PENTAGON PAPERS: AN UGLY PICTURE OF MEN, MOTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360124-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 124
• Publication Date: June 16, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

._-- STATINTL
ORON, OH7b~roved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
~3EACON JOU AM .
- 175,468
8 ?r :203,112
JUN- 161971
STATINTL
Ll`l, Q ` ML
.. Uiy
Motives
By ROBERT I10Y'T times have the facts come to
Beacon Journal staff writer 11 g Il t so quickly after the
Publication of the Pentagon events --- making the excrui-
Papers by the New Y o r k e ciating judgment o f history
Times - the "nuclear bomb even more painful because it
rocking Washington" - de?? comes within the lifetimes
stroys the credibility of more and the careers of the men
public figures in one stroke involved.
than probably any "inside re-
port" in history. TILE DISCLOSURES of the
? - These men stand naked --
from. President Kennedy and
President Johnson to highly
regarded academics and ca-
reer statesmen like the Bundy
brothers to cabinet secretaries
Rusk and McNamara to mili-
tary Yuen like generals West-
moreland and Taylor (also an
ambassador) and the admi-
rals.
T h e Kennedy administra-
tion, though ultimately spared
from major escalation deci-
sions by the. death of Presi-
'deiit Kennedy, transformed
;t It e policy of "limited-risk
gamble" which 1 t inherited
into a "broad commitment"
that left LBJ with a choice be-
tween' more war and with.-
'drawal.
Further, most of the princi-
pals . In the key decisions of
the .Johnson administration
Were men he kept on after,
Kennedy's death.
WRAT A R i now labeled
f'the Pentagon Papers" will in
some circles be called "Mc-
Namara's Folly" -- for it was
he who ordered the study, ap-
parently deep in the personal
depression growing out of his
involvement in the whole Viet-
nam affair..
Surely' no President w 111
h
ll
e prepara-
ow t
ever again a
tion of such a report by a de- to Congress, to the world - if THE 47-VOLUMES of the a 11 something" afflicted fever that entu-
partment of gQ t i seems il~~t~e~r ,pyy everyone but
We ~U3itture o {a~' le princ~ Pp a s`D1t~Q'0~?2Qmc~60124-6 y
access to secs"et me soirrf? pi c
Probably never in modern
NI cNarnara?ordered s t u d y
show that:
U.S. OFFICIALS' w e r e
much more interested in the
American image than about
the plight of the South Viet-
namese.
POLICY was based to an
alarming degree on the so-
called domino theory - that if
South Vietnam and Laos fell
to Communism, so would all
Asia - despite a CIA analysis
that indicated the ttii ry was
nonsense and that only Cam-
bodia if any other country
would be affected.
"111E PENTAGON Papers"
cement many impressions: ROBERT MCNAMARA -i
interested only in how to do it!
IT WAS "Alice in Wonder better --? no mailer what "it"
land" in Saigon - as the Pen- vas: bombing, maneuvering,
tagon analyst described it. -- reporting, u s e of materials{
In the period when LBJ decid-
ed that he had to give all-out
'support to the feeble South
Vietnam government, no mat-
ter what the consequences of
such action were to be.
- L IF E WITH LBJ in the
W h i t e House during those
days were like living with a
collection of speed freaks. Ac-
tion begat action begat action
each heating up the war
and each moving to a new lev-
el of clanger. And - always -
the attempt to move, without
letting the public or Congress
know what was going on. -
Adding to the hectic nature
of the play was the constant
changing of the principals by
Johnson as he named ii e w
generals, new ambassadors,
new advisers.
A . News
Analysis
and men. No strong opinions
about what "should" be done;.
judging by the documents in,
the study.
DEAN RUSK -a man still
living in the "contain China"
days, the- last remnant of the
philosophy of former Secre-
t a r y pf State John Foster;
Dulles.
THE BUNI)Y BROTHERS;
- they suggested almost ev
ery possible course of action
THE SANEST man in the
whole ugly drama appears to
have been Undersc-crellary of
State George Ball who said:
In the beginning: "Don't do
it."
Later: "If you do, you'll be
sorry." ?
- at one time or another. Wil- V/
Liam Bundy, the one at the.
State Department, had talent
for finding "middle ground"
between the extremes of "do
nothing" and "all-out war".
As events unfolded, the al-
ternatives got closer and clos-
Still later: "S t o p. Never or together - but he seemed
mind your losses - get out!" - always to be able to find a
. new, _ "middle ground." His
THE "NEXT SANESST" was view often prevailed --- mak-
C_I A Director John McCon, ing U. S. policy therefore ap-
range ge of of advice on get a such critigood-:wh -?o -predicted that bombin g pear to be an endless series of
?
c a 1 issues as Vietnam and' the North would make them "half steps" toward all-out
that leaves them relatively more determined, not force war. -
t } to do whatever the ton t
t ? tl
ose m
z
n
o s
f
?
i
eg
e,
ree o c lo
pre. McGEORGE BUNDY, prob-
t h e I r instincts would have dicted that a U. S. ground war ably LBJ's closest adviser on
them do. would o it 1'y repeat Korea's
mistake. theme war and considered the
ONCE TIIE PRESIDENT The CIA comes principal architect of Vietnam
has decided on a course of ac- generally policy, was more concmage
off with good marks - its as- with protecting LBJ's image
tion, all levels of government sessments o f both military than the quality of advice he
- career people included - and political situations seems gave the President.
ef-
bend ever
d
t
y
y
o
seem rea
to have been excellent.
fort to support and justify the qt's noteworthy because so He" toned down the "bomb
decision. now' panic reports of others,
many peace advocates have but when he went to Saigon to
PRESIDENTS and their ad- blamed the CIA for many of investigate personally f o r
visers are willing to lie end- the problems the U. S. has LBJ, McGeorge Bundy was
faced
. seized by the "we must do
lessly to the American public, in recent years.
 `'?"1U TON, MASS. S INTL
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