SAIGON'S TOP NEWSMEN GUESSED STORY YEARS AGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360123-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 123
• Publication Date: June 17, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

, BOSTON, MASS. IAD L
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:.Bylceyes Beech ?
Chicago Daily News
. ?
. _ .
C-:SAIGON ? The New
i.York Times report of a
1Pentagon history on how
Ithe United States got in
-
;volved in the Vietnam war
judged by scanty reports
'received here ? held few
surprises for the corre??
spondents who have cov-
ered this war from the
'start. . ? -
(. In general; the Pentagon
'account confirms what
some ofe us .knew, half
knew or suspected without
being able to document,
Some of us had and wrote
the story piecemeal but not
in context, While we could
-see what was happening
'here, we could. not know
what was happening . in
Washington. .
Obviously, President
Johnson's decision to esca-
late the war,. including the
-bombing of North Vietnam,
was no s p u f-t e-
imoment decision but re-
quired months of carefully
/calculated planning.
None of us knew that thefl
Johnson Administration
reached a "general consen-
us" on Sept. 7, 1964, that ,
jt might be necessary to
ponab North Vietnam.
But we had a clue to the.
poombing on Feb. 6, 1965,
?the day before it .began,
;when half a dozen of us.
*ere invited to e lunch at
-
Ithe home of Barry Zor- .
thian, 'then the US mission
?
spokes/nen for McGeorge
Bundy, then White House
:adviser for national securi-
?
'? It was an off-the-record
laffair. Bundy was paying
:us the compliment of ask-
ing us what might be done
.to win the waApprOVed:
; might; bomb North
-' ? ?
? ? Vice President Nguyen
Tril (P\ WC-A LIU at FirTi Cad Ky, who flew with the
key . Americans pn the first
yeEITO
!I
bombing - mission or 1965
ei and allegedly dropped his
(17ir'T
bombs on the wrong target,
D
was involved in the US-
backed "black" operations
in 1964. He flew a C-47
that dropped' intelligence
?
.These intelligence-
gathering missioes . were
singularly unsuccessful be-
cause of tight communist
.security. The intruders
were quickly rounded up.
It is interesting, but not
very surprising in the light
of subsequent events, that
a Canadian diplomat deliv-
ered a message from Wash-
ington to Hanoi shortly be
foreUS planes hit North
Vietnam- in August, 1964,
The American strike was in
retaliation for an alleged
North Vietnamese ?torpedo
boat attack on US destroy-
ers in the Tonkin Gulf. -
I was sitting in the Hotel.
Caravelle bar one evening
shortly after the attack
when a Well-known CIA ts7
man with too many d'in'ITs'"
under his belt came in and
announced in ? a -loud, clear -
voice:
"I want you to know the
Gulf of Tonkin attack .was
tisged.".
?
A couple of friends hu-
stled him out of there. He
has long since. been dis-
missed by the CIA. - - -
The Canadian diploinat,
Blair . Seaborn, delivered
another message to Hanoi
in 1965, something he was
able to de because he was
Canadian delegate to the
three-nation International
Control Commission, which
still, travels. between Sai-
gon and Hanoi.. -
A highly regarded pro-
fessional, Seaborn sat on a,
packing case in his Saigon ?
home shortly before he left
for Canada lat 1965
and discussed his trip to
Hanoi without revealing ?
that he was carrYing .a
"Precisely . -what - good -and sumnier came and it
would that do?" said was plain that the South
:Bundy in his most pedantic . Vietnamese were losing the
manner.
. war, the number' of Amen-
"Why don't you ask your can troops grew until even-
. brother?" I said, referring I'CialIy it reached more than
to William P. Bundy, thene/half a million.
assistant secretary of state Two years later, in Hon-
for the Far East and en- olulu, I asked Alex John-
- thusiastic hawk. "He's the son if he ever expected we
S one who keeps promoting would commit more than
the idea." 500,000 men to Vietnam.
New York .Times corre- "Good God, no," he ex-
.? spondent Seymour Topping claimed. ?
expressed the opinion that . As the troop buildup
if we did bomb the North, grew, the Johnson Admin-
Riissia might be forced to istration continued to deny
come into the war. that there was any change
in US policy 'in Vietnam
Bundy disagreed. "Oh;
when quite obviously there
? they'll. rattle their rockets,
was. This was the heart of
all . right," Bundy said.
Johnson's credibility gap.
"But they don't really do
Later in 1965, Gen. Wil- ?
anything." ? ham C. Westmoreland,
? "Well, it's academic any- - then US commander here,
e way, since we aren't going traced the decision to corn-
to bomb North Vietnam," mit oinbat troops beck to
another ' correspondent ,
said.
November, 1964-; This coin- ??
cides. with the Pentagon
U. Alexis Johnson, .then J account that Johnsen made
, deputy ambassador to Sai- his fateful decision Nov. 3,
go n and now the State': 1964, Election Day.
Department's senior career . Still later, in 1967 West- -
:officer, had remained silent moreland was to tell me
-during most of the conver- that he was initially op-
sation. But now he spoke posed to bombing the
? North. When I expressed'
"I wouldn't rule out surprise, he chuckled. and
bombing," he said with said, "Not for the reasons
some emphasis. Topping you might think. Mind you,.
and I later agreed it I didn't have any troops at ?
wouldn't be a bad idea to the-time and. I was wonder-
write a story speculating ing what I woufd do if the :
that we might bomb North whole North Vietnamese
-Vietnam after all.
The following morning
at 2 a.m., Viet Cong sap-
pers hit a US helicopter
unit at Pleiku and .befol.e
'the day was over the
bombing was on.
story at the time, but So far
. The following month, US as I knew, only South Viet-
Marines landed at Da - namese intelligence teams
Nang, the first American ett ? ?
army .came charging. down
south." ? ; . ?
The disclOsure that ? the.
United States was con-
ducting clandestine opera- .
tions in North Vietnam as
_early. as 1964 was no 'sur--,
prise. Some of uswrete the
Footoipintl?osictop JoCAYA-kiNisgoloi 661 R0003003164342345n.
Metnam," I suggested. -60,ret i tithe-4
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? ROANOKE, VA.
TIMES
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Hooray for the CIA
The Central Intelligence' Agency
comes out well in the documentation
of the Vietnam war provided by The
New York Times. Asked specifically
in June, 1964, whether all of South;
east Asia would go Communist if
Laos and South Vietnam.- were cap-
tured, the CIA reported:
? With the possible excep-
tion of Cambodia, it is likely
that no nation in the area
would quickly succumb to
communism as a result of the
fall of Laos and Sottth Viet-
nam. Furthermore, a contin-
uation of the spre.ad of com-
munism would not be inexor-
able, and any spread which'
did occur would take time--
time in which the total situa-
tion might chang e in any
number of ways unfavorable
to the Communist.cause. ?
That was an intelligent estimate
provided by what is assurned to be
our best intelligence agency in de-
fense affairs. It may no longer be
good: the devastation caused since
1964 might have had the effect of
self-fulfilling the domino theory.
With hindsight, the country can
greatly regret that its top leaders fol- -
lowed their hunch rather than the
CIA estimate. Not. too long ago the ,
United States was playing ping-pong
with the Communist Chinese, against
whom it did not want to play domi-
noes. The domino theory was long the
most popular basis offered for the
Vietnam involvement. It Was not then
a good basis and there is some en-
couragement it finding that the CIA:
recognized it as such.
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CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN -TIMES
? 1.4 536,108
S 309,123
dliti 4 7 1971
he secret war?H
? The revelations contained in the se-
cret Pentagon- papers not only go a
long way toward explaining how the
United States became So. deeply in-
volved in the Southeast Asia conflict,
they also shed- some clear, sharp ?
and tragic --- light on the why of that
involvement.
Throughout the installments pub-
lished by the New York Times before
the temporary injunction, there runs a
current of "great power" thinking
which was clearly outmoded before it
began. There was, for example, the
"domino theory," subscribed to by
most U.S. leaders and restated in a
March, 1964, memorandum from Sec.
of Defense Robert S. McNamara to
President Johnson. Should the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese win, said
McNamara, Southeast Asia from India
to New Zealand would be weakened.
This was not supported by the Cell-
-,
tral_In_tellasee Agency.
-'To a lesser extent, there was the
question of "containment of China,"
mainly expounded by Sec. of State
Dean' Rusk. But neither the "domino
theory" nor "containment of China"
nor relations with Russia seem to have
been the major considerations.
- Rather, there was the thought that
r the United States, which had emerged
- froth?W-OiTCVair- II as the world's
strongest power, could somehow work
: its will on North Vietnam merely ? by
applying military pressure or threat-
ening it. This is implicit in the note
given the Canadian Embassy in Wash-
ington on Aug. 8, 1964, to be trans-
mitted to Blair Seaborn, the Cana-
dian Member of the International Con-
trol Commission for Indochina.
It instructed Seaborn to tell Hanoi
leaders that "U.S. public and official
patience with North Vietnamese ag-
gression is growing very thin" and
that Hanoi "knows what it must do if
:the peace is to be restored."
The planners hi Washington were also
discovering that :increased American
might was having little effect on the
Viet Cong, as intelligence had also ?
warned. In November, 1964, Ambas-
sador Maxwell B. Taylor expressed sur-
prise that "the Viet Cong units have the
recuperatiVe powers of the phoenix."
Another part of this mystique cen-
tered around a concern with loss of
prestige in the eyes ,of the world ?
--what Mr. Nixon, in a latter-day ver-
sion; refers to as a view of America as
"a pitiful, helpless giant."
Among others, John T. MeNaugh ton,
assistant secretary of defense for in- :
ternational security affairs, made this
point in a 1964 memorandum to
McNamara assigning relative values
to American goals in Vietnam. He saw
70 per cent of the effort directed "to
avoid a humiliating defeat (to our rep-
utation as a guarantor)," 20 per cent to.
keep South Vietnam out of Chinese
hands and only 10 per cent "to permit '
the people of South Vietnam to enjoy
a freer, better way of life."
The leaders. in Washington, then, be-
lieved that it was only necessary for
them to threaten and punish a little
and America could retain its position
? and its reputation ? as the ac-
knowledged leader of the "free
world." What they reckoned without
was the stubborn, stiff-necked pride ;
and nationalism of the new Countries or
the Third World, particularly North
Vietnam and its allies, the Viet Cong:
Still thinking in terms of World War II
military might and forgetting the les- !:
sons of Korea, these national movers
and shakers in Washington, were
somehow unable to hold up their fin-
gers to the winds of change, even as:
their own intelligence estimates were
clearly indicating the direction of
those winds.
__ ? --
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Security vs. embarrassment
Never before in modern times has a
confrontation between the government
and the press _reached the classic pro-
portion of the present court case in
which the New York Times has been
enjoined temporarily from continuing
Lto publish an until-now secret Defense
:Department study of the Vietnam
War. The Justice Department says
continued publication will endanger
, the interests of the nation. The Times
says the documents, covering the peri-
od .before 1908, are now history and
cannot conceivably damage American
, security interests, muck less the lives.
of Americans or Indochinese.
In the great anti-censorship decision
'Near vs. Minnesota in 1931, Chief Jus-
tice Hughes held that suppression is
the "essence of censorship" and prior
*restraint could be applied only In "ex-
ceptional cases." One, which may ap-
ply here, was Where the success of the
nation's armed forces was at. Stake In
:time of war;. we do not believe, how.
ever, that it does. Another was the
protection of private rights, but what
is involved here are the scandalous :ac-
tions _of public officials. As for the pos-
sibility that circulation of "scandal"
might tend to disturb the public peace,
said Hughes, "the theory of the con-
stitutional guarantee is that even a
more serious 'public evil would be
caused by authority to prevent publi-
cation."
The court case, it seems to us,
comes -clown to a determination wheth-
er the national security would be truly.
endangered by printing the rest of the
document. The government must de
more than merely make the assertion
that this is the case. The press cannot .
be muzzled by executive fiat,
Certainly the documents ctil embar.
rassing, at home as well as abroad.
But _ this is a political consequence.
The nation is entitled to .the truth.
about its own affairs, which it is a re-
- sponsibility of the press to give them.
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H 5348 Approved For Relffaise20(11M3104 netkeIDP-44600
have twice visited South Vietnam, On
my first visit, I. saw the finest, best
trained, best equipped young soldiers the
world has ever seen. I saw hospitals and
supposedly pacified areas. In 1966, I was
a member of the Speaker's Committee
of Combat Veterans of World War II sent
to evaluate the war effort. By that, time,
the so--called pacified areas I had previ-
ously visited had been retaken?ours for
only as long as snow drops on the river?
a moment white, then gone forever.
Asa, result of this tragic war, our coun-
try is torn by dissention?troubled by
traitorous rabblerousers and rioters who
blatantly- curse the beloved land which
has nurtured and cared for them. .And
yet- they are permitted to spout hate,
incite arson, promote looting with
impunity.?
Yes, Mr. Speaker, ours is a troubled
land. The war in Vietnam is causing
great worry and anxiety. Among the p eo-
? pie of my district and our whole coun-
try, sentiment is Increasingly against the
war. We all look for the day when every
American soldier will be removed from
this unhappy land,
- Let us now, while we are yet strong,
bring our men home. If we must fight,
let us fight in defense of our homeland
and our own hemisphere. Our sons' lives
are too precious to lose on foreign soil.
If they must die, let it be in defense of
? America. As a combat medic with an in-
fantry division in the South Pacific, I
have been intimate with the horrors of
? war and feel that the lives of our men
should only be risked in case our coun-
try is attacked. In that event, we know
? they would resist assault with all their
stamina, and strength.
. I compliment the present administra-
? Um's efforts to wind down the war. In
order to emphasize the desire of our
people to end tile war, I support, the
amendment of the distinguished gentle-
. _man from New York (Mr. Ronisox).
Mr. O'NEILL. ? Mr. Chairman, I rise
In support of the Nedzi-Whalen amend-
ment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
?'? Massachusetts is recognized.
- Mr. O'NEILL, Mr. Chairman, I feel -
- obliged to speak in behalf of this amend-
ment, just as I feel a moral obligation to
? oppose the continuation of this cruel and
senseless war.
Mr. Chairman, some time ago I, with
'three other Members of Congress, Hum
CAREY, of New York-, DAN ROSTENKOWSKI,
of Illinois, and JAMES CORMAN, -of Cali-
fornia, circulated to the Members a
statement of ptirpose on Vietnam.
Over 120 Members of Congress have
signed it and an additional num-
ber have signed a similar state-
ment. Out of that, I beileVe, has come the
- Nedzi-Whalen amendment. It is an ex-
pression of concern and responsibility. It
is our contention that the Congress has a
responsibility for ending this war, since
the President is not, and that the Con-
gress should set a deadline for -ending
this war, no later than the end of this
year.
I recall that it was about November
1965 that I first heard the term used:
"The light can be seen at the ?end of the
tunnel." That was the day Mr. McNa.-
mare said to us:
Approved For Rele
We will bomb North Vietnam. We will have
them on their knees within 6 weeks, and
? the war. will be over.
Well, people have been seeing the light
at the end of the tunnel for over 6 years,
and the war is not over.
I listened with interest today to the let-
ter of Mel Laird, a man with whom I
served for many years here in the Con-
gress. His words are not a bit ? different
from the words of Rusk and of 'McNa-
mara; his predictions are the .same, his
expectations are the same.
I remember that back in 1965 I was a
hawk, as some of you still are?perhaps
a majority of the House. But I spoke to
admirals, I spoke to generals, and I spoke
to people in high security places. I spoke
to members of the State Department and,
those in the highest echelons. of Gov-
ernment.
- These people were advocating the
policy of the administration, the John-
son administration, and advocating the-
policy of the State Department. But
within the confines of private' and
friendly conversations they told me they
were opposed to the war, and that our
policies were wrong and could not sue-.
cced. While they were publicly advocat-
ing and following the, policy of the Presi-
dent, they told me in their private
conversations that they were opposed to
the war and knew that it could never be
won this way, nor could we extricate
ourselves this way. These were people
from the CIA, generals and admirals, anc
you know, I believed them. They con-
vinced. me that I could not justify this
war in moral, political, or security terms.
They convinced Inc that I could not
justify being a hawk on a war that
could not be v,,on, and should have been reality it is a civil war, and, unfortu-
ended. ? . nately, we are fighting for the elite in
Mr. Chairman, I was one of the first, I Saigon, the rich who do not have the
believe, early in 1967, that changed my interests of the Vietnamese people at
opinion on tile war, and it was for those heart, nor do they have the support of
reasons. Our policies?then and now? the people we are supposedly fighting to
could not will the war and would not save.
end it. ? We are drafting 18-year-old boys to
You know, during my 20 years here, fight for people that do not draft their
many important events have happened, own sons until they are 21. And the
I - remember June 1961, when K'hru- legislature of South Vietnam on many,
,.shchev said to John P. Kennedy, the many occasions refused to change that
President of the United States: age. ?
Oct your troops out or Berlin or we win ? ' American boys must serve their Nation
Invade.
- in uniform or go to jail, but the rich
Kennedy went over and made the
South Vietnamese boy can buy his way
font of the Army. . .
groat Berlin speech, called up. our re- We have spent $150 billion on this war
serves, and Khrushchev backed down, while the leaders of South Vietnam
fill
knowing that otherwise it would have their Swiss bank accounts with American
/ 1971
He knew America was serious and he
knew it womid mean World War HI,
Wily do I raise this point?
? Well, Mr. Chairman, we are fighting
war which we have made no attempt to
win. Why? The only way we could win
would have been to have bombed Hanoi
and the rice paddies, bombed Haiphong,
and invaded North Vietnam with infan-
try. Why have we not done that? We
have not done it because we know that
China and Russia would come to the aid
of North Vietnam, and that it would
mean World War III. Just as Kennedy
defended our place as, a major power, so
would Kosygin and Mao defend, their
positions.
So, what are we there for? We are
there for the same reasons vie have been
there for years. Because we refuse to
admit past errors and mistakes. I have
seen the pacification program fail, and
we have talked about the Vietnamization
program. We give new names to old pol-
icies amid continue a hopeless war.
Mr. Chairman, I believe we ought to
be out of there lock, stock, and barrer
tomorrow. We cannot justify our being --
in there. The President is fighting a war
ho does not want to win. Yet, lie does
not want to lose. We are not providing
.self-determina?tion for the people, we are
only providing destruction.
When -I spoke with the knowledgeable
people in our security and intelligence
'branches of Government about the war,
they convinced me that this war was
wrong. That was in 1966, yet the same
policies continue.
What makes this war such' a tragic
mistake, is that we have viewed it as
a war between two states, whereas in
set off World War III. . ?money,
That happened again, Mr, Chairman, Our Nation suffers for housing, schools,
with Cuba, in October 1962. We all re- and hospitals, while tile rich elite in
ceived notice to report. You remember South Vietnam accumulate wealth. .
the messages, the phone calls, and tele- Our Nation has given so much to South
grams that you got. We, from all oi' New Vietnam that has never reached the
England,- went to Logan Airport; other people there and will never reach the
Members met at the GSA Building in the people there. We need much here?mas- ?
battery section of New York, and other sive increases in funds for education, for
Members from other -sections of the health care, public housing, welfare,
country went, directly to Chicago or to research, and environmental quality.
Los Angeles. We met with trepidation, J3ut instead we waste our people and our
both Democrat and Republican, We did substance in a useless war. ? -
not know whether we were going to hear Our priorities have been turned on end
a declaration of war. We were there and while we fund and fund this war. And
we were told about the missiles and the corruption in that commtry makes -
shown pictures of the missiles and' told it more and more tragic that a single
about the blockade. But, thankfully, American boy has given his life for this
Krushchev backed down. ? conflict. The Government of South Viet-
Mr. Chairman, why did he back down? nam is corrupt to its core. It doe,s not -
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FIJ
. 13Iames Johnson and Nixon
fat' Ae,tions----Ex'-Sonator
Avers He is Vindicated
By ritED TRAVIS
ch,tumoor,A. Times Bureau
? NASHVILLE ? Former U.S.
Sen. Albert Gore said publica-
tion by.' The New York Times
of secret documents involved in
:escalating the Vietnam war,
."illustrates ?the deception prac-
ticed by the Johnson adminis-
tration and continued by Presi-
dent Nixon."
The former Senate dove, de-
feated for re election last No-
vember by Bill 1.3rock of Chat-
tanooga, }1 Republican, said
outecame of the election might
.'have been different if the Times
:articles had been published a
year ago.
Ife claimed they completely
vindicate his position on the
--war and-validate what "1 have
:been telling the people of Ten-
nessee for a long, long time."
? Gore made these statements
at a press conference here
? Wednesday as he announced .his
association as a partner. in law
firms here and in Washington.
He described this dual ar7.
-rangement as quite common for
.former congressmen who take
up the'pi-actice of law.
. He will be a partner in a
;Washington law firm headed by
-former Massachusetts G o v .
Endicott Peabody and he will
:be the senior partner in a firm,
here whin includes George
'Barrett, Jack Mitchell and!
Lionel Barrett. The Washington
firm specializes in international
finance while the one here is
engaged in the general practice
or law.
Gore said the division of his
time between Nashville and
Washington will depend on the
needs of his clients but that
initially he will spend about half
of hi time in each city. Mrs.
Gore, who is also a lawyer,
will be an 'associate counsel in
both firms.
Resumption of a full law
practice, the former Democrat
senator said, will of necessity.
limit his lectures on college.
campuses and his political ac-
tivities but he added:
"I. hope to help elect a presi-
dent who will not violate the
confidence of the American
people."
Favors Musick.
lie listed Sen. E5.3,tro.tad-4tig.-
,..:\laine as his favorite ?
fcir- the presidential nomination.
but also spoke favorably of
Sens. Harold' Hughes of Iowa
and Henry M. Jackson of
Washington.
Earlier, in response to
que.Stion, Gore declared that the!
Times articles, based on secretl
documents of the Defense De-
partment, confirmed his own
findings during a 1966 investi-
gation into the background of
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. .
This resolution, approved by
Congress at President Johnson's
urging following an alleged at-
tack on a. U.S. destroyer in
Vietnam, was used as the legal'
basis for sending large numbers
of American troops into Indo-
china. The Times' series, pub-
lication of which has been
halted temporarily by a federal
court order, "Illustrates two
things," Gore said.
He listed these as "first, a
I great national' misfortune in
!deception at the highest level
iof government; and secondly it
represents the extreme to which
pacification has been taken.
"Of course, we Nt.'&'0 trapped
into the Vietnam war," he con-
tinued. "I have known that for
a long, long time. This validates
what I have said to the people
of Tennessee for a long while.
'My investigation into the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1.966
showed there was no substantial
evidence that there was any
attack upon- one of our ships:
in the Tonkin Gulf in August:
'The ?whole .
the product of a deception by
President Johnson, the. Army, .
the Navy, the Air Force, the,:'
Defense Department, the ,f`1, t./
-- the whole executive
of the U.S. Government. Presi-
dent Nixon has continued this
deception.
."When you have had 55,000
men killed, hundreds of thou-
sands disabled- and hundreds of
thousands of others made into
dope addicts, this is a terrible
price to pay for the politics.
of two presidents."
Gore asserted that the Times'.
series showed that the people
"had reason for loss of confi-.
dence in their government."
He accused the Nixon admin-
istration of practicing the sanni
kind of deception in expanding
_the way into Laos.
le nom war
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In "-trying to assess the. McNamara Reporthastily
suffering a bad case of intellectual
; exCess---one is impressed not the least by the general-
ly.. high quality of the'advide given by the intelligence
cOrnmunity. -
. , The voluminous report?just the part that has
been published in newspapors.Hprovides a . casein-
-ating, and 'sometimes shocking, insight into the
process by which the United States became enmeshed
in the jungle of an. unwin'pable Indochina war. But
of - all the branches of the government that had a
share. in the decisions on Vietnam,. the intelligence
:agencies, particularly the CIA, come out looking tho
, best.
The intelligence people: warned?and accurately ,
'.---.-that neither the South Vietnamese government nor :
,
' the American forces could overcome the appeal of :.
the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese people. ?
They warned?iind aecurately?of the ineffectiveness
of aerial bombing. They suggested the inconclusive- .
ness of introducing large numbers.. of American .
- ground troops into the fighting in South Vietnam. ,
After more bomb tonnage. had been dropped on. North
Vietnam than had been dropped in World War II :
and after half a million .American troops had been '
'deployed in South Vietnam, the enemy remained un- ;
defeated and victory remained as elusiVe as it had
.been for 15 years.
dPo be sure, the CIA cannot claim 100 per cent :
? ? commenclation. In mid-1965- John A. McCone, head ?
. of the CIA, warned that the use of U.S. combat
troops wOuld be, ineffective unless the .aerial bomb- '?
frifil
.ing campaign, already .under way, was subject t......
- .."Ininimuzn festrairit." That sounds suspiciously lil.cb
: the. later exhortation of Gen, 'Curtis Lei/fay to bomb
the North Viei....natirese ."bacl: to the stone age."
in general the estimates of the CIA and
other -intelligence agencies seem to have gauged
accurately the mood of the Vietnamese people, the
utaying power of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam-
ese, and the limitations Of Arrierican military might
when separated from the democratic ideals that had
in ,the past motivated American intervention abroad.
:-Jf:AMerican powei-,and.ideals became separated,,
v.,. a lag,"iart of the reason was the failure of the
highest "officials in our government to inform the
People or even Congress fully about both the condi-
tions that existed in \:Tictnarri and the real purposes
for expandi1g. the war. The 1,1:clqamara Report is -
not a complete record of the entanglement process,
but it is record enough to show the folly of presi-
dential decisions that ignored the best intellence
and the arrogance of presidential war-making with.
out the full participation of Congress.
_ .. Many Americans?probably a majority?failed to
1
-
get aroused about Vietnam when the johnson ad-
ministration was.making the fateful coimnitment of
American combat troops because; like the officials
, at the top, they believed the tiny enemy could not
t3tand for long against the overwhelming might of
American troops and planes. The argument has fre-
quently been used that these officials had little more
information than the general public for the crucial
decisions. :But the McNamara Report indicates that
they did have considerably more----and quite specific
--information, much of it. negative in its implica-'
tions, Those who trusted the highest officials to
haew what they were doing were sadly mistaken.
A. ful1-dr655 congressional debate might have avoided,
the pitfall into which the country stumbled, particu-
larly if the intelligence estimates had been more,
Widely available.
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