlr. Johnson
~iud those to whom t_he then pr.esi?
dent flit-t listen.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000300360100-2
 ST~TINTL ~ N~'~`r ~~~'virLZC
Approved For Release 200/03 :f'~! A-RDP80-01601 R00
~~ ~ ~~~:t~~ ,~o I~JL~~~~~~~~~~.
The overall effect of the publication 'of the Pentagon
Papers is as yet somewhat unclear. There is no ques-
lion, ho~vever, but that their 'publication has damaged
the reputation of some officeholders -past .and
' present -_ancl that it has added to the' grarving distrust
on the part of the Congress and of the people of the
country in the official statements of policy dltCl pro-
. ~, gram by the executive branch of the government.,
The papers published have not revealed very much
`' that was altogether new or different. I~Tevertheless,
what they have shown is highly significant.
They have shown first that the executive branch,
acting and? speaking principally through the presi-
dency and the State Department and tiie Pentagon, has
been more devious and more deceptive than was sus-
. peeled. And it was suspected very greatly -especially
? by members of the Foreign Relations Comntittce of the
.Senate, which has been at least since 1965 asserting ,
without notch success the right of the Congress and of.
the country to accurate information as to our policies
in Vietnam and as to the realities of the >var.
The difference is quantitative rather than qualita-
live, relaEive rather than absolute, but it is a significant
difference. The papers show, for example, that the
misrepresentations ~ surrounding the preparation dItd
the presentation to the Congress in 1964 of the Ton-
'. kin Gulf Resolution were more carefully programmed '
and directed, more calculated even. than was revealed.
by the Senate inquiry on? that incident in 1968. It
seems quite clear now that there was a connection
between the United States destroyers patroling in the
Tonkin Gulf and action in South Vietnam, although
this connection was denied by Secretary McNamara in
an appearance before the Senate Committee. And also
''that the captains of the United States destroyers knew
that the South Vietnamese were COIldUCting naval
raids, ,although this wld by a veryhigh official" on
withheld it from the Secretary and Congress had responded~tho operations staff of the Joint
of Defensa until. F'ulbri~ltt with a resolution grin; tts ap-~Chieis that the study was re-
a'aised the question. Iproval to "all necessary steps".;girded as "sensitive" because
"The reason they were so'tiken by the President to repel tt rased tapes of ~4r. tiicNatna.ra's
jealous of it;' said Dr. Ellsberg,;"further aggression" in South- conversations throuUh the war
"was they did not want the'east Asia.. room to commanders, including
Secretary of llefense to know "I rememb?r the flan raised" tldmiral U. S. Grant Sharp,
they had certain data--tapeslby Senator Fulbright's request, Conv??snder of Pacific Forces.
of the Secretary's conversa- Dr. Elisber said. Dr. Ellsberg, ?who has said
floras with joint and subordi- The transcript of file bear- that he gave the Pentagon pa-
natc commanders overseas. ings on Feb. 20, 19ub, show that!pers "to the American people
[They) Didn't want it known~Senator Pulbri~ht said he had through the press," today add-
fihpir file of C.T.A. ,.??essagesasl.ed the pentagon for its ed that "there was at least one
~wic ao cu,7tpiece.'? "command and control docu- other source" of the documents
Ivlr, b4cNamara, now pros-Iments.'? to one newspaper. He named
ident of the World Tank, was In his response, Mr. Nictia- neither the source nor the
called for comment on Dr. Ells-Imara said that he had "never newspaper.
App~gved.ForRelease-2001/3/04: ~li4=RDP80-01601 R0003003Fi0100-2.
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-016018000300360100-2
SACi?it~h9:i~TO, CAS=
~~ Li1J
C .~
r ~.
tcllience ~1t;ency h>as told President
Dixon thwrt itre nett' Vic:(. Car1~; lret~ce
Iu?opusal is aimed at embarrass}ng the
Llzrited States "l~otlr at horr,e and oa-
crscas" and enc.ottr?a,